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CONGRESS ^flLflp* 

: i *v 

August 30, 1976. — Ordered to be printed 


Printed for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical 
and Space Sciences 









August 30, 1976. — Ordered to be printed 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical 

and Space Sciences 

67-371 WASHINGTON : 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.55 

FRANK E. MOSS, Utah, Chairman 

Gilbert W. Keyes, Staff Director 
James T. Bruce, Professional Staff Member 
James J. Gehrig, Professional Staff Member 
Craig M. Peterson, Chief Clerk/Counsel 
Joseph L. Platt, Assistant Chief Clerk 
William A. Shumann, Professional Staff Member 

Craig Voorhees, Professional Staff Member 
Dr. Glen P. Wilson, Professional Staff Member 

Charles F. Lombard, Minority Counsel 
Earl D. Eisenhower, Professional Staff Member, Minority 

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That there be printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Aero- 
nautical and Space Sciences one thousand five hundred additional 
copies each of volumes 1 and 2 of its committee print entitled "Soviet 
Space Programs, 1971-1975'', Ninety-fourth Congress, second session, 
prepared by the Congressional Research Service with the cooperation 
of the Law Library, Library of Congress. 

JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi 
WENDELL H. FORD, Kentucky 


S. Con. Res. 113 

Agreed to August 30, 1976. 

Attest : 

Frances E. Valeo, 




The Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, 
Washington, B.C., January 29, 1976. 

Hon. Frank E. Moss, 

Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 
U.S. Senate, Washington. B.C. 

Dear Senator Moss : Pursuant to your letter of request, the Con- 
gressional Research Service with the cooperation of the Law Library 
has undertaken a study of the Soviet space program for the years 
1971-75. The study has been divided into two volumes, of which this 
is the first. 

The purpose of the study is to bring up to date previous reports pre- 
pared bv the Library of Congress for your committee, published in 
1962, 1966, and 1971. 

The first volume has been completed and is herewith submitted. 

This volume has sought to review Soviet space resources, facilities 
and hardware, past and on-going programs of flights, research and 
applications, and projections of future plans. 

It should be emphasized that the report is based exclusively upon 
unclassified, open sources, both Soviet announcements and independ- 
ent checks on such data derived from U.S. observational equipment 
whose findings are published in this country, and from corresponding 
British data. A comparison of information in this report with that in 
classified sources has not been made. 

Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II, Chief of the Science Policy Research 
Division and Senior Specialist in Space and Transportation Tech- 
nology, Congressional Research Service, has been coordinator of the 
project. Also, he has been responsible for writing the summary, Chap- 
ters 1, 2, 6 and 7, plus preparing the appendices. 

Ms. Marcia S. Smith. Analyst in Science and Technology. Congres- 
sional Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chapter 3. 

Mr. Christopher H. Dodge, Analyst in Life Sciences, Congressional 
Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chapter 4. 

Ms. Lani Hummel Raleigh. Analyst in Physical Sciences, Con- 
gressional Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chap- 
ter 5. 

Ms. Vikki A. Zegel, Analyst in Life Sciences, Congressional Re- 
search Service, has been responsible for writing the Chapter 3 Annex. 
( Mr. J. Glen Moore, Analyst in Science and Technology, Congres- 
sional Research Service, has been responsible for writing the Chapter 
7 Annex. 

Mr. Geoffrey E. Perry, leader of the Kettering Group based in the 
United Kingdom, has been responsible for writing the Chapter 5 
Annex and the two Chapter 6 Annexes. 



The study has been reviewed by appropriate individuals in more 
than one institution of Government in the interest of accuracy and 
security, although the final responsibility rests with the authors and 
the Congressional Research Service. Thanks are also extended to the 
following additional consultants and reviewers of the entire volume: 
Mr. Geoffrey E. Perry, Mr. David R. Woods, Mr. Charles P. Vick, 
and Mr. Maarten Houtman. 
Sincerely yours, 

Norman Beckman, 

Acting Director. 



United States Senate, 
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 

Washington, D.C., June 11, 1976. 

Hon. Frank E. Moss, 

Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: Transmitted herewith is a report, Soviet 
Space Programs, 1971-1975, in two volumes. The report was prepared 
for the use of the Committee by the Congressional Research Service, 
with the cooperation of the Law Library, Library of Congress. This 
report is a follow-on to similar reports published at intervals since 
1962. It is, as are its predecessors, a comprehensive and detailed study 
of the Soviet space program. 

Volume I provides an overview of the Soviet space program, its 
facilities and hardware, the manned and unmanned Soviet space mis- 
sions, Soviet bioastronautics, Soviet civilian and military applications, 
and projects future Soviet space plans. Volume II examines the goals 
and purposes of the Soviet space program, the organization of space 
activities in the Soviet Union, allocation of resources to Soviet space 
activities and Soviet attitudes towards international space cooperation 
and space law. 

The report was prepared under the direction of Dr. Charles S. 
Sheldon, II of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Con- 
gress. Dr. Sheldon, one of the free world's foremost authorities on 
Soviet space activities, is also the major contributor to the study. 
Other parts of the study were prepared by other experts in the Library 
of Congress, and Geoffrey E. Perry, consultant from the L^nited 

Mr. Fred Doering of the Government Printing Office prepared the 
report for printing. 

In every respect this report is a remarkable accomplishment. It 
represents scholarship at the highest level but was done at minimum 

I believe that this study of Soviet space programs has resulted in an 
important report and will be most useful to the Committee and to 
other members of the Congress. 

Gilbert TV Keyes, 

Staff Director. 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 


in 2013 



I. Overview, supporting facilities and launch vehicles of the Soviet Tags 

space program 1 

A. Overall trend 1 

1. Gross statistics 1 

2. Breakdown by categories 1 

3. Comparative weights of payload 1 

B. Launch sites in the Soviet Union 1 

1. Tyuratam 1 

2. Plesetsk 2 

3. Kapustin Yar 2 

C. Soviet launch vehicles 2 

1. The standard launch vehicle series ("A") 2 

2. The small utility launch vehicle ("B") 2 

3. The flexible intermediate vehicle ("C") 2 

4. The non-military large launch vehicle ("D") 2 

5. The military combat space launch vehicle ("F") 2 

6. The very heavy launch vehicle ("G") 3 

D. Tracking and other ground support _ 3 

1. Communications needs 3 

2. Earth orbital tracking in the U.S.S.R 3 

3. Foreign tracking stations 3 

4. Sea-based support 3 

5. Deep space tracking 3 

6. Space operations and data processing centers 3 

7. Space research centers 3 

8. Manufacturing and assembly centers for spacecraft 

and rockets 3 

9. Test and training centers for space 4 

II. Program details of unmanned flights 4 

A. Early years 4 

B. The Kosmos program 4 

1. Kosmos scientific flights 4 

2. Kosmos precursor flights 4 

3. Flight mission failures disguised as Kosmos 5 

C. Other recent scientific flights 5 

1. The Prognoz program 5 

2. French payloads carried by Soviet launch vehicles 5 

3. Indian and Swedish payloads carried by Soviet launch 

vehicles 5 

4. Soviet vertical rocket probes 5 

D. The second generation of planetary flights 5 

1. The Mars attempts of 1971 and 1973 5 

2. The Venus attempts of 1975 6 

E. The third generation of lunar flights- 6 

1. Luna 16, 18, 20, and 23 6 

2. Luna 17 and 21. _ _ 6 

3. Luna 19 and 22 6 




III. Program details of man-related flights 6 

A. Early years 6 

B. The Soyuz program 7 

1. Soyuz ferry flights to Salvut space stations 7 

2. The Apollo-Soy uz Test Project 8 

C. The Zond program of manned circumlunar precursors 8 

D. The Soviet manned lunar landing program 8 

E. Unmanned biological flights 9 

IV. The Soviet space life sciences 9 

A. Cosmonaut selection and training 9 

B. Space medicine 9 

C. Life support systems and technology 9 

D. Gravitational biology and medicine 9 

E. Space radiation 10 

F. Gas atmospheres and pressures 10 

G. Space biology and exobiology 10 

H. Conclusion 10 

V. Soviet application of space to the economy 10 

A. Communications satellites 10 

1. Molniya satellites 10 

2. Statsionar satellites 11 

3. International cooperation 11 

4. Direct broadcast 11 

B. Meteorological satellites 11 

h Meteor satellites 11 

2. Experimental weather satellites 11 

C. Other civil applications 11 

VI. Soviet military space activities 12 

A. Introduction 12 

B. Extension of civil type space activities to military needs 12 

C. Navigation 12 

D. Space related control systems 12 

E. Electronic ferreting or elint space missions 12 

F. Minor missions in space for the military 13 

G. Early warning satellites 13 

H. Military manned space missions 13 

I. Recoverable military observation flights 13 

J. Ocean surveillance 13 

K. Fractional orbit bombardment system satellites 13 

L. Military interceptor/inspector/destructor satellites 13 

M. Ground based space detection and defense systems 13 

N. Orbital bombs stationed in orbit 14 

O. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component- 14 

1. Minor military missions 14 

2. Electronic ferret or elint missions - 14 

3. Navigation and navigation/geodetic missions 14 

4. Obscure missions operating in the store/dump mode _ 14 

5. Targets for interception and the interceptors them- 

selves 14 

6. Fractional orbit bombardment satellites 14 

7. Military ocean radar surveillance 14 

8. Early warning satellites 14 

9. Military observation photographic missions 14 

VII. Projections of Soviet space plans 15 

A. General technical capabilities 15 

B. Unmanned space flights 15 

C. Manned space flight 16 

D. Soviet philosophy toward their space program 16 


I. Overall trends in flights 17 

A. Gross statistics 18 

Table 1-1 — Worldwide record of known space launchings. 20 

B. Breakdown by categories 22 

Table 1-2 — Summary of Soviet space payloads by mission 

category (with U.S. comparisons) 23 


I. Overall trends in flights — Continued 

B. Breakdown by categories — Continued Pa * e 

Table 1-3 — Detailed summary of Soviet space payloads 
by launch site, launch inclination, name or category, 

launch vehicle and year 25 

Table 1-4 — Summary of Soviet space payloads by name. 29 

C. Comparative weight of payload 30 

Table 1-5 — World table of payload weight to orbit or 

beyond 32 

IT. Launch sites in the Soviet Union 33 

A. Tyuratam 33 

B. Plesetsk 35 

C. Kapustin Yar 36 

Table 1-6 — Number of successful orbital and escape 

launches by site and by year 38 

III. Soviet launch vehicles 39 

Table 1-7 — Number of successful launches to Earth orbit and 

beyond by basic first stage by year 40 

Table 1-8 — Soviet launch vehicle characteristics 43 

Table 1-9 — Soviet launch vehicle lifting capabilities 46 

Table 1-10 — Soviet launch vehicle upper stages and capacities.. 47 

A. The standard launch vehicle series ("A") 48 

1. The original version — A 48 

2. Launch vehicle with lunar upper stage, A-l 49 

3. Launch vehicle with improved planetary upper stage, 

A-2 50 

4. The added stage version for eccentric orbits and 

escape missions, A-2-e 51 

5. The standard vehicle with maneuvering stage, A-m. 52 

6. The standard vehicle possibly in an A-l-m configura- 

tion 52 

7. The standard vehicle possibly in an A-2-m configura- 

tion 52 

B. The small utility launch vehicle ("B") 53 

C. The flexible intermediate launch vehicle ("C") 54 

D. The non-military large launch vehicle ("D") 55 

1. The basic vehicle without extra stages, D 55 

2. The improved vehicle with an added stage, D-l 56 

3. The improved vehicle with regular upper stage plus 

an escape stage, D-l-e 57 

4. The possible use of a D-l-m version 58 

E. The military combat space launch vehicle ("F") 58 

1. Use as a weapons carrier, F-l-r 60 

2. Use as a maneuvering vehicle, F-l-m 61 

F. The very heavy launch vehicle ("G") 61 

Table 1-11 — Soviet surface-to-surface land-based stra- 
tegic missiles 65 

IV. Tracking and other ground support 66 

A. Communications needs 66 

B. Earth orbital tracking in the U.S.S.R 66 

C. Foreign tracking stations 67 

D. Sea-based support 67 

1. Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov 68 

2. Akademik Sergey Korolev 69 

3. Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin 69 

Table 1-12 — Characteristics of known Soviet 

space and missile monitoring and control ships- 71 

4. Other tracking ships 72 

5. General locations of Soviet tracking ships 72 

E. Deep space tracking 73 

F. Space operations and data processing centers 73 

G. Space research centers 76 

H. Manufacturing and assembly centers for spacecraft and 

rockets 76 

I. Test and training centers for space 77 




I. Early years __ _ 79 

A. Origins of the Soviet space program 79 

1. Early interest _ 79 

2. Organization of the Soviet effort for space 81 

3. Soviet weapons planning 81 

4. Plans for the International Geophysical Year 82 

B. The first Sputniks _._ 82 

1. Sputnik 1_ ___ _ 82 

2. Sputnik 2_ 83 

3. Sputnik 3 _._ 83 

C. The first Lunas _ 84 

1. Luna 1 84 

2. Luna 2 84 

3. Luna 3 _ 84 

D. The Korabl Sputniks 85 

E. Beginnings of the planetary program 85 

1. 1960 Mars attempts 85 

2. 1961 Venus attempts 85 

3. 1962 Venus attempts 86 

4. 1962 Mars attempts 86 

5. 1964 Venus attempts 87 

6. 1964 Mars attempts 87 

7. 1965 Venus attempts 88 

8. 1967 Venus attempts 88 

9. 1969 Venus attempts 90 

Table 2-1 — Atmosphere of Venus, early Soviet 

data 91 

10. 1970 Venus Vttempts"_"""""~"..""""""I 91 

11. 1972 Venus attempts 92 

F. The second generation lunar program 93 

1. Change of technology 93 

2. 1963 Moon attempt 93 

3. 1965 lunar attempts 94 

4. 1966 lunar attempts 94 

5. 1968 lunar attempt 99 

G. The first maneuverable satellites 99 

H. The Elektron program 100 

I. The Proton program 100 

1. Proton 1 100 

2. Proton 2 101 

3. Proton 3 101 

4. Proton 4 101 

II. The]Kosmos program 102 

A. The need for Kosmos 102 

B. The cover plan of Kosmos 103 

C. Broad categories within Kosmos 106 

D. Techniques for defining Kosmos missions 107 

E. Kosmos scientific missions 109 

1. Use of the B-l for scientific flights 109 

Table 2-2— Identifiable use of the B-l launch 

vehicle for scientific orbital missions 110 

2. Use of the C-l for scientific flights 112 

Table 2-3— Identifiable use of the C-l launch 

vehicle for scientific orbital missions 113 

3. Use of the A-l and A-2 for scientific supplemental 

payloads 113 

Table 2-4 — Identification and possible use of the 
A-l and A-2 launch vehicles for Kosmos 

scientific and supplemental payloads 116 

F. Kosmos military flights 118 

G. Precursor flights within Kosmos 118 

H. Flight mission failures disguised as Kosmos 118 

I. Summary on Kosmos flights 119 

Table 2-5 — Summary recapitulation of Kosmos, other 
name, and unacknowledged Soviet space payloads by 

mission category, 1957-1975 - H9 


II. The Kosmos program — Continued Pa *e 

J. The Interkosmos program 120 

1. Overview of all international orbital flights 120 

Table 2-6 — Summary list of Soviet orbital and 
escape flights which carried experiments of 

other nations 121 

2. Interkosmos flights of the period 1968-1970 123 

3. Interkosmos 5 123 

4. Interkosmos 6 124 

5. Interkosmos 7 124 

6. Interkosmos 8 124 

7. Interkosmos Kopernik 500 125 

8. Interkosmos 10 125 

9. Interkosmos 11 125 

10. Interkosmos 12 125 

11. Interkosmos 13 126 

12. Interkosmos 14 126 

III. Other recent scientific flights 126 

A. The Prognoz program 126 

1. Prognoz 1___ 126 

2. Prognoz 2 127 

3. Prognoz 3 127 

4. Prognoz 4 - 127 

B. French payloads carried by Soviet launch vehicles 128 

1. Oreol 1 128 

2. MAS-1 128 

3. Prognoz 2 128 

4. Oreol 2 128 

5. MAS-2 129 

6. Further French experiments 129* 

C. Indian payload carried by a Soviet launch vehicle 129 

1. Antecedents 129 

2. Arvabhata 129 

3. A second flight 130' 

D. Swedish cooperative programs 130 

E. Soviet veitical rocket probes 130 

1. National flights 130 

2. The Vertikal international program 132 

IV. The second generation of planetary flights 133 

A. Soviet use of planetary windows 133 

B. The Mars attempts of 1971 133 

1. Launch failures 133 

2. Launch of Mars 2, Mars 3, and Mariner 9 134 

3. In-flight progress 134 

4. Mars 2 arrival 135 

5. Mars 3 arrival 135 

6. Instruments on the landers 136 

7. The orbital buses and their activity 136 

C. The Mars attempts of 1973 138 

1. The launches of Mars 4, Mars 5, Mars 6 and Mars 7_ 138 

2. The flight en route 138 

3. Arrival at Mars 139 

4. Follow-up details of the flights 139 

D. The Venus attempts of 1975 142 

1. Launch of Venera 9 and Venera 10 142 

2. En route to Venus 142 

3. Landing of Venera 9 142 

4. Landing of Venera 10 143 

5. The Venera 9 and 10 orb iters 144 

V* The third generation of lunar flights 144 

A. Luna 15 __ _ ___ 145 

B. Kosmos 300 and Kosmos 305 _ 146 

C. Luna 16 146 

h Comparative cost of Luna 16 and a typical Apollo 

mission 149 

D. Luna 17 and Lunokhod 1 J J. 151 

1. Flight of Luna 17 151 

2. Description of Lunokhod roving vehicle 151 


V. The third generation of lunar flights — Continued 

D. Luna 17 and Lunokhod 1 — Continued 

3. Review of operational life 152 

Table 2-7 — Summary record of the performance 

of Lunokhod 1 154 

4. Scientific findings 154 

5. Relative merits of manned versus unmanned roving 

lunar vehicles 155 

Table 2-8 — Comparison of Lunokhod 1 and 

Apollo 15 rover 155 

E. Luna 18 156 

F. Luna 19 156 

G. Luna 20 157 

1. Flight of Luna 20 157 

2. Surface activity 157 

3. Return flight and recovery 158 

4. Scientific results 158 

H. Luna 21 and Lunokhod 2 159 

1. Flight of Luna 21 159 

2. Operations of Lunokhod 2 159 

Table 2-9 — Summary record of the performance 

of Lunokhod 2 __ .1 160 

L Luna 22 163 

J. Luna 23 1 64 

VI. Statistical tables on deep space missions 165 

Table 2-10 — Summary of lunar distance flight attempts 166 

Table 2-11 — Summary of planetary distance flight attempts 170 


I. Early years 173 

A. Advance preparation for manned flight 173 

1. Sputnik 2 173 

B. The Korabl Sputnik precursors to Vostok 174 

1. Korabl Sputnik 1 174 

2. Korabl Sputnik 2 174 

3. Korabl Sputnik 3 1 74 

4. Korabl Sputnik 4 175 

5. Korabl Sputnik 5 175 

C. The Vostok program 175 

r. Vostok 1 175 

2. Vostok 2 176 

3. Vostok 3 176 

4. Vostok 4 176 

5. Vostok 5 176 

6. Vostok 6 176 

D. Kosmos precursors to Voskhod 177 

E. The Voskhod program 177 

1. Voskhod 1 177 

2. Voskhod 2 178 

II.^The Soyuz program 179 

A. Precursor flights to Soyuz 179 

B. Soyuz flights 1-9 179 

1. Soyuz 1 179 

2. Kosmos 186 and 188 180 

3. Kosmos 212 and 213 181 

4. Kosmos 238 181 

5. Soyuz 2 182 

6. Soyuz 3 182 

7. Soyuz 4 and 5 182 

8. Soyuz 6, 7 and 8 183 

a. Soyuz 6 184 

b. Soyuz 7 184 

c. Soyuz 8 184 

9. Soyuz 9 184 


II. The Soyuz program — Continued 


C. Further tests: Kosmos 370, 382, 308 and 434 186 

Table 3-1— Flight parameters of Kosmos 370, 382, 308 and 

434 186 

D. The space station era 187 

I. Soyuz 10 and 11 with Salyut 1 187 

a. Salyut 1 187 

b. Soyuz 10 189 

c. Soyuz 11 190 

Table 3-2 — Daily log of activities on Salyut 1 

during the period Soyuz 11 was docked to it__ 192 

2. Kosmos 406 194 

3. Salyut 2 194 

4. Kosmos 557 195 

5. Kosmos 573 196 

6. Sovuz 12 196 

7. Kosmos 613 197 

8. Soyuz 13 197 

9. Kosmos 638, 656, and 672 100 

10. Kosmos 670 109 

II. Soyuz 14 and 15 with Salyut 3 200 

a. Salyut 3 200 

b. Soyuz 14 201 

c. Soyuz 15 204 

12. Sovuz 16 204 

13. Soyuz 17 and 18 with Salyut 4 206 

a. Salyut 4 206 

b. Soyuz 17 208 

c. April 5 Anomaly 211 

d. Soyuz 18 212 

14. Soyuz 10, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project 213 

15. Kosmos 772 214 

16. Soyuz 20 with Salyut 4 214 

III. The Zond program of precursors to manned circumlunar flight 214 

A. Zond 4 214 

B. Zond 5 215 

C. Zond 6 216 

D. Zond 7 217 

E. Zond 8 217 

IV. The Soviet manned lunar landing program 218 

A. Verbal evidence 218 

B. Technical capability 219 

1. Rendezvous and docking 219 

2. The spaceship 220 

3. The launch vehicle 220 

C. Conclusion 221 

V. Unmanned biological flights 221 

A. Kosmos 110 221 

B. Kosmos 605 222 

C. Kosmos 600 222 

D. Kosmos 782 222 

E. Soyuz 20 223 

VL The Soviet cosmonauts 224 

A. Biographies of cosmonauts 225 

Table 3-3 — Summary list of Soviet cosmonauts 228 

VII. Statistical tables on manned space flight 229 

Table 3-4— U.S. and U.S.S.R. manned space flights 230 

Table 3-5 — Soviet flights related to biological payloads 233 

Table 3-6 — Soviet crews by program 238 

Table 3-7 — Manned spaceflight programs summarized (Soviet). 239 

Table 3-8 — Manned spaceflight programs summarized (U.S.) 239 

Table 3-9 — Comparative time spent on space missions 241 

Table 3-10 — List of deceased astronauts and cosmonauts 242 




I. Mission Summary 243 

A. ASTP crews 244 

B. ASTP hardware 245 

C. ASTP experiments 245 

I. Photography of the solar corona and zodiacal light 

against the background of the night sky 246 

2. Investigation of refraction and transparency of the 

upper layers of the atmosphere 246 

3. Photography of daytime and dust horizon 246 

4. Microorganisms growth 246 

5. Fish embryonic development 246 

6. Genetic experiments 246 

7. Artificial solar eclipse 246 

8. Ultraviolet absorption 246 

9. Zone-forming fungi 246 

10. Microbial exchange test 247 

II. Furnace system experiments 247 

II. Historical background 247 

A. ASTP agreement 247 

B. U.S. -Soviet cooperation 247 

C. U.S.-Soviet preliminary talks 249 

1. Key personnel 250 

III. Joint preparations 250 

A. Astronaut and cosmonaut training 250 

B. Simulations 251 

C. ASTP docking system development 251 

1. APDS development 251 

D. Spacecraft atmosphere and pressure differences 252 

E. Communications 252 

IV. Political issues 252 

A. Contributions to detente 253 

B. U.S. doubts — Senator Proxmire and the C.I. A 253 

C. Post-ASTP plans for future U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in 

space 254 

V. Summary 254 


It Introduction 257 

A. Information resources 257 

Figure 4-1 — Soviet literature agencies and interrela- 
tionships 259 

Figure 4-2 — Soviet literature for life sciences digest 260 

Table 4-1 — Foundations of space biology and medicine. _ 261 

Table 4-2 — Space life sciences source journals 263 

B. Organization of the Soviet space life sciences effort 266 

Figure 4-3 — Organization of Soviet biomedical institu- 
tions - 267 

II. Cosmonaut selection and training 270 

A. The selection process 270 

B. The training process 273 

1. General protocol 273 

2. Vestibular training 275 

3. Visual training 276 

4. Acceleration training 277 

5. Weightlessness training 277 

6. Physical and survival training 27 S 

7. Behavioral and simulator training 279 

Table 4-3 — Soviet training devices for condi- 
tioning the operational habits of cosmonauts. _ 280 

III. Space medicine 281 

A. Medical monitoring 281 

B. Medical instrumentation and biotelemetry 283 

Table 4-4 — Biomedical monitoring on Soviet and 

United States spacecraft 1957-1975. __ 283 

Table 4-5 — Characteristics of biomedical monitoring 

systems for different manned spacecraft missions 284 


III. Space medicine — Continued Page 

C. Exercise and associated equipment 285 

D. Medication and emergency drugs 287 

E. Nutrition 288 

F. Work-rest cycles and biological rhythms 289 

G. Biomedical findings 291 

Table 4-6 — Dynamics of change in body weight of 

cosmonauts after flight 292 

IV. Life support systems and technology 293 

A. Air regeneration and space cabin ecology 293 

Table 4-7— Oxygen content of certain peroxide com- 
pounds of alkali metals and their capacity for ab- 
sorption of carbon dioxide 294 

B. Water and food management 295 

C. Waste management 296 

D. Space suits and clothing 296 

E. Man-machine interactions 297 

F. Rescue equipment and emergency measures 298 

Table 4-8 — Means of cosmonaut protection and rescue 

in case of rapid depressurization of spacecraft cabin. _ 299 

G. Future trends and systems 300 

Figure 4-4 — Characteristics of integrated life-support 

systems 301 

V. Gravitational biology and medicine 302 

A. Linear accelerations 302 

B. Weightlessness and simulated weightlessness 305 

Table 4-9 — Reactions of man and animals to effects 

of weightlessness 306 

Figure 4-5 — Proposed process of adaptation to weight- 
lessness 308 

Figure 4-6 — Overview of current hypothesis concerning 
processes involved in man's adaptation to zero 

gravity 308 

Figure 4-7 — Effects of the influence of weightlessness 

on man 309 

Table 4-10 — Means of preventing adverse effects of 

long-term weightlessness 311 

C. Rotatory environments and vestibular factors 312 

D. Noise and vibration 315 

VI. Problems of space radiation 316 

A. The space radiation environment 316 

Table 4-11 — Nature and location of electromagnetic 

and particulate ionizing radiations in space 317 

Table 4-12— Average dose absorbed by the astronauts, 

according to thermoluminescent dosimetry data 318 

B. Biomedical aspects of space radiation 319 

Table 4-13 — Expected short-term effects from acute 

wholebody radiation 319 

C. Radiation in combination with other spaceflight factors __ 321 

D. Radioprotective compounds and shielding 323 

E. Non-ionizing radiations and force fields 324 

VII. Gas atmospheres and pressures 325 

A. Hyperoxic environments 325 

B. Hypoxic environments 327 

C. Carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and inert gases 329 

Figure 4-8 — Classification of C0 2 toxic action effects in 

relation to P co 2 329 

Table 4-14— Toxic effects of elevated C0 2 330 

D. Pressure effects 332 

Figure 4-9 — P co 2 of the AGA as a function of baro- 
metric pressure; three zones of oxygen supply: 

hypoxia, normoxia, and hyperoxia 332 

E. Respiration and toxicology 334 

VIII. Space and exobiology 334 

A. The biosatellite program 334 

B. Exobiology 339 

C. The search for extraterrestrial intelligent life 341 

IX. Conclusions 343 




I. Early recognition of potential uses of applications satellites 345 

II. Communication satellites 345 

A. Earlv experiments 345 

B. The Molniya system 346 

1. Description of Molniya 1 346 

2. Operation of Molniya 1 347 

3. Molniya 2 348 

4. Molniya 3___ 348 

5. Launch programs of Molniya 1, Molniya 2, and 

Molniya 3 348 

Table 5-1 — List of Soviet communications-related 

space flights 349 

6. The Orbita ground station system 349 

a. Station construction __ 350 

b. Orbita station locations 350 

c. Operation of Orbita stations 350 

C. The synchronous communications satellites 351 

1. Kosmos 637, Molniya 1-S-l and Kosmos 775 351 

2. Statsionar/Raduga 351 

D. Broader proposals and applications of Soviet communications 

satellites 353 

li International links 353 

a. Intersputnik system 353 

b. U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation 354 

c. Washington-Moscow hot line 354 

d. "Mars" portable ground station 355 

2. Joint experiments with France 355 

E. Future of communications satellites — technical considerations 

and direct broadcast satellites 355 

III. Meteorological satellites 357 

A. Early experiments 357 

1. Kosmos 14 and 23 357 

2. Kosmos 45, 65 and 92 357 

3. Kosmos 44, 58, 100 and 118 357 

B. The announced weather satellites of the Kosmos series 358 

1. Kosmos 122 358 

a. Instrumentation 3.58 

b. Pavload appearance 358 

2. Kosmos 144 359 

3. Kosmos 156 360 

4. Kosmos 184 360 

5. Kosmos 206 360 

6. Kosmos 226 360 

C. The Meteor system of weather reporting 360 

D. The fully operational Meteor satellites 361 

1. The launch program of the weather-related satellites- 361 

Table 5-2 — List of Soviet weather-related space 

flights (main sequence) 361 

2. Operation of the Meteor system 362 

3. Future of meteorological satellites 363 

E. Soviet weather rockets 364 

F. Other weather-related flights 364 

1. Molniva 1-3 and Molniva 1-4 365 

2. Kosmos 149 and 320 365 

3. Kosmos 243 365 

IV. Navigation satellites 366 

A. Soviet references to navigation satellites 366 

B. Actual navigation satellite flights 367 

V. Earth resources satellites 367 

A. Earth resources data from the Meteor satellites 368 

B. Manned flights gathering Earth resources data 369 

C. Permanent space stations - 369 





Table 5A-1 — Replacement sequence of Molniya 1 satellites 372 

Table 5A-2 — Replacement sequence of Molniya 2 satellites 373 

Table 5A-3 — Molniya time and longitude of ascending nodes 373 


I. Introduction 375 

A. Definitional underpinnings of military space activity 375 

B. Soviet statements on space for military purposes 377 

II. Extension of civil type space activities to military needs 380 

A. Weather reporting 380 

B. Regular communications 381 

C. Geodesy and mapping 381 

III. Navigation 383 

IV. Space-related control svstems 384 

A. Traffic controL 384 

B. Military command and control 385 

C. Other secure systems 386 

V. Electronic ferreting or elint space missions 387 

VI. Minor missions in space for the military 388 

VII. Early warning military satellites 388 

VIII. Military manned space missions 3S9 

IX. Recoverable military observation flights 390 

X. Ocean surveillance 393 

XI. Fractional orbit bombardment system satellites 393 

XII. Military interceptor/inspector/destructor satellites 395 

XIII. Ground-based space detection and defense systems 395 

XIV. Orbital bombs stationed in space 398 

XV. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component 400 

A. Use of the B-l vehicle at Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk 401 

1. Kapustin Yar 401 

2. Plesetsk 401 

3. Other B-l flights at both sites 402 

Table 6-1 — Probable military space flights using 
the B-l launch vehicle by Kosmos number, 

apogee and perigee 403 

Table 6-2 — Other space flights using the B-l 
launch vehicle by Kosmos number, apogee 

and perigee 405 

B. Use of the C-l vehicle at all three launch sites 406 

1. Tyuratam developmental flights 406 

2. Plesetsk elint or ferret missions 406 

3. Plesetsk navigation missions 406 

4. An unidentified category at Plesetsk 407 

5. A Plesetsk series which could add geodesy to navi- 

gation 407 

6. Plesetsk military communications possibly for com- 

mand and control 408 

7. Plesetsk targets for interceptors 408 

8. Plesetsk minor military C-l flights 408 

9. Non-military uses of the C-l launch vehicle 409 

Table 6-3 — Probable military space flights using 
the C-l launch vehicle by Kosmos number, 

apogee and perigee 410 

Table 6-4- — Other space flights using the C-l 
launch vehicle by Kosmos number or name, 

apogee and perigee 413 

C. Use of the F-l-r and F-l-m launch vehicles at Tyuratam _ _ 414 

1. Weapons use of the F-l-r launch vehicle 414 

Table 6-5- — Probable military space flights using 
the F-l-r or F-l-m launch vehicles by Kos- 
mos number if any, apogee and perigee 415 

Table 6-6 — Apparent weapons-related flights 

of the F-l-r launch vehicle 416 

2. Military interceptors for inspection and destruction. 424 

Table 6-7 — The Soviet military space intercep- 
tor program, with orbital changes 425 

67-371—76 2 


XV. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component — Con. 

C. Use of the F-l-r and F-l-m launch vehicles at 

Tyuratam — Con. Page 

3. Military ocean surveillance using radar 430 

Table 6-8 — Military ocean surveillance flights 

of F-l-m 430 

4. Remainder of the F-l-m program 432 

D. Military use of the A-l launch vehicle 433 

Table 6-9 — Use of the A-l launch vehicle including 
probable military nonrecoverable space flights as 
well as others by Kosmos number or other name 
(excluding Elektron), apogee and perigee 435 

E. Military uses of the A-2-e launch vehicle 436 

Table 6-10— Use of A-2-e launch vehicle for eccentric 
Earth orbit space flights including probable military 
Kosmos and others by name with apogee and perigee 
(plus Elektron A-l flights) 438 

F. Use of the A-l and A-2 launch vehicles for military recover- 

able observation missions 440 

Table 6-11 — Soviet military photographic recoverable 
Kosmos missions by Kosmos number and days 

duration 441 

Table 6-12 — Summary of Soviet military photographic 
recoverable Kosmos by years and by generation and 

subcategory 445 

Table 6-13 — Summary of Soviet military photographic 
recoverable Kosmos by years and by announced in- 
clination 446 

1. Flight durations 447 

2. Launch sites 447 

3. Inclinations 447 

4. Altitudes of the flights 447 

5. Identification of variants 448 

G. Summary of commitment of launches and payloads to 

military versus civil primary uses 451 

Table 6-14 — Approximate comparison of United States 
and Soviet successful space launchings and payloads 
primarily civil-oriented versus presumptively mili- 
tary-oriented 452 


I. An operational system with a 74° inclination 453 

Table 6A1-1— List of Soviet navigation satellites at 74°, 1970- 

1972 453 

II. The change to 83° inclination 454 

III. The radio transmissions 454 

IV. Conclusion 455 

Table 6A1-2— List of Soviet navigation satellites at 83°, 1972- 

1975 456 


I. Launch statistics 457 

II. Mission profile 457 

III. Photographic coverage 458 

IV. Radio transmissions and telemetry formats 459 

V. Recovery beacons 462 

VI. Identification of possible targets 463 

Figure 6A2-1 — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 246 463 

Figure 6A2-2(a) — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 463 464 

Figure 6A2-2(b) — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 464 465 

Figure 6A2-3 (a)— Ground-tracks of Kosmos 596 466 

Figure 6A2-3(b) — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 597 467 

Figure 6A2-3(c) — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 598 468 

Figure 6A2-3(d) — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 599 469 

Figure 6A2-3(e) — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 600 470 

Figure 6A2-3(f) — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 602 471 

Figure 6A2-3(g) — Ground- tracks of Kosmos 603 472 

Figure 6A2-4 — Ground-tracks of Kosmos 759 474 

VII. Related observations of telemetry for the manned programs.-. 475 




I. Introduction 479 

A. How plans can change 479 

B. Paucity of Soviet indicators 480 

C. Effects of personalities and sporadic events 481 

D. Capabilities vs. intentions 481 

II. General technical capability 482 

A. Overall support 482 

1. Industrialization and gross national product 482 

2. Key industries 482 

3. Education and manpower 483 

B. Supporting hardware and facilities for space 483 

1. Launch sites 483 

2. Tracking systems 483 

3. Manufacturing and testing of space hardware 484 

C. Vehicle capabilities 484 

1. Existing vehicles 484 

2. Additions to the vehicle stable 485 

3. Use of high energy fuel in rockets 485 

4. Nuclear and electric rockets 485 

5. Reusable vehicles 486 

III. A chronology of Soviet statements on future space plans 486 

IV. Analysis of Soviet intentions in space 487 

A. Unmanned space flight 487 

1 Earth orbital science 487 

2. Civil space applications 488 

a. Communications 488 

b. Weather 488 

c. Earth resources 488 

d. Other 489 

3. Military applications 489 

a. Recoverable observation 489 

b. Early warning 489 

c. Electronic ferret 489 

d. Ocean surveillance 490 

e. Navigation 490 

f. Geodesy 490 

g. Mapping 490 

h. Communications 490 

i. Minor military 490 

j. More threatening missions 491 

4. Lunar studies 492 

5. Planetary studies 492 

B. Manned space flight 493 

1. Soyuz 493 

a. Ferry 494 

b. Independent mission 494 

c. Component 494 

d. Docking modes 494 

e. Tankage 494 

f. Solar panels 494 

g. Work module 494 

h. Heat shield 494 

i. Seats 494 

Table 7-1 — List of Soyuz variants 495 

j. Soyuz capacity and mission potentials 496 

k. Further variants of Soyuz 497 

1. Overall design considerations 497 

2. Salyut 499 

a. Military Salyut 499 

b. Civilian Salyut ___ 499 

c. Salyut as a component 499 

d. Large conical instrument container 500 

e. Docking 500 

f . International cooperation 500 


IV. Analysis of Soviet intentions in space — Continued 

B. Manned space flight — Continued "P&ge 

3. A long-term space station 501 

a. Single launch 501 

b. Multiple launches 501 

c. Other orbits 501 

d. Near-term 501 

e. Longer term 501 

4. Reusable space shuttle 502 

5. Zond 502 

6. Manned lunar landing 502 

a. Background 502 

b. Requirements 503 

c. Assessment of Soviet capabilities 505 

d. Components and alternatives 506 

e. Unpublished studies 510 

f. Total requirements for Soviet manned lunar 

landing 513 

7. Manned planetary flight 515 

8. Colonies on the Moon and planets 517 

9. Interstellar travel 518 

C. Pace and timing 518 

D. Soviet philosophy toward their space program 510 

1. National pride 519 

2. National prestige 520 

3. The engineering logic of developing space appli- 

cations 521 

4. Interest in science and discovery 522 

5. Willingness to subordinate immediate consumer 

gains 523 

6. Marxist-Leninist religion 524 

7. Final conclusions 524 


FORECASTS 1970-75 525 




By Charles S. Sheldon II* 

1. Overview. Supporting Facilities and Launch Vehicles of the 

Soveet Space Program 


Statistics on space activities are only approximate and are subject 
to revision, but enough data are available to afford a reasonably good 
overview of rates of relative progress among nations. 

J. Gross Statistics 

Although the U.S. launch pace has declined since 1966, the Soviet 
record shows no similar drop, and now runs about three times as high 
as the current U.S. level. While the U.S. record of failures in flight is 
fairly well known, the Soviet Union continues to hide most of its fail- 
ures, and these can only be estimated as probably proportional to the 
number of successes in the same ratio as applies to the U.S. space 

2. Breakdown by Categories 

Despite Soviet and U.S. secrecy in hiding the missions of military 
space nights which overall make up a majority of launches, in both 
cases it is possible from open sources to deduce these missions. The 
largest single component in both programs are the flights which have 
a recoverable payload from low Earth orbit, presumably flown for 
observation purposes. Examination of 27 program elements shows that 
both the U.S. and Soviet programs are broadly based, seeking mul- 
tiple goals, with the primary difference being the Soviet inclusion of 
fractional orbit bombardment satellites (FOBS) and satellite in- 
spector/destructor flights. These flights have no U.S. counterparts and 
on the Soviet side have ceased after 1971. 

3. Comparative Weights of Payload 

In the absence of published data, only estimates can be made, and 
the launch capacity of the rockets used have been normalized to nom- 
inal low Earth orbit equivalents. These show the Soviet Union cumu- 
latively has launched about 50 percent more tonnage than the United 
States, and is currently running about four-fold the U.S. level, now 
that the Saturn V has been withdrawn from use. 


1. Tyuratam 

This site, in Kazakhstan, is the Cape Canaveral of the Soviet Union, 
launching many research and development (R&D) flights, some ob- 

*Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress. 



serration flights, all manned, lunar, and planetary flights. It is offi- 
cially called the Baykonur Cosmodrome, but it is 370 kilometers south- 
west of Baykonur, adjacent to the new rocket city of Leninsk. 

2. Plesetsk 

This is the Vandenberg Air Force Base of the Soviet Union, located 
north of Moscow toward Arkhangelsk. It is used mostly for military 
operational flights, most civil applications flights, and for extreme 
latitude scientific flights. It has never been named or pinpointed by 
the Russians. 

3. Kapustin Yar 

This site on the Volga River near the Caspian Sea is equivalent to 
White Sands, New Mexico and Wallops Island, Virginia. It is used 
to launch vertical probes and small satellites for civilian and military 
purposes, as well as conducting missile tests. The Russians now iden- 
tify it as the Volgograd Station. 


1. The Standard Launch Vehicle Series ("A") 

This adaptation of the 1957 SS-6 Sapwood ICBM (intercontinental 
ballistic missile) is still the mainstay of the Soviet program, with a 
first stage thrust of about 500 metric tons. It was used for Sputnik 1 
and still is used for the Soyuz and many other flights today. It has 
been used more times than any other orbital launch vehicle in the 
world. With improved upper stages it will put up to 7.5 metric tons 
of payload in orbit. It is launched at Tyuratam and Plesetsk. 

2. The Small Utility Launch Vehicle ("B") 

This adaptation of the SS-4 Sandal MRBM (medium range ballistic 
missile) is used for the smallest direct-injection Kosmos flights proba- 
bly with payload s ranging up to about 400 kilograms. It has been 
launched to orbit from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar (first in 1962). 

3. The Flexible Intermediate Vehicle ("<7") 

This adaptation of the SS-5 Skean IRBM (intermediate range 
ballistic missile) may be able to put as much as one metric ton into 
low orbit. With a restartable upper stage, it is able to put payloads into 
circular orbits at various altitudes at least up to 1,500 kilometers. 
It is launched from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar, and used to be 
launched from Tyuratam, starting in 1964. 

Jf. The Non-Military Large Launch Vehicle ("Z>") 

First used for the Proton scientific payloads, it is now used for deep 
space flights to the Moon and planets, for 24-hour synchronous flights, 
and for Salyut space stations. It can put about 20 metric tons into 
Earth orbit, or send up to about 5 metric tons toward a near planet 
at a favorable window. It is launched from Tyuratam, beginning in 

5. The Military Combat Space Launch Vehicle ("F") 

This adaptation of the SS-9 Scarp is used from Tyuratam to put up 
ocean surveillance radar flights, and earlier was used to loft both 
FOBS (fractional orbit bombardment system) and inspector/destruc- 
tor flights. It has never been announced as in use for a definable scien- 
tific or civilian mission. Flights to orbit began in 1966. 


6. The Very Heavy Launch Vehicle ("#") 

Presumably this was first launched in 1969, but through 1975, it had 
not made a successful flight. It may be designed to put about 135 or 
more metric tons into Earth orbit, or to send over 60 metric tons toward 
the Moon after Earth orbit rendezvous with other elements. Estimates 
of first stage thrust range as high as 6,300 metric tons. 


1. Communications Needs 

Tracking and communications with spacecraft are necessary to their 
successful use. The early Soviet support in this regard was limited and 
has had to be improved. 

2. Earth Orbital Tracking in the U.S.S.R. 

Soviet tracking facilities have been identified in part in connection 
with the recent Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, and some very elaborate 
missile and space defense tracking systems are also known to exist. 
The vast geographic extent of the U.S.S.R. provides a fairly adequate 
setting for such work. 

3. Foreign Tracking Stations 

There is a scattering of relatively modest tracking stations in 
Africa, Cuba, and probably at Kerguelen and in Antarctica, but noth- 
ing corresponding to the big stations used by the United States at some 
overseas locations. 

If. Sea-Based Support 

In the absence of good land-based overseas tracking stations, the 
Russians have put into service some fairly impressive large tracking 
ships both for Earth orbital support and for deep space mission 

6. Deep Space Tracking 

While deep space operations are aided by tracking ships, and there 
may be facilities in the Far East, the main deep space station is at 
Yevpatoriya in the Crimea, also the main flight operations center for 
Earth orbital flight. 

6. Space Operations and Data Processing Centers 

These w T ere relatively simple at first, but over the years, better com- 
puter support and graphic displays have been introduced at the launch 
sites, at Yevpatoriya, and now at another manned operations center 
at Kaliningrad near Moscow. 

7. Space Research Centers 

Limited information is available about such space research centers. 
Two well-known ones are the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory 
and the Moscow Space Research Institute. 

8. Manufacturing and Assembly Centers for Spacecraft and Rockets 
Probably much construction is carried out in conjunction with air- 
craft plants, with use of rail transport to deliver modules to the 
assembly buildings at the launch sites for further testing. 


9. Test and Training Centers for Space 

Environmental chambers and other test equipment are used increas- 
ingly, often with the actual flight matched on Earth by an analog 
exposed to as close to the same environment as can be achieved. The 
principal training center for manned flight is at Zvezdnyy Gorodok 
in the Moscow suburbs. 

II. Program Details of Unmanned Flights 


Interest in the Soviet program for space dates back at least to the 
last century when Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy, now the patron saint of 
the space program, began publishing his ideas in this regard. Soviet 
space plans were announced for the International Geophysical Year 
in 1955, a day after the announcement of Project Vanguard, but these 
turned out to be about two orders of magnitude more ambitious. 

The first Sputnik (October 4, 1957) and Luna flights had great 
political impact upon the world position of the Soviet Union. Prepara- 
tions for manned flights and for flights to the planets followed in 
quick succession. During the mid-1960's, the Soviet space program 
began to proliferate in many directions including work aimed at prac- 
tical applications of a civilian and military character. 


From 1962 on, most Soviet flights were simply named Kosmos and 
g^iven a number. This sweeping label covered a great variety of scien- 
tific, manned precursor, and military end uses, and also was used to dis- 
guise certain failures which attained Earth orbit, but did not accom- 
plish their probable full purpose. Even so, through study of repetitive 
patterns in orbits, the kind of debris associated with flights, and the 
timing of these flights, it has been possible to group most of these in- 
dividual payloads according to their mission purpose. 

1. Kosmos Scientific Missions 

The early B-l launched Kosmos flights were scientific, roughly 
equivalent to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's 
(NASA) Explorer series. These came from Kapustin Yar, and then 
occasionally from Plesetsk. When they carried experiments from other 
countries of the Soviet Bloc as well, they were generally named 

For the last few years, virtually all Kosmos and Interkosmos scien- 
tific flights have been launched by the larger C-l class vehicle from 
Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar. 

Some of the military observation flights launched by the A-l or A-2 
vehicles have carried supplemental experiments related to science, and 
over a period of time references to the findings have appeared in the 
literature, but the main mission is not mentioned. 

Kosmos Precursor Flights 

About 23 flights related to the manned program have carried Kos- 
mos names. At least 9 flights with the Kosmos label were direct pre- 
cursors of the Meteor weather satellites. A miscellany of other precur- 
sor flights, also received the Kosmos label. 


3. Flight Mission Failures Disguised as Kosmos. 
At least 11 mission failures received Kosmos names. 


1. The Prog no z Program 

Four long-duration nights related to measuring solar weather phe- 
nomena and their interactions with Earth have been launched under 
the label Prognoz. 

2. French Payloads Carried by Soviet Launch Vehicles 

Oreol (Aureole) 1 and 2 have been French spacecraft used for 
auroral studies as a follow-on both to Soviet Bloc auroral studies and 
to French-Soviet conjugal point studies between Kerguelen and the 
Soviet arctic under the code name Arkad. 

MAS(SRET)-1 and 2 have been small French engineering test 
satellites carried along on the same nights as Soviet Molniya commu- 
nications flights. Individual French experiments have been carried on 
other Soviet flights, including Prognoz, a biological Kosmos, and on 
lunar and planetary flights. 

3. Indian and Swedish Payloads Carried by Soviet Launch Vehicles 
In 1975, the Indian payload Ariabat (Aryabhata) was launched 

from Kapustin Yar on a C-l vehicle. A much more ambitious pay- 
load to do Earth resources work is expected to be launched in 1977 or 

With little fanfare, a Swedish cooperative program also has begun, 
although the first payload in 1975 with a Swedish experiment failed 
to attain orbit. More are to follow. 

4. Soviet Vertical Pocket Probes 

Most major sounding rocket launchings are conducted from Kapus- 
tin Yar. Both geophysical rockets and animal flights have been car- 
ried out. The international part of the program applies the name 
Vertikal to the flights. 


Most planetary windows to Mars and Venus have been used since 
1960, with the exception of the time in the case of each planet that the 
launch vehicle was being upgraded from the A-2-e to the D-l-e, plus 
the 1975 Mars opportunity which was skipped because of the high en- 
ergy requirements. 

1. The Mars Attempts of 1971 and 1973 

The move up to the D-l-e launch vehicle permitted Mars 2 and 3 to 
include both orbiter and lander craft within each 4,650-kilogram pay- 
load. The orbiters put secondary emphasis on picture- taking, but gath- 
ered a wide range of synoptic data. One lander did not make a soft 
landing; the other began a television transmission from the surface 
which was abruptly terminated before a complete picture was received. 
Because of higher energy requirements which cut the weight of pay- 
load available, tasks were further divided on the second occasion 
(1973). Mars 4 returned pictures but did not achieve orbit; Mars 5 


did both. Mars 6 returned direct readings of the atmosphere but did 
not send signals from the surface ; Mars 7 missed its landing, and flew 
by the planet. In summary, the flights fell well short of their goals, 
yet collectively returned valuable data. 

2. The Venus Attempts of 1975 

The use of the D-l-e launch vehicle permitted both Venera 9 and 
10 to carry orbiters and landers, and each pair worked well. The land- 
ers repeated previous direct readings of the atmosphere and sent back 
surface pictures which showed rock formations, sunlight and shadows, 
and a view to the horizon. The orbiters as of this writing are probably 
still functioning, but only limited findings have been reported to date. 


Starting in 1969, Soviet unmanned lunar flights graduated to use 
of the D-l-e, probably able to carry as much as 5,800 kilograms to 
the vicinity of the Moon. Luna 15 and two Earth-orbital Kosmos rep- 
resented early trials which fell short of their objectives. (Luna 15 
crashed on the Moon during the Apollo 11 mision.) 

1. Luna 16, 18, 20, and 23 

These four flights were all aimed at returning samples of lunar soil 
to Earth. Luna 16 and Luna 20 were both successful in making soft 
landings, using a television inspection system, then drilling for core 
samples which were loaded into a return vehicle which flew directly to 
Kazakhstan. The amounts returned were about 100 grams each, modest 
but enough for valuable analysis in several countries. Luna 18 landed 
in rough terrain (lurain) and did not survive. Luna 23 damaged its 
drill during the landing so was abandoned within three days. 

2. Luna 17 and 21 

Both spacecraft made soft landings to discharge on the surface re- 
motely controlled roving scientific laboratories. Lunokhod 1 operated 
for about 10 months, traveling over 10 kilometers, returning over 
20.000 television pictures, plus mechanical and chemical tests of the 
soil, and doing topographic studies and some astronomy. Lunokhod 2 
operated over 3 months, traveling about 37 kilometers, and return- 
ing over 80.000 television pictures. It also made soil tests, topographi- 
cal studies, and astronomical measurements. 

S.Luna 19 and 22 

Both spacecraft were placed in lunar orbit to do both high resolu- 
tion and wider area photographic survey work, plus gathering synop- 
tic data on orbital conditions. Each operated for something over a 
year. There were studies of the composition of surface rocks, circum- 
lunar plasmas, solar radiation, Jupiter radio emissions, and lunar mas- 

III. Program Details of Man-Related Flights 


The Soviet program of manned flights was preceded by many verti- 
cal probes from Kapustin Yar carrying dogs and other animals to al- 
titudes above the sensible atmosphere. Sputnik 2 carried the dog Layka 
to orbit. 


A succession of precursor craft called Korabl Sputniks made Earth 
orbital flights including the first successful recovery on Earth with two 
dogs as passengers. 

The flight of Yuriv Gagarin in Vostok 1 on April 12, 1961 created 
almost as much sensation in the world as did the flight of Sputnik 1 
less than four years earlier. By 1963 there had been six manned flights, 
two pairs occurring at overlapping times, with the last flight occupied 
by a woman, Valentina Tereshkova. 

"The Voskhod follow-on flights included the first three-man crew 
and the first EVA (extra-vehicular activity) . 


The attempted recovery of Soyuz 1 in 1967 resulted in the first flight 
death of a human being, although three American astronauts had been 
killed in a static test at Cape Canaveral three months earlier. The So- 
viet program back-tracked to more automated tests including the suc- 
cessful conduct of two sets of dockings within the Kosmos program. 

By 1969, a manned docking was accomplished, and two crew mem- 
bers transferred by EVA from Soyuz 5 to Soyuz 4 to return to Earth. 
A complicated group flight of three manned ships that fall did not 
include a successful docking. Soyuz 9 in 1970 set a duration record 
of 18 days. 

1. Soyuz Ferry Flights to Salyut Space Stations 

In 1971, Soyuz 10 docked 'with a Salyut 1 station for a combined 
weight of over 25 metric tons. However, the station was not occupied. 
Shortly, three more men went up in Soyuz 11 to enter the station, with 
a total flight time of almost 24 days. A large variety of geophysical, 
astronomical, medical, and ship systems tests were conducted. Tragi- 
cally, just before reentry, a pressure equalization valve stuck open, 
and when the ship had landed automatically, the men were found to be 
dead. This was a major setback to the Soviet schedule, and required 
more unmanned tests. 

A Salyut 2 station was launched in 1973, but it failed within a mat- 
ter of days, and was not visited by a Soyuz. Kosmos 557 that same 
spring was also a Salyut station and it failed even before the Salyut 
name could be applied. Soyuz 12 was sent to orbit in a two-man flight 
in 1973 as a check on improved systems for the Soyuz ferry version, 
returning to Earth in two days. With no Salyut station available, the 
year was closed out with an independent flight of Soyuz 13 doing the 
kind of astronomical work (but on a more limited scale) which was 
done with the Salyut station. 

In 1974, Salyut 3 was put into a low orbit, with much the same char- 
acteristics as the aborted Salyut 2. It was judged to be largely a mili- 
tary observation flight, capable of operating either manned or un- 
manned. An all-military crew in Soyuz 14 went up for about 15 days 
and occupied the station. A similar crew in Soyuz 15 followed, but 
made poor approaches in rendezvous, so came down again in two days. 
Salyut 3 continued to operate in automatic mode to complete six 
months in orbit, during the course of which a data capsule was re- 
turned to Earth by remote control. 

Salyut 4, with characteristics similar to Kosmos 557, was sent to 
a higher orbit late in 1974. During 1975, it was visited during a 30 day 


flight by the crew of Soyuz 17, and then during a 63 day flight by the 
crew of Soyuz 18. Primary emphasis was put on astronomical work, al- 
though there was also study of Earth resources, medical problems, and 
ship systems. Late in the year Soyuz 20 made an unmanned flight to 
Salyut 4, and remained docked to it in a long-duration test as the year 
ended. Between the flights of Soyuz 17 and 18, another Soyuz was 
launched on April 5, 1975, which ran into difficulties during the launch 
phase, and an automatic abort put the crew down about 1,600 kilome- 
ters away from the launch site 20 minutes later. They were rescued. 

2. The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project 

As a result of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, agreement was reached to 
conduct a joint flight which would include the use of a new universal 
or androgynous docking system, together with the conduct of other 
experiments. On the Russian side, there were several unmanned pre- 
cursor flights under the Kosmos label, and then Soyuz 16 in December 
1974 was a complete analog for the flight to come, even to the test of a 
docking ring which it carried to orbit and then docked to several times. 

On July 15, 1975, the joint flights occurred on time. Soyuz 19 was 
followed to orbit 7.5 hours later by an Apollo, and the two crews were 
united after Apollo conducted the active rendezvous and docking. Not 
only did the flight require development of the new docking system, but 
for the first time detailed engineering exchanges of information on 
hardware and procedures. The crews and their back-ups had to learn 
each others languages. There were repeated trips between Houston 
and Zvezdnyy Gorodok, and eventually visits to both launch sites. 
For the first time the Soviet launch and recover} 7 were shown live on 
worldwide television. For the most part, the flights went according to 


Although Western observers had expected the Russians to be the 
first to send men around the Moon, a variety of delays and troubles 
beset this part of their program. Zond 4 through Zond 8 made un- 
manned flights testing various aspects of the operation which was to 
carry men as soon as the systems were man-rated. All those planned to 
pass near the Moon and return to Earth did so and were recovered. 
Most return approaches were over Antarctica toward the Indian 
Ocean. Zond 5 landed in that ocean. Zond 6 and 7 made a skip reentry 
over that ocean and flew on to Kazakhstan, thereby cutting the G load. 
Zond 8 approached Earth from the north, and landed in the Indian 
Ocean. But time and events had obsoleted the program, and no further 
developments have been noted since 1970. 


For a long time the Russians were sufficiently confident they would 
be the first to land men on the Moon that they made a number of 
predictions to this effect. Apollo eventually ended that hope. But if 
Apollo 11 had failed and lost the crew, and if the several Soviet re- 
quired elements of technical systems for manned lunar landing opera- 
tions had been more successful, they might have pursued their work: 

to be first. There is not much doubt that one by one they were develop- 
ing the components needed for such lunar operations, and were learn- 
ing the techniques of rendezvous, assembly, landing, and Earth return 
from lunar distances. The program was set aside for the present 
shortly after the first G-l-e vehicle failed in launch, and the Apollo 
11 flight was successfully completed. 


Five payloads have been dedicated to Soviet biological experiments 
starting with Kosmos 110 in 1966, and continued with Kosmos 605, 
600, 782, and Soyuz 20. These have carried a variety of animals, 
insects, plant life, and microorganisms. Kosmos 782 in the fall of 1975 
has carried additionally experiments of the United States, France, 
Czechoslovakia and Romania. 

IV. The Soviet Space Life Sciences 

The Soviet space life sciences effort is the most comprehensive in 
the world, and information about this effort is surprisingly available 
to scientists in other countries. Subtle differences exist between the 
U.S. and Soviet approaches. 


The cosmonaut selection and training process is evolving from a 
program of rigorous physical conditioning to one that is more special- 
ized and task-oriented. More accurate quantitative methods are being 
developed to predict cosmonaut behavior and performance. More elab- 
orate new training facilities and spaceship analogs have been con- 
structed. The program encompasses preparation for orbital, lunar, and 
even interplanetary flight. 


The technology of medical monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment 
of disorders arising during progressively longer spaceflights has been 
significantly improved. Equipment has been developed to counteract 
the undesirable effects of spaceflight, mainly weightlessness. The foods 
available have been expanded and upgraded. 


While the basic Soviet life support systems remain the same, many 
modifications and improvements have been made in these systems, 
including better recycling of water and air. The ultimate goal is an 
almost totally closed ecological system able to perform reliably for 
months or years. Already ground tests of closed ecological systems 
have been operated up to one year, with lower plants, higher plants, 
and men. 


These studies have received considerable attention, particularly in 
combination with other spaceflight factors. These include high gravity, 


weightlessness, and rotatory accelerations to determine effects and 
human tolerances, and steps to overcome problems through physical 
conditioning and drugs. 


Experiments in radiobiology are extensive, including study of pre- 
ventive measures through use of drugs, shielding devices, and force 
fields. These studies extend to the conditions to be found on manned 
interplanetary flights. 


The Russians are making considerable study of the effects on the 
crews of different gases and atmospheres in life support systems. They 
are also studying the effects of altered atmospheric pressures, par- 
ticularly sudden decompression phenomena, to learn limits of human 
tolerance and the prevention and treatment of related disorders. In 
general, they still favor spacecraft atmospheres as close to Earth's as 
possible. They are working on management of toxic substances that 
may be found in atmospheres. 


Their unmanned biological satellites in recent years have grown in 
technological quality in their automated management and handling of 
large numbers of animals and plants in order to meet their metabolic 
requirements. They are studying with suitable parallel controls the 
effects separately and synoptically of weightlessness, radiation, and 
rotatory accelerations on their experimental subjects. 

Study of exobiology includes the possible life forms that might exist 
on other planets, the detection of extraterrestrial life, and the search 
for intelligent life elsewhere in the universe. 


Every sign points toward a continued commitment to manned flight 
even to the planets and beyond. The successes in the life sciences are 
already reflected in the operations of their orbiting stations. The space 
life sciences seem assured of continuing support at a high level. 

V. Soviet Application of Space to the Economy 


1. J/ olniya Satellites 

The principal part of the Soviet communications satellite program 
has revolved around repetitive use of the Molniya classes of payloads, 
put up by the A-2-e vehicle into an eccentric orbit ranging from 
around 500 kilometers in the southern hemisphere to about 40,000 
kilometers in the northern hemisphere, and inclined at about 63 degrees 
to the Equator. Three satellites of the Molniya 1, 2, and 3 class variants 
are in the same plane in four groups 90 degrees apart for a total of 12 
active at any one time, to meet military, international, and domestic 
television and civilian message traffic requirements. These satellites 


connect with about 60 Earth terminals of the Orbita system. The use 
of the Molniya inclined, eccentric orbit has made it possible to put up 
heavier payloads of greater power to cut ground terminal costs, and 
to give good service to northern latitudes. 

2. Statsionar Satellites 

Starting in 1974, several years later than expected, the Russians have 
begun experimental flights to equatorial 24-hour synchronous orbits, 
fixed relative to a point on the surface of the Earth, by using the larger 
D-l-e launch vehicle. Late in 1975, the first Statsionar of 10 projected 
for the next five years w r as placed in orbit and given the new name 

3. International Cooperation 

The Russians have moved at a deliberate pace to set up their own 
Intersputnik Soviet Bloc cooperative communications system in 
competition with the Intelsat consortium used by most of the rest of 
the world. However, they also have an Earth terminal near Lvov to 
link into the Intelsat system. The Washington-Moscow "hot line" uses 
both American satellites and Soviet Molniya satellites to link the two 

4. Direct Broadcast 

For the future, the Russians may overcome their own objections to 
direct broadcast satellites which could penetrate their censorship, and 
may create their own direct broadcast system. But their ambivalence 
shows in their proposal to permit action against program material 
offensive to the receiving nation through jamming or even satellite 


1. Meteor Satellites 

Several years of expanding experimental service was carried on be- 
fore the Meteor system was declared operational, and by the end of 
1975, 24 satellites of that name had been placed in orbit. They are 
three-axis stabilized, and are launched by the A-l vehicle. They carry 
television cameras with a resolution of about 1,200 meters, with two 
cameras each covering a slightly overlapping path about 1,000 kilom- 
eters wide. A separate infrared (IR) sensor system returns night 
pictures to supplement the day pictures. More recent flights have 
added APT (automatic picture transmission) for realtime coverage. 

Soviet weather satellites not only give cloud cover pictures, but re- 
port on ocean ice, snow cover on land, and have even given some geo- 
logical information of value. 

2. Experimental weather satellites 

Weather cameras have also been carried on a few of the Molniya. 
communications satellites. Advanced sensors related to passive micro- 
wave to determine ocean currents, ice fields under cloud cover, and 
soil moisture have been tested in Kosrnos flights starting with Kosmos 
243. An experimental Meteor 2 was orbited in 1975. 


In time, Soviet navigation satellite use is likely to spread from 
purely naval to the merchant marine. 


There are not yet any comprehensive Soviet Earth resources satel- 
lites of the unmanned variety. Techniques of Earth resources survey 
are under development largely within the manned program, supple- 
mented b}^ individual experiments in unmanned satellites. 

Finally, the Russians also speak of versatile future cities in space 
serving many economic and human purposes, but these are not yet 
discussed in terms specific enough to be considered actual hardware 

VI. Soviet Military Space Activities 


The Soviet Union claims each individual space flight to be 
scientific in character, and in the early years many Soviet charges of 
aggressive military intent were made against the United States space 
program. As Soviet military space capabilities have grown in quantity, 
variety, and operational effectiveness, such charges against the United 
States have largely been muted, and a certain accommodation between 
the nations has been tacitly developed in this regard. 


Weather reporting is generally an open activity, and military clients 
of such a system are not identifiable from the fact of such flights, but 
of necessity exist. 

By now, it is suspected that the Molniya 1 satellites have moved from 
handling civilian television and telephone traffic to government and 
military uses. This is because this series is maintained actively while 
the newer Molniya 2 and 3 flights have taken on the tasks originally 
assigned to Molniya 1. 

Geodesy and mapping could be either civil or military functions. 
The absence of identification of such flights by mission suggests that in 
the Soviet setting, they are still considered to be military. 


The Russians have claimed a navigation satellite system for many 
years, but never have identified a specific payload as assigned to this 
use. They probably have gone the same technical route as the Ameri- 
cans in building a system which leaves the using submarines or sur- 
face ships passive, manipulating the signals heard in an onboard ship 
computer to establish the ship location in reference to the known 
position of the satellite. 


There is no si<m the Russians yet operate a spaceborne traffic control 
system. They probably do use space links both for military command 
and control, and to maintain clandestine channels of communication. 


Russian concern with all kinds of electronic intelligence is so well 
noted in their literature that one must assume many flights gather such 
intelligence, whether in the form of message traffic or of radar charac- 



A miscellany of minor missions such as environmental monitoring, 
testing of new components, and radar calibration are not viewed as 
especially sensitive military activities, but are not specifically identified 
by the Russians. They almost certainly make such flights. 


In an age of short time spans between initiation of missile launch 
and arrival of warheads at targets, early warning systems are a natural 
concern of military planners. It should be assumed that Soviet space 
flights include provision for early warning sensors. 


In the Soviet case, military manned missions, beyond the use of 
military cosmonauts, is not admitted to, and must be inferred from 
the performance of some missions. 


The Soviet Union only obliquely admits to use of military observa- 
tion photographic flights in space, but the characteristics of their pro- 
grams and the obvious need in both strategic and tactical applications 
are so great that their use must be probably the highest priority mili- 
tary mission under active application. 


Because naval vessels may operate under radio silence and maneuver 
to maintain positions under cloud cover where possible, an obvious ap- 
plication of space technology is an ocean surveillance system, using 
radar to penetrate the clouds. Such a Soviet system is now flying. 


TThile the United States has not considered fractional orbit bom- 
bardment satellites as cost effective, considering the alternative uses of 
limited funds, the Russians at least for some years held a different 
view, and worked vigorously to bring to operational level such a sys- 
tem. These satellites have not been flown since 1971. 


The United States abandoned its one-time commitment to develop- 
ment of a satellite co-orbit inspection system. The Russians pushed 
such a system vigorously, demonstrating intercepts at many altitudes, 
and exploding the inspectors after making close approaches. 

m. ground based space detection and defense systems 

Because the Russians have an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, 
one is not rash to assume they have at least a limited capability to in- 
tercept and destroy satellites with these same weapons. 

67-371—76 3 



There is no evidence the Russians have placed weapons of mass 
destruction in sustained orbit, and both major space powers are sig- 
natories of a treaty prohibiting such action. 


It is possible to match the characteristics various military space sys- 
tems should have to be effective against the characteristics of actual 
Soviet flights which have not been specifically identified by the Rus- 
sians as to purpose. The repetitive patterns of most of these flights 
make their mission identification fairly easy to a reasonable degree of 
certainty, although some judgments may have to be altered with time. 
Categories found include : 

1. Minor Military Missions 

These are launched by the B-l or the C-l from Plesetsk and less 
often today from Kapustin Yar. 

2. Electronic Ferret or Flint Missions 

These are launched by the C-l or the A-l from Plesetsk. 

3. Navigation and Navigation/ Geodetic Missions 
These are launched b}' the C-l from Plesetsk. 

4. Obscure Missions Operating in the Store-dump Mode 

Whether launched from Plesetsk singly by the C-l to about an 
800 kilometer altitude, or eight at a time by the C-l to about a 1,500 
kilometer altitude, these flights probably serve communications pur- 
poses related to command and control or tactical communications, or 
for other clandestine purposes. 

0. Targets far Interception and the Interceptors Themselves 

The C-l from Plesetsk has been used to put up targets, and the 
F-l-m from Tyuratam has put up both targets and the maneuverable 
interceptors themselves. 

6. Fractional Orbit Bombardment Satellites 

For a period of six years, the F-l-r was used at Tyuratam to fly 
simulated bombs about 95 percent or so of the distance around the 
Earth back to home territory, but this was suspended in 1971. 

7. Military Ocean Radar Surveillance 

The F-l-m maneuverable satellite is being used increasingly for 
ocean surveillance, and at the end of the mission, the "hot'- radioactive 
power source is being moved to a higher orbit from which it will not 
decay for many centuries. 

8. Early Warning Satellites 

The A-2-e is used to put early warning satellites into 12-hour orbits 
from Plesetsk, most likely for this purpose. It is possible the first simi- 
lar use has been made of the D-l-e at Tyuratam to put such a pay load 
into a 24-hour orbit. 

9. Military Observation Photographic Missions 

The largest single element of the entire Soviet space program is 


made up of recoverable missions which stay in low circular orbit for 
periods up to 14 days and then return to Kazakhstan. They are 
launched both at Plesetsk and at Tyuratani, using the A- :i launch 

Analysis, particularly in the public domain by the Kettering Group 
of the United Kingdom, sorts these flights into various subsets by 
maneuvering capabilities, and telemetry and beacon formats. These 
have made it possible to estimate the categories of camera resolutions 
and often to identify the specific Earth targets which t hey watch. 

Overall, the ratio of military uses to civil uses of space launches by 
the Soviet Union is two to one. 

VII. Projections of Soviet Space Plans 

Soviet space plans for the future are commented upon extensively 
by Russian spokesmen, but usually without specific timetables. So 
much is predicted that one realizes not all the goals can be attained 
in the near term. Hence, the task is to estimate intentions rather than 
just their broad technical capabilities. Such coming trends may be 
estimated both from the clues of precursor flights and subsystems 
development and from a careful reading of how they make their public 
predictions. The best estimates of the future may fail to materialize if 
external events intervene, or if their policies are changed. 


They have now built up a complex, of industry, experience, and 
human talent which is capable of supporting indefinitely their present 
high level of space flight, and there is no reason to assume there are 
presently any plans for retrenchment. Further growth may come, but 
at a slower rate, unless they put into service a reusable space shuttle, 
which could provide a "quantum jump" in what they do. The long- 
awaited very large lift vehicle, the G class, will probably appear, and 
permit some direct launches of large payloads without the necessity 
for orbital assembly to the same degree otherwise required. 


Their existing activities in science, weather reporting, and com- 
munications should continue to grow in operational effectiveness. One 
can expect further flights to the Moon of sample retrievers, roving 
vehicles, and orbiters. Both Mars and Venus will continue to receive 
attention when the windows for launch are favorable. Later, there 
will be Soviet flights inward to Mercury, outward to the giant planets, 
and new missions to comets, planetoids, and out of the plane of the 

Military uses are already so large a part of the total that they will 
continue to expand upon and perfect the great variety of activities cur- 
rently being pursued. The question of more threatening missions is 
one that turns both on the issues of arms controls and of the possible 
appearance of new technologies which could change prevailing as- 
sumptions as to what is now "reasonable". 



Several more years of flights using the evolving Salyut station and 
the Soyuz ferry craft should be expected. These operations will 
develop toward longer and longer life stations with resupply and 

Manned lunar landing seems to have been delayed longer than was 
expected five years ago, but has not been written out of the realm of 
possibilities. All the hardware ingredients which were being rushed 
to readiness in the late 1960's and shortly thereafter are still in exist- 
ence with active production lines. When the Russians are confident 
their systems will work reliably, they will visit the Moon, probably 
using a combination of Earth orbit rendezvous and lunar orbit 

Manned interplanetary flight is not only an announced goal in 
speeches, but a strong likelihood In terms of the work being done on 
space medicine and life support systems. An operational Soviet space 
shuttle would move plans for such work from the merely technically 
possible to the economically possible. 

For the more distant future, human settlements on other celestial 
bodies and study of interstellar travel are of interest to the Russians, 
but not yet in the form of concrete plans. 


The Russians have taken pride in their space accomplishments, and 
have not been loath to exploit the prestige associated with their suc- 
cesses. Space technicians seem to have convinced the political leader- 
ship, which often has an engineering background, of the economic 
necessity and benefit of pursuing an expanding program of explora- 
tion and application. 

They have not neglected science and discovery for its own sake. If 
this has involved any delay in improving the lot of the consuming 
public, it is part and parcel of a broader philosophy of sacrificing the 
present for Communist "pie in the sky". 

For a system which flaunts its atheism, there is a certain element of 
secular religion in the official attitude that Soviet man through his 
mastery of science and technology can control his destiny for the 
good of his system of society and government. 

Overall, their space program is pursued consistently, in orderly 
fashion, seeking multiple goals; and the investment in support of these 
ends is substantial, and probably in real terms is in excess of the U.S. 
program at its previous peak. 



By Charles S. Sheldon II* 

I. Overall Trends in Flights 

The purpose of this section is to provide a perspective on the trends 
of development of the Soviet space program, including data on its 
general composition before turning in detail to particular components. 
To this end, statistical tables have been developed which will cover the 
entire period of flight operations even beyond the years on winch this 
report is concentrated. It may be noted by the discerning reader that 
over a period of time some numbers in historical tables are modified 
from those previously published. This is because even at this late date, 
there are some new disclosures and also fresh interpretations of old 
data based upon more recent events which permit a refinement and 
more meaningful interpretation of what was even less perfectly under- 
stood earlier. In one sense, there never will be final figures for many 
tables. Not only do governments maintain policies of secrecy, but many 
numbers are based upon arbitrary definitions which are only occasion- 
ally spelled out in sufficient detail to be able to understand why two 
tables which purport to cover the same events come up with different 
numbers. For the most part, Soviet official numbers show fewer varia- 
tions than do their U.S. counterparts. This may be because when an 
early estimate is made and published, the Soviet authorities continue 
to use those data, even if their own computers later could make avail- 
able slightly different refined figures. 

While this study does not present a complete comparison of Soviet 
space data with that of other nations because it was not called for in 
our terms of reference, some of the tables which follow do include 
worldwide coverage in order to provide a perspective on the Soviet 

The basic data come from national announcements such as TASS 
bulletins and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) press releases, plus the compilations of several national agen- 
cies. Most of the basic worldwide record maintained by the United 
States is compiled by Norad (North American Air Defense Com- 
mand), a joint U.S.-Canadian activity at Colorado Springs. Norad 
data are passed to the Goddard Space Flight Center which selects a 
part of these data and may add a few items of NASA origin which 
are then issued every 7 other month. There is a corresponding activity 
in the United Kingdom. The Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farn- 
borough, Hants, has a satellite analysis group headed by Desmond 

*Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress. 



(r. King-Hele which once a month issues a limited circulation tabula- 
tion combining data from many sources to provide more data than the 
basic U.S. public lists show. These preliminary monthly lists are 
cumulated and corrected from time to time. In addition to the above 
official sources, similar unofficial lists, often with additional details, 
are carried semi-annually in Flight International in London, bi- 
monthly in Spacevievj in Amsterdam, and monthly in Spaceflight in 


Table 1-1 which follows is a world summary by years of launches 
and payloads to Earth orbit or beyond, successes and failures to the 
extent known or estimatable for each country. As such, it reveals 
something about trends, but nothing about the size, the effectiveness, 
or the utility and significance of each flight. According to the table, 
the Soviet Union reached a peak in number of successful launches in 
1975, This contrasts with the U.S. peak of 1966 from which declines 
have brought this country down by about 62 percent. The flights of 
all other nations are minor by comparison with the two space leaders. 

The record on payloads to Earth orbit is somewhat more erratic 
because the count includes a scattering of flights in which a consider- 
able number of payloads were sent up together. Even so. approxi- 
mately the same trends are reflected as for launches. For the so-called 
escape payloads, those sent to the vicinity of the Moon, the planets, 
or around the Sun. the number of payloads is much smaller. In this 
case there is no single Soviet peak, and the U.S. peak was in 1907. 

One can be reasonably sure that the record of successful launches 
is complete. The number of payloads may be nearly right, although 
there is always a chance of a pickaback which for some reason was not 
announced, or a piece of debris was thought to be a useful payload in 
the absence of information to the contrary. On the other hand, the 
record of failures is very problematical overall. The U.S. count on 
launch failures is probably accurate despite the reluctance of our 
Government to give prominence to these failures. The number of U.S. 
payloads lost through failure to reach orbit is more suspect because 
there is no legal obligation to report how many payloads a launch 
vehicle may have contained. The counts for all other non-Communist 
nations and their international agencies are probably accurate. There 
is no reliable public record of possible Soviet or Chinese launch fail- 
ures. Only two Soviet launch failures have been acknowledged by that 
nation. (These were the Soyuz launch of April 5, 1975 and a launch on 
June 3, 1975 which included a Swedish experiment.) In addition 
two Soviet launch failures were officially publicized by the U.S. 
Government. (These were the Mars attempts of October 10 and Octo- 
ber 14, 1960.) However, because of the Soviet use of the orbital launch 
platform technique for sending payloads either to deep space or to 
eccentric Earth orbit, a strong inferential case based upon time of 
launch and behavior of debris can be made that 22 payloads intended 
for escape missions fell short of that objective, and count as "failures'* 
even though they were in most cases Earth orbital "successes". In some 
of these cases, the Soviet Government did not even acknowledge the 
fact of launch. For the purposes of this table, judgments on success or 
failure of launches and pa} T loads are based exclusively on whether 


hardware attained Earth orbit or "escape", not on whether the pay- 
loads functioned and returned data. There is no public basis for classi- 
fying by operational effectiveness the payloads of most of the Soviet 
flights and those of the U.S. Department of Defense. 

There were two choices open to the analyst in estimating the unre- 
ported and immeasurable Soviet or Chinese failures. One was to com- 
pile a list of rumors (as has been done by J. A. Pilkington in the 
United Kingdom) ; the other was to argue that development of a com- 
mon technology has probably moved at a somewhat similar pace in 
different countries, and therefore the known failure rate of the United 
States could afford order of magnitude ratios to apply to the records 
of those countries which do not admit to failure. The latter course 
has been followed. Neither the rumor approach nor the common ratio 
approach can be counted upon to be accurate. What would not be satis- 
fying would be ro accept uncritically the oft-repeated early Soviet 
claim that their program unlike the American has no failures. In the 
1970's the Russians issued a feature length motion picture. "The Tam- 
ing of the Fire", which was a fictionalized account of the life of rocket- 
eer Sergey Korolev, and this included footage of one spectacular near 
launch site failure after another, to reflect the problems of the days 
Korolev was developing the standard launch vehicle. The pictures 
appeared to be genuine, and in any case represented a shift in policy 
by acknowledging that all space programs have their difficulties. The 
directly measurable Soviet failure rate for their deep space program 
runs higher than a simple ratio comparison with the United States 
would suggest, but this may have something to do with their use of 
the orbital launch platform technique, and poorer worldwide support 
facilities for this phase of their flights. 






'Fable 1-2 which follows analyzes Soviet payload statistics by the 
probable mission categories, including sonic tentative comparisons with 
the United States. For a large number of Soviet flights such data are 
not published, and a variety of analytical techniques have had to be 
applied to come up with this approximation of the probable missions. 
Each of these categories will be discussed in some detail further into 
this section. Some flights can be tagged because those of a particular 
series have been given a specialized name and usually described in fair 
detail. But most have been thrown under the catchall label , 'Kosnio>" — 
which means Space. The press release issued at many of these launches 
references the release in 1962 which accompanied Kosmos 1 which listed 
so many potential missions as to account for almost anything. In the 
instance of the Kosmos flights, they must be studied for all known 
characteristics of time and place of launch, of orbit al element s, of total 
time in orbit until decay, and of measurable behavior in orbit. Some 
of these flights later have their results published in articles in the 
Soviet scientific journals. Then inferences can be made about others 
of similar characteristics. For example, 3-ears before the United States 
announced that it had been operating previously unannounced mili- 
tary weather satellite program, it was evident to close observers that 
when a succession of payloads were put into 960 kilometer circular 
orbits, just retrograde enough to be Sun-synchronous, this would al- 
most have to be for the purpose of taking low resolution pictures such 
as those used for weather reporting purposes. Likewise, when the 
Soviet Union puts up heavy satellites about 30 times a year and calls 
them down from low circular orbit after just a few days in orbit, one 
has to think of high resolution pictures recorded on film which will be 
analyzed in laboratories on Earth. Similar assessments based on logic 
and inference give a fair basis for defining the missions of most 

There are inevitably some arbitrary classification problems. For 
example, should the first flight in a new series only later defined and 
made fully functional be classed with that series, or listed under "ve- 
hicle tests"? In general, the decision has been to list them with the 
emerging program. Then there are flights which may serve at least 
two major purposes. Here somewhat arbitrary choices have been made 
based upon the best estimate of the dominant purpose. 


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There is no certain way of finding out the exact weights of payload 
carried to orbit by each nation as only selectively is such information 
released by the governments concerned. Further, the actual weights of 
payload. announced or estimated, suffer from two statistical problems. 
There is no universal definition of what constitutes payload, and the 
significance of a given payload weight is modified by the velocity im- 
parted to it. 

A payload may be defined by some reports as the total weight sent to 
orbit, and by other reports as the weight above the accompanying 
rocket casing. Still others narrow the definition to the specific weight 
of instrumentation carried in a space vehicle. Illustrative is the variety 
of numbers associated with an Apollo Moon flight. The typical range 
of numbers are lofi.OOO kilograms in Earth orbit, 45.400 kilograms to 
the vicinity of the Moon. 5,440 kilograms returned to Earth, for a crew, 
some rocks, and film with an approximate weight of perhaps 400 

The amount of payload carried by a given rocket is subject to divi- 
sion of weight carrying capacity between fuel to attain a given velocity 
in order to reach certain altitudes or inclinations, and the useful pay- 
load of the vehicle structure and its instrumentation or passengers. A 
given rocket will place the largest amount of weight in orbit by being 
fired due east from an equatorial launch site, because the rotational 
speed of the Earth is added to the rocket speed. All launches from sites 
closer to the poles or at higher inclinations if posigrade put up less 
payload. The use of retrograde orbits at any inclination exacts a car- 
rying penalty by working against the rotation of the Earth. 

Being mindful of these several qualifications, perhaps the most use- 
ful kind of comparison is to estimate the weights of payload which 
could be put into a low circular orbit, which reflects in a sense the 
potential payload capacity of each launch, even if in a particular case 
payload was traded for more fuel to send the lighter payload to higher 
orbit or to escape. AVe are handicapped in compiling such statistics 
related to total weight by other problems. For some vehicles, we do not 
hare definitive information on their lifting capabilities (see the dis- 
cussion which follows on each Soviet vehicle). Further, even when we 
know something about vehicles, such as those of the United States, 
there are constant technical changes being made and the precise charac- 
teristics of even the seemingly known vehicles may not really be known 
to the outsider. Most striking are the kinds of changes which have oc- 
curred in the Thor Delta family whose capacity ranged from a few 
hundred kilograms in the early days to a spread today up to thousands 
of kilograms, depending upon the length of main tank, and the number 
of solid-fuel strap-ons. 

Table 1-.") which follows is offered with some resitation because it is 
so approximate, but it probably is generally indicative of trends. It as- 
sumes an approximate average capacity for each launch vehicle used, 
and applies this to the number of launches each year from each coun- 
try. The table has not been further refined to convert the comparisons 
to a uniform eastward equatorial launch ; rather, it accepts as the aver- 
age the site of Tyuratam as the best Soviet site at about 45.6 degrees 
north hit itude, and Cape Canaveral as the best U.S. site at about 28.5 


degrees north latitude. Hence the table is not a measure of any actual 
weight of payload, whatever that definition. It represents some kind of 
a normalized maximum carrying capacity of rockets to place space- 
craft in an orbit of about 185 or 200 kilometers above the Earth, firing 
duo east from the named launch sites or their other national equiva- 
lents. The table divides the U.S. and Soviet payloads between small and 
medium launch vehicles and those of very large capacity, because the 
latter so influence the totals. 

Others have tried to estimate the actual weight of Soviet payloads 
by use of the small number of data points made available. The most 
ambitious and recent of these calculations is that by Anthony Kenden 
of the United Kingdom. 1 Kenden took as a starting point a figure men- 
tioned by the Soviet Chief Designer of Rocket Engines. Valentin 
Glushko. who cited by July 1. 1973 a Soviet total of 742 satellites 
weighing 2,233 metric tons, and 41 more weighing 110 tons which 
reached escape velocity. Kenden then examined lifting capacities 
quoted by the TRW Space Log, previous studies of the present writer, 
and those of the tables published by the Royal Aircraft Establishment. 
He examined in some detail the flights for which there are Soviet pub- 
lished weight figures, those whose weights are fairly readily estimat- 
able, and finally those that are more obscure. By looking at each class 
of launch vehicle and each type of mission. Kenden builds numbers 
which provide a reasonably good fit with the figure from Glushko. 
Ills effort is generally satisfying, although there is one minor flaw. 
He assumes that certain figures published in the TRW Space Log 
have been estimated b}^ them on the basis of optical data and decay 
rates. The figures in question were supplied by the present writer to 
TRW, and he in turn obtained them from the publications of the RAE 
in Great Britain. Hence, although they may be the best numbers ob- 
tainable, many of them essentially are estimates made by J. A. Pilking- 
ton, and similarities from one source to another are not signs of con- 
firmation but of use of the same original source. 

1 Kenden. Anthony. An analysis of the masses of Russian spacecraft. Spaceflight, London. 
August? September 1975, pp. 2S9-29T, and 344. 


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II. Launch Sites in the Soviet Union 

The Soviet Union has three collections of space launch pads, just as 
does the United States. Curiously, even the functions of these three 
locations have a similarity, which will be detailed in the sections to 


The largest and most versatile of the Soviet launch sites is near 
the rail stop village of Tyuratam in Kazakhstan at about 45.6° X. 
latitude, 63.4° E. longitude. The Russians call it the Baykonur Cos- 
modrome, although it is about 370 kilometers southwest of the station 
stop of that name on quite a different railway line. It originally may 
have been thought that by giving contradictory information about the 
cosmodrome, the Russians would maintain some element of doubt in 
the Western world, since the town of Baykonur is on the correct 
ground trace of the early Soviet flights which were at 65° inclina- 
tion. To this day the Russians pinpoint the launch pad for manned 
flights as being at 47.3° N. and 65.5° E. which is patently false in light 
of conclusive public evidence of initial revolution ground traces and 
known launch times. Presumably based upon Soviet data, the NASA 
press kit for the Apollo- Soy uz Test Project lists the launch site as 
being at 47.8° K and 66° E. This does not square with NASA Landsat 
photographs and the visits and descriptions supplied by NASA 
visitors to this launch site. 2 

Tyuratam was first accurately placed in public announcements by 
the optical studies of Professor Tadao Takenouchi in December 1957 
following his observations of Sputnik 1 and 2. 3 The American trade 
press continued for some years to report the launch site as being in 
European Russia, until the Russians themselves announced it was in 
Kazaldistan (albeit at false coordinates, at the time of the Gagarin 
flight in 1961.) 

Tyuratam was the site from which the first Soviet ICBM's were 
fired, all the early Sputniks, all manned flights, all lunar and plan- 
etary flights, the earlier communications satellites, all the fractional 
orbit bombardment system (FOBS) and military inspector flights. 
It is also the area from which all heavy payioads put up by the Proton 
"D" type launch vehicle. Presumably when the largest Soviet launch 
vehicle is brought into use, the same site selection reasons will recom- 
mend Tyuratam as the logical place for its launch. 

In effect, Tyuratam is the Kennedy Space Center (Eastern Test 
Range) of the Soviet space program. 

The first good look at the immediate launch site of the standard 
launch vehicle was provided by a 1067 movie giving an historical re- 
view of the Soviet program during the previous ten years. Those fairly 
sweeping panoramic views fit consistentlv with the carefully cropped 
or pointed views which had been released piecemeal in previous years. 
Earlier the Russians had disclosed that the historical marker for Sput- 
nik 1 was beside the pad used for manned launches, one more far f or 
confirming the lon<T term use of both the same pad and the same first 
stage for missions from Sputnik 1 through Soyuz 19. the Apollo-Soyuz 

* Aviation WeeK New York. Jarnarv 14. 1074. op. 12-13. pictures. 

3 Takenouchi. Tadao: A launch site In the Kizil Knra Desert? Kajrnku Asahl, Tokyo. 
February 1958, pp. 40-4S (in Japanese) ; reported earlier in press dispatches. 


Test Project (ASTP) flight. For a long time no outsider could gel to 
the launch site. President De Gaulle was taken there in June 1966 to 
see the launch of the first acknowledged weather satellite (Kosmos 
122), accompanied only by his personal physician. In 1970, President 
Pompidou saw the launch of a military observation satellite i Kosmos 
368) which carried a supplemental scientific payload. Finally, in con- 
nection with the upcoming ASTP flight, three parties of American 
astronauts and technicians were flown in at night, put up in a hotel, 
driven to the launch pad, and then were returned to their hotel for 
another night flight out. 

In the meantime, low resolution pictures made public by NASA 
routinely to anyone interested showed that the Landsat 1 views of the 
Tyuratam area were covered with roads, railway tracks, and other 
-igns of human activities including almost certainly assembly build- 
ings and launch pads which spread over a distance of about 135 by 90 
kilometers or more. Also, the NASA people flying at night saw a scat- 
tering of electric lights from their aircraft that spread over distances 
of about this amount. At the day of the launch, the American ambas- 
sador, the science attache, and AVillis Shapley of XASA headquarters 
were flown there in daylight hours for the launch, but did not see too 
much from the air. People did report that the little railway stop of 
Tyuratam these days, is completely overwhelmed by the adjacent 
city of Leninsk. of perhaps 50,000 people. This city has not been shown 
in public Soviet atlases, and seems to owe its existence to the growing 
space activity. With launch pads for many different launch vehicles 
widely scattered over the area, it is not possible to speak of a single 
closely defined latitude and longitude as defining the site, or to know 
what all the launch facilities look like. The original "A" class stand- 
ard launch vehicle is carried horizontally on railway flat cars to the 
launch pad, tilted up, to sit on a stand over a large flarne deflector pit. 
The base of the rocket in the upright position is well below the level 
of the railways tracks which deliver the rocket. There is a many-plat- 
formed service tower which is tilted away from the vehicle some time 
before launch, and shorter supports for the first stage which retract 
away after ignition when thrust reaches a certain level. Tall adjacent 
light-weight structures are described as carrying lightning rods to 
minimize electrical interference with the launch equipment and vehi- 
cle, and perhaps to carry television or motion picture equipment. 

One gains the impression that tracking and guidance of Soviet space 
vehicles during the launch phase involve fixed radio, radar, and or 
optical stations down range. This is because repetitive flights of a 
given launch vehicle tend to be flown at almost exactly the same or- 
bital inclinations. To achieve the right azimuth for launch, the whole 
vehicle assembly and platform are rotated to the required compass 
heading. When two very similar yet different flight inclinations are 
achieved using different launch vehicles and other evidence supports 
the judgment, one receives the impression the difference in launch 
vehicle is also matched by using a different launch pad. and in order 
to fly the right "slot' ? in relation to the guidance points down range, 
the resulting orbit has a slightly different inclination. 

Pictures in movies as well as the visits of XASA people show that 
the assembly of vehicles and the attachment of payloads occurs in 
special assembly buildings. Checkout of spacecraft is done in the ver- 


tical position. Mating of spacecraft and launch vehicles is done hori- 

Although only one launch pad in a vast cosmodrome has been opened 
to limited inspection, the Landsat pictures of the whole area confirm 
the general impression that this is open steppe country, relatively flat 
and only slightly rolling. There is no hasis to the rumors of the early 
days that Soviet launches were conducted by winged, recoverable 
booster stages which ran on a track up a mountain side before becom- 
ing airborne. 

Other Landsat pictures suggest there is a general area in which 
spent lirst stages impact on the steppe, and informally Russians in the 
program have suggested they are able to salvage for reuse some com- 
ponents from this ''bone yard". 4 

A Soviet account of the Baykonur Cosmodrome described the as- 
sembly-test building used for the Soyuz. The building is called the 
MIK (Montazhno Ispytatel'nyy Korpus). The article said that a 
Soyuz is first given a full checkout in the MIK, and then again on the 
pad. In the MIK, the separate modules are tested in vacuum cham- 
bers, including the firing of maneuvering engines. After the individual 
modules are tested, they are assembled to create the whole vehicle 
and returned to the vacuum chamber for further checkout. Then they 
are also placed in an anechoic chamber to test the radio compatibility 
of the assembled ship with its communications systems. 5 

Another account of the Tyuratam complex was carried by Space- 
flight. Leninsk was identified as the long-referenced "Rocket City" of 
Soviet accounts, about 2,090 kilometers southeast of Moscow on the 
main Moscow-Tashkent railway line, with Tyuratam the original 
village railway stop. The area was described as rolling but mostly flat 
country, with complex irrigation systems and some tall trees planted. 
The climate is very extreme summer and winter. It is said to be about 
32 kilometei*s from Leninsk to the ASTP launch pad, and about 1.6 
kilometers from the MIK to the pad, using the standard Soviet 5 foot 
gauge railway track to join the two points. The second pad for the 
ASTP backup was supposedly another 32 kilometers away. The same 
account said there is a test building for the G-l-e rocket and a gantry 
122 meters tall for full assembly testing of the G-l-e. 6 


The second of the Soviet launch sites is near the town of Plesetsk 
on the railway from Moscow to Archangel at about 62.8° X. latitude. 
40.1° E. longitude in European Russia. This site has never been spe- 
cifically acknowledged. It is finding increasingly heavy use. primarily 
as an operational site, in contrast to the often experimental or special- 
ized nature of the Tyuratam nights. 

Plesetsk is in effect the Vandenberg Air Force Base (Western Test 
Range) of the Soviet Union. From here are launched many of the 
navigation satellites, the weather satellites, and the majority of the 
military satellites for a wide range of purposes. Xow also, most of the 
Molniya class inclined orbit communications satellites which previous- 

* Aviation Week. New Tork. February 18, 1974, p. 17, pictures of drop area. 

6 Pravda. Moscow. Mav 25. 1975. pp. 1. 2. 

« Spaceflight, London, 11 October 1975, p. 368. 


ly were launched from Tyuratam are also launched from Plesetsk. 
With its northern location, Plesetsk is used for missions which require 
coverage of extensive parts of Earth, since even flights launched due 
east for maximum payload capacity cover most of the inhabited Earth. 

Plesetsk had been discussed in the Western press as a missile launch- 
ing area. Its later space role presumably was known to Western 
governments, but the first public disclosure of this space cosmodrome 
came from the Kettering Grammar School in England. Geoffrey E. 
Perry published the first clue in April 1966 shortly after the first 
space launch in March. 7 He published the pinpointed location in No- 
vember 1966 when flights at different inclinations had established a 
nodal point of crossing ground traces. 8 As additional kinds of missions 
were launched from the Plesetsk area, their patterns of orbital inclina- 
tions suggested launch pads scattered over a considerable geographic 
area. Landsat pictures confirmed to the public that Plesetsk was spread 
over tens of kilometers although not quite as large as the Baykonur 
Cosmodrome near Tyuratam. 9 

When weather conditions are just right, an occasional Plesetsk 
launch has been visible from Sweden and Finland, when the still firing 
rocket rises above the horizon. The closest the Soviet Government has 
come to acknowledging Plesetsk is to permit its use for cooperative 
Soviet Bloc payload launches, one of the first being Interkosmos 8 of 


The third Soviet launch site is near Kapustin Yar on the Volga 
River below the city of Volgograd at about, 48.4° N. latitude, 45.8° E. 
longitude, also in European Russia. Indirectly the site has been finally 
acknowledged by the Soviet Government, as some suborbital launches 
as referred to as coming from "Volgograd Station 7 *. The area has been 
used for a long time as a rocket test station. In the middle 1950's be- 
fore the first Sputnik, Aviation Week magazine revealed the United 
States had a radar station in Turkey which used radar to follow mis- 
sile and test rocket firings from this point. 10 Magazines of the period 
said that Soviet short and medium range missiles were launched south- 
eastward from there toward the Kyzylkum Desert near the Aral Sea 
as the principal test range. In fact, this launch site was so well known 
that for several years after 1957, the American press assumed that 
it was used for the launch of the early Sputniks and Luna flights when 
in fact they came from the Tyuratam ICBM test center. 

It was not until 1962 that payloads were placed in orbit from the 
Kapustin Yar site, using the smallest of the Soviet launch vehicles, 
and only in 1973 did they start space launches from Kapustin Yar 
which used the intermediate size of launch vehicle. All the "B" class 
small launch vehicles from there put payloads into an inclination of 
48.4 to 49 degrees. All the intermediate "C" class vehicles put payloads 
into an inclination of about 50.7 degrees inclination. 

T Perry, G. E„ Flight International, London, April 21. 1966, p. 670. 

8 Perry, G. E., Flicrht International. London. Nov. 10. 1966, p. 817. 

Aviation Week, New York. April 8. 1974, pp. 18-20. 

1 Aviation Week, New York, October 21, 1957, p. 26. 


The combination of use of the smaller launch vehicles and the use 
of the site for launching vertical probes make this site seem to parallel 
a combination of the Wallops Island, Virginia station, and the White 
Sands. New Mexico test area. Some Western observers speculated that 
when the day came that the Soviet Government would ease its security 
rules sufficiently to open a launch site to outside visitors that Kapusl in 
Yar was most likely to be the first to "go public''. This view was en- 
couraged when finally Soviet bloc scientists were permitted to go there 
in connection with the launch of Interkosmos flights which began in 

Landsat pictures of the area show signs of activity over many kilom- 
eters, but not on the scale of Tyuratam or even Plesetsk. 11 

Sary Shagan, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) test station to inter- 
cept rockets fired from Kapustin Yar. was also found in Landsat 
pictures. 12 

Table 1-6 which follows summarizes the known successful launches 
by site, worldwide, to provide a perspective on their relative levels of 
activity for orbital launch purposes. The figures do not reveal addi- 
tional suborbital or missile launchings. The table reveals that Plesetsk 
has conducted more successful orbital launches than any other base 
in the world with Vandenberg and Tyuratam running neck and neck, 
and Cape Canaveral a poor fourth. 

11 Aviation Week, New York, December 1, 1975. pp. 1S-19. 

12 Aviation Week, New York, November 25, 1974, pp. 20-21. 


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III. Soviet Launch Vehicles 

In (lie Soviet Union as well as in the United States, the develop- 
ment of military long range missiles was the essential source of most 
of the space launch vehicles until such time as space needs for larger 
capacity rockets began to exceed missile capabilities. 

There was one difference, however. The United States started its 
civilian space program with a non-military launch vehicle, the Van- 
guard, assembled for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) by 
a team directed by the Naval Research Laboratory. This country 
moved step by step to use of the modest-sized Redstone, and then to 
intermediate range missiles, the Jupiter and the Thor. before applying 
any ICBM's to orbital flights. Its small, solid-fuel Scout, like Van- 
guard, was not evolved from a military missile. 

By contrast, the Soviet Union from the outset took its original 
IOBM and applied it to space work for the flights from 1957 on, and 
still uses this vehicle, although now with improved final stage or 
stages. Only after some years did the Soviet Union move down in 
size to use of medium-range and intermediate-range missiles as first 
stages for space launch vehicles. Also, an improved Soviet ICBM has 
been brought into the stable of space launch vehicles, but to date has 
been reserved exclusively for limited types of military space payloads. 

When both countries needed to exceed the capability of existing 
military missile first stages, they moved to create launch vehicles exclu- 
sively dedicated to space launches. In this country, these were the 
Saturn family, plus the hybrid Titan III vehicles which combined 
a modified military missile with large solid-fuel strap-on boosters. In 
the Soviet Union, the first larger vehicle was the Proton or "D" fam- 
ily, and we believe, a new larger vehicle in the Saturn V class, the 
"G'- family, which has not yet flown successf ully. 



Table 1-7 summarizes the successful flights of basic classes of launch 
vehicles over the years by all countries, providing a perspective on 
their relative frequency of use. This table has deliberately been kept 
simple, and it does not reflect the great number of upper stages used 
with the basic vehicles. 

The table shows that the Soviet original ICBM, Sapwood, or "A" 
remains the most used Launch vehicle in the world, followed by the 
I .S. Thor. Use of the Sandal or "B" began in 196*2. The Skean or 
U C" came into use in 1964. The Scarp or "F" after its introduction in 
1966 seems to have peaked early and is used only occasionally now. 
The Proton or "D" as a bigger vehicle is used less frequently, but its 
applications are growing. We are still waiting for a first successful 
flight of the "G" very large vehicle, so it does not appear in this table. 
Aviation Week and other publications claim there have been three 
flight failures of the "G" vehicle since a first attempt in I960. Even 
the "D" vehicle seems to have had many troubles in development. 13 

The Soviet Union does not name or even identify by appearance 
and capacity many of its launch vehicles, giving reasons of military 
security. Only after many years have pictures of some been released 
or models put on display. It is a satisfaction that these pictures and 
models when made available are consistent with the previously derived 
inferential analyses based upon the performance of these vehicles and 
the few facts disclosed by the Soviet Government. 

The original Soviet ICBM which was brought into both missile and 
space use in 1957 was put on public display in 1967 under the label 
Vostok. The same launch vehicle but with a longer upper stage is 
used for Soyuz. Neither label is sufficiently descriptive for the pur- 
poses of this study, as this original first stage and the two kinds of 
upper stages are used for many different missions. Likewise, the 
smallest of the Soviet space orbital launchers is now on display labeled 
Kosmos. This is not sufficiently descriptive either because the Kosmos 
name has been applied to payloads launched by all five basic first 
stages. It may be worth emphasizing that in the absence of any com- 
prehensive and consistent public use by the Soviet government of a 
nomenclature system, all those in general use in the West have been 
invented in the West. In the early days of orbital flight a great variety 
of names of space vehicles purportedly of Soviet origin appeared in 
magazines, but they seem to have had no more basis than the fanciful 
track up the mountain side for the winged launchers which in fact 
never existed. 

Gradually over a period of years, Soviet missiles of the surface-to- 
surface type were assigned numbers with the prefix SS by the U.S. 
military services, and as these missiles were better and better defined, 
their designators and approximate characteristics were made avail- 
able to the trade press or showed up in congressional testimony. Thus 
the SS-4, SS-5, SS-6 . . . Some of these missiles such as the SS-7 and 
SS-11 achieved a prominent place in the Soviet arsenal without being 
clearly seen by the Western public, and they were not used as space 
launchers. When missiles were seen to the extent their configurations 
were recognizable by the military branches of the XATO powers, code 

"Alsop. Stewart. Salt and Apollo 13. Newsweek, New York. April 27, 1970, p. 112. He 
described a large number of failures of this vehicle. 


names such as Sandal, Skean, Sapwood . . . were assigned, and these 
also in time reached the trade press. Military authorities in the West 
seem also to have created a nomenclature system for space launch ve- 
hicles, whether of military missile or other origin, and these carry the 
prefix SL. But an authenticated list has not been made public, so can- 
not be used here across the board. Some years ago in the TRW Space 
Log in the absence of anything better a system was devised which is 
being used in this report because its use has spread throughout much 
of the Western world, and it meets at least minimum needs. The basic 
scheme is to assign a capital letter to each basic first stage, and then to 
use a number for the principal upper stage of the particular launch ve- 
hicle, and a second number if the earlier upper stage is replaced. A 
final stage is indicated by a small letter generally indicative of its capa- 
bility such as e — escape, m — maneuvering, r — reentry, and h — higher 

As subsequent discussion will show, even though the Soviet Union 
has not disclosed an overall nomeclature system for its launching ve- 
hicles, it has identified some of the individual rocket engines, such as 
RD-107, RD-108, RD-119 . . . , which will be discussed in later parts 
of this chapter. 

Table 1-8 is a summary of the characteristics of Soviet launch ve- 
hicles. Because of Soviet secrecy, it must be considered as highly pro- 
visional. This is especially true when irreconcilable differences exist 
in partial Soviet data made public, and when Western observers have 
not seen pictures of some models and disagree as to their possible per- 
formance. With this warning about uncertainties, perhaps the table 
at least gives some notion of the scope of launch vehicles, the relatively 
modest number of kinds, and about what their dimensions, power 
plants, fuels, and thrust approximate. 

Table 1-9 summarizes data for each known rocket type as to the 
number of kilograms which can be sent to different orbits, and trends 
over the years as these vehicles have evolved. It suffers the same un- 
certainties as other tables where the Soviet Government released only 
partial information, so must be considered provisional and subject to 
revision. However, it is at least generally indicative of what the lift 
capacity of each principal rocket is. 




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1. The Original Version — A 

Some time in the early 1950's a large Soviet rocket engine was de- 
veloped for use in connection with the first ICBM, and it may have 
been considered even at the outset for space work as well. The Russians 
designated this the RD-107. The engine burns kerosene and liquid ox- 
ygen, uses a single shaft turbine assembly to pump the oxidizer and 
fuel to four combustion chambers with exit nozzles and to two steering 
rockets. There are auxiliary systems to pump a hydrogen peroxide 
gas generator and to run a liquid nitrogen to nitrogen gas pressure 
supply. The engine operates at f>0 atmospheres to produce a vacuum 
thrust of about 102 metric tons with an of 314 seconds. A variant of 
the same engine is called the RD-108, differing from its predecessor 
primarily in having four steering rockets instead of two, and its vac- 
uum total thrust is 90 metric tons. The first ICBM which also became 
the launcher for Sputnik 1 was assembled by placing four long tapered 
tanks of roughly cylindrical shape around a sustainer core. Each of 
these strap-ons had an RD-107 engine and the central unit had an 
RD-108. AH five units with their 20 main nozzles and 12 steering rock- 
ets are ignited on the pad, and as soon as thrust builds up to lift off the 
pad. the rocket rises. When the boost task is over, the four strap-ons 
fall away leaving the sustainer core to continue burning for a time. 

The total assemblage creates a fairly graceful impression. The cen- 
tral sustainer core. 2S meters long, described from the ground up starts 
as a regular cylinder, then flares outward, and tapers back again, creat- 
ing a hammer head effect. This peculiar shape was selected to blend 
with the four strap-ons which are modified elongated tapered cones. 
When all five units are strapped together, the result is a fluted pyra- 
mid effect with a maximum base diameter of 10.3 meters, including 
the four stubby fins. 

This is the vehicle which the Russians claim first flew as their orig- 
inal ICBM from Tyuratam on August 3. 1957. 14 Then it was used for 
the launch of Sputnik 1 on October 4. 1957. and likewise for the next 
two Sputniks. During that period the rocket had no upper stage, so it 
was not used very efficiently for payload weight purposes. The entire 
sustainer core was placed in orbit on these occasions, and one of the 
blurred Western photographs taken of such a rocket tumbling in orbit 
definitely suggests its hammerhead shape which has since been revealed 
by the Russians. Judged by the weight of the last and heaviest of these 
payloads, the lifting capacity of the rocket was about 2 metric tons 
to low circular orbit. It is possible that the residual weight of the spent 
rocket casing was on the order of G metric tons. 

With the announced weight of Sputnik 1 at under 84 kilograms, it is 
understandable why Western observers in that period postulated the 
use of a much smaller launch vehicle than the real one. When people 
rushed out of doors to see the passing of the first satellites, usually 
they were really viewing that 28 meter rocket casing, like a Pullman 
railway sleeper tumbling end over end, rather than the spherical Sput- 
nik 1, 0.58 meters in diameter, or even Sputnik 3 which was 3.76 meters 
long. Sputnik 2 remained attached to its rocket. 

11 Moscow Radio. August 2, 1967 0800 GMT. 


Some time later, when the United States launched the Project 
Score satellite in the same mode as Sputnik 2— namely, leaving the 
payload attached to the spent rocket casing— it injected the entire 
sustainer portion of the Atlas launch vehicle into orbit. The United 
States announced achievement of the world's heaviest satellite to date 
(3,969 kilograms). The useful payload was actually about 68 kilo- 
grams. This provoked Leonid Sedov of the Soviet Union into some 
testiness, when he pointed out that the total weight in orbit in con- 
nection with each of the three Sputnik launches had been in exce— of 
the U.S. weight. The residual Soviet weight has been assumed to be 
about 6 metric tons, and the Sputnik 2 vehicle which like Score re- 
mained attached to the rocket body weighed 508 kilograms for a total 
combined weight of perhaps 6,50S kilograms. 

2. Launch Vehicle with Lunar Ufpev Stage, A-l 

Considering the lead times involved in developing space vehicles, it 
is likely that well before the time of Sputnik, the Russians were de- 
signing and building an upper stage to fit on their original model 
ICBM, and this raised its orbital capacity to over 4,700 kilograms, 
though its first use was for direct flights to the Moon with a net pay- 
load weight of about 400 kilograms. 

This upper stage used for the Luna 1, 2 and 3 flights was the first 
Soviet spacecraft to be put on public display in replica. Mounted on 
top of the sustainer core by an open truss structure, it measures about 
3.1 meters long and has a diameter of 2.58 meters. Strangely to this 
date the Russians have not announced the designator for the single 
nozzle engine or given its thrust. Its thrust should be on the order of 
10 to 20 metric tons. We are left with a mystery in the Soviet accounts. 
They reported for some years that the total thrust of all the engines 
was 600 metric tons. Having then told us that the five engines of the 
core and boosters had a thrust of 102 metric tons each, by subtraction 
the upper stage thrust should have been 90 metric tons, which would 
have put a heavy G load on this stage when it fired. This is the amount 
of thrust of the Soviet RD-219 upper stage engine, but it has two 
nozzles, and the lunar stage engine has only one nozzle. When this 
rocket was used for the direct flights to the Moon, the lunar stage was 
accelerated to a speed sufficient to send it to the Moon along with the 
payload. The combined weight of spent rocket and payload was on the 
order of 1.500 kilograms. 

When the Russians were ready to begin test flights leading toward 
placing man in orbit, they used this same upper stage on the original 
launch vehicle. It was not until 1967 that a replica of Vostok 1 was put 
on public display (Paris Air Show), and indeed, the upper stage of 
that assembly was essentially the same as the earlier unveiled lunar 
stage of 1959. 

It was mentioned that at first Western analysts thought a much 
smaller rocket had been used by the Russians for the launch of Sputnik 
1 because that payload weighed only 84 kilograms, and people at first 
were unaware of the great weight of accompanying rocket stage also 
in orbit. A second factor in the underestimation was the difference 
in design philosophy. For example, the early U.S. Atlas missile has 
such light construction that it must be kept pressurized all the time to 
keep it from collapsing of its own weight in relation to skin thickness. 


This was done to maximize performance for a given size of vehicle. 
By contrast, when the Soviet launch vehicle arrived by ship at Rouen, 
France, observers were fascinated to note that the core and boosters 
were unloaded with cables attached at opposite ends, and workmen 
could walk the length of the empty rockets. The implication was the 
Russians did not feel weight-limited, and had built rugged vehicles 
which still permitted them to carry the payload they wanted, within 
reasonable limits. 

3. Launch Vehicle with Improved Planetary Upper Stage, A-2 

The Luna and Vostok version of the standard vehicle did not exploit 
the total potential of the first stages, and so an improved stage was 
built which began to fly as early as 1960. Its first public disclosure came 
in 1961 in connection with the Venus attempts of that year. The Luna 
upper stage was replaced by a stage 6.6 to 8 meters long. It was able to 
send about 1,500 kilograms of payload to the Moon, not counting the 
weight of an escape rocket, and over a period of time the capacity was 
raised. Without an escape rocket it was used to increase the Earth or- 
bital capacity. The first announced use in Earth orbit was to put up 
•6.583 kilograms, and subsequently, the capacity has been described by 
them as 7,500 kilograms maximum. It was used for the pair of Voskhod 
manned flights, and has continued in use to the present time in the 
Soyuz manned flights. In addition it is the version most used in the 
Kosmos program for those flights which perform a military mission 
followed by recovery after some days. 

It is the Soviet practice to disclose information only piecemeal about 
their vehicles. In the case of the Vostok it was years before they dis- 
closed the thrust of the rockets or their number. The sole statistic 
beside the orbital weight was an output of 20,000,000 horsepower, not a 
common measure for describing the power of rockets. As mentioned 
they later said the combined thrust was 600 metric tons from six 

When the Voskhod flights came, they said the rocket had seven en- 
gines of 650 metric tons. No replica was put on display, so that analy- 
sis in the West was made more difficult. Subtraction of the announced 
thrust of the five core and booster engines seemed to leave 140 metric 
tons of thrust for an upper stage of 2 engines. This was not logical for 
the purposes or for the observed behavior of the flights. It is only in 
1975 that we finally have a fresh Soviet statement on this rocket com- 
bination. First of all, they have adjusted downward the thrust of 
the central core rocket to list it at 96 metric tons, giving 504 metric tons 
for the combined thrust of the core and boosters. Now they list the 
same upper planetary stage, as used for Soyuz as having a thrust of 
30 metric tons. The stage is powered by a single engine with four com- 
bustion chambers and nozzles. There is no clue as to how to reconcile 
the 534 metric tons of combined thrust in Soyuz with the 650 metric 
tons quoted for the same stages in the Voskhod of many years earlier. 
We still do not know what the seventh engine alluded to earlier meant, 
as only six can be counted. 

The mystery of why the Soviet listed thrusts ran ahead of normal 
reality was finally solved in 1975. Maarten Houtman of Amsterdam 
was talking with a Soviet engineer at the Paris Air Show, and was 
told that the 600-metric ton figure for thrust was found by adding to- 


gether the combined thrust of four RD-107 engines at 102 tons each, 
plus the RD-108 engine at 96 tons, for a total of 504 tons, and then 
adding to that the thrust of the same RD-108 which continued to burn 
after the four strap-ons dropped away, making the total of 600. The 
arithmetic is impeccable, but it seems a most peculiar way to count 
total thrust, and it still ignores the thrust of the final stage. 

A review of the book by Leonid Vladimirov (Finkelstein) shows 
that he published in 1971 the thrusts of the Vostok (A-l) rocket four 
years ahead of the 1975 Soyuz disclosures on the same rocket, and he 
further had information that the mysterious upper stage had a thrust 
of 11 tons, which is consistent with the RD-119 engine to be discussed 
presently. 15 

If. The Added Stage Version for Eccentric Orbit and Escape Missions, 

The A-2 version, just described, was itself a step back from the A-2- 
e, already partly described. In this version, there was indeed a seventh 
engine, in contrast to Voskhod and Soyuz. This added stage when 
used is contained within the shroud which covers the payload. The 
Russians after Luna 3 used consistently a special technique for their 
flights which required an extra stage. This was especially important 
for flights more nearly in the plane of the equator, since the Soviet 
launch sites are at relatively northern latitudes. The rocket assembly 
is launched from the cosmodrome to place the interplanetary larger 
stage plus the payload in low circular Earth orbit, where the burned 
out stage is separated. During the course of the first orbit as the pay- 
load heads northeast across the South Atlantic to cross Africa, a spe- 
cial orbital launch platform, never specifically described as to shape, 
dimensions, or weight, is oriented and from it the final payload is 
launched to higher speed by the escape rocket. This probe rocket, after 
it has done its work, is separated from the payload and flies on es- 
sentially the path as the payload. It has not been described in detail 
in Soviet publications available in the West. However, it was shown 
diagrammatically in a Soviet pamphlet written in German, "Nachrich- 
tenbruke in Kosmos" which described Molniya 1. This has subsequently 
been issued in English : "A Satellite's Overhead". The stage is shown 
as a stubby cylinder measuring about 2 meters in diameter and per- 
haps 2.5 meters long. The Royal Aircraft Establishment estimates its 
length as 2 meters. Soviet payloads which are launched from the orbi- 
tal launch platforms and given their impetus with this added escape 
stage also carry a special maneuvering engine for orbit adjustments 
and smaller verniers for orientation. 

When this whole system works, it does a very effective job. The 
Soviet program is given added flexibility as to launch windows through 
the technique of orbital launch, and calculations can be made as to the 
final stage firing in the relative tranquility of the vacuum of space. 
This flexibility is important for the Russians who have lacked the 
worldwide network of land-based tracking and control stations which 
the United States has developed in cooperation with other nations. 
But the number of steps required to carry out a deep space mission, sup- 
ported by automatic devices and a few ships, tended to expose these 

15 Vladimirov, Leonid, The Russian Space Bluff. London: Tom Stacey Ltd., 1971, p. 83. 


operations to a fairly high failure rate. Assuming that in general So- 
viet flight successes and failures are comparable to those of the United 
States because competent people in both countries are applying the 
same technology, then we see no particular reason why Soviet Earth 
orbital operations should be any less successful than those of the 
United States. But deep space work with the platform launch tech- 
nique presents in fact another story. For example, the United States 
has made 59 launch attempts for escape missions, of which only 11, or 
19 percent, have failed to escape. The Soviet Union has made an un- 
published number of attempts to use the orbital launch technique, but 
we can note that of 65 Earth orbiting platforms carrying payloads in- 
tended for the Moon, Mars, or Venus, 20 failed to send their probe 
payloads beyond Earth orbit, or a failure rate of 31 percent, higher 
than the U.S. rate. The total failure rate is undoubtedly higher for 
deep space missions because additional flights presumably did not 
even attain Earth orbit. 

5. The Standard V ehicle with Maneuvering Stage, A-m 

Late in 1963 and again in 1964, the Russians flew payloads with the 
name Polet, and these were heralded as but the first ones of a large 
series. In actual fact, no more flights occurred with exactly the same 
characteristics, and the name itself was not used again. 

What was distinctive about these flights was that they came early 
enough in the Soviet program and were ambitious enough in perform- 
ance for their being an application of the A vehicle. They were 
launched from Tyuratam. Each was advertised to have made extensive 
changes of altitude and also of orbital plane. However, the amount of 
plane change was not specified, and it is doubtful that it was very 
large. Neither flight left a separated carrier rocket in orbit as a guide 
to how extreme the subsequent maneuvers were of the final payload. So 
apparently the A-l or A-2 were not used for these launches, but some 
experimental maneuvering stage which remained attached to the pay- 
load. Either this combination did not work out as hoped, or the "m" 
stage subsequently has been incorporated into other hardware, to be 
discussed later. 

6. The Standard Vehicle Possibly in an A-l^m Configuration 
There were two more engineering test flights which bore at least a 

partial resemblance to the Polet flights. These occurred in 1965 and 
1966 under the labels Kosmos 102 and 125. There were no separated 
carrier rockets accompanying the flights, and their location of perigee 
in the southern hemisphere suggested that their lunar type stages had 
been only suborbital with an integral upper stage firing half way 
through the first orbit to put the apogee back in the latitude of the 
launch site. It is a temptation to consider this a further development 
of the use of the "m" stage, but without Soviet data, it is not provable. 

7. The Standard Vehicle Possibly in an A-2^m Configuration 

In 19T0 and 1971 there were three flights (Kosmos 379, 398, and 
434) which have never been adequately explained. In another context, 
their possible missions will be examined. They behaved a little like 
regular A-2-e vehicles in that they abandoned an interplanetary type 
stage in low Earth orbit after their launch from Tyuratam. Later they 
abandoned some piece of hardware in an eccentric orbit which reached 


out to approximately 1,200 kilometers. After this a maneuvering en- 
gine integral with the payload carried the flight to a distance of be- 
tween 11,000 and 14,000 kilometers, depending on the flight. It is pos- 
sible that this was therefore a series of flights using the A-2-m con- 
figuration. On the other hand, supposing that the hardware abandoned 
in an intermediate orbit was an "e" upper stage, then the payload may 
have incorporated a new fourth stage of high efficiency, and it might 
be labeled the A-2-e-h combination. Until there are more flights to 
give us data points, or a Soviet explanation, we may be left with no 
firm answer possible. 

Elsewhere in this chapter, Table 1-10 attempts a synthesis of the 
data collected in Tables 1-8 and 1-9 to suggest a possible set of rela- 
tionships among the rocket engines and stages used in different ve- 
hicle assemblies. It must be stressed that this is somewhat of an exer- 
eise in building a castle of sand. One good wave of new Soviet disclo- 
sures even if not crumbling the whole structure would change some 
of its parapets and towers of speculation. 


Just as the United States looked to the Redstone, Thor, Jupiter. 
Atlas, and Titan in the missile inventory to serve as first stages of 
space launch vehicles, the Russians also saw the logic of applying 
the results of extensive military R & D. As discussed, the original 
ICBM, SS-6 or Sapwood became the standard Soviet launch vehicle 
from 1957 to the present time, with its lift capability gradually im- 
proved to as much as 7.5 metric tons. Even with the economies of serial 
production, this is still an expensive way to put up every payload 
whose weight may be a small fraction of 7.5 metric tons. 

Moscow parades of military hardware had revealed medium range 
and intermediate range missiles which should have been quite capable 
of serving as the first stage of space launch vehicles. One of these, the 
SS-3 or Shyster was later pictured by the Russians as the largest of 
four classes of vertical probe rockets used for geophysical payloads 
and biological flights launched at Kapustin Yar during the late 1950's. 
Shyster was replaced in parades by an improved version which may 
have a range of about 1,600 kilometers instead of about 1.000 kilometers 
like its predecessor. This newer model was code named SS^t or Sandal. 
It was the principal rocket which showed up in Cuba during the fall 
of 1962, so its picture became well known in the United States. 

Kapustin Yar, a primary base for test flights of the Shyster and 
then the Sandal missile, came into use as a space orbital launch site 
in March of 1962 when Kosmos 1 was announced. The small Kosmos 
flights, all flown at close to 49 or 48 degree inclinations would have 
boon ideally launched by the Sandal, and that was the conclusion of 
Western analysts for five years. No specific weights were announced 
for these groups of Kosmos payloads, strongly suggesting that there 
would be a large military component among them. However, from a 
study of the replica payloads which have been put on display, this 
vehicle should be able to lift from 260 to 425 kilograms to orbit. A 
Soviet official at the Montreal Expo told David Woods the range was 
2S0 to 600 kilograms. In 1967 at the Paris Air Show, the Russians put 
on display for the first time the RD-119 upper stage rocket used for 


this launch vehicle. It had been developed between 1958 and 1962 at 
the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory. Its design concept was a 
little like the ED-107 and RD-108 from the same source. It operates 
at a pressure of 80 atmospheres, has a thrust of 11 tons, and a vacuum 
Isp of 353 seconds. It burns unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine 
(UDMH) and perhaps liquid oxygen. The single nozzle is bell-shaped, 
and a single shaft turbo pump system drives the fuel and oxidizer 
supplies as well as fairly elaborate set of auxiliary nozzles for roll, 
pitch, and yaw. 

Late in 1967, with the expansion of the Moscow Museum of Indus- 
trial Achievement, a total assembly of this small Kosmos launcher was 
put on display. This confirmed the analysts had been right: It did 
use a modified SS-4 Sandal first stage, with an added upper stage 
powered by the RD-119. Most of the payloads it puts up are spin 
stabilized, and then the carrier rocket upper stage is separated. In at 
least one case, the payload was not separated. In another case, two pay- 
loads were put up in a single launch. Twice, a special aerodynamic 
stabilization was used. More recently the first stage rocket engine has 
been displayed as the RD-214. It has four nozzles, burns kerosene in 
refined form and nitric acid. Its thrust is 72 tons, the I sp is 264 sec- 
onds, and its chamber pressure is 45 atmospheres. 

Although this study is devoted to the space program and not to 
military hardware per se, so much reference is made to military sur- 
face-to-surface missiles, many of which are also used for space pur- 
poses that Table 1-10 has been appended to give a quick reference 
check list of the better known of these. 


Small, relatively modest Soviet payloads for five years came only 
from Kapustin Yar, and after that also from Plesetsk, but not from 
Tyuratam. In 1964, however, a new series of flights began at Tyuratam 
with a vehicle which was neither a B-l, nor the large A class. It can be 
designated the C-l, and starting in 1967 it also came into use at Ple- 
setsk. It was first used for a space launch from Kapustin Yar in 1973. 

As first used, it put up multiple payloads, initially three at a time, 
then five at a time, and now eight at a time. Starting at the end of 1965 
and most of the flights since have been single payloads. The earliest 
launches were in eccentric orbits, and then came flights with circu- 
larized orbits, and these have been at increasing altitudes. 

This performance seemed in excess of what could be expected of the 
B-l launch vehicle both because of the many multiple payloads, and 
the demonstrated capacity to achieve circularized orbit at higher al- 
titudes. In addition to that the appearance of the flights from a cos- 
modrome not used for the regular small Kosmos or B-l flights was 
a further indication. Even where flights of the B-l and the C-l come 
from the same cosmodrome, there are marked differences in inclination, 
suggesting the use of different launch pads. 

As Western analysts sought a military missile which might fit the 
needs of a first stage of the C-l, the SS-5 or Skean came to mind. 
This had been paraded in Moscow, and was believed to have a range 
as a missile of close to 4,000 kilometers. It was also known as the missile 
which followed the Sandal into Cuba and posed an added threat then 
because of its greater range. 


The Skean-based C-l type of launch vehicle has not yet been put on 
display by the Russians, but finally some photographs are appearing 1 , 
and they confirm the use of this particular missile for the first stage. 
The first photograph was obtained in the West by Maarten Houtmar 
of the Netherlands. The exact dimensions are not known, bu1 some 
ratios have been developed by Phillip S. Clark of the United King- 
dom. The vehicle may be as much as 2.5 meters in diameter although 
it may be 2.4 or 2.25 meters and about 31.6 meters long. It probably 
could put over 1,000 kilograms into low Earth orbit but has not been 
used that way. More likely the payloads range from about 900 to 500 
kilograms, decreasing with altitude. The reticence to disclose anything 
about its rocket engines or performance again suggest a role which is 
largely military. Even the Skean missile when paraded in Moscow 
carried a plate to hide its power plant. Kenneth Gatland says it has 
four nozzles. 


In the United States the time came when occasional needs for put- 
ting up large space payloads exceeded the capacity of existing varieties 
of military missiles, and hence the Saturn I and I B were created. They 
grew out of preliminary designs of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency 
Redstone Arsenal team headed by Wernher von Braun. Much the 
same need must have been felt in the Soviet Union, and they, too, have 
created their first non-military-missile vehicle for space purposes. 
Some Western analysts speculate it was first designed as a super 
ICBM to carry the 100 megaton city buster warheads that Premier 
Khrushchev talked about. In any case, its flight test program has 
been limited to space work. 

1. The Basic Vehicle without Extra Stages, D 

The first launch of a new large vehicle came in July 1965, with a pay- 
load named Proton 1, and said to weigh 12.2 metric tons. The payload 
replica was put on display and it had a cylindrical cross section of 
about 4 meters. When the payload was orbited, it was accompanied 
by a separated spent carrier rocket stage. Published Western estimates 
of this stage have ranged between 12 and 27.7 meters in length, and 
these different figures in turn have raised issues not fully resolved 
about the first three Proton flights. 

The vehicle has not yet been put on public display, even though it 
has been flying for ten years, noi has a complete photograph been 
shown. Motion pictures of launches, released in the last year or so 
tantalizingly show the upper stage and payload, and also the attach- 
ment points of strapped on boosters. Inflight pictures are too fuzzy to 
do more than reveal that there are six boosters firing at the time of 
ascension from the launch pad at Tyuratam. 

The first careful drawing of the vehicle based upon these partial 
looks was done by Peter Smolders of The Netherlands. 16 He postulated 
that the general appearance was that of a scaled up A class vehicle 
with six instead of four boosters. Subsequently closer study by Charles 
P. Vick and others in the United States builds a case for the same 
essential operation of boosters, but that these may be regular cylinders 

Smolders, P. L. L., Soviets In Space, London : Lutterworth Press, 1973, pp. 70-71. 


through most of their length rather than the tapered design used for 
the A class vehicles. There may be a brief transition at the upper end 
into a conical fairing to the point of attachment to the sustainer core 
rocket. 17 

When the first launch occurred the Russians heralded this vehicle 
as opening the door to many important space uses. These included the 
construction of manned space stations and unmanned flight to the 
planets. It was given a brief and non-explicit description, generally 
said to produce about three times the horsepower of the A vehicle. 

If one makes the assumption that the same design philosophy was 
used, and this seems borne out by the limited looks provided in Soviet 
films, then the vehicle should be much like an A vehicle scaled up in 
volume three-fold (or 1.44 times linear), with the likely change that 
the boosters are mostly cylindrical. Holding to the same proportions, 
the basic vehicle sustainer core should be about 40.7 meters long. The 
combined thrust of the core plus six boosters should be on the order of 
about 1,542,000 kilograms, or close to 220 metric tons of thrust for each 
engine. Any simple three-fold scaling presents contradictions. If one 
assumes the A vehicle would lift 3,000 kilograms, the D vehicle should 
lift about 9,000 kilograms. If the A-l and A-2 lift in the range of 
4,725 to 7,500 kilograms, then the D-l should lift about 14.175 to 22,500 
kilograms. The first three Proton payloads were 12,200 kilograms, not 
an ideal fit for the D or D-l. The fourth Proton at 17,000 kilograms 
was in the right range. If the estimated length of the accompanying 
orbital rocket for the early Protons was 27.7 meters, that is too short 
to be the sustainer core which may be 40.7 meters long, if operating in 
the "A" class burn sequence. The problems with both weight lifting 
capacity and length tend to minimize the chance that the first Protons 
were put up in the same fashion as Sputnik 1 through 3. We have to 
allow for the possibility of a D version but the case is not strong. Vick 
prefers the notion that the core vehicle is ignited at altitude rather 
than at ground level. But he suggests that if this long stage went into 
orbit, it might weigh enough to explain the relatively low payload 
weight of the first three Protons. 

2. The Improved Vehicle with an Added Stage, D-l 

If the D vehicle was to demonstrate its potential in more ambitious 
flights, it needed one or more added stages, and, as discussed, may have 
had an additional stage from the outset. Applying the proportions of 
the A-2 interplanetary stage and scaling up three fold, its 8 meters 
should be about 11.6 meters on the larger vehicle. This is compatible 
with the 12 meter length assumed by the Royal Aircraft Establish- 
ment in its publications. 

One notes that the Saturn I with a first stage thrust of about 680 
metric tons would put up 9.072 kilograms of payload, and the Saturn 
I B would put up closer to 18,500 kilograms. Considering the first stage 
thrust of the D class vehicles as perhaps 1,542 metric tons, then at the 
same level of efficiency and same use, the D class vehicles should have 
the potential to put up payload weights in the range of 20,570 to 41.950 
kilograms. In fact, one must scale this back both because there is no 
evidence for the Soviet use of LOX-hydrogen fuel in upper stages, 

17 Vick, Charles P., The Soviet Superboosters — 1, Spaceflight, London, December, 1973, 
pp. 457-471. 


and because the launch site is less favorably located than Cape 
Canaveral. In addition to that is the Soviet design philosophy which 
tries to offset heavier structures for launch vehicles with more thrust, 
this combination being at the expense of payload weight. 

In the first half of ^1967 came two Kosmos launches, 146 and 164. 
These were given routine anouncement by the Russians, but British 
optical measurements showed a carrier rocket in orbit larger than the 
interplanetary stage of the A-2 rocket, and smaller that the possible 
27.7 meter length associated by some estimates with the first Proton 
launches. The payloads were estimated at 14.2 meters in length by 3 
meters in diameter. One must recognize that a small number of read- 
ings of an indirect nature which make some assumptions about shape 
and surface must render all measurements that are very tentative. The 
British estimate at the time was that the payloads in question might lie 
in the 18.000 to 27.000 kilogram range. These numbers would square 
generally with use of the D-l launch vehicle. 13 

What we do not know is whether these flights performed their mis- 
sions as intended in low Earth orbit, or were intended to fire probe 
rockets (making them D-l-e) into some further trajectory. 

In November 1968, Proton 4 was launched into orbit, and seemed 
to be accompanied by a 12-meter spent rocket casing. The Russians 
announced a weight for the payload of 17 metric tons, reasonably close 
to the Western estimate of 18 metric tons for the D-l. 

The first Salyut space stations also put up by the D-l seem to have 
had a weight of about 18.6 metric tons. With reports that they are 
likely in the future to grow to a weight of closer to 25 metric tons, this 
might, still be within the capacity of the D-l, but pushing close to the 
possible upper limit. 

3. The Improved Vehicle with Regular Upper Stage plus an Escape 
Stage. D-l-e 

During 1968, several Zond flights were made into deep space and 
around the Moon, some to return to Earth for successful recovery. 
These were identified as capable of carrying men. Of the known ve- 
hicles, only the D-l with added stage should have the capacity to carry 
a crew on a circumlunar voyage. The pictures which ultimately were 
released of the Zond 4 through 8 series showed a craft which looked 
like a Soyuz without its work compartment but with a high gain an- 
tenna for long range communications. Because the Soyuz weighs about 
6.570 kilograms, the Zond may be in the same range, but more prob- 
ably lower such as 5,800 or even 5.300 kilograms saving weight on the 
work compartment but carrying added maneuvering fuel. 

The D-l-e vehicle came into further use in 1969 for the unmanned 
Luna flights starting with Luna 15. Only occasionally have weights 
been announced. Luna 16 was listed as having landed 1,880 kilograms 
on the Moon, which is generalh T compatible with what one would ex- 
pect. Since the Russians have announced an A-2-e payload of 1.640 
kilograms sent to the vicinity of the Moon (Luna 11) and 1,180 kilo- 
grams sent to the vicinity of Venus, then a three fold increase with use 
of the D-l-e would give 4.920 kilograms and 3,540 kilograms respec- 
tively. In fact the D-l-e likely does better. For lunar fights, it prob- 
ably can carry payload in the range of 4,820 to 6,500 (more likely 

» Flight International, London. March 30, 19G7, p. 495. 


between 5,300 and 5,800) ; and for planetary flights to Venus or Mars, 
depending on the year it can probably deliver between 3,500 and 5,000 
kilograms. These numbers square with the only announced weights for 
Mars 2 and 3 at 4,650 kilograms. The D-l-e has now also been used 
to place several payloads in 24-hour circular orbit close to a fixed 
position over the Equator. 

4. The Possible Use of a D-l-m Version 

In December 1970. Kosmos 382 was launched with only a routine 
announcement of its initial orbit, which ranged from 320 kilometers 
■to 5,040 kilometers at an inclination of 51.6 degrees. Western observers 
noted that it had the same kind of man-related telemetry and fre- 
quencies as used for the Soyuz program and the other Kosmos flights 
starting with 379 whicli might have been launched by an A-2-m 
vehicle. But Kosmos 382 was different in its performance. It was 
maneuvered upward to 1,615 kilometers by 5,072 kilometers, and then 
again from 2.577 kilometers to 5,082 kilometers. In addition, on the 
last maneuver, the orbital plane was shifted to move the inclination 
from 51.6 degrees to 55.9 degrees. This was something that involved 
energy expenditures for a pay load, presumably large enough to carry 
a human crew, that was beyond the capacity of any A-2 class vehicle. 
Consequently, it has been judged to be a version of the D-l. Since it 
used a platform launch technique, it left a spent carrier rocket and 
platform in the initial orbit reported by the Russians. Its subsequent 
multiple burns went beyond the performance of previous escape 
rockets. Hence one is led to the possibility of a D-l-m combination, 
with an improved maneuvering stage. Some people would suggest 
calling it a D-l-h. indicating that the upper stage not only maneuvered 
but demonstrated some special high performance. 

If at some point the Russians bring in a new family of upper stages 
propelled by high energy fuels as the United States has done, we 
should see further increases in the lifting capacity of these A-2-e and 
A-2-m as well as D-l-e and D-l-m vehicles. 


The cumbersome SS-6 Sapwood ICBM represented a beginning for 
the Soviet intercontinental missile stockpile, but its use of cryogenics, 
and awkward shape for potential silo use must have indicated fairly 
early that despite its continuing usefulness for space, it was not 
especially good for missile purposes, unless these were first strike. 

In a 1967 article in Red Star, General Tolubko stated that these 
surface launches of the [Sapwood] took a long time to prepare and 
that later version rockets were smaller and placed in silos. 19 

As Soviet missile capabilities improved, they conducted more and 
more tests at the principal test site of Tyuratam which extended to the 
Kamchatka target areas, and then beyond to the mid-Pacific. These 
flights were often protested by the Japanese when target area closures 
were announced by the Russians. Photographs released by the United 
States Government of Soviet missile tracking ships in mid-Pacific 
and even of splashes of reentry bodies suggested that the United States 

19 Tolubko, V. F. Strategic Intercontinental . . . Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow. November 18, 
1967, p. 1A. 


was monitoring Soviet tests in the same way that Soviet ships mon- 
itor U.S. missile tests. The Russians have always described these Pa- 
cific tests as further tests of carrier rockets, often signalling through 
variation in the language that new models were coming into the test 
program, rather than just continuation of earlier series. The obser- 
vations made of the flights suggest they have definitely been tests of 
military missiles, not space carrier rockets as such. Every so often in 
the past, Soviet military leaders made specific reference to the high 
accuracy with which these tests delivered the "penultimate'* stage of 
the carrier rockets to the assigned area. 

As Table 1-11 summarizes, the Western powers have assigned SS 
designators up through the SS-20 so far, and there are NATO code 
names for most but not all of these, depending on whether they have 
been available on display or pictured in clear photographs. Of the 
longer range missiles, the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-6 have already been 
discussed in the context of their adaptation to space flight. At one 
time the SS-7 Saddler made up a large part of the Soviet missile in- 
ventory, but it was never put into a Moscow parade, and so far as can 
be judged was not adapted for space use. It was apparently a fairly 
modest capacity ICBM, which may have been the missile once shown 
in a rather blurred film clip from a Soviet movie and pictured on the 
cover of Missiles and Rochets magazine in the United States. The 
SS-8 Sasin was paraded in Moscow for a number of years, as the first 
Soviet ICBM ever given such public exposure. It seems never to have 
played a very prominent part in the inventory, but did become oper- 
ational. According to U.S. Department of Defense testimony before 
Congress, the SS-11 replaced the SS-7 as the principal part of the 
Soviet ICBM inventory. Despite its extensive use, it has not been 
paraded in Moscow, and it does not seem to have come into space use. 
Having been hidden so carefully, it lacked any publicly known XATO 
code name until quite recently, but is now called Sego. It was also of 
relatively modest capacity. 

Three other ICBM class missiles have been paraded in Moscow. 
These are the SS-9, SS-10, and SS-13. Taking them in reverse order, 
the SS-13 Savage is the technological equivalent of a Minuteman. But 
the Russians seem not to have favored solid propellant missiles for 
long range missile or space launch use. Some observers have said this 
is because their chemistry has not kept up with the same state of the 
art attained in the United States. In general, the Russians have moved 
from the early cryogenic systems to storable liquid propellants. The 
SS-10 Scrag was first paraded in May 1965 and has not been seen since 
1071. It was a long, cigar shaped three-stage rocket described by the 
Russians as "akin" to the Vostok launcher (which was then still two 
years away from its first public unveiling). The stages were joined by 
open truss sections. The Russians also hinted that this vehicle was cap- 
able of putting a bomb in orbit for delivery to any place on Earth. In 
November 1965. when it was paraded again, the Russians were a little 
defensive in their comments stressing it did not violate any treaty re- 
strictions on use of space weapons because such agreements prohibited 
their use, not their production. Further, they said in a sense, every 
ICBM is a space weapon, anyway, as all such missiles fly through 
space, and their use is permitted under the terms of the spkce treaty. 


1. Use as a Weapons Carrier, F-l-r 

When Soviet test nights of fractional orbit bombardment syst 
(FOBS, see Chapter Six) began in 1960, unofficial Western observers 
wondered if they were seeing the SS-10 Scrag being flown. Later, I . 
U.S. Department of Defense credited the FOBS nights to the SS-9 
Scarp with added stages. Apparently the SS-10 Scrag never entered 
the operational inventory. It was paraded again in May 1066 and No- 
vember 1966. The same brief description of its orbital use continued. 
However, when it was paraded in November 1967, no reference was 
made to an orbital capacity, and in the parade appeared for the first 
time the SS-9 Scarp. The TASS report on this new SS-9 was : 

The last to appear were mammoth rockets each of which can deliver to target 
nuclear warheads of tremendous power .... These rockets can he used for inter- 
continental and orbital launchings. 20 

The SS-9 has indeed become an important element in the Soviet ar- 
senal, and in retrospect it is possible to trace its further extension to 
use in the space program as well, for missions closely allied with mili- 
tary functions, but not the more civilian and scientific part of the space 

In December 1965, the Russians announced rocket tests which they 
called tests of "landing systems" with "some elements" falling in the 
Pacific (staging, not payloads), which fitted the operational pattern 
of FOBS flights which came later. In November 1966, General Dan- 
kevich associated orbital rockets with silo launches, and said these ve- 
hicles carried very lanrc warheads. 21 Secretarv Laird in the United 
States stated that the SS-9 Scarp was the carrier of the FOBS 
system. 22 

The SS-9 Scarp was paraded as a 33.2-35 meter long, bottle-shaped 
rocket, with a principal diameter of 3 meters. In the parade the war- 
head section was about 1.15 meters in diameter, then expanding into 
a cone to join the main 3 meter diameter cylinder. It is hard to tell pre- 
cisely whether the SS-9 Scarp as paraded was a two or three stage 
vehicle. It may have been divided at about 17.5-19.7 meters up from 
the base, with perhaps another 10.4-8.5 meters making up the second 
stage, and 5.3 meters making up either a third stage with warhead or 
simply a warhead. 

Since for two years the SS-10 Scrag was described as an orbital 
weapon, it is possible that the third stage of that vehicle was trans- 
ferred to the SS-9 Scarp for a further version which has not been pic- 
tured or put on display. In some of its space uses, a fourth stage is also 
required, to account for the patterns of debris or expended rocket cas- 
ings winch can be observed in flight. 

Our interest in this rocket in the context of this report is as a 
military space payload carrier, the F-l-r or F-l-m. "We cannot say 
what the whole assemblage looks like today. From parade views, we 
know the first stage is quite different from the A class vehicles. While 
the A class uses a core with four strap-on boosters, for a total of 20 noz- 
zles, the F class first stage shows 6 nozzles visible, while a plate covers 
the center part of the base, which could hide a seventh central nozzle. 

20 TASS, Moscow. 0710 GMT, November 7. 1967. 

21 Dankevich, P. E., Interview on Moscow Radio, 1430 GMT, November IS. 1966. 

22 Laird, Melvin Ii. Fiscal year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, Februarv 20, 1970, 
p. 103. 


The first known space use of the system was for FOBS tests, apparently 
in a four stage version. The first stage is suborbital. A carrier rocket 
stage, whether second stage or third stage is not clear, is abandoned in 
the initial orbit attained. The Royal Aircraft Establishment gives its 
dimensions as 8 meters long by 2.5 meters in diameter. In flight, a 
further change in orbit occurs, and this places an orbital platform in 
still another position. It is from this latter object that retrofire occurs 
(hence the designator "r" symbolizing the retrofire fourth stage) 
which drives the warhead back to Earth; while the rest of the orbiting 
hardware continues in space for at least a few more orbits. 

2. Use as a Maneuvering Vehicle, F-l-m. 

The F class vehicles have now appeared in several other flight mode-, 
and these will be discussed in a later chapter. The essential change in 
the hardware is the appearance of a fourth maneuvering stage which 
may be the outgrowth of work started in the Polet and Kosmos 102 
and 125 programs. These can be labeled the F-l-m series, although 
there may be subtypes to fit the different flight modes which have been 
observed. All the F class space payloads have been launched from 
Tyuratam. The weapons-related flights have been at an inclination of 
49.5 degrees. The maneuvering flights, for a variety of military pur- 
poses in the general range of from 62 to 66 degrees inclination. These 
additional missions seem to relate to inspector/destructor flights, 
radar ocean surveillance, and possibly other uses. 


Perhaps the most elusive space launch vehicle in the Soviet collec- 
tion is their very heavy system. The need for such a system is highly 
compelling if the Russians have been serious in their interest in botl 
manned lunar flight and later manned planetary flight. They have 
talked a great deal about orbital assembly of orbital stations and deep 
space manned craft, but the actual use of orbital assembly has not 
kept pace with the talk and rumors of what they may be planning to 
do. Some of these possibilities will be discussed later in this study. 

While orbital assembly is seen by Soviet space officials as the ultimate 
technique for many advanced missions, the availability of a large 
launch vehicle would serve Soviet interests at an earlier date in the 
same way the Saturn V was of use to the United States. Even when 
assembly is commonplace, putting up some heavy and complex compo- 
nents with a large launch vehicle has advantages. 

Over the years, the Russians have taken some special pride in build- 
ing large aircraft, hydroelectric dams, drag lines, battle tanks, artil- 
lery. They have in the past stressed their leadership in high payload 
weights in space. One can imagine that a very large space launch 
vehicle would find a place in their hardware development. However, 
because they have treated all space propulsion details as sensitive 
information, they usually have waited some years after launch ve- 
hicles became operational before revealing details about them. This 
has been evident in the text of this chapter. Consequently, it is very 
difficult to find specific Soviet statements about a very large vehicle. 

In the United States, however, there have been statements by the 
most senior NASA officials through 1970 that such a Soviet very 


heavy lift vehicle lias been underdevelopment. Indeed, it has even been 
described as having the general capacity of the Saturn V. Depending 
upon what assumptions one makes about upper stage efficiency, its lift 
capacity for several missions can be variously estimated. If it was orig- 
inally intended to fly during the late 1960's, it can be speculated that 
perhaps some or all of the stages of the D-l-e vehicle related to Pro- 
ton, Zond, deep space, and Salyut payloads, would represent a shortcut 
way to attain an earlier operational capability. This would be akin 
to the U.S. use of the S-IVB stage on Saturn V or the Centaur stage 
on Titan III. Since the D-l-e vehicle does not demonstrate the kind 
of lifting efficiency associated with high energy fuels, then perhaps 
the G-l-e heavy lift vehicle also will fall short of its full potential in 
early use. The NASA estimates about the Soviet vehicle put the first 
stage thrust in the range of 4.5 to 6.35 thousand metric tons, compared 
with 3.4 thousand metric tons of the Saturn V. But without high 
energy fuels, that might mean a capacity to deliver about the same 
45.500 kilograms to the vicinity of the Moon which a Saturn V typical- 
ly will send. 

How reliable can such estimates be ? That is hard to say for a vehicle 
which the Russians have not discussed in specific terms, and which 
in any case is too big to be paraded. But since the "national technical 
means" which are used to count Soviet missile silos and slight differ- 
ences in their dimensions are freely cited by Secretaries of Defense, 
one has to assume that this Nation should have a fair idea of the scope 
of work associated with such a postulated large vehicle. 

The Russians themselves have thoroughly obscured the issue of 
whether in fact such a vehicle exists. Some have praised the economy 
of orbital assembly over direct flights to the Moon with a big vehicle. 
On November 12, 1965. Cosmonaut Nikolayev stated in a Sovio radio 
interview that studies were underway to see whether manned flights 
into deep space should be solely through orbital assembly or also 
through use of a large vehicle for direct flights. By July 1966. a Czech 
commentator, Jan Petranek, was talking in terms of a 100,000-kilo- 
gram-payload ship. 23 In March, 1967. General Kamanin, the leader of 
the cosmonaut corps was predicting flights to the Moon of payloads in 
the 60.000 to 70.000 kilogram range. 24 This might have meant through 
orbital assembly, but if based upon use of high energy fuel in upper 
stages would scale well with the 4.5 to 6.35 thousand metric ton thrust 
first stage for the G class vehicles, since a Saturn V at 3.4 thousand 
metric tons thrust would deliver 45,500 kilograms on a similar mission. 

One of the most specific forecasts of a very large Soviet vehicle 
was written by Karel Pacner of Czechoslovakia in the October 4, 1967 
issue of the Prague magazine Student, in which he specifically credited 
Cosmonaut Popovich and General Kamanin as saying the very large 
vehicle was under preparation, that is, a vehicle well ahead of the D 
class. By October 1967, Cosmonaut Feoktistov, who was a senior official 
of the space design bureau, was quoted in Pravda as forecasting deep 
space flights using both the approach of Earth orbital assembly and 
direct from the surface of the Earth with [large] vehicles. 25 In March 

23 Petranek, Jan, quoted on Prague Radio, 1530 GMT, July 21, 1966. 
,4 Kamanin, N., quoted on Warsaw Radio, 1900 GMT, March 9, 1967. 
25 Quoted by Moscow Radio, 0300 GMT, October 3, 1967. 


1968 at Frankfurt, Leonid Sedov, the important space academician, 
stated there were now larger rockets in existence which were used 
exclusively for space, as opposed to adapted military rockets, and that 
these could support flights to the Moon and planets. The rocket re- 
quired for landing on the Moon already existed, he said. 26 

Rumors and cosmonaut predictions of a manned lunar landing by 
the end of 1969 were prevalent in the first half of that year, and could 
reasonably have been supported only by flights of a large vehicle. It 
is hard to conclude the Russians were really ready for such a mission 
on the basis of public evidence, although some surprising development 
might have made it feasible. Alternatively, the Soviet predictions of 
that spring may have garbled plans for manned orbital flight around 
the Moon and also the automated return to Earth of lunar samples 
gathered by remotely controlled devices, rather than referring realis- 
tically to manned lunar landings that early. In any case, no success- 
ful flights of the big vehicle were accomplished, and the American 
press by early fall was repeating stories of uncertain origin that there 
had been a failure (or failures) of the big vehicle. It is obvious that 
hopes for any manned operations, whatever the missions, in 1969 were 
not met, including any time-competitive flight to rival Apollo 11, or 
any follow-on American flight if Apollo 11 had failed. 

The next Soviet reference to a potentially large vehicle was by 
Academician Boris Petrov in August 1969 that a new type of vehicle 
would be used to place a large unmanned space station in orbit, that 
it was not necessary to send men to the Moon when automatic devices 
could perform the mission of bringing home rocks. He said that up to 
four Soyuz craft could then dock with this large new space station. 
"While talking of ultimate flight to the Moon, he claimed that Luna 15 
could not carry a man, but that the Zond class could ; and further that 
some flights would be direct to the Moon. 27 

From these many speculative statements and inferences of the logic 
of how to achieve missions the Russians have repeatedly claimed were 
encompassed within their interest, it seems possible to postulate at 
least two versions of the large vehicle : One would be the G-l-e, in- 
tended for flight to the Moon; the other would be the G-l, intended 
for launching a space station core into Earth orbit. Later versions 
might substitute high energy fuel upper stages enhancing the per- 
formance over the levels estimated to be similar to the Saturn V. 

One can speculate that any direct flight to the Moon with men would 
be beyond the capability of the G-l-e as described, since the Saturn V 
could not do this. Either a rendezvous operation would be required, or 
the G-l-e would have to be uprated with high energy fuels, to make it 
the equivalent of the one-time NASA design concept called Nova. 
Some of these possibilities will he explored in further details in a later 

Meanwhile, what has happened to the class G vehicle? Some West- 
ern observers doubted that it ever existed. This seems unlikely, consid- 
ering the need and the NASA official testimony. Charles P. Vick has 
even drafted a book about this vehicle which the public has not seen, 
with his findings summarized in Spaceflight magazine of London. 28 

96 Frankfurt Radio, 2020 GMT, March 20, 1968. 
27 Tokyo Kyodo. 0505 GMT, August 20, 1969. 

29 Vick, Charles P. The Soviet Super Boosters — 2, Spaceflight, London. March 1974 p. 94. 


Aviation Week has carried a number of times the apparent dates or 
periods that launch attempts were made with the G class vehicle, all 
of which failed. 29 If it is true that there have been three failures since 
the first attempt in 1969, this must have been very disappointing to I he 
program managers. Now, six years later, we still have not seen a suc- 
cessful flight. The program may be as much as sixteen years old. and 
presumably a very heavy investment has been made in assembly, test- 
ing, and launch facilities as well as the cost of developing the flight 
articles. The investment is perhaps almost too much to write off, and 
future parts of the program depend upon successful development. 

Charles P. Vick has made extensive studies of the Landsat pictures 
of the Tyuratam launch area, using pictures taken in several different 
wavelengths, and he is convinced he can pick out two very large launch 
pads and a major assembly building which support the G class vehi- 
cles. While his studies have tested a variety of hypotheses for various 
structures which might represent the design of the G class vehicles, it 
seems the data in the public domain are too scarce to come up with any 
real notion. Assuming that the vehicle uses some form of clustering as 
is true of both U.S. and Soviet vehicles of large size, and further 
assuming the configuration is anything like the A class vehicles, th n 
the basic stages without escape stage and payload may measure on the 
order of 80 meters tall and with a base measure of 17 meters, or if there 
are fins, 21 meters. No one should be misled into thinking that these 
dimensions are the actual ones; rather, they merely show in terms of 
tankage how big a vehicle of the A configuration would be if the 
thrust w T ere around 5.4 thousand metric tons. 

This concludes the discussion of launch vehicles which either have 
been used successfully or there are strong grounds for suspecting have 
been tested for space purposes. Predictions for the future will be con- 
sidered in another chapter. Some Western analysts have postulated 
a number of additional Soviet space launch vehicles, including one 
midway between the D and G vehicle sizes, 30 but this chapter has not 
speculated on vehicles which have not appeared in some form, as 
even dealing with the ''known 1 ' vehicles has proven difficult enough. 

29 Aviation Week, New York, March 17, 1975. p. 71 summarized these failures. See also 
Charles P. Vick, The Soviet Superboosters — 2, Spaceflight, London, March 1974, pp. 

so For example, see : Stine, G. Harry, Some Strange Things Happened at Baykonur, in 
Analog Scieuce Fiction/Science Fact, 1970, pp. 104-120. 


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IV. Tracking and Other Ground Support 


Space operations require extensive support from Earth, including 
not only a launch pad with its associated assembly and checkout equip- 
ment, but also down range guidance and command, tracking, and other 
communications links. After the payload is in orbit, then tracking is 
useful for keeping posted on it and on all other objects in space, and 
for commands to the payload and receipt of data gathered or observed 
by the payload. 

The Soviet Union may have started its space program with a curious 
mixture of very ambitious and comprehensive plans for use of l&rge 
vehicles which could perform many missions in Earth orbit and be- 
yond, combined with minimal support on the ground in terms of varie- 
ties of hardware, limited number of pads, and minimal communica- 
tions links. 

It is very likely that the early launch guidance was primarily by 
radio, radar and optical means because of the pattern of flying down 
the same corridor repetitively from Tyuratam : indeed this may still 
be true for many space launches, simply with more radio and theodo- 
lite tracking stations being added along additional corridors. This is 
suggested by the fact that vehicles which almost certamly must come 
from different launch pads, added when new tvpes of vehicles were 
added, fly on inclinations that vary from the earlier standard ones only 
by an amount compatible with passing near some down range track- 
ing points in about the same relationship as vehicles launched from 
the original pads. 

Minimal ground support will permit the start of a program, but as 
needs to exploit the potential of space for science and applications 
grow, then more is required in Earth-based facilities. 


Soviet public state?nents abont their tracking capabilities for the 
early years made particular reference to optical tracking facilities. 
These were in many parts of their own countrv. They also encouraged 
observers in Soviet bloc countries to send reports of observation? to 
Moscow. Some of the equipment was relatively simple: only a few 
more advanced telescope systems were pictured, with no indication of 
how many of these better systems there were. 

Even with Soviet reticence in discussing more than optical track- 
ing- there were Western reports of a network consi sting- of a master 
station and twelve others equipped with receivers to measure Doppler 
shifts in radio signals, tracking radars, and phototheodolites, trans- 
mitin<r data to a central computation center. 31 Four such stations were 
revealed as to location by the Russians in 1964 in a OOSPAR report. 32 

The first official and mnyp f > x ter\? : "<^ listing <oo me in connection with 
the Apollo Soyuz Test Proiect in 1975. This included the following 
seven land bases: Yevpatoriya, Tbilisi, Dzhusaly, Kolpashevo, Ulan- 
Ude. Ussuriyisk, and Petropavlovsk. 33 More likely than not. there are 
other stations to meet the needs of particular programs. 

81 Aviation Week, New York. January 26. 1969. p. 26. 
» Cospar Bulletin No. 18, Paris. April 1964, pp. 10-11. 
" Aviation Week, New York. May 5, 1975, pp. 42-43. 


In addition (to tracking stat ions tied to specific programs, the Rus- 
sians have a space defense system, akin to the facilities which feed data 
to Norad on this continent. There have been frequent references in the 
Western press to their ABM defense system, which of necessity is not 
only a missile launching system, but is also an elaborate tracking sys- 
tem, built around large arrays of radar referred to as Hen House. Any 
system which tracks long range strategic missiles also tracks space 
objects crossing Soviet territory or its approaches, regardless of na- 
tionality and absence of active signal emissions. 

Because of the size of the Soviet Union in geographic terms, stretch- 
ing as it does to a width close to two and a half times that of the con- 
tinental contiguous United States, the domestic space tracking net- 
work does a better job of coverage than would a U.S. domestic system. 
But any worldwide tracking capability must extend beyond the politi- 
cal borders of any single nation. 


From the time of Vanguard on, the United States developed bi- 
lateral agreements with other nations to permit the establishment of 
tracking stations in all parts of the world, especialty north and south 
through the Americas, essential to coverage of the satellites using 
minitrack. Then a similar system was developed for Project Mercury 
in an equatorial belt around the Earth. This has since supported 
Gemini and the Earth orbital operations of Apollo. 

The Soviet Union either did not feel the same need for such com- 
plete coverage of its flights, being content to pick up recorded data as 
the flights went over their own territory, or perhaps they were re- 
luctant to negotiate pacts with other countries which would expose the 
details of their data collection in the same open manner as the NASA 
program of the United States. 

Hence, in a much more limited way they developed only a few largely 
unpublicized tracking stations in other countries, mostlv place? with 
a political climate favorable to the U.S.S.R. In December 1967. TASS 
referred to Soviet stations in the United Arab Republic (presumably 
Helwan), Mali, and "other" countries. 24 By April 1968, Guinea in 
West Africa was also named. 35 By October 1968. reference was made to 
a station in Cuba. 36 In February 1970, reference was made to a second 
Station in the U.A.R., this one in Aswan. 37 In 1971, they added one in 
Fort Lamy, Chad. 38 From time to time there have been rumors and re- 
ports that the Russians put out feelers that they might like to estaH ish 
tracking stations in such countries as Indonesia. Australia, and Chile. 
It is believed tracking is done at Khartoum in the Sudan, Afgoi in 
Somali, Kerguelen (South Indian Ocean) and Mirnyy (Antarctica). 


Because of Soviet reluctance to become too dependent upon foreign 
land-based stations, or perhaps because not all nations approached were 
willing to be hosts, the Soviet Union has put considerable emphasis 

84 TASS 0755 GMT. December 7, 1967. 

85 Moscow Radio, 1800 GMT, April 13, 1968. 

86 Grnnma, Havana. October 19. 1968. p. 6. 

87 TASS. 1940 GMT. February 8, 1970. 

88 TASS, 1719 GMT, February 8, 1972. 


upon developing a sea-based support system. These consist of 
several classes of ships. One group operates in the mid-Pacific, ami ha 3 
been pictured in Western magazines and books. These are fairly im- 
pressive looking, loaded down with radomes and many specialized an- 
tennas and theodolites. They serve both to record missile tests, in the 
area where the dummy warhead is to splash; or in sight of the orbital 
path of spacecraft overflying the Pacific, usually for their initial 

Other less well-equipped ships in comparison with the missile track- 
ers have for some years operated in the tropica] Atlantic and the Medi- 
terranean along the path of orbital flights. Such ships would put into 
various ports in these parts of the world for supplies and crew rest, 
and when they left port it was usually an indication that new space 
launches were pending. 

By noting what tracking ships are registered by the Russians as 
civilian type vessels, and which are treated as naval ships, it appears 
that the Pacific missile tracking ships whose pictures have been pub- 
lished after being photographed at sea by U.S. aircraft, are under the 
operational control of Soviet military authorities. 

By contrast, the ships seen in the Atlantic and Mediterranean have 
now been identified as operating for the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 
Where once these ships were merchant vessels with only a minimum 
of modifications in appearance to serve the space program, now there 
has been a marked upgrading and even the development of highly 
sophisticated big ships with considerable communications equipment 
on board. In December 1067, the science ships were identified as the 
Dolinsk, Bezhitsa, Ristna, Aksay, Morzhovets, Kegostrov, Nerd, 
Borovichi, and Kosmovavt Vladimir Komarov. 2,9 Since that time vir- 
tually all of these ships have been named by the Russians as being in 
particular regions to support certain space flights, especially in the 
Atlantic, but also in the Indian Ocean. Subsequent to the 1007 list- 
ing, two progressively larger and better science tracking ships have 
been added : the Akademik Sergey Korolev, and the Kosmonavt Yuriy 
Gagarin. Details on the principal ships follow : 

1. Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov 

This was the first of the greatly improved Soviet tracking ships. It 
appeal's to be a converted merchant ship hull of about 11,000 gross 
tons with an enlarged superstructure and several large radomes. It 
was first spotted by the West on a voyage through the English Chan- 
nel while outbound from Leningrad to Havana, Cuba, which harbor 
ir often frequented. 

TASS in June 1970 said the ship has 1.000 or more berths, that it 
was built in 1967 at Leningrad, and has special computers and lab- 
oratories on board. 40 Pravda Ukrainy of June 23, 1970, said that it 
i >] rated during the Soyuz 9 flight with a total complement of 240 
men. including 125 scientists. 41 

The Russians have also said that communications between some 
spacecraft and Moscow can be maintained on a realtime basis even 
when not in direct view of the Soviet Union by having the Kosmonavt 

as Moscow Radio. 2200 GMT, November 26, 1967. 

« TASS. 1004 GMT. June 5. 1070. 

41 Pravda Tkrainy, Kiev. June 23, 1970, p. 4. 


Vladimir Komarov serve as a relay point on Earth, with a further 
relay from the ship via one of the Molniya 1 satellites which shares 
mutual visibility between the ship and the Soviet Union. This type of 
relay was first mentioned in connection with the Soyuz 6-7-8 flights 
of October 1969." 

2. Akademik Sergey Korolev 

On December 2G, 1970, the Soviet Union announced the addition to 
the fleet of the Soviet Academy of Sciences the space satellite con 
ship Akademik Sergey Korolev. It was described as the largest scien- 
tific research ship in the world, 182 meters long and displacing 21,250 
metric tons. It was not further described, but was to set out on its 
maiden voyage early in 1971." Details finally were forthcoming in 
September 1971. It was described as a Diesel-engined ship with single 
propeller, a speed of 17.5 knots, and carrying a crew of 300. It had a 
radome just aft of the bridge, and two fairly large parabolic dish 
antennas, one amidships, and the other near the stern. The ship was 
described as having 28 suites of office, bedroom and bath for senior 
command staff, 34 single and 124 double cabins for crew and scientists. 
There was a gymnasium, two swimming pools (one enclosed), a li- 
braiy, reading room, and other cultural amenities. The ship had over 
80 laboratories and dual air conditioning systems. The ship was active 
in the flights of Soyuz 10 and 11 serving as a link witli Moscow via a 
Molniya satellite. It was built at Xikolayev on the Black Sea. With 
a range of 22,500 nautical miles, it was capable of 120 days of inde- 
pendent navigation without replenishment." 

3. Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin 

This vessel was the latest and also the largest, most ambitious of 
the Soviet tracking ships. The ship made its first voyage in 1971. It 
looks as if it had been converted from the hull of a super tanker. 
The first account spoke of its having over 120 laboratories. Its scien- 
tific instrumentation came direct from scientific institutes rather than 
from industrial enterprises, and units were designed for easy installa- 
tion and replacement so that the ship could keep up to date as tech- 
nology advanced. It was designed to operate away from home base 
for as long as six months at a time. It had a 19,000 horsepower turbine 
power plant, The library had 10,000 books. Its theater seated 300 
people. There were nine elevators, three swimming pools, and a 
sports hall big enough for a football match. There was also an auto- 
matic telephone exchange. 45 

The ship was described as having over 100 antennas, and via Mol- 
niya satellites could reach almost any telephone in the Soviet Union 
around the clock. It was capable of receiving high data rates fr m 
satellites and amplifying weak signals at planetary distances. There 
were over 1,250 compartments in the ship. 

The Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin has a displacement of 45,000 tons, 
a speed of 18 knots, has a length of 231 meters, and a width of 31 
meters. 46 

42 Izvestiya. Moscow, October 10. 1960. p. 2. 
« ^ASS. 1817 GMT, December 2G, 1070. 

44 Kamenetskiy, Yu. T. G. M. Balabayev, and O. M. Zlatopol'skaya "Akademik Spr^v 
Korolev — A New Scientific Research Ship". Sudostroveniye, Leningrad, No. 9, 1971, pp. 3-4. 

45 T.eninjrradskava Pravda. Leningrad, July 17, 1971, p. 1. 

46 Izvestiya, Moscow, July 18, 1971, p. 3. 


Late in December 1971, a photograph appeared showing this ship 
anchored in Odessa, getting ready for its first operations. The first 
big dish antenna just behind the bridge was like a regular Orbita 
antenna for communication with Molniya. One of similar size was 
appearently intended to make trajectory and orbital data measure- 
ments. The two largest dishes, further back were intended for deep 
space work. In the same photograph were the 17,500 ton Kosmonact 
Vladimir Komarov and the almost 21,500 ton Akademik Sergey 
Korolev. An accompanying article noted the new ship had 11 decks, 
and spoke of its many marvels, including a precision navigation sys- 
tem which permitted the antenna to correct for movements of the 
ship, movements of star fields, and also correct for angles of list and 
yaw in relation to the ship's course, and even for distortions in the 
ship's hull caused by heavy seas. This ship is also air conditioned 
throughout. Slightly different statistics credited it with eight elevators 
and 260 seats in its theater. 47 

Still another account counted 130 antennas in addition to the four 
main dishes. The ship's horsepower was listed as 19,500. It also has 
roll dampers and tw T o maneuvering rudders in the bow and a third 
in the stern. 48 

The major antennas were listed as ranging from 12 meters to 25 
meters in diameter. 49 

The new tracking ships were a great advance over such vessels as the 
Ilichevsh and Krasnodar, used for space support in 1957 and long 
since disappeared. 

Table 1-12, which follows, summarizes what is known from public 
sources about all the Soviet tracking ships. 

47 Izvestiya. Moscow. December In, 1971. p. 4. 

48 Trud. Moscow, December 14, 1971, p. 2 ; Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, December 15, 1971, 
p. 4. 

48 Leningradskaya Pravda, Leningrad, March 15, 1975, p. 4. 


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4. Other Tracking Ships 

It will be noted from Table 11 that four military tracking ships are 
relatively small, the Sibir, Suchan, and Sakhalin entered service first, 
The Chukhotka, Chazma, and Chumikan followed with the latter i wo 
being larger and faster. It probably was not coincidence that during 
the recovery of the aborted Apollo 13 flight the Chumikan was in this 
remote part of the South Pacific, not near known Soviet test area.-, 
when it offered assistance to the Americans. Undoubtedly its reason 
for being there was the collection of intelligence by studying the 
Apollo reentry ablation phase. 

Other tracking ships which have broken into the news, include the 
Morzhovets which was put under temporary arrest in a Brazilian port 
for violating territorial waters. During the Soyuz 9 mission. Trud re- 
ported that the Morzhovets, Kcgostrov, and Bezhitsa were in the South 
Atlantic. 50 

During the Zond circumlunar flights, the Russians have described 
how they deliberately plan for these to approach Earth over the polar 
regions, sometimes dipping into the atmosphere and then skipping out 
again before making a second reentry and landing. In one case, Zond 5 
entered over Antarctica, but instead of developing aerodynamic flft to 
skip out of the atmosphere and home to the U.S.S.Iv.. it made a ballistic 
reentry and landed in the ocean. The Russians had named five track- 
ing ships as being in that ocean, and it was the Borovichiy that made 
the pick up, but the capsule was transferred to a Soviet meteorlogieal 
service ship, the Vasiliy Golovnin for carriage to Bombay, from where 
it was air-lifted home. Zond 8 also landed in the Indian Ocean, after 
a northern approach, but the ship making the pickup was not named. 

Closely related to the Soviet Academy of Sciences ships like the 
Morzohovets and its three sisters are eight ships with naval crews 
that are not known to have supported the space program but appar- 
ently work on missile programs. 

5. General Locations of Soviet Tracking Ships 

The foregoing paragraphs have referenced several of the places 
where Soviet tracking ships can be found during missions, but a com- 
prehensive summary of these locations was prepared by James E. 
Oberg of the United States. 51 Captain Oberg mapped in relation to 
spacecraft ground traces the favorite places for the tracking ships. For 
example, he showed that during most of the Soyuz flights, one of the 
high capacity civilian ships anchors off Sable Island, Xova Scotia 
( about 44.5° X, 59.5° W) where four successive orbits pass within easy 
direct communication range. A second location connected with the 
manned flights is in the Gulf of Guinea. West Africa, to monitor retro- 
fire just before the reentry and landing near Karaganda in the 
U.S.S.R. In this same Gulf of Guinea area, deep space flights get their 
acceleration out of Earth orbit, so are often monitored there. When a 
deep space flight occurs, the ground trace reflects the combined effects 
of the acceleration to escape and the turning of the Earth itself. The 
ground trace goes east over Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, but as it 
climbs away from Earth, velocity is lost and the ground trace makes a 

50 Trud. Moscow, June 6, 1970. p. 4. 

51 Oberjr. James. Soviet tracking from the sea, Flight International, London. Novem- 
ber 15, 1973, pp. 828-9. 


U-turn over the South Atlantic and heads west over Central America. 
I [< rice, there are often tracking ships strung along (his South Atlantic 
trace which otherwise would be unobservable with ease from Soviet 
territory. Finally, the Zond type of low G reentry from the Moon re- 
quires monitoring and potential pickup near Madagascar in the Indian 
Ocean when flights approach Earth over Antarctica. They also must 
be in the Indian Ocean between South Africa and Australia when 
such flights come in over the Arctic and land in the Indian Ocean. A 
large tracking ship either in a Cuban port such as Havana or Santiago, 
or in Trinidad gives added coverage to these deep space flights during 
early critical phases of the escape mission. During the ASTP mission, 
a large tracking ship was located off the coast of Honduras (at ap- 
proximately 16° N, 87.5° W) to supplement the Sable Island position. 


Reference has already been made to sea-based tracking in support 
not only of Earth orbital missions, but deep space flights as well. In 
the case of the United States. 3STASA saw a need for 24-hour world- 
wide coverage to support its deep space operations. It first built 
•2r>.D-meter stecrable dishes at Goldstone, California; and in Australia, 
South Africa, and Spain, and these were followed by 64-meter dishes 
for Goldstone. Australia, and Spain. 

The Soviet Union could profit from a similar worldwide capability, 
but has not achieved the same level of coverage. Its equivalent of Gold- 
stone is at Yevpatoriya in the Crimea, once visited by Sir Bernard 
Lovell of British Jodrell Bank fame. The design approach used by 
the Russians ha- been different from the American approach. They 
seem to have two principal sets of antennas, each consisting of a single 
steerable mount carrying eight medium sized dishes arranged in banks 
of four. By operating these mounts along a railroad track, they ran 
serve as interferometers. One would think it logical that there be a 
second installation in the Soviet Far East to expand their coverage, 
but if there is such a major station, it has not been revealed. 

Beyond that, they rely on such devices as the three largest of their 
tracking ships which may take turns serving in the Caribbean area to 
extend Soviet deep space coverage. The only other Soviet recourse is 
to rely upon automatic systems in their deep space craft, or if more 
nearly real time data and commands must be exchanged, to plan their 
missions to have crucial events take place when that part of the world 
containing the U.S.S.R. faces toward the distant spacecraft. 


Earlv Soviet pictures of space operation^ centers looked very simple 
by U.S. standards, but gradually over time, the pictures have shown 
advances in the kind of equipment the Russians have available. The 
program was about ten years old before detailed descriptions of con- 
trol centers began to appear, and it was only with the Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project that visits by Americans were permitted to one center. 

Colonel General Tolubko described for TASS in November 1007 the 
role of the military in the launch of Venera 4. which can probablv be 
assumed to be typical of so-called scientific flights. Members of the 


Soviet Strategic Rocket Force conducted the launch, and ten minutes 
after lift-off, control passed from the military to the command meas- 
uring complex of stations all over the U.S.S.R. and on ships in 
several oceans. 52 That same month, Lieutenant General Leontyev 
stated that the Strategic Rocket Forces had been responsible for all 
launches of Sputniks, Lunas, Veneras, Molniyas, and the manned 
flights. 63 

In May 196S, Red Star described the computing-coordinating center 
(KVTS) operated by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. This center 
collects data from stations all over the world where it is then processed, 
analyzed, evaluated, and compared. Red Star described the center as 
having a huge operations hall, with a large map of the world at one 
end on which the computed trajectories of the current spacecraft were 
displayed. Illuminated panels either side of the main map carry the 
principal steps of the launch count down, and a status board of all 
other active Soviet payloads. Other walls are covered with more de- 
tailed diagrams, tables, graphs, and maps needed for the operation. 
The account went on to describe the receipt and use of many channels 
of telemetry. 54 

Pravda carried a further description in April 1969. This was in 
connection with the Venera flights. A side room was used for this 
purpose rather than the main hall. There were special telephones and 
apparatus for communicating with all computer coordinating centers 
and telemetry collection points throughout the U.S.S.R. Data on the 
flight position of the two Venera spacecraft then in flight were being 
plotted on a cylindrical recorder by tracing pens. In the telemetry 
section near by. the reporter saw more tracing pens plotting data from 
the spacecraft on paper bands. At the opposite end of the establish- 
ment were the big computers with the output unit passing out endless 
columns of numbers. In the main hall, primary data on the flight were 
being displayed on several large screens. The pictures were being 
drawn in full color diagrams by connection with a computer which 
was generating these displays directly from the telemetry. 55 This gen- 
eral description is highly reminiscent of the most advanced U.S. dis- 
play systems. 

More descriptions were released in June 1970. The reporter from 
Izvestiya reported that on the approach drive to the center he saw 
three large steerable antenna dishes which were receiving data. On this 
occasion it was Soyuz 9, and as soon as the ship came over the horizon, 
the large display screens showed live television from the cabin of the 
manned craft. He reported the tape was almost half a meter wide, as 
it poured out of a computer with many blinking lights. 56 

A similar article in Krasnaya Zvezda discussed the problems of com- 
mand and control during flights, recommending a combination of 
commands sent to the spacecraft by radio from Earth, and others 
program-timed on board the spacecraft itself. The report mentioned 
that the deep space flights launched from Earth orbit are observed by 
radio and sent command signals from ships placed in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, which is consistent with our knowledge that the probe 

« TASS. 0738 GMT. November 16, 1967. 
88 Trurl. Moscow, November 19, 1967. p. 1A. 
M Red Star. Moscow. May 16, 1968. p. 4. 
58 Pravda. Moscow. ApriJ 12. 1969. p. 6. 
M Izvestiya, Moscow, June 4, 1970, pp. 1, 4. 


or escape rocket is generally fired somewhere over or near Africa. 
Other nignts are supported by aircraft, particularly during the recov- 
ery phase, supplementing the ships used for search, rescue, and evacua- 
tion of spacecraft which have lauded in ocean areas. Information 
from all these sources feeds into the ground complex. The total com- 
bination of all support aids involves systems for orbital path measure- 
ments, reception and registry of telemetry, controlling onboard instru- 
mentation, communications, and a standard time service. Communica- 
tions may be relayed through Molniya satellites, and reliance is placed 
on the Meteor satellites for supporting weather data. 57 

Communications in near-Earfh space require a greater number of 
antennas, but those for flights to lunar and planetary distances need 
special, large antenna systems, special molecular and parametric 
amplifiers, and special narrow band filters to sort out weak signals 
amidst space "noise". At least two but not more than four deep space 
stations if sufficiently spread out, are all that are needed for planetary 
flights. 58 

Still another account in Pravda described the antennas as 25 meters 
in diameter at the main space flight control center. The main receiving 
antenna is close to the buildings of the center. The transmitting an- 
tenna to the spacecraft is about ten kilometers away. Because several 
different frequencies are used, and these pass through the receiving 
antenna, special devices sort them out to deliver the separate compo- 
nents of television, telemetry, and telephonic information. These are 
all recorded on magnetic tape, while the information on orbital infor- 
mation especially is fed immediately to the computers. When com- 
mands are sent to the spacecraft, these are in coded form which has 
been put into the computers, so that only pressing a button on a panel 
is required. When these signals are played back to Earth correctly 
from the spacecraft, only then does the "execute" command go out to 
the spaceship. 59 

It was interesting that through all these years of partial disclosure, 
there was never a clue as to the location of the space control centers. 
Certainly the launch itself is controlled by military men at the individ- 
ual launch sites. It was this immediate block house with its periscopes 
that was declared off limits when American astronauts, technicians, 
and other higher officials visited Tyuratam in connection with the 
Apollo Soyuz mission. 

When the Apollo Soyuz mission was approaching, the Russians 
opened up some more information by making known they were build- 
ing an entirely new space control center for this mission in the general 
vicinity of Moscow. It was revealed that the Soyuz 12 flight was the 
first one controlled from this new center northeast of Moscow. 60 At 
first the site was believed to be at Kalinin, 150 kilometers northwest of 
Moscow. But the site was finally located accurately when the U.S. 
press representatives were allowed to visit it in mid-May 1975. It was 
in Kaliningrad, 10 kilometers northeast of Moscow and 10 kilometers 
northwest of the Yuriy Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center at 
Zvezdny Gorodok. 61 It had been building since 1970. The main opera - 

67 Dmitriyev, Q. Eyes and ears of the Earth. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow. June 12, 1970, 
p. 2. 

88 Idem. 

59 Smirnov. V. Information from orbit, Pravda. Moscow, June 9, 1970. 

60 Aviation Week, New York. November 5, 1973, p. 20. 

61 Soviet Aerospace, Washington, May 19, 1975, p. 18. 


1 i oils room lias five banks of consoles, 24 in total with a large screen 
map of the world in front center, with the orbital path and all track" 
mg stations shown on the map, with additional data listed on side 
panels. It was evident from these disclosures that there must be a dif- 
ferent and possibly more versatile center already in use elsewhere. The 
Russians were evasive on this point, but during the Apollo Soyuz 
mission mentioned almost casually that the Salyut mission was being 
controlled from a center at Yevpatoriya, the same site in the Crimea 
where the deep space tracking station is located. Whether there are 
still other major control centers is not known. It is reminiscent of the 
fact the United States has control facilities at each of its major launch 
sites in Florida and California, and also has additional facilities in 
Houston, Texas: Greenbelt, Maryland: and Sunnyvale, California at 
the very least. So for some purposes, the Russians may also have 
additional locations in use. 


Reliable information about Soviet space research centers is also 
mited. There are a few which have come to public attention. For ex- 
ample, 1 1 10 engine development work of the Leningrad Gas Dynamics 
Laboratory has boon revealed through research publications of a theo- 
retical nature, and early experimental engines as well as a few cur- 
rently operational engines have been put on display and described as 
< - oveloped there. There is even a museum in Leningrad where it is pos- 
g ible to see these products. 

The large body of published literature in various fields of space 
sciences reveals researchers in many scientific institutes pursue studies 
of geophysics, the upper atmosphere, radiation, space medicine, the 
planets, the Sun. and so forth. But it is not possible from these papers 
to build a definitive list of titles and locations of space laboratories and 
centers. It can be assumed that some are in the new science cities which 
have been created in several parts of the Soviet Union. 

A fairly detailed description of one major institute was provided 
during 1971. The Moscow Space Research Institute of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences consists of administrative buildings, parking lots, 
and landscaping in front, and laboratories in the central area, with 
experimental and storage areas at the back. The administrative build- 
in o- has three stories, underground parking, a library, conference and 
reception rooms, and an auditorium seating 1,200 persons. The labora- 
tories are in a 13-story building with 2-story annexes. There are spe- 
cial air-conditioning units in towers nearby. All told, there are 41,000 
square meters of floor space, including 33,000 square meters in labora- 
tories: and the building volume is 599,870 cubic meters, including 
534,700 cubic meters in laboratories. 62 



FeAV details are available on Soviet factories equivalent to those of 
American industry in which specialized craft are built or where 
"serial" production is carried on. Occasional American visitors have 

63 Stroitelstvo 1 Arkhitektura, Moskvy, Moscow, No. 1, 1971, pp. 26-29. 


been allowed to visit aircraft factories, and it is always possible that 
some space manufacturing is done in closed but adjacent buildings in 
some of these aviation centers. Occasional photographs have shown 
assembly lines for Vostok and for Soyuz spacecraft, and the numbers 
of such craft shown in the pictures strengthens the notion that the 
same basic shells are used for the large unmanned recoverable Kosmos 
flights used by the Soviet military to conduct observations of interest. 
Somewhere there must also be a production line for the smaller Kos- 
mos, because many use the same basic shell, with modifications to fit 
the particular missions of the craft. 

Except for the very largest launch vehicles, presumably almost all 
components are rail-transportable, especially as the Soviet railway 
lines have a generous clearance gauge through tunnels and stations. 
We know both through Soviet movies and through the recent visits to 
Tyuratam that launch rockets and payloads are brought together in 
assembly buildings within a few kilometers of the launch pads, with 
the mating done horizontally, and then the combined rocket and pay- 
load pushed out to the pad atop flat cars and special transporters by 
Diesel locomotives. At the pad, the transporter tilts the rocket up into 
a vertical position for final checkout and launch. This may not be true 
of the G-l-e class vehicles, but seems to apply even through the 
D-l-e class. 


Of necessity the Russians must have test stands for rocket develop- 
ment, and environmental chambers for rockets and payloads. These 
are not described as to location in the open literature. 

Because of the numerous Soviet failures in planetary payloads, they 
have come to the American practice of having a duplicate payload in 
an environmental chamber undergoing as nearly as possible the same 
conditions as the actual spacecraft in flight, so that if problems de- 
velop, solutions can be tested with the laboratory "bird". This was first 
announced as the practice with the Venera 4 flight. 63 Something similar 
has been hinted at in connection with manned flights in 1974 and 1975. 

The principal test and training center for Soviet cosmonauts is at 
Zvezdnyy Gorodok east of Moscow in the suburbs. This has been visited 
by both the American astronauts and NASA technicians, and also by 
the Western press. There are classrooms, isolation chambers, centri- 
fuges, simulators, and mockups, as well as good living accommoda- 
tions for the cosmonauts and their families, and associated scientists 
and technicians. 

Apparently there are some facilities for training in the Tyuratam 
area, presumably in or near the new, burgeoning city of Leninsk. The 
American visitors found the accommodations provided at Leninsk to 
be equal or superior to those provided at the Kennedy Space Center. 
The cosmonauts when suited up for flights ride out to the pad in a well 
equipped, air conditioned bus, much in the manner that NASA astro- 
nauts are transported. 

When the Soyuz 9 cosmonauts returned to Earth, they went to a 
special isolation center, which was highly reminiscent of the Houston 
quarantine facility, perhaps as a dry run for similar procedures once 
Soviet cosmonauts return from the Moon. 64 

M Tass, 0R00 GMT, October 19, 1967, quoting Komsomolskava Pravda, Moscow. 
«* TASS, 1704 GMT. June 20, 1970. 

67-371—76 7 


The lunar material recovered by Luna 16 on the Moon was also f akeu 
to a special isolation laboratory at an unspecified point which employs 
the same general kind of procedures to preserve freedom from con- 
tamination, both in and out, as Houston has supplied for its Lunar 
Receiving Laboratory. 65 

All in all, one is struck with the close parallels between the U.S. and 
Soviet programs in terms of procedures and equipment, but also with 
the paucity of definitive Soviet information in the public domain on 
any of these matters aside from the few facilities which have been 
occasionally opened to visitors. 

« TASS, 1077 GMT, September 26, 1970. 


By Charles S. Sheldon II* 

I. Early Years 

Although it is the mission of this report to concentrate primarily on 
Soviet space developments from 1971 to 1975, it seems desirable to 
supply enough of the earlier history of the Soviet program to provide 
continuity and perspective, and to provide accessible information for 
those who do not have copies of similar reports covering in detail the 
earlier years of the Soviet program. 


1. Early Interest 

Other sources have traced the evolution over the centuries of man's 
interest in the universe beyond his Earth and his gradual recognition 
of the nature of the problems to be overcome in entering this larger 
environment and how this might be accomplished within the bounds 
of human science and engineering. 1 

A quasi-scientific description of solutions was provided by such 
writers of a century ago as Jules Verne in France 2 and Edward 
Everett Hale in the United States, 3 using the medium of fiction. In the 
first quarter of the present century, three outstanding scholars 
analyzed and experimented with rockets and space techniques to merit 
the labels of fathers of modern space programs. These were Robert H. 
Goddard in the United States. Hermann Oberth of Germany and cen- 
tral Europe, and Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy of Russia. 

Of these three, Tsiolkovskiy was probably the first to receive wide- 
spread and official recognition for this genius, and chronologically, 
his work predates that of the other two men, although language and 
cultural barriers meant the writings of Tsiolkovskiy had little impact 
outside what is now the Soviet Union. Today he continues to be a 
national hero in his home country. The Tsiolkovskiy medal is awarded 
for outstanding contributions to space progress, and the home town of 
Kaluga where Tsiolkovskiy lived and worked has a space museum. 

By the 1930's, private societies in a number of countries, especially in 
the U.S.S.R. (GIRD — Gruppa Isutcheniya Reaktivnovo Dvisheniva | . 
Germany (VfR — Verein fur Raumschiffahrt), Britain (BIS — British 

♦Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research 
Service. The Library of Congress. 

1 Von Braun. Wernher and Ordway, Frederick I.. Ill, History of Rocketrv and Space 
Travel. New York: Crowell. 1966; Ley, Willy. Rockets, Missiles, and Space Travel. New 
York : Viking Press. 1958 : Emme, Eugene M.. History of Space Flight. New York : Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1965. 

2 Verne, Jules, From the Earth to the Moon, 1865 ; Round the Moon. 1870. 

s Hale, Edward Everett, The Brick Moon, Atlantic Monthlv, November 1869-February 



Interplanetary Society), and the United States (ARS — American 
Rocket Society) were experimenting with rockets, and writing papers 
•on space travel. The most aggressive support and conversion of rocket 
work to meet practical applications came in Germany where the Army 
appointed Captain Dr. (and later Major General) Walter Dorn- 
berger to head this effort. From the VfR, he drew interested technical 
support, and his young chief engineer was Dr. Wernher von Braun. 4 
It was this team which eventually produced the V-2 rocket of World 
War II, the vehicle which also became the first significant tool for 
exoatmospheric research in the United States, the Soviet Union, 
France, and the United Kingdom. Modifications of the V-2 especially 
were important to early Soviet military missilery, while several U.S. 
rocket systems clearly show the same ancestry. 

Dr. Dornberger, Dr. von Braun, and several hundred of the top 
rocket engineers of the German program came voluntarily to the ad- 
vancing U.S. forces in Europe, or were acquired at the end of the war 
under Operation Paper Clip. Soviet forces, meanwhile, overran the 
principal test station on the Baltic at Pecnemunde, and later, under- 
ground factories in Silesia. They picked up more hardware and test 
equipment, and some technicians, but fewer of the top group of engi- 
neers. The Western allies also acquired in territories they overran, near 
the English Channel, complete and partially assembled V-2's which 
they stockpiled for experimental use. Apparently the Soviet Union in 
the postwar years resumed serial production of the V-2. 

It should be emphasized that the Soviet Union had a strong rocket 
program of its own well before any technology was picked up from 
Germany. No nation made more effective use of tactical rockets in 
combat during World War II than the U.S.S.R. Also, there is an 
extensive technical literature throughout the 1930's largely coming 
from the Gas Dynamics Laboratory in Leningrad in support of 
understanding rocketry. 

The United States had its own rocket efforts in the Army and Navy, 
and later the Air Force, with such outstanding centers of effort as 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena and the Naval Ordnance 
Test Station, China Lake, California. The German Paper Clip scien- 
tists were first at Fort Bliss, Texas, and later at Redstone Arsenal in 
Huntsville, Alabama. Other work was pursued in private industry 
under Government contract. 

The full details of the corresponding Soviet effort are obscured by 
their penchant for secrecy, but the broad outlines have been revealed 
in summary histories. One can sense the barest beginnings of an 
international competition in the early years after World War II. From 
the debriefings of Dr. Wernher von Braun, the United States was 
presented with fresh ideas on how rockets could be made to fly across 
the Atlantic Ocean carrying weapons, although Dr. Vannevar Bush 
was able to point out a number of reasons why the concept was imprac- 
tical at that time. 5 The Germans also described permanent manned 
space stations in Earth orbit serving a variety of scientific and military 
purposes. These plans were brought to public attention in understand- 

* Dornberger, Walter, V-2, New York : Viking Press, 1954. 

6 Emme, Eugene M., Op. Cit, p. 108: Dr. Bush testified before Congress in about 1947: 
"[An intercontinental ballistic missile] is impossible and will be impossible for many years 
to come. I think we can leave that out of our thinking. I wish the American public would 
leave that out of their thinking." 


able form by such means as illustrated articles in Colliers magazine 
in the early 1950s. By this same time, the world community of engi- 
neers interested in space had organized the International Astronauti- 
cal Federation (IAF) and at its meeting came the first reports that 
the Soviet Union was designing orbital spacecraft, and even was plan- 
ning a very large ship to carry men to the Moon. In the United States 
by the end of the 1940s, rival projects at the study level were under- 
way to explore construction of satellites for military purposes in all 
three of the armed services. These plans did not proceed beyond the 
study phase, and indeed, conservative elements of Government and 
the military greatly restricted discussion of spaceflight lest the Con- 
gress react negatively to such "foolishness". Although the Soviet 
Union was relatively quiet in any public statements, it seems to have 
accepted at a high level of Government at a much earlier stage that 
space could be a practical endeavor worth supporting. 

2. Organization of the Soviet Effort for Space 

Another portion of this report will treat organizational matters in 
greater detail. It suffices here to note how, well after the fact, it has 
come to Western attention that the Soviet Union in about 1953 created 
a permanent Commission on Interplanetary Travel, its nearest early 
equivalent, to the United States NASA of 1958. Although the details 
are lacking, it seems almost certain that within a year of that organiza- 
tion, the broad outlines of the Soviet space program which were pur- 
sued for at least the next five to eight years were mapped out. A clear 
decision was made to apply military technology to the development 
of space. 

3. Soviet Weapons Planning 

One will recall that at the end of World War II, the United States 
was at the peak of its military power compared with much of the rest 
of the world. Although we rapidly dismantled much of this force and 
shut down military bases, we relied upon our nuclear capability, then 
close to a monopoly, to serve as an airborne strategic deterrent as a 
means for maintaining peace in the world, at least to the extent of 
avoiding general war. The Soviet Union, by contrast, faced great dev- 
astation at home, had a large army which was only in the process of 
moving from animal power transport and foraging the countryside 
for logistics purposes, to reequipping with motorized transport. It had 
a tactical air force, but was weak in strategic bombers. It had a defen- 
sive navy with heavy emphasis on coastal submarines, and no air- 
craft carriers to extend air power as did the United States. 

The Soviet Union seems to have made the deliberate decision to 
move aggressivel} 7 into the new technology of rocketry, even in advance 
of its development of nuclear weapons appropriate to long range 
delivery by rockets. While the United States had considered a number 
of ballistic rocket designs, it first put greater stress in the missile area 
on automatic pilotless aircraft. Its principal design for an ICBM 
would have been a very large rocket before the thermonuclear break- 
through. 6 Once the more powerful warheads of reasonable size could 
be counted on, our designs for Atlas and then for Titan were scaled 
down to a more economical set of dimensions. 

6 Stine, G. narry, How the Soviets did it in space. Analog, New York, August 19G8, 
p. 66. 


But the Soviet Union, despite its approximately parallel develop- 
ment of fusion weapons, seems already to have committed itself to a 
srery large ICBM. This weapon, developed through the middle 1950*8, 
would be considered in this country as oversized for ease of operations 
and economy, and awkward because of reliance on cryogenic oxidizer 
and radio guidance during launch. It has now been replaced in the 
military arsenals by a number of much more effective weapons of sim- 
pler design, storable fuel, and inertia] guidance. But the original 
ICBM to this day remains the very effective mainstay of the Soviet 
space launch vehicle stable. This vehicle by Soviet claim made its first 
flight on August 3, 1957 from Tyuratam toward the Kamchatka penin- 
sula. The same launch site was then readied for the Sputniks to follow. 

Jf. Plans for the International Geophysical Year 

After the exciting but perhaps premature plans for manned Moon 
rockets and Earth orbital stations, revealed in Collier's and elsewhere 
in the early 1950s, U.S. thinking on space retreated to some fairly 
modest proposals for launching small unmanned satellites for scien- 
tific purposes. Agreement was won in 1955 that the Federal Govern- 
ment would support the IGY by funding a non-military launch vehicle 
to put up a few pounds of instrumentation. Although the Redstone 
military rocket built by the von Braun Redstone Arsenal team and 
carrying experiments of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the Uni- 
versity of Iowa was a possibility, President Eisenhower was advised 
and agreed to support a new effort by civilian scientists of the Naval 
Research Laboratory and an industry team to build Vanguard. The 
President announced the IGY satellite program on July 29, 1955. A 
day later, the Soviet Union announced that it, too, planned to launch 
scientific satellites during the IGY period, although the specifics were 
not then made available. 

With the advantage of hindsight, it is possible to see that by 1957, 
the Russians were telling the world that its satellites might be some- 
what larger than the 9 kilogram planned payload of Vanguard, and 
as early as June 1957, that the radio frequencies to be used by their 
craft would not be those which were recommended for IGY purposes, 
but in a high frequency range readily receivable by radio amateurs. 


1. Sputnik 1 

Rumors of an impending launch, perhaps in time to celebrate 
Tsiolkovskiy's birthday on September 17, 1957, began to circulate in 
Moscow. Although this did not happen, the rumors grew more posi- 
tive in the first week of October. Even so, the Sputnik shock of Octo- 
ber 4 has become a classic case. Not only laymen, but many technical 
people were caught by surprise with the Soviet announcement of the 
first satellite. Launched from an unspecified point, it circled the 
Earth every 96 minutes at an inclination of 65 degrees to the Equator, 
which meant it passed overhead of most of the inhabited world. It 
broadcast on two harmonic frequencies close to 20 and 40 megahertz. 
Battery powered, variations of its cricket-like beeping signal both re- 
vealed characteristics of the ionosphere and told of its own tempera- 
ture changes. Its variations in orbit and eventual decay revealed some- 
thing of atmospheric density. But its announced weight of 83.6 kilo- 
grams, an order of magitude greater than the planned American satel- 


lite, suggested to a number of scientists that a decimal place had been 
in error. There were still others who could not accept the notion the 
Soviet Union could be first in a field of advanced technology and they 
invented elaborate schemes for explaining Soviet trickery to simulate 
a satellite which they felt did not exist in fact. It also became popular 
to believe there were constant Soviet attempts to launch which gen- 
erally failed, and that whatever had been put up was necessarily 
crude and only for propaganda purposes, and in any case was built by 
Germans or stolen from the United States. The assessments were wide 
of the mark. 

2. Sputnik 2 

While the first Soviet satellite was a bad shock, its simple structure, 
limited battery power, and lack of instrumentation, other than its 
beacons, could be contrasted with the more elaborate, miniaturized in- 
strumentation promised for Vanguard. However, on November 3, 1957, 
the second Soviet pay load placed in orbit was announced as weighing 
508.3 kilograms, and it carried a respectable range of geophysical in- 
strumentation. Also, it contained a life support system and returned 
biomedical data for a week from the dog, Layka. This supplied basic 
data for planned manned flights. The life support system showed it 
could function remotely. Data were returned on the effects of weight- 
lessness and G load during launch, on radiation, and on temperature 
changes. Sensors measured some kinds of radiation and mierometeorite 
impacts. Also, the Russians revealed what was evident to visual observ- 
ers: The payload remained attached to a much larger spent rocket 
casing, so that the total weight was probably on the order of 6.5 metric 

3. Sputnik 3 

In the months which followed, the United States faced the frustra- 
tions of launch delays and launch failures, including the explosion of 
a Vanguard test vehicle on December 17, 1957, with the world press to 
witness the ball of fire at the launch pad. However, the revived Red- 
stone Project Orbiter, which might have been launched even before 
Sputnik 1, met with success on January 31, 1958 (local time) to put up 
14.5 kilograms of pa}doad and rocket casing for Explorer 1. Also, Van- 
guard was later (March 17, 1958) successful in putting up a 1.4-kilo- 
gram test vehicle and a 23-kilogram rocket casing. 

On May 15, 1958, the Soviet Union put up Sputnik 3, and it was 
by far the most formidable challenge to the U.S. program. It was a 
1,327-kilogram orbiting geophysical observatory of considerable so- 
phistication. Unlike the two battery-powered previous flights, this ve- 
hicle was equipped with solar cell panels, elaborate louvres for heat 
control, and an array of instrumentation which matched all the experi- 
ments planned for the U.S. IGY series of flights and also those planned 
for the immediate post-IGY period. Although this ship carried 
heavy, off-the-shelf conventional electronic equipment such as vacuum 
tubes, it also contained thousands of solid state devices. It was in ef- 
fect the early equivalent of the American OGO flights of 1964 on, 
although with a lower data rate of return. It is to Soviet credit that 
the ship continued to operate electronically until the moments of its 
reentry and burning in the atmosphere two years after launch. 


All three Soviet Sputniks placed their instruments in sealed contain- 
ers which were maintained at normal Earth surface pressures and con- 
tained gas constituents of normal atmosphere. Although only Sputnik 
2 had its carrier rocket final stage left attached to the payload, all three 
were put up by the same original ICBM system. The whole core ve- 
hicle was in orbit, with its weight of about 6 metric tons, measuring 28 
meters long, slowly tumbling end over end, almost the size of a railway 
Pullman sleeper. It was this big rocket which was most easily identified 
on its passage across the night sky by observers in every continent. 


1, Luna 1 

At the close of 1958, Soviet authorities announced that the new year 
would bring the first Soviet flights to the Moon. On January 2, 1959, 
Luna 1 was launched on a fast flight toward the Moon, carrying a pay- 
load weight of 361.3 kilograms, plus a separated final stage carrier 
rocket with a weight of 1,111 kilograms, for a total weight of 1,472 
kilograms, The payload had a minimum collection of geophysical in- 
strumentation in a spherical container, and projecting antennas. Be- 
cause of the high velocity and its announced package of various metal- 
lic emblems with the Soviet coat of arms, it is reasonable to conclude 
that it was intended to strike the Moon. It missed its target, and flew 
by the Moon at a distance of 5 to 6 thousand kilometers at nearest 
approach, had its orbit bent by lunar gravity and flew off to become 
the first artificial planetoid of the Sun. Its batteries gave out very soon 
after, on January 5, at 600 thousand kilometers from Earth. Yuriy 
Gagarin acknowledged its strike mission, in which it failed. 7 

The United States also was undertaking a lunar program in this 
same general period. The first three Pioneer flights in late 1958 were 
intended to orbit the Moon. The first was destroyed at the Cape during 
launch. The next two Pioneer flights developed insufficient velocity to 
reach the Moon, and fell back to Earth. The next two Pioneer flights 
used different hardware and were intended to make close passes by the 
Moon. The first fell back to Earth because of insufficient velocity. The 
second (called Pioneer 4), launched March 3, 1959, flew by the Moon 
at a distance of 60,000 kilometers. This 6 kilogram payload was bat- 
tery-powered, and signals ceased at about 654,250 kilometers from 

2, Luna 2 

On September 12, 1959, a Soviet attempt to hit the Moon was 
launched again, and this time was successful in striking about 435 
kilometers from the visible center of the Moon the following day. 

3, Luna 3 

A much more complex operation was launched on October 4, 1959. 
This payload, referred to as an Automatic Interplanetary Station, 
flew past the Moon at about 7 thousand kilometers, and then while in 
optical view of a good part of the never-before-seen far side of the 
Moon, it was stabilized, took a series of photographs which were devel- 
oped on board, and the information was scanned to be radio-trans- 
mitted back to Earth in facsimile form. Because the payload was 

7 Reuters, Moscow, July 29, 1961, quoting his letter to the magazine, Soviet Lithuania. 


equipped with solar cells, it had a much longer active life than its two 
Luna predecessors. Its so-called barycentric orbit brought it sweeping 
back toward Earth. The pictures were returned on October 18, and 
were to have been transmitted at another point much closer to Earth, 
but the second transmission was not accomplished. Typical of bary- 
centric orbits which are influenced in a complex way by the tug of both 
Earth and Moon gravity, the flight path kept changing, and ap- 
parently after 198 days in eccentric orbit, the payload, long since radio- 
silent, reentered the Earth's atmosphere to burn. Its pictures were very 
indistinct, but through computer enhancement permitted the Russians 
to develop a tentative atlas of the far side of the Moon. Those individ- 
uals who charged this, too, was a Soviet forgery were proven wrong 
when some of the same features eventually were found in the later and 
far superior pictures taken by American Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. 
Lunar Orbiter 4 of August 1067 found the Tsiolokovskiy crater named 
in the Luna 3 pictures. 


Soviet visible space activity during 1960 was devoted to testing the 
precursors for their early manned flights. These are referenced here 
simply to maintain the chronology, and will be discussed in the fol- 
lowing chapter on manned flights. 


1. 1960 Mars Attempts 

The Soviet Union until recently had never admitted to any launch 
attempts which fell short of attaining Earth orbit. The United States 
in a number of instances has been able to monitor such failures, but 
on only one occasion has disclosed this knowledge officially (on Sep- 
tember 5, 1962). On October 10, and again on October 14, 1960, the 
Soviet Union launched a new combination of rockets intended to send 
payloads to the vicinity of Mars, but neither was successful in reach- 
ing even Earth orbit. From their subsequent repetitive use of an orbi- 
tal launch platform technique for planetary and other missions remote 
from low Earth orbit, we can imagine how the operation was intended 
to proceed. 

People had been expecting a Soviet Mars attempt at the appropriate 
astronomical "window*' for this launch. Premier Khrushchev timed 
his arrival in New York at the United Nations accordingly, expecting 
to be able to announce the flights. A seaman defector from the Soviet 
ship Baltika* which had brought Khrushchev told reporters that on 
board the ship was a replica of an advanced spacecraft which was to 
be put on display if a certain mission were successful. If true, the 
replica was carried back to the Soviet Union unseen. 

2. 1961 Venus Attempts 

On February 4, 1961, the Soviet Union announced the launch of 
Tyazheliy Sputnik 4, of 6,483 kilograms, described as a test of an 
Earth orbital platform from which an interplanetary probe could be 
launched. The fact that this launch occurred at the correct hour for 
a Venus probe indicated the mission while an Earth orbital success 
was a Venus probe failure. In this respect, a further evolution of 
Soviet technology was demonstrated. The first three Luna flights 


had been direct ascent missions; probably starting in October 1000. 
the change to a more powerful upper stage occurred, and the added 
flexibility of launch from orbit was intended, an approach which has 
been used ever since for deep space missions. Another launch was 
announced on February 12, 1961 — Tyazheliy Sputnik 5 — and from this 
came a probe or Zond rocket carrying another Automatic Interplane- 
tary Station (AIS) called Venera 1. The payload weighed 643.5 kilo- 
grams. It was by far the most elaborate payload combination to be 
unveiled to that time. For some weeks the mission went well, but at a 
distance of about 7.25 million kilometers from Earth, communications 
ceased. The payload is estimated to have passed Venus at a distance 
of about 100,000 kilometers on May 19, 1961, based on its known 

3. 1962 Venus Attempts 

Venus launch windows come about every 19 months. True to prac- 
tice, the Soviet Union launched multiple attempts on August 25, 
September 1 and September 12, 1962 carrying Venera spacecraft. All 
of these reached Earth orbit, but failed to launch their payloads suc- 
cessfully toward Venus, leaving various kinds of debris and major 
segments in Earth orbit. No Soviet acknowledgment of these launches 
has been made to this day. The United States routinely published its 
Goddard Satellite Situation Report including the August 25 pieces 
of debris in Earth orbit. But then it began to worry about the possible 
diplomatic consequences of such announcements, and for a time sus- 
pended publishing the statistical report altogether; and when it 
resumed, it skipped all Soviet objects in orbit after August 25, 1962. 
However, all objects, listed or not. are assigned a sequential astronomi- 
cal designator which is supposed to account for all observable objects 
in orbit. The omission of certain designators signalled to anyone famil- 
iar with the system that there were unacknowledged flights in orbit. 
In early September, press accounts rumored that the United States 
had begun to make secret military launches, and the Soviet represent- 
atives at the United Nations made charges against the United States 
to this effect. Our representative denied this and said the stories "were 
not wholly accurate", rather than revealing there had been a Soviet 
launch on September 1. The diplomatic stances adopted by both coun- 
tries are not too flattering to either, in retrospect. Actually, for a long 
time, the September 12 Soviet launch was carried in British publica- 
tions as a secret U.S. launch because of the de facto U.S. and Soviet 
agreement not to disclose these Soviet failures. 

4. 1962 Mars Attempts 

The window for Mars flights comes about every 25 months, and 
Soviet launch attempts were made on October 24, November 1, and 4, 
1962. All three reached Earth orbit : the first and third were never 
acknowledged by the Soviet Union because that is all they did. The 
flight of October 24 was especially awkward in its implications be- 
cause it came at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and it broke into 
a considerable number of pieces of debris which followed a path 
bringing these within view of the Alaska BMEWS missile detector 
system. The first impression might have been one of a massive missile 
attack against the United States, although the computer must have 
quickly revealed it was not. 


The November 1 launch was the only success in launching a probe 
(Zond) rocket from the Earth orbiting platform in six 1962 attempts. 
The AIS (Automatic Interplanetary Station) received the name 
Mars 1. This pay load set a record of active communications with 
Earth to a distance of about 106 million kilometers on March 21, 1963, 
after which signals ceased. The ship passed Mars at a distance of 
about 193,000 kilometers in June 1963. This payload had been im- 
proved over Venera 1 by raising its weight to 893.5 kilograms, and 
having a greatly improved "bus" for the instrumentation and more 
elaborate experiments. In fact, the basic design of this craft became 
the standard Zond payload for planetary missions as revealed through 
Zond 3 and Venera 8. 

5. 1961+ Venus Attempts 

Since ten planetary attempts had succeeded in launching only two 
Zond payloads, and both of these had failed to continue communica- 
tions all the way to their planetary destinations, it appears the Rus- 
sians launched a diagnostic flight November 11, 1963, which was 
acknowledged as Kosmos 21, but it was not able to send a deep space 
ZoTid beyond Earth orbit. 

Nonetheless when the Venus window came, a launch was made on 
March 27, 1964. When it failed to launch a Zond, it was given the 
name Kosmos 27, and was passed off as a routine flight. It will be noted 
that this was a change of information policy, compared with the 
1962-63 period when debris in Earth orbit was not acknowledged. 
The United States, goaded by further Soviet charges at the United 
Nations about project Westford, space "needles"', in its counter blast 
named the five 1962 planetary Zond failures which reached Earth 
orbit together with a 1963 Soviet Moon flight failure which also was 
stranded in Earth orbit. The closest thing to a Soviet acknowledg- 
ment was a Soviet further complaint that the United States was at- 
tempting to register flights of other nations, which was not its busi- 
ness under the registration agreement of the United Nations. In any 
case, by assigning an arbitrary and neutral Kosmos (Space) name 
and number to later escape failures stranded in Earth orbit, the Soviet 
Union thereafter avoided this particular information problem. 

On April 2, 1964, another Venus probe was launched. Because of the 
poor record of its predecessors, the U.S.S.R. this time simply labeled 
it Zond 1. However, the details announced on its course made clear 
that it was bound for Venus. Communications failed soon after 
May 14, and it passed Venus on July 19, 1964 at 100,000 kilometer 
estimated distance. 

6. 196 i Mars Attempts 

The Soviet Union launched Zond 2 toward Mars on November 30, 
1964, and this time acknowledged that it was bound for Mars, which 
would have been evident to Western astronomers and space trackers 
anyway. Communications failed some time in April 1965, but the Zond 
made a close pass by Mars at about 1,500 kilometers on August 6 of 
that year. 

There was a strong likelihood that another Mars attempt was 
planned for the 1964 window because every other window to Mars and 
Venus from 1960 on had seen multiple Soviet attempts. It may be that 


difficulties in the launch preparations delayed the flight beyond the 
window. In any case, it was not until July 1H, 1005 that Zond 3 was 
launched on a trajectory which carried it all the way out to the orbit 
of Mars. But because the launch was made without reference to a suit- 
able launch window for Mars, that planet was nowhere near the Zond 
when it achieved that distance. However, as a diagnostic test, Zond 
3 also made a flyby of the Moon, passing it at a distance of about 
9,200 kilometers. It took 25 pictures of the far side of a quality supe- 
rior to those of Luna 3, and these were returned to Earth by facsimile 
a number of times at ever-greater distances, proving the ability of the 
communications .system to do its planetary task. Some signals were 
still being received when Zond 3 reached the orbital path of Mars. 

7. 1065 Venus Attempts 

With renewed confidence in the basic Zond bus, the launch of No- 
vember 12, 1965 was named Venera 2 ; that of November 16 was named 
Venera 3 ; but that of November 23 was only Kosmos 96, because it 
failed to launch its Zond from the Earth orbiting platform. Venera 2 
passed Venus at a distance of about 24,000 kilometers on February 27, 
1966. Venera 3 struck Venus on March 1, 1966 about 450 kilometers 
from the center of the visible disk. The Russians received many con- 
gratulations for these twin successes, which included sending the first 
manmade object to the surface of another planet. Soviet emblems were 
contained in the payload. A few days after the congratulations had 
been received, the U.S.S.R. revealed that communications had failed 
in both Zonds at an unspecified time shortly before the planet had been 
reached. This ran the total to 18 Zond payloads expended without a 
single bit of planetary data returned, although there were a number of 
engineering triumphs involved and some data on the interplanetary 
medium, as well as pictures of the Moon. 

8. 1967 Venus Attempts 

Venera 4 was launched on June 12, 1967, using an A-2-e vehicle like 
its predecessors, but carrying a heavier payload of 1,106 kilograms. 
Two days before arrival its mission was revealed as one to make direct 
atmospheric measurements. On October 18, 1967, a capsule separated 
from the bus, and after aerodynamic braking, the capsule deployed a 
parachute, on which it hung for about 1.5 Earth hours while descend- 
ing toward the surface where it deposited the Soviet coat of arms 
marked on a pennant of metal, as had been true of Venera 3. Its suc- 
cessful return of planetary data Avas an important first in the Soviet 
program. Data were refined over a period of time, apparently sug- 
gesting some problems of calibration and interpretation. At first the 
Russians thought they had data readings all the way to the surface, 
but unless a landing had occurred on a very high mountain peak, it is 
more likely that signals ceased at an altitude of 25 kilometers. With 
this assumption the Soviet data could be reconciled with the indirect 
U.S. Mariner readings, which were based upon interpretations of 
radiated and reflected energy. 

The main bus of the Soviet Venera 4 carried a magnetometer, 
cosmic ray counters, hydrogen and ox} T gen indicators, and charged 
particle traps. It found a weak hydrogen corona at 10,000 kilometers 
above the surface on the night side of Venus and a magnetic field only 


0.001 the strength of that around Earth, and no radiation belts. The 
bus was burned as it plunged into the atmosphere. 

The sterilized landing capsule was an egg-shaped package about one 
meter in diameter, weighing 383 kilograms and protected by ablative 
material against the high heat of entry friction. The parachute, de- 
ployed after the speed was slowed sufficiently, was made of heat re- 
sistant material. The capsule carried two thermometers, a barometer,, 
a radio altimeter, an atmospheric density gauge, and 11 gas analyzer.-. 
The latter took 5 readings at an altitude of 25 kilometers and others 
at an altitude of 23 kilometers. Signals from the capsule were received 
for 96 minutes both in the U.S.S.R. and at Jodrell Bank. The readings 
received ranged from a first temperature of 39° C. to a final reading 
between 263 and 277° C. The atmosphere was measured as 90 to 95 
percent carbon dioxide, 0.4 to 0.8 percent oxygen, perhaps between 0.1 
and 0.7 percent, but not over 1.6 percent water vapor. The remainder 
might have been argon or other inert gases, and if nitrogen was pres- 
ent, it was not identified. The final pressure reading obtained was 15 
to 22 times that of Earth. Later study by both American and Soviet 
scientists of the Soviet data suggested the Celsius temperature at the 
true surface was probably about double the reading, and the atmos- 
pheric pressure was about 90 Earth atmospheres. Although the arrival 
of the American Mariner 5 a day later in time helped to find the cor- 
rect meanings of Soviet data, the Mariner itself gave some readings 
whose estimates were farther off from what is the best information 
today. Mariner data suggested 72 to 87 percent carbon dioxide, little 
oxygen, and the balance being either neon or nitrogen. The surface 
temperature was estimated as 371° C. Mariner 5 also detected what 
might have been a slight magnetic field, but no radiation belt. The 
Russians revealed that an operating replica of Venera 4 was kept in an 
environmental chamber on Earth through the entire period of the 
flight to duplicate as nearly as possible the same circumstances so as to 
serve as a systems check and to give early warding of problems in order 
that they might be solved on Earth in timely fashion and new com- 
mands sent to the actual flight. The flight was monitored in 114 com- 
munications sessions during the several months of the voyage. Power 
was supplied as in the other Zond flights partly from solar cell panels, 
tilting them away from maximum direct exposure to the Sun as the 
flight moved closer to that body. Chemical batteries served as buffers. 
Special attention was given to communications because of the sad 
results on earlier flights often related to communications difficulties. 
As the bus approached the planet, a command was sent to orient the 
main antenna toward Earth and signal strength at Earth jumped 300- 
fold. Doppler changes in signals provided data on its speed and 
stability. Once the final approach began, the ship was switched to its 
autonomous program. After separation of the capsule and opening of 
the parachute, the capsule's own directional antenna was deployed so> 
that signals were still 20 percent the strength of those of the main 
parabolic antenna of the bus. 

The initial departure from the Earth orbiting platform would have 
made Venera 4 miss the planet by 60,000 kilometers, so a midcourse 
correction was applied July 29, to aim it for the visible center of the 
planet. During its entry, it is believed the capsule withstood tem- 
peratures in the range of 10,000 to 11,000° C. The capsule had been 


designed to withstand pressures up to 100 atmospheres and loads up 
to 300 G (compared with the 10 to 12 G a man can withstand for the 
same length of time). 

Just five days after the launch of Venera 4. Kosmos 167 was sent 
to Earth orbit, and from its timing and behavior, it was intended to be 
the second Venera of the 1967 window, but the Zond rocket failed to 
fire, leaving it stranded in Earth orbit. 

9. 1969 Venus Attempts 

On January 5, 1969, Venera 5 was launched toward Venus using the 
same A-2-e launch vehicle as its predecessors. The payload weighed 
1.130 kilograms. F rom the outset it was identified as intended to gather 
additional atmospheric data. The probe carried not only the usual 
metal pentagon with the Soviet coat of arms, but a bas-relief of Lenin's 
head. The Zond rocket, escape stage "e", was fired from its orbiting 
platform over Africa. Most details of the flight were as already 
described for Venera 4. This bus jettisoned its capsule to hit the atmos- 
phere at a speed of 11.17 kilometers per second, which was reduced 
aerodynamically to 210 meters per second when the parachute was 
opened. For 53 minutes while suspended from the parachute, data were 
returned about the atmosphere. Further details are discussed in con- 
nection with the following flight. 

Venera 6 was launched five days after Venera 5, January 10, 1969. 
It was a close duplicate of its immediate predecessor, of identical 
weight, and carrying the same symbols and instrumentation. It, too, 
was slated to land on the night side of Venus, as were Venera 3, 4, and 
5. Venera 6 reached Venus on May 17, a day after Venera 5. The hope 
in running two flights so close to the same pattern was to improve the 
cross calibration of results for consistency in data readings. 

During the course of the flights, some 1,500 commands were sent to 
the two stations in 136 communications sessions (73 to Venera 5 and 
63 to Venera 6). Semidirectional antennas were used in the first two 
months of the voyages, and then the parabolic antennas of 2 meters 
diameter wore aligned whenever high capacity data links were needed. 
Considerable information was stored in tape recorders on board, which 
could be emptied during a communications session, ready for refill 
with fresh data. 

As with Venera 5, Venera 6 deployed its parachute after slowing 
down aerodynamically, and data were returned for 51 minutes. 

The Russians supplied further inf omiation on orientation of the bus. 
"When it was time to use the high gain directional antenna, the Sun 
seeker searched for the Sun, and then using the Sun direction as an 
axis, the ship was rotated until the Earth tube found Earth at which 
point it locked on and the antenna was correctly pointed. 

These two Venus probes were also matched by a replica in an en- 
vironmental chamber on Earth for diagnostic purposes. The claim 
was these latest Zonds were built to a higher standard of resistance to 
beat and pressure than Venera 4. The resistance of the ships to G load 
was raised to 450 as opposed to 300 of the earlier model. Instruments 
in the probe bus were supposed to function between and 40 degrees 
Celsius, but in actual fact were held between 10 and 25 degrees. Because 
of the more rugged construction and better protection, the parachute 
size was cut to one third that of Venera 4 to permit a more rapid 


descent through the atmosphere to enhance the chance of survival 
closer to the surface. 

While discussing these craft, the Soviet Chief Designer predicted 
that future automated craft would fly to Mars, dig samples, and return 
these to Earth. 

In March 1070, the scientific findings of Venera 5 and 6 were released 
for comparison with Venera 4 with these results : 


Atmospheric components Venera 4 final data Venera 5 and 6 

C0 2 (percent) 90±10 97±4 

N> (percent)... <7 (possibly ^2.5) <,! 

0j (percent)... 0.4-1.5 220. 1 

HjO (at P 0.6 atm) mg/liter 1-8 ~11 

SOURCE: Vinogradov, Acad. A. P., et a!.; Study of the composition of the Venerian atmosphere on Venera 5 and Venera 
6 automatic stations. Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR, Vol. 180 No. 3, pp. 552-554. 

It will be observed that the two sets of results hear a relation, but 
that the later readings brought some noticeable shifts in the conclu- 
sions. Especially, the Soviet position had shifted from an estimate of 
surface pressure from 22 atmospheres to 100 atmospheres, and the 
temperature from 280° C. to 500° C. 

10. 1970 Venus Attempts 

Venera 7 was launched on August 17, 1970 with an A-2-e launch 
vehicle and weighed 1,180 kilograms, the heaviest yet of the Zond 
payloads sent to the planets. It followed the familiar pattern of place- 
ment in Earth parking orbit with the use of a Tyazheliy Sputnik. 
From this platform the Zond rocket was fired toward the end of the 
first revolution to send it toward Venus. The mission was described as 
designed to conduct further studies of the atmosphere of Venus, as 
well as other studies of the planet. 

On December 12, 1970, as Venera 7 approached Venus, the solar 
cells of the main bus were used to charge the batteries of the landing 
capsule, and the temperature of the capsule was lowered to minus 8 
degrees Celsius. On December 15, only li seconds later than estimated, 
Venera 7 entered the atmosphere of Venus at 7 :58 :44 Moscow time. 
This signal reached the Soviet Union at 8 :02 :06. The speed was close 
to 11,600 meters per second, about as estimated. As soon as the atmos- 
phere affected the stability of the vehicle so that it lost its lock, this 
automatically triggered the separation of the landing capsule. After 
aerodynamical braking slowed the capsule to 250 meters per second, 
the parachute system was deployed, and the antenna was extended. Its 
signals to Earth continued for 35 minutes. In light of the limitations 
with its predecessors, this capsule had been made still heavier and 
shaped as a perfect sphere for greater strength, and with no holes 
drilled through its shell which might prove weak points during entry. 
Instead, only after the top hatch blew off to deploy the parachute and 
antenna were the sensors exposed. 

With no more news at the time from Soviet sources. Western observ- 
ers concluded once again that the environment of Venus had been too 
much for the capsule. But apparently after the 35 minutes of strong 
signals ended, the Russians continued to tune in the hiss of electronic 


"noise" from space, and to apply advanced computer techniques to 
their recordings. On January 26, 1971, they announced that these 
studies had found buried within the noise an additional 23 minutes of 
coded telemetry from the capsule with only about 1 percent the signal 
strength of the earlier signals, which at best took sensitive equipment 
to receive. We do not know whether the craft tipped to misalign the 
antenna or some other local environmental factor cut signal strength. 
But for the first time, a man-made object landed on another planet 
and returned data to Earth. The surface temperature was found to 
be 475 degrees Celsius, plus or minus 20 degrees. The pressure was 
found to be the equivalent of 90 times that of Earth surface atmos- 
phere, plus or minus 15 atmospheres. These data were a good fit with 
the extrapolations of both earlier Soviet and U.S. estimates. As the 
capsule descended through the atmosphere, the temperatures and 
pressures rose as expected. On the surface, the data remained virtually 
constant which served as an important indication the surface had been 
reached. Doppler shifts in signals on the way down also measured the 
rate of drop of speed which disappeared in the data at the surface. It 
is likely that after 23 minutes, the intense heat of the surface finally 
penetrated the vitals of the capsule to disable it ending further trans- 

J ust five days after the launch of Venera 7, Kosmos 359 was placed 
in a low Earth orbit at the correct time for a Venus launch. From the 
Tyazheliy Sputnik, a payload was separated, and fired into a slightly 
more eliptical orbit, but evidently the Zond rocket cut off before build- 
ing up much speed after its ignition. It decayed after 76 days. 

11. 1972 Venus Attempts 

Venera 8 was launched on March 27, 1972 using the A-2-e launch 
vehicle and orbital launch platform technique to send the Zond rocket 
on its course toward Venus. This payload also weighed 1,180 kilograms 
like its immediate predecessor. It also carried pennants with the Soviet 
coat of arms and the bas-relief of the bust of Lenin. Further details 
were that the escape rocket burn was for 243 seconds and that signals 
were being received on 928.4 MHz. 

In contrast to all the previous night-side landing attempts at Venus, 
this capsule was separated to land on the day side, obviously near the 
rim of the visible disk of the planet since Venus was both near Earth, 
relatively speaking, in its orbital path, and closer to the Sun than 
Earth. There had been a course correction on April 16, and 86 com- 
munications sessions during the flight. The capsule was separated at 
1040 Moscow time on July 22, 1972. Speed was cut from 11.6 kilom- 
eters per second to 250 meters per second. The payload measured 
brightness, temperature, atmospheric pressure, and something of the 
nature of surface soil. The landing came at 1229 Moscow time. This 
time signals continued for 50 minutes from the surface. It found the 
temperature on the day side very much like night temperatures, but 
the hour at the launch site was early morning, which may not be totally 
representative. While the weight of the capsule was the same as on the 
previous flight, with surer knowledge of the environment, some 
strength was traded off for more instrumentation. This time the tem- 
perature w T as found to be 465° C. and the pressure 93 Earth atmos- 
pheres. Brightness equalled that on Earth just before sunrise. This time 


a dual antenna system was used on the capsule. In addition to one 
directly on the capsule, a second tossed to one side on landing was also 
used. The first 13.3 minutes of data came from the main antenna, and 
the next 20 minutes from the secondary antenna, and then the remain- 
ing 30 minutes came from the main antenna again. 

Analysis of the soil of Venus, a new feature, was incomplete, but 
suggested a soil density of 1.5 grams per cubic centimeter. The soil 
showed 4 percent potassium, 0.0002 percent uranium, and 0.00005 per- 
cent thorium. This suggested rock similar to granite. 

On March 31, Kosmos 482 was launched at the right time to be a 
Venera flight. Again, there was payload separation from the orbital 
launch platform, but an early cutoff which left the Zond rocket and 
payload in an eccentric orbit with the apogee sufficiently high that the 
payload remains in orbit now more than three years later. 


i. Change of Technology 

Luna 1, 2, and 3 had made direct ascents from Tyuratam to fly 
toward the Moon with net payload and total weights on the escape 
trajectories as follows: 361.3 and 1,472 kilograms; 390.2 and 1,511 kil- 
ograms; 278.5 (in A.I.S.) and 15G.5 (in carrier rocket) for a combined 
weight of 435 and 1,533 kilograms respectively. All three flights had 
used the A-l vehicle; that is, the standard original ICBM, plus an 
upper stage which tripled the lift capacity over that of the A vehicle 
alone as used for the first Sputniks. 

But the planetary program starting in 1960 had introduced an en- 
tirely new and more powerful upper stage, which replaced the original 
lunar upper stage. This j)lanetary upper stage made it possible to 
raise the demonstrated weight in Earth orbit from about 4,700 kilo- 
grams to about 6,500 kilograms, and later even to 7,500 kilograms. 
This also afforded an opportunity to mount a more ambitious lunar 
exploration program, by placing a Tyazheliy Sputnik orbital launch 
platform in orbit, as well as the separated third stage rocket casing.. 
From the platform, generally over Africa, while completing the first 
revolution around the Earth, a probe rocket fourth stage could be fired 
to send a Zond away from Earth, carrying an A.I.S. On this basis, the 
weight of the gross payload could rise to 1,400 kilograms and better,, 
not counting the added weight of the separated probe rocket which 
might be another 440 or even 1,000 or more kilograms. 

2. 1903 Moon Attempt 

The first improved lunar rocket was launched on January 4, 1963. 
It failed to leave Earth orbit. Because it came during the period the 
Russians were uncertain as to how to describe such failures when fail- 
ures were not acknowledged, this flight went unannounced until the 
United States disclosed it later in the spring in connection with the 
five Soviet planetary failures also stranded in Earth orbit in 1962. 8 

Luna 4 was launched successfully on April 2, 1963 and because it 
followed its planned trajectory, it was acknowledged and named by 
the Russians. It w r eighed 1,422 kilograms. Unfortunately, as it ap- 

8 Letter of June 6, 19(53 from Ambassador Adlal E. Stevenson to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. 

67-371—76 S 


proached the Moon, it became evident the path was not quite correct, 
and it missed the Moon by 8,500 kilometers, entering a barycentrk 
orbit around the Earth. Because its radios fell silent and these orbits 
are especially difficult to calculate through many complet ions, it is not 
certain whether it is still in this orbit or whether on some pas< as it re- 
approached the Moon it was accelerated to be flung olf into heliocentric 

3. 1965 Lunar Attempts 

A lunar attempt occurred on March 12, 1965, and failed to leave 
Earth orbit. With Russian public information rules settled on calling 
such failures Kosmos, this was named Kosmos GO and passed off as 

Luna 5 was launched on May 12, and when its retrorocket system 
failed, it impacted in the lunar Sea of Clouds. 

Luna 6 was launched on June 8. Because a mideourse correction 
failed, it missed the Moon by 160,000 kilometers. Although it may 
have gone into barvcentric orbit, it is thought more likely to have gone 
to heliocentric orbit. 

Luna 7 was launched on October 4, and the flight went well until 
the last minutes. Too early a retrofire and cutoff permitted it to impact 
in the lunar Sea of Storms too harshly to survive. 

Luna 8 was launched on December 3, and again the flight went well 
until the closing minutes. Retrofire was late, and velocity was too high 
for survival when it impacted the lunar Sea of Storms. 

Through all of these flights the exact mission had not been described, 
but it seems fairly evident that after the early strike missions and 
photo-flv-bv. the missions from 1063 through 1065 were all aimed at a 
survivable landing for instruments on the lunar surface. This obvious 
supposition was later officially confirmed by the Russians after they 
attained successes. 9 

It is rather interesting to compare the problems experienced by the 
Soviet Union and the United States in their respective unmanned 
lunar landing programs. The time target for both was to achieve such 
missions in 1063. In the United States, its Surveyor craft actually was 
not ready for launch until 1066. when it became an outstanding suc- 
cess. The Soviet Union began making actual landing attempts in 1063, 
but did not meet success until 1066. This mission was more limited in 
its accomplishments than the Surveyor mission, but it did come first 
by a narrow margin, and answered the most basic questions about the 
problems of landing and what the surface was like. 

^. The 1966 Lunar Attempts 

Luna was launched on January 31. 1066. and a day later was an- 
nounced as a soft landing attempt. Launched at Tyuratam by an 
A-2-e vehicle, it used the orbital platform technique to send its Zond 
probe toward the Moon. The payload at this stage weighed 1,583 kilo- 
grams, and consisted of three basic parts : The automatic lunar station 
itself which was to make the survivable landing on the Moon; motor 
units for making mideourse corrections in trajectory and for braking 
on approach to the Moon; and compartments containing apparatus to 
control the flight. That control equipment not needed during the brak- 

9 TASS, April 4, 1966. 0756 GMT. 


ing maneuver or thereafter was contained in two underslung con- 
tainers which were to be detached independently when the braking 
rocket was turned on. 

The automatic station was a hermetically sealed container with 
radio equipment, a program timing device, heat control systems, scien- 
tific apparatus, sources of power, and a television system. The device 
had a shock absorbing system to soften the blow of landing, and then 
opened four petals outward which had protected the television system. 
Extended, they tended to stabilize the craft on the surface. With the 
petals open, spring controlled antennas also flipped out into operating 
position, and the TV camera rotatable mirror system could begin a 
panoramic survey of the surroundings, both by revolving and by 

The propulsion unit consisted of a rocket chamber with pumping 
system for the propellants, flight stabilization controls, and fuel tanks. 

The control compartments contained a complex of gyroscopic and 
control instruments, electronic-optical devices for orientation of the 
station in flight, a system for radio control in orbit, a program timing 
device, a radio system for the soft landing, power sources, and micro- 
motors for orientation purposes. 

The spacecraft made its landing in the Ocean of Storms, with Pul- 
kovo Observatory at Leningrad catching this on film at 21 :45 :30 hours, 
Moscow time, February 3, 1966, to become the world's first survivable 
landing on that body. This location is at 7°8' N. and 64°22' W. The 
approach to the Moon had been preceded by midcourse corrections, and 
data were supplied to the craft as to the amount of braking impulse 
required to achieve the landing. Telemetry return to Earth confirmed 
the conditions of the craft and that the right commands had been re- 
ceived. Final orientation occurred one hour before touchdown. At an 
altitude of about 8,300 kilometers, the craft assumed a strictly vertical 
position in relation to the Moon, and was held in this position by its 
sensors. At 75 kilometers, 45 seconds before touchdown, the retro- 
rocket was switched on. Just before this the two compartments no 
longer needed in the operation were jettisoned to save weight. At the 
moment of touchdown, the station with its shock absorber was sepa- 
rated from the motor unit to land nearby. It took 4 minutes 10 seconds 
to deploy the equipment and begin radio transmissions. It was about 
seven hours before television transmission began. 

The Russians did not immediately release the pictures from the 
Moon, but Jodreil Bank in England was following events, and by 
hooking up a press wire facsimile machine the British were able to 
make public the first views from Luna 9. The British picture, lacking 
calibration data, distorted the scale in one dimension, and the combina- 
tion of this distortion plus the unauthorized release annoyed the Rus- 
sians according to TASS. But the British release created a credibility 
for the project which might otherwise have been harder to estab- 
lish in some quarters where Soviet reports tend to be discounted. 

Batteries ran down in the craft on February 6 after seven radio 
sessions of 8 hours 5 minutes total duration, and the three series of 
television pictures when assembled provided a panoramic view as 
planned. The total weight of the landed small station was 100 kilo- 
grams. The camera itself weighed only 1.5 kilograms. A non-direc- 


tional antenna was used to return the signals to Earth. The pictures 
showed rocks close at hand and the horizon at a distance of 1.5 kilo- 
meters away. Pictures were taken twice on February 4, anr 1 once on the 
5th, so that with changes in shadow length, dili'erent objects were high- 
lighted. Also, there was some shift in the payload between the sec- 
ond and third picture series giving a slightly different perspective. As 
near as can be judged from the Soviet accounts, each picture series 
involved in the panoramas included nine positions of the mirror. 

Kosmos 111 was launched on March 1, 1966, but failed to leave its 
low Earth orbit from which it decayed in two days. It is generally 
assumed that it was intended to be a lunar orbiter mission, but it 
could have been another lander. 

On March 31, 1966, Luna 10 was launched toward the Moon from 
an orbital launch platform. The weight of payload sent toward the 
Moon was 1,600 kilograms. Apparently, the vehicle was structured like 
Luna 9 in terms of its propulsion, guidance, orientation, and commu- 
nications elements, except that the landing station was replaced by an 
orbital station of a different nature. Luna 10 was braked to enter lunar 
orbit, the first man-made object to achieve this. The main propulsion 
unit was separated from the payload after lunar orbit was attained, 
and the remaining payload weighed 245 kilograms. The initial orbit 
w T as about 1,017 by 350 kilometers with an inclination of 71°54 / to 
the lunar equator and had a period of 178.25 minutes. Although the 
prime purpose of the flight was science, at the 23rd Congress of the 
CPSU (Communist Party, Soviet Union) the delegates were brought 
to their feet when the payload circling the Moon played back to 
Earth the strains of the Internationale. 

Luna 10 was not equipped with a television camera, but it had a va- 
riety of instruments to return data. One task was the reporting of 
meteoritic impacts on the payload. Another was to determine the ther- 
mal characteristics of the Moon without interference of the Earth's 
atmosphere. Another had to do with study of the Moon's magnetism, if 
any. Also, there was a need to establish some notion of the irregulari- 
ties of the Moon's gravitational held. 

One midcourse correction had been required on April 1, and then 
when it was 8,000 kilometers from the Moon, the braking engine was 
fired to drop the speed from 2.1 kilometers per second to 1.25 kilo- 
meters per second so that it could go into orbit. The payload was 
separated 20 minutes after the end of retrofire. 

The listed instruments were: A meteorite particles recorder; a 
gamma spectrometer; a magnetometer; instruments for studying solar 
plasma ; a recorder for infrared emissions from the Moon ; and devices 
to measure radiation conditions in the Moon's environment. The gravi- 
tational studies were pursued as a byproduct of the tracking. The 
device was battery-powered, but by careful husbanding of this elec- 
trical supply, it was possible to continue to receive radio signals from 
the payload until May 30, 1966. By this time, there had been 460 orbits 
of the Moon, and 219 active transmissions of data. 

By placing the payload in an orbit inclined at 72 degrees to the 
lunar equator, it was able to take readings over much of the surface 
over a period of time. The stunt of sending back music was achieved 
by programing some semiconductors to emit a definite sequence of 
electrical oscillations. 


The payload found a magnetic field around the Moon about 0.001 
the strength of that around Earth. Cosmic ray background levels were 
slightly high, as expected. The natural radiation of lunar rocks was 
determined to resemble most closely that of basalt on Earth. The in- 
tensity of meteoritic impacts was higher than in interplanetary space. 
Some of the observed radiation from the lunar surface was believed to 
come from interactions with cosmic rays rather than from natural 
radioactivity within the rocks. Particles of the Moon's radiation belts 
were estimated to be present to only one-one hundred thousandths that 
of Earth in the corresponding zone. The gamma ray spectrometer was 
that of the multiscintillation type, to cover energies between 0.3 and 3 
million electron volts. The magnetometer had three channels at recip- 
rocally right angles. The ion trap was modulated to register positive 
ions down to an energy level below 10 electron volts, while the four 
electron traps would measure a full stream of ions if exceeding 50 
electron volts. 

Luna 11 was launched on August 24, 1966 with a weight sent toward 
the Moon of 1,640 kilograms. It was launched from an orbital launch 
platform, and later a midcourse correction was performed. It ap- 
proached the Moon on August 28, when retrorockets were fired to place 
it in lunar orbit. Less was said about this flight than about Luna 10. 
Most of the early bulletins merely reported that communications were 
stable, and how many orbits had been accomplished. A month after 
launch, the mission was described as studying gamma and X-ray emis- 
sions of the Moon to determine more exactly the chemical composition 
of the Moon, and studying gravitational anomalies in the Moon. Addi- 
tionally, this satellite was studying the concentration of meteoritic 
streams, and intensity of hard corpuscular radiation near the Moon. 
This payload was put into an orbit between 1,200 and 160 kilometers, 
at an inclination of 27 degrees with a period of 178 minutes. Xot much 
more was said until the announcement that the batteries had been 
used up by October 1, 1966, after 137 radio sessions, and 277 orbits of 
the Moon. 

Xo picture has ever been released of this payload, and very little has 
been published about the findings. An early Soviet announcement sug- 
gested in a vague way that this was improved over Luna 10. Jodrell 
Bank intercepted signals that suggested that Luna 11 was intended to 
return television pictures from lunar orbit. 10 This combination of facts 
suggested that Luna 11 resembled Luna 12, the next in the series, but 
that it fell well short of its planned functions. 

Luna 12 was launched on October 22, 1966 toward the Moon, also 
employing the usual orbital platform technique. A midcourse correc- 
tion was carried out, and the ship was placed in lunar orbit on Octo- 
ber 25. The orbit was first given as 1,740 by 100 kilometers with an 
'•equatorial'' inclination and a period of 205 minutes. Later it was an- 
nounced as 1,200 by 133 kilometers, at an inclination of 10 degrees. On 
October 29, it returned pictures of the lunar surface by radio facsimile. 
The system used was to take pictures with a camera, develop these 
photographic films on board, and then scan the pictures for radio 
transmission to Earth. Xo weight was announced for this payload, but 
it was probably close to that announced for Luna 11. 

10 Reuters, Moscow, August 30, 1966, carried in the New York Times of August 31, 1966. 


The appearance of Luna 12 differed from Luna 10 mostly because 
of the large radiator covering much of the instrument compartment. 
Those parts of the scientific apparatus which did not need to be air 
tight — the antennas, and the gas reserve spheres for the mierosteering 
engines were also external to the body of the station. The propulsion 
unit of the liquid fuel rocket, its pumping system, control devices, and 
fuel tanks were little changed from earlier Luna or Zond payloads. 
Again, there were separate attached compartments to contain the astro- 
orientation devices consisting of gyroscopes, electro-optical instru- 
ments, and program timers to be cast loose just before retrofire. These 
were both to orient the total craft for midcourse and braking maneu- 
vers, and those that went with the payload to align the spacecraft dur- 
ing picture-taking sequences while circling the Moon. The main in- 
strument compartment of the orbiter contained the major experiments, 
radio receivers and transmitters, and the automated photographic and 
facsimile picture processing equipment. Pictures apparently were first 
transmitted to Earth at a fast data rate for a quick scan at the deep 
space tracking facility, and then retransmitted at a slower rate to 
maximize the detail for more thorough study later. The pictures con- 
tained 1.100 lines of scan, to give a maximum resolution of 15 to 20 
meters. T\ r hen the last had been transmitted, the facsimile/television 
unit was switched off to conserve power. It is not known how many 
pictures were taken, compared with Zond 3 which had taken 25. Only 
two or three seem to have been made public from the Luna 12 flight. 
Radio transmissions from this craft ended on January 10. 1967, after 
602 orbits of the Moon, and 302 radio sessions with Earth. 

Luna 13 was launched on December 21. 1960. It repeated the opera- 
tional steps of its predecessors, and landed on the Moon on Decem- 
ber 24 in the Sea of Storms at 18° 52' N. and 62° 0.3' W. Four minutos 
after landing it began to transmit to Earth, having opened its petals, 
sprung out antennas, and warmed up radios. A day after landing, it 
began to send back photographs f the surface in the same manner as 
Luna 9. The first successful lander had gone into mountainous terrain 
(lurain), and this one was on a lunar seabed, but the general appear- 
ance of the surroundings were much the same. Luna 13 differed from 
Luna 9 in that it carried two telescoping arms which were gunpowder- 
controlled, once extended, to swing outward and down from the craft 
to thump the lunar surface so that sensors could judge something of 
the density and firmness. The 16 degree tilt of the station away from 
horizontal meant that the panoramic swing of the mirror on the camera 
permitted views at a distance of less than one meter to show objects 
of millimeter size, graduating out to other views of the lunar horizon. 

Some davs after the landing, the lunar soil properties were de- 
scribed as having to a depth of 20 to 30 centimeters the mechanical 
properties of average density terrestrial ground, but general density at 
the landing site was believed to be less than typical Earth ground 
density. Little radioactivitv in the soil was detected. The impact device 
could develop a pressure of 23.3 kilograms to force a rod into the soil. 
These data from the impact device were compared with accelerometer 
data from the actual deceleration in landing, leading to reasonably 
consistent findings on the mechanical properties of the soil. The actual 
density was estimated by direct measurements of the volumetric weight 


by means of gamma quanta. Density was estimated as not exceeding 
one gram per cubic centimeter, much less than both terrestrial ground 
or average density of the Moon. 

It was also determined that the lunar surface reflects about 25 per- 
cent of particles of space radiation which fall upon it. consistent with 
the Luna 9 data. Observed stones looked like local debris, not 

It was also revealed that the camera and television system required 
about 100 minutes to transmit an entire panoramic view of (lie sur- 
roundings. From the absence of further reports, it is likely the bat- 
teries ran down before the end of December 1966. 

o. 1 '968 Lunar Attempt 

Sixteen months were to pass before the concluding flight of the sec- 
ond generation Luna series came about. Luna 14 was launched on 
April 7, 1968. After the usual midcourse correction, the braking sys- 
tem slowed it oil April 10 to place the payload in a lunar orbit, ranging 
from 870 to 160 kilometers, at an inclination of 42 degrees, and with a 
period of 160 minutes. Xo weight figures and no pictures were released 
on the craft. But the listed experiments most closely resembled those 
of Luna 10, the first orbiter. These were aimed at studies of interac- 
tions between the mass of the Earth and the Moon, studies of the 
Moon's gravitational field, the propagation and stability of radio 
communications between Earth and spacecraft, measures of the stream 
of charged particles from the Sun, and formulation of a precise theory 
for the Moon's movement. Not announced until two years later, this 
vehicle and Luna 12 earlier had carried out tests of the type of elec- 
tric motor used to provide locomotion on Lunokhod 1 in 1970. 

The President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Keldysh, stated 
that the flight would have enormous significance for future, more 
ambitious flights to the Moon. Xo published data have been discovered 
to indicate the termination of this experiment, although it was still 
operating normally at the end of April 1968. 


On Xovember 1, 1963, Polet 1 was placed in Earth orbit. Khrush- 
chev himself pointed to the designation of it as being the first of a 
series, saying that a whole new era was opening for craft able to 
maneuver after attaining orbit. The flight entered an initial orbit 
with an apogee of 592 kilometers and a perigee of 339 kilometers. It 
was announced to have made many maneuvers of a lateral nature and 
of altitude, so that the final orbit was 1,437 by 343 kilometers, and the 
inclination was 58° 55'. Little more was said of the specifics of the 
flight, although there were many comments on the importance of being 
able to maneuver. 

On April 12, 1964, Polet 2 was also placed in Earth orbit. Again, the 
Russians stressed its ability to maneuver repeatedlv. but they did not 
publish the details on these maneuvers. The final orbit was described 
as 500 by 310 kilometers, at an inclination of 58.06 degrees. 

As discussed earlier in this report, we can describe the launch vehicle 
used as an A-m combination. Strangely, the program was never again 
identified, and one may speculate that it served its purpose, that the 
technology was incorporated into some other classes of vehicles as a 



On January 30, 1964, the Soviet Union made its first launch of two 
payloads with a single launch vehicle, subsequently identified by them 
as having been put up by their standard vehicle (A-l). Elektron 1, 
weighing 330 kilograms, was put into an eccentric orbit of 7,100 by 
406 kilometers at an inclination of 61 degrees and a period of 169 
minutes. Elektron 2, weighing 445 kilograms, was put into an even 
more extreme orbit of 68,200 by 460 kilometers, also at an inclination 
of 61 degrees, and with a period of 1,360 minutes. Both were fairly 
complex spacecraft. Elektron 1 was cylindrical with six solar panels 
which folded out away from the craft, and it carried multiple an- 
tennas at both ends. Elektron 2 was shaped like the cupola of a build- 
ing, was mostly covered with solar cells, had antennas at both ends, 
and a magnetometer boom at its pointed tip. 

The purpose of these flights was to map the radiation belts and to 
supply synoptic readings. Western observers suggested that in light 
of their probable power supplies which should be available from such 
large expanses of solar cells, and the announced experiments on board, 
these craft could easily have the power and weight to carry additional 
unannounced experiments. For example, they could easily have carried 
nuclear explosion detection instruments, like those of the U.S. Vela 
series, although the latter fly in circular orbits at about 100,000 kilo- 
meters circular orbit above the Earth. 

On July 10, 1964, Elektron 3 and Elektron 4 were put up into similar 
orbits in another dual launch. Elektron 3's orbit was 7,040 by 405 
kilometers, 60.86 degrees inclination, and a period of 168 minutes. 
Elektron 4 was in an orbit of 66,235 by 459 kilometers, inclination 
of 60.86 degrees, and period of 1,314 minutes. These flights, about 
six months after the earlier series, and launched about 12 hours later 
during the day provided a second set of readings for comparison with 
the first flights. Weights were not announced, but presumably were a 
close repeat of the earlier flights. There have been no more since that 


It was appropriate that after the eccentric orbit, relatively small 
Elektron flights, that the largest of Soviet scientific flights should be 
called Protons. An earlier chapter of this report has already described 
the Proton or D class launch vehicle, about three times the capacity 
of the standard A class launch vehicles. As noted, to this day, no com- 
plete photograph of this launch vehicle has been made available. 

1. Proton 1 

On July 16, 1965, the U.S.S.R. announced the launch of Proton 1, 
said to weigh 12.2 metric tons, into an orbit 627 by 190 kilometers at 
an inclination of 63.5 degrees, and with a period of 92.5 minutes. The 
rocket was described as having a power output in excess of 60 million 
horsepower. The payload was described as a massive cosmic ray meas- 
uring experiment, to gather evidence on cosmic ray primaries up to an 
energy level of 100 trillion electron volts (10 14 eY). Later, when a 
replica of the payload was put on display, it was found to consist of a 
short cylinder about 4 meters in diameter, with four large solar cell 
panels or paddles which folded out from it, and a number of antennas. 


Cradled within the cylinder was the experiment package as if within 
an annulus. Separate cutaways of the experiment showed typical 
blocks of metal, paraffin, and plastic as often used for cosmic ray 
experiments. The ship was able to transmit many channels of tele- 
metry. The low orbit led to its decay after 87 days. 

2. Proton 2 

This similar payload was launched on November 2, 1965, and lasted 
92 days. It was in an orbit of 637 by 191 kilometers, at an inclination 
of 63.5 degrees, and with a period of 92.6 minutes. It also was an- 
nounced as weighing 12.2 metric tons. Western optical studies of the 
accompanying debris in Earth orbit left in doubt whether the whole 
core vehicle was in orbit with the payload (the D version) or an upper 
stage (the D-l version). 

3. Proton 3 

After eight more months, Proton 3 was announced as launched on 
July 6, 1966. It was in an orbit of 630 by 190 kilometers, at 63.5 de- 
grees inclination, and with a period of 92.5 minutes. It also had an 
announced weight of 12.2 metric tons. Decay came after 72 days. This 
flight continued the study of cosmic rays, including solar cosmic rays, 
and their energy spectrum and chemical composition in the range up 
to 100 trillion electron volts. It measured the absolute intensity and 
energy spectrum of those of galactic origin, and it sought primary 
cosmic rays for any particles which might have a fractional electrical 
charge. Specific reference was made to searching for the postulated 
fundamental particle, the quark. In any case, the orbital station af- 
forded study opportunities impossible to pursue on the surface of the 

Considering that three such similar payloads were flown, and prob- 
ably without too efficient a use of the new launch vehicle, it seemed 
perhaps the primary purpose of the flights was to test the new vehicle 
with science getting a free ride, much like the three early flights 
of Saturn I which carried repetitive Pegasus meteoroid experiments. 

4. Proton 4 

The final Proton flight came on November 14, 1968, as an improve- 
ment over the predecessors. It was put into an orbit of 495 by 255 
kilometers at an inclination of 51.5 degrees, the inclination used here- 
after for D- vehicle launches, with a period of 91.75 minutes. It de- 
cayed after 250 days. This time the payload weight was listed as 17 
metric tons. 

Later, a replica was put on display, and it was substantially like its 
predecessors, but at one end there was a blunt, conical nosecone, even 
though the payload was non-recoA T erable. It had a number of rod 
antennas, and the same kind of solar panels. This time there was agree- 
ment among Western optical observers that the accompanying spent 
rocket casing in orbit was on the order of 12 meters long, 4 meters 
in diameter, the same as seen with the Luna 15 and Zond 4 flights (the 
D-l version). 

The Soviet description of the experiments this time raised its capac- 
ity to measuring cosmic ray energies up to a level of one quadrillion 
electron volts, (10 15 eV) and to do chemical analysis studies in the 
range between 10 and 100 trillion electron volts. It was also to study 


the possible collisions of cosmic ray particles with the nuclei of hydro- 
gen, carbon, and iron in the range of 1 to 10 trillion electron volts, and 
to study the dynamics of collisions of cosmic ray particles in the 10 
to 100 trillion electron volt range with the nuclei of atoms. They con- 
tinued their search for primary particles with fractional electric 
charges, and to measure the intensity and energy spectrum of high 
energy electrons. They still hoped to find quarks. A number of the 
instruments had been refined over what were used in the earlier flights. 

The main instrument used on the Proton station was an ionization 
calorimeter. It consisted of a considerable number of steel bars be- 
tween which were special plastic scintillators. When a cosmic ray 
primary would strike an iron nucleus, secondary particles spread out 
to collide with still other nuclei through many generations. A lump 
of carbon serving as one half and a lump of polyethylene as the other 
half of the instrument were used as measuring devices where the inter- 
actions of particles could be studied. 

IT. The Kosmos Program 


In the first five years of the Soviet space program, only 15 nights 
were successful in attaining orbit. All had come from Tyuratam. and 
all had used the large standard vehicle in its several forms, the A. A-l, 
A-2, and A-2-e. It is possible that only one or two launch pads were 
in use. In a sense, despite the very considerable achievements of the 
program, it represented a current operation on a shoe string, exploit- 
ing to the utmost the investment which had been made. Lead times 
suggest that by the time the first Sputnik flew, work undoubtedly was 
already well along in planning use of the upper stage which permitted 
the first Luna nights, and perhaps the Vostok manned ship was also 
under actual development. 

But the time had come as these early nights occurred to flesh out 
the Soviet space systems beyond proof of principle into both practical 
applications nights and more ambitious exploratory missions. One 
obvious need was to bring into operation a simpler launch vehicle 
which would be more economical for modest missions, in the same way 
that XASA uses not only its complex orbiting space observatories but 
also its simpler Explorer payloads. Secondly, the Soviet Union needed 
to be able to fire its launch rockets at additional inclinations, from 
places where these changes of azimuth would not risk dropping first 
stages on populated regions. Third, if the pace of such flights was to 
pick up, it would be useful to spread the launch range workload more 

The Soviet Union was in the slightly contradictory position of 
describing all of its space activity as devoted exclusively to scientific 
purposes, codefined as peaceful in nature, and probably also self- 
defined to include all technological endeavors as automatically scien- 
tific. But at the same time they were exploiting to the utmost the 
concept of operational and strategic surprise, to keep their American 
rival off balance and their world image one of successful leadership. 
Startling predictions were made as to what they planned to do, but 
without a specific time table, and enough of these missions were 


accomplished to create that sought image of purposeful success. Infor- 
mation on failures was kept carefully hidden for many years, and 
constantly the theme was pressed that these sure successes were the 
direct result of the superiority of the socialist system. It was flatly 
stated repeatedly for the early years that there were no failures in the 
Soviet program. Secrecy was defended both on the score that the 
Soviet Union did not boast before it had accomplished deeds worth 
advertising, and that its use of powerful military missiles as carrier 
rockets, the front line of defense against aggressive imperialism, 
needed protection against Western spying designed to help the United 
States catch up in a held where the Soviet technical lead was said to 
be strong. 

At the same time that the U.S.S.R. was drawing comparisons un- 
favorable to the United States by contrasting Soviet spacecraft weigh- 
ing tons and U.S. Vanguards like grapefruit, they were reading in 
the American press about U.S. plans for Pied Piper, Big Brother, 
Sentry, and other project names for further generations of U.S. mili- 
tary spacecraft in quite a different league from the first U.S. small 
scientific payloads. It would be hard to believe that Soviet technicians 
were any less aware than our own, that spaceflight provided new and 
interesting opportunities for applications of advanced technology. But 
how were such Soviet military applications to be made without under- 
cutting their own propaganda contrasting their scientific and peaceful 
image with their claims that the U.S. Department of Defense was 
already militarizing space for purposes of world aggression? 

There was a body of Soviet literature which looked beyond the tem- 
porary license of the IGY agreements permitting overflights of na- 
tional territories to proposals that all military flights in space should 
be subject to international prohibition. Observation from space was 
called spying, and not only the lawyers were critical, for military 
figures spoke of the need to take countermeasures. Premier Khrushchev 
spoke scathingly of people who peek into others' bedrooms, promising 
that satellites would meet the same fate as the U-2 had on May 1, 1960. 
If the Russians were to protect their own freedom of action in space 
while not sacrificing the peaceful image they were carefully construct- 
ing, they needed an appropriate cover plan. 


The United States proved sensitive and defensive about the Soviet 
charges that it was practicing aggression in space, and the trauma of 
the Gary Powers capture and subsequent collapse of public informa- 
tion policies had produced a very secretive attitude within some seg- 
ments of the United States Government. This Government knew that 
gathering information was important to maintaining peace, and that 
this was not aggressive by our standards. Xo one knew what the Rus- 
sians were up to within their closed and compartmented society. 
National security required that U.S. work proceed on several fronts 
against all the possible contingencies of rapid expansion of Soviet 
strategic missile capabilities, of Soviet bombs in orbit, of Soviet inter- 
ception of U.S. payloads. Because the Soviet Union disclosed so little 
information which could be verified by normal means, it was vital that 
some notion of the order of battle and disposition of military resources 


arid hardware be known as a guide to the pacing of American protec- 
tive developments. If there was a danger that our information gat hir- 
ers were going to be "neutralized" by the Russians, then everything 
had to be done to protect the privacy of these U.S. nat ional technical 
means, as well. 

Some very carefully reasoned legal interpretations of the U-2 in- 
cident showed that such Government aircraft overflights in the air 
space of other nations were not necessarily espionage and illegal. 11 
But the political reality of the U-2 and the storm it produced wont 
far beyond abstract legal principles. By contrast, flight through outer 
space could hardly be considered invasion of air space. No logic would 
support the concept of sovereignty extending outward from Earth to 
sweep limitless regions of the universe as the Earth rotated on its 
axis. Nonetheless, in the absence of firm international law on such 
points in these early years, a cautious policy seemed appropriate. 

Hence, in the fall of 1961, the United States information policy on 
its military space operations progressively tightened to withhold 
details of hardware and operations plans. By November 22, the first 
U.S. launch of unannounced purpose occurred. The occasional 
launches of this one category of flight drew such added attention from 
the world press that information policies had to be tightened even 
more, and extended to most military space flights. After the launch 
of Discoverer 38 in late February 1962, no more names were an- 
nounced for flights with the same characteristics, and information 
disappeared on recovery of any capsules returned from space by the 
military. This contrasted with the news releases urged upon the press 
about such recoveries until that time. Later, even the previously widely 
publicized navigation satellites called Transit went under cover. 

Thus it became United States policy from March 1962 on to have 
no public names for its military space flights, aside from some later 
exceptions where a variety of other agencies were sharing in the scien- 
tific and technological experiments to gather environmental data, to 
develop communications techniques, or to test some supporting sys- 
tems such as gravity stabilization devices or tracking devices. Al- 
though the names and descriptions for the bulk of U.S. flights dis- 
appeared, the flights did not become truly secret. First of all, the fact 
of launch was announced locally at the launch site, naming the launch 
vehicle used. This was hardly a disclosure as private citizens in the 
areas adjacent to the launch centers could observe the obvious. Second, 
the orbital elements of most of these flights later were published in 
the NASA Goddard Satellite Situation Report. In more recent years, 
secrecy has extended to excluding from the Goddard report the orbital 
elements of some of these Defense satellites. Third, under international 
agreements, the names of all launch vehicles including the orbital ele- 
ments even of the satellites no longer listed by elements with NASA 
are registered at the United Nations, not only for the payloads, but 
for all associated pieces of debris. Even with this record of name 
hiding but ultimate openness on where the satellites are in orbit, there 
followed some years of continuing Soviet criticism about these mili- 
tary operations. They even planted the suspicion in the world that 

u Beresford, Spencer M. High altitude surveillance in international law. Paper given in 
Stockholm, Sweden, August 16, 1960 at the 11th Congress of the International Astronauti- 
cal Federation. 


r.S. flights had gone beyond passive military support to placement 
of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. This latter possibility can be 
analyzed to show its complete absurdity, but will not be done here. 
At the height of Soviet ''hysteria 7 ' about U.S. overflights, even the low 
resolution pictures taken by the NASA TIROS weather satellites 
were described by some Soviet writers as "spy in the sky" flights. 12 

It has already been suggested that the Russians faced an informa- 
tion handling crisis of their own in the very months that the United 
States was "jinwriting" its own history of articles about space observa- 
tion. and was trying to defuse a potentially bad situation by toning 
down and taking the spotlight off U.S. military space flights and 
"provocative" program descriptions. Whether our policy was both 
correct and wise is a matter of opinion. In the long run it seems to 
have worked, but not necessarily for the reasons originally offered. 

The Russians decided they wished freedom of action in a number of 
military space fields, and that their own withholding of information 
on coming programs could be protected with a very simple cover plan 
which gave as complete privacy as technology would permit while 
maintaining the wholly "peaceful" image of the first five years of 
spaceflight. This was simply to have a blanket, all-inclusive flight de- 
scription which was generally correct or at least hardly challenge- 
able which could be used for the bulk of their flights. At the same time 
TO percent of all flights could be given the meaningless name Kosmos, 
and a serial number. This "openness' of name, immediate release of 
orbital elements, and peaceful Kosmos label, could be contrasted with 
the fact that half of U.S. flights were for the Department of Defense, 
had no name, no announced mission, and details on orbital path were 
withheld for weeks or months for belated release, sometimes after the 
flight was over. This Soviet practice was only a propaganda ploy, al- 
though an effective one, when in fact a cover name, serial number, and 
vague description provided no real information. The Soviet release of 
orbital parameters was useful, but presumably told no more than was 
already evident to the tracking systems of the United States and 

Here is the text of the Kosmos announcement of March 16, 1962 : 

A series of artificial Earth satellites will be launched from different cos- 
modromes of the Soviet Union during 1962. Another launching of an artificial 
Earth satellite was carried out in the Soviet Union on 16 March 1962. . . . 

The launching of the artifical Earth satellite continues the current program 
of studying the upper layers of the atmosphere and outer space in fulfillment 
of which a series of satellite launchings will be effected under this program from 
different cosmodromes of the Soviet Union in the course of 1962. The scientific 
program includes : The study of the concentration of charged particles in the 
ionosphere for investigating the propagation of radio waves ; a study of corpus- 
cular flows and low energy particles ; study of the energy composition of the 
radiation belts of the Earth for the purpose of further evaluating the radiation 
dangers of prolonged space flights ; study of the primary composition and intensity 
variation of cosmic rays ; study of the magnetic field of the Earth ; study of the 
short wave radiation of the Sun and other celestial bodies ; study of the upper lay- 
ers of the atmosphere ; study of the effects of meteoric matter on construction 
elements of space vehicles ; and study of the distribution and formation of cloud 
par terns in the Earth's atmosphere. 

Moreover, many elements of space vehicle construction will be checked and 
improved. The launching of sputniks of this series will be announced in separate 
reports. This program will give Soviet scientists new means for studying the 
physics of the upper atmospheric layers and outer space. 18 

r - Aleksandrov, Col. B. Spies in the cosmos. Red Star, Moscow, July 23, 1961, p. A. 
13 TASS. March 10. 1962, 1701 GMT. 


Then when the second launch occurred on April 6, it was named 
Kosmos 2, and reference was made back to the press release for Kosmofl 
1. This same pattern has been continued through subsequent years and 
hundreds of Kosmos flights. The first three Kosmos flights clearly came 
from a new orbital launch site, the one at Kapustin Yar, and they flew 
at an inclination close to 49 degrees to the equator. 

But Kosmos 4, announced with the same kind of a press release, 
was flown at the older inclination of 65 degrees, and after three days 
the TASS announcement read : 

The Soviet artificial Earth satellite Kosmos 4. launched on 26 April 19G2, 
has been in orbit for more than three days and has flown in this period about 
2 million kilometers. Throughout the world flight the systems and apparatuses 
on the satellite to carry out the exploration of cosmic space and the upper layers 
of the atmosphere worked well. In connection with the completion of the pro- 
gram of scientific research on 29 April, at a command from Earth, the success- 
ful landing of the satellite in a predetermined area of the territory of the 
Soviet Union was carried out. As a result of the launching of satellite Kosmos 4, 
valuable scientific data, which at present is being processed and studied, has 
been received. 14 

Thus was signaled that many separate programs, many different 
launch vehicles, and several cosmodromes would be used by the 
U.S.S.R,, with individual purposes released only selectively, and in a 
minority of instances, under the general blanket cover label of Kosmos. 
Also, they were able to announce their successful recovery of a pay- 
load on land, without tying that work to a military program, which 
the United States managed to do when President Eisenhower dis- 
played the first recovered Discoverer capsule after its ocean pick-up. 
The reference to using some flights to take cloud cover pictures was 
especially ironic, even humorous, after the earlier paroxysms the 
Soviet government went through when they put on display camera 
systems in Moscow, recovered from U.S. balloons launched to drift 
over the Soviet Union from West Germany, and intended for recov- 
ery in the area of Japan. The United States had described the purpose 
of the balloon flights to be that of gathering cloud pictures, but the 
Russians said they represented spying localise of the resolution of the 


Especially with the advantage of hindsight, it is possible to sort out 
the Kosmos flights in almost all instances into broad categories. This 
process has been carried out in part through earlier sections of this 
report. The identification of launch sites and the distinguishing of 
different launch vehicles start this process. Beyond this, the public 
record of orbital elements is very revealing as repetitive patterns are 
studied, and these characteristics are compared with possible missions 
which would use such paths around the Earth. 

As time passes, the Soviet scientific community publishes experi- 
mental results on those Kosmos flights which are scientific. This ac- 
counts for some of them, including use of A, B. and C classes of launch 
vehicles, even though the bulk of all three categories have no findings 
reported in either scientific journals or popular sources. When space 
applications flights for such functions as weather reporting, carrying 
human crews, and communications have appeared and ultimately been 

" TASS, April 29, 1962, 1232 GMT. 


described by TASS, it has been possible to find within the Kosmos 
label certain flights with the same characteristics of orbit or duration 
of flight. The manned flight precursors have been especially easy to 
spot not only for their orbital placement and recovery, but usually 
the radio frequencies used and sometimes even the broadcast of 
recorded human voices. For those Kosmos flights which ultimately are 
followed by scientific findings published, it is possible to note their 
special characteristics and identify follow-on flights of the same series 
even in advance of the ultimate publication of results. 

Hence it is safe to say that Kosmos includes elements of programs 
devoted to science, to development of practical civil applications, and 
to testing precursors to manned ships to follow. 

There are two further categories of Kosmos flights which cannot be 
identified as to purpose on the basis of later Soviet publications any- 
thing like as directly, and these flights make up the overwhelming bulk 
of all Kosmos flights. The smaller portion of the unknowns are flight 
failures, whose malfunctions are ignored by issuing a routine an- 
nouncement of the flight which also says that incoming data are being 
received and studied. Examples of these are the deep space flights 
whose orbital platforms for some reason have not sent a payload on 
its way to the Moon or a planet. But the greater part of the Kosmos 
flights are ones that seem to have functioned and where despite the 
fact they number on the order of 500, no scientific finding has ever 
been published. These are almost surely military in character, and 
their probable missions will be discussed in another chapter. 


It has already been pointed out that the Soviet announcements alone 
when coupled with later publication of scientific findings and with 
later announced manned or applications flights permit positive identi- 
fication of a substantial number of Kosmos missions, even though less 
than half the total. The nature of announced orbits even without elab- 
oration provides a checklist of potential applications which would 
be consistent with the orbital location of the flights. 

Beyond this, important indicators are supplied by the Goddard Sat- 
ellite Situation Report which gives the orbital elements and then decay 
dates on not only the payloads but associated debris as well. Abandoned 
debris may reveal something about the staging and mode of operation 
or maneuver, if any, used by the flight. Rates of orbital decay over 
time may reveal something of the density or shape of the objects in 
orbit. If final decay from orbit occurs before natural decay by air drag 
would dictate, it is reasonably likely that retrofire was employed in a 
recovery attempt, or return to Earth was deliberately arranged to 
clump a large non-recoverable spacecraft in an ocean area. If pickaback 
payloads are separated later from the main payload. this fact generally 
can be noted in the public register. Clearly catastrophic events such as 
explosions in orbit are signaled by the large amount of debris, and the 
dispersion from the original single orbit tells something of the violence 
of the explosion. Payloads which were spin stabilized early in flight 
and then slowed down by unwinding "yo-yo" wires with weights are 
identifiable because these separated weights above and below the main 
payload are a standard tell-tale with such flights. 


The Goddard report is inadequate by itself to answer all the ques- 
tions that public sources of information could provide. The Koyal 
Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough in England gives a 
much more explicit description of all world flights, including Soviet, 
by labeling which objects are pay loads, which are spent rocket casings, 
which are special capsules, and which are miscellaneous debris. The 
British also give the hour of launch which often helps to identify the 
launch site and sometimes the purpose of the mission. Because the KAE, 
too, is looking for repetitive patterns and they can add some data from 
optical or radar observations, they are able to list the shape, weight, 
and dimensions of most objects to the best of their estimating ability. 
They describe the orbit more completely than does Goddard by giving 
the date of orbit determination, sometimes with multiple entries, the 
estimated orbital life time, the semimajor axis, the orbital eccentricity, 
and the argument of perigee. This is in addition to the Goddard type 
information on apogee, perigee, inclination, and period. 

Still more information on Kosmos flights is available from private 
observers whose findings may ultimately find their way to publica- 
tion at least in summary form. The chief of these sources is provided 
from the team of observers linked with the Kettering Grammar 
School, Northants, England. Geoffrey E. Perry, the head science 
master of the school has led this effort with important support from 
his family, colleagues, and successive generations of pupils. Coordi- 
nated information comes from correspondent stations in Sollentuna 
and Malmo, Sweden, operated by Sven Grahn and Jan Ola Dahlberg, 
and one in Cyprus by Peter Wakelin. Horst Hewel in West Berlin and 
Richard S. Flagg in Gainesville at the University of Florida cooperate 
at times of manned space flight. Christopher D. Wood contributed 
data from Fiji until he returned to the United Kingdom. 

The Perry effort first concentrated on the signal characteristics of 
the then mostly eight-day military recoverable photographic missions 
of the U.S.S.R. Doppler shift in signals made it possible to establish 
the flight path to a good degree of accuracy. When the flights were 
ready for recovery, the radio beacon was tracked, and the stages of 
retrofire, ionospheric blackout, parachute opening, touch down on the 
ground, and arrival of the pickup crew to turn off the final beacon 
could be logged with great precision. 

Perry's studies proceeded to identify telemetry format so that even 
on the first revolution it has been possible to discern wmich flights 
fall into each of the several modes of operation, with most of the 
newer flights staying up 12 to 14 days. Often impending launches 
could be forecast because a spacecraft already in orbit would vacate 
its previous frequency, moving to a different one in order to free the 
original frequency for new launch coming within the day. 

By study of the pen tracing of signals. Perry was able to correlate 
some of these readings with probable expenditure of photographic 
film during the flight, and to find some of the other housekeeping 
or environmental parameters being measured. 

Hence, with the passage of time, these Kettering techniques have 
given a highly professional, consistently positive identification to 
many aspects of the Soviet space program from completely unclassi- 
fied, private sources, which are not matched by any public release 
of data by the Soviet, United States, or British governments. The 


general public interested in data on Soviet flights owes a debt to the 
Kettering Grammar School whose published findings in a few in- 
stances may have been factors toward influencing the official bureauc- 
racies to ease up on the rigid suppression of what is essentially 
non-sensitive information about space flights. Perry has received 
recognition in many forms from both the scientific world and the Lay 
world of government and press. His name appeared on the New 
Year's Honors List of January 1973, and he was personally invested 
with the order of MBE by Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace 
on March 13, 1973. In January 1974, he was awarded the Jackson- 
Gwilt Medal and Gift of the Royal Astronomical Society. 


As the foregoing discussion has suggested, the largest part of the 
Kosmos program is military. However, the program overall is so 
large that even the minority of flights which are scientific makes an 
impressively long list. By the techniques discussed above, it is usually 
possible to distinguish between scientific and military missions. The 
out and out military missions are discussed in detail in another chap- 
ter. The scientific missions can be tagged tentatively as they occur, 
based on external characteristics, and often it is a matter of waiting 
from a year to several years until the tentative assignment can be 
confirmed or reevaluated on the basis of published scientific findings. 
In addition to those flights with a primary scientific mission, there 
are a number of military flights which carry a separable scientific 
payload in pickaback form, and there are other scientific experiments 
which are incorporated as part of the main military payload. To the 
extent any of these categories can be identified or have been disclosed, 
they will be accounted for in the text to follow. 

For convenience these missions will be treated by launch vehicle 
and by date of launch. 

1. Use of the B-l for Seientific Flights 

The B-l vehicle is used to put up a more or less standardized Kos- 
mos scientific payload which consists essentially of a short sealed cyl- 
inder with hemispheric ends. Most are spin stabilized during launch. 
Some carry internal chemical batteries only; others have solar cells 
either on the exterior of the cylinder or on panels that fold out from 
the body of the spacecraft. The instrumentation and booms, if any, 
vary with the experiments being conducted. Their weights have never 
been announced, but probably range from 260 to 425 kilograms. Two 
had a special stabilization system that depended upon use of the 
aerodynamics of the atmosphere still present in low orbit enough to 
influence vehicle performance. An annular ring was extended in or- 
bital flight on telescoping booms well to the rear of the spacecraft. 
This was successful, but would only work for relatively short-lived 
low orbits. 

Flights made at Kapustin Yar have flown at inclinations close to 
49 degrees, or, from 1966 on at about 48.4 degrees. Only a few were 
announced as to the scientific purpose at the time of launch. An even 
smaller number of scientific payload launches were made at Plesetsk, 
either at 71 degrees or at 82 degrees. In more recent years, the Kosmos 

67-371—76 9 


name was replaced by Interkosmos because the flights were carrying 
cooperative experiments of other countries of the Soviet bloc jointly 
with the Russians. In the B-l category, these have been phased out 
recently through a switch of such payloads to use of the larger and 
more versatile C-l launch vehicle. 

Replicas of many of the B-l payloads have ultimately been put 
on display either in Moscow or in international exhibitions. 

The table which follows sorts out the B-l launches by inclination 
and by orbital characteristics. The mission descriptions represent ex- 
periments or instrumentation referred to in the Soviet literature, often 
with added details or overlapping details becoming available over a 
period of time. 


KapustinYar 48.4-49° Plesetsk 

Yenr and 

Kosmos Inter- 
number Very low Low mediate High 71° low 82° low Mission description 


1 980-217 Electron density, propagation, geo- 

mcgnetic, solar wind. 

2 1, 546-212 Electron density, propagation, icn 

composition, solar UV radiation. 

3 720-229 Electron density, propagation, at- 

mospheric density, solar and 
cosmic radiation. 

5 1,600-203 Electron density, atmospheric den- 

sity, solar and cosmic radiation, 

6 360-274 Cosmic radiation. 

8 604-256 Electron density, atmospheric den- 

sity, micrometeorites. 

11 921-245 Atmospheric density, ion density, 



14 512-265 Meteorology. 

17 788-260 Electron density, atmospheric den- 

sity, solar and cosmic radiation. 

19 519-270 Atmospheric density, cosmic radia- 


23 613-240 Meteorology. 


25 526-272 Cosmic radiation. 

26 402-271 Magnetic fields. 

49 490-260 Magnetic fields. UV radiation. 

51 554-264 Luminosity of stellar background. 


53 1,152-227 Cosmic radiation, neutron flux. 

97 2,100-220 Quantum generator maser and 

atomic clock. 


108 865-227 Electron density, propagation, at- 

mospheric density, solar and cos- 
mic radiation. 

135. 662-259 Gamma radiation, micrometeorites. 

137 1,720-230 Radiation, proton spectrum, charged 

particles (Cerenkov counter). 


142 1,362-214 Radio propagation. 

149 297-248 Meteorology, radiation gauges, 

aerostabilized payload. 

163. 616-261 Cosmic ray telescop'e. 

166 578-283 Solar X-ray, UV, and short v>ave 

emissions (spin stabilized). 

196 887-225 Atmospheric studies. 


215 426-261 8-telescope astronomy— visible, IR, 

UV, X-ray. spectrometer, also 
ocean surface brightness, pho- 
tometer of upper atmosphere, 
emission line of oxygen, (spin 

219 1,770-222 Electron spectrum of inner belt- 

magnetometer, scintillation 
counter, photospectrometer, soft 
proton spectrometer. 



Kapustin Yar 48.4-49° Plesetsk 

Year and 

Kosmos Inter- 
number Very low Low mediate High 71° low 82° low Mission description 

225 530-257 Electron flux study of Brazilian 

anomaly, cosmic rays. 

230 580-290 Solar X-ray and UV (spin sta- 


259 1,353-219 Ionospheric studies, radio picra- 


261 670-217 Atmospheric and aurorae studies - 

charged particles, plasma, fluxes 
of soft photoelectrons, spectra of 
auroral electrons [Bloc co- 

262 818-263 Hard radiation intensity (Geiger 



IK-1 640-260 Solar UV and X-ray, plus effects on 

upper atmosphere. (Bloc co- 

IK-2 1,200-206 Night ionospheric measures and 

magnetoiphere, concentration of 
positive ions, electrons, electron 
temperature [Bloc cooperation!. 


320 342-240 Meteorology, reflected solar radia- 

tion, albedo, long wave radiation, 
cloud cover, aerostabilized pay- 

321 507-289 Geomagnetism, ring currents, iono,- 

spheric measures. 

335 _ 415-254 UV radiation. 

348 680-212 Atmospheric and aurorae studies- 

photo electrons, ion tempera- 
tures, horizontal gradients [Bloc 

IK-3 1,320-207 Cosmic rays, low frequency fluxes 

of charged particles, dynamic 
processes of radiation belts, 
UV and X-ray, nature and 
spectrum of electromagnetic 
oscillations. [Bloc cooperation]. 

356 600-240 Atmospheric and aurcrae studies- 


IK-4 668-263 Radiation flux of whole solar disk, 

soft and hard X-rays, UV, 
background cf charged par- 
ticles, optical measures. [Bloc 

1971: IK-5__ 1,200-205 Cosmic ra>s and lower frequencies, 

fluxes of charged particles. 
[Bloc cooperation]. 


481 540-279 Geomagnetic. 

IK-7 568-267 Solar UV and X-rays. [Bloc co- 


IK-8 679-214 Ionospheric electrons and tempera- 

tures, protons, ion concentration. 
[Bloc cooperation]. 

1973: IK-9 1,551-202 Solar radiation and ionospheric 

radio waves excitation by solar 
corona. [BIcc cooperation). 


1. The groupings by apogee and perigee are somewhat arbitrary, but may be compared with groupings used for military 
missions with similar externals and launched also by the B-l vehicle. 

2. The mission descriptions, often issued piecemeal even years after the flight occurred are abbreviated, and to a degree 
overlap, or mix missions and instrumentation, but they give a general indication as to the areas cf interest for each flight. 

3. It will be noted that Interkosmos flight designations appear as well as Kosmos flights. The Soviet Bloc cooperative 
flights are abbreviated with the prefix initials I K. Kosmos 261 and 348 although not given I K numbers were also cooperative 
flights. Presumably they were assigned Kosmos designators because at the time non-Soviet participants were not permitted 
to visit the Plesetsk launch site where these were sent up. 

SOURCES: Basic flight data from Soviet TASS bulletins. Followup mission descriptions sometimes appear as articles in 
the regular Soviet press. Others appear in references in the scientific literature evan years later; and some references 
are found one or more years later in Soviet reports to COSPAR (Committee on Space Research, International Council of 
Scientific Unions). 


% Use of the C-l Scientific Flights 

The B-l launch vehicle came into use in 1962, and the C-l came into 
nse in 1964. But while the B-l was used for scientific flights from 
the outset, the C-l was restricted to military missions until 1970. This 
may be why the Russians released pictures, replicas, and measure- 
ments of the B-l in 1967, but even today have not done the sari f 
the C-l, but whose picture without other details finally was made 
public in 1975. 

The last use of a B-l for a scientific mission came m 1973, and the 
growth in the mse of the C-l has now completed the phased shift to 
the larger, more versatile vehicle. 

The preceding section noted that in some cases, it has not been pos- 
sible to establish a B-l flight as scientific rather than military until 
well after the event, depending upon the appearance of references in 
the scientific literature. Most C-l flights can be catalogued as to mili- 
tary versus civilian use on the basis of their announced flight parame- 
ters, but there are exceptions, and hence any tabulation may need 
revision overtime. For example, Kosmos 381 was promptly announced 
as a scientific topside sounder, and many results have been published. 
Kosmos 385 has almost the same kind of orbit, but nothing has been 
said of it, and it was followed by other flights which have been judged 
to be navigation satellites. 

At least two C-l launches (Kosmos 426 and 546) look from their 
externals as if they should be scientific flights. Will the literature 
eventually reflect this, or are they instrumentation failures, or are they 
unidentified military missions? Another small group of exceptional 
flights with the C-l could be scientific when and if results of experi- 
ments are published, but have been counted as military even though 
not fitting the wholly regular and repetitive flights in the ferret, navi- 
gation, and store-dump communications categories. Since the B-l has 
been replaced by the C-l for scientific missions, the suspicion arises 
that some of the minor military flights which look similar to scientific 
missions may also have been upgraded from use of the B-l to use of 
the C-l. This leaves us, therefore, several missions which do not match 
other scientific missions or regular military C-l missions, but two of 
them match the kinds of orbits used for minor military B-l mission. 
These are Kosmos 660 and Kosmos 687. They may prove later to be 
scientific. Kosmos 708 also does not fit any other pattern: it has the 
apogee and perigee of the navigation or geodesy series, but is at a 
unique inclination. It could be scientific. Kosmos 752 is also anomalous, 
but will be treated as probably military until shown otherwise by 
Soviet announcement. 

Both the French Oreol (Aureole) payloads and the Indian Ariabat 
(Aryabhata) pay load have used the CM. launch vehicle. 

The table which follows summarizes the tentative assignment of 
C-l flights to the scientific category. The table excludes Kosmos 256 
which carried only supplemental scientific experiments to its main 
military missions and Kosmos 610 for the same reason. 




Year and Kapustin Mission 

Kosmos Yar 69.2° 74° 74° 83 c 

number 50.7° circular eccentric 


378 1,763-241 Ionospheric studies, plasmas, leaking ct 

charged particles ot different energies. 

381 1,023-985 Pulsed topside sounder on 20 frequerxies 

and measuring electron flux. 

426 2,012-394 Possible ionospheric studies. 

461 " 524-490 Intensity, spectral composition, distribution, 

angular direction of gamma radiation. 

Oreol 1 2,500-410 Wideband spectrum of protons and electrons, 

proton intensity, ion composition of 
atmosphere (French). 


546 630-585 Possible solar studies. 

IK-10 1,477-265 Particle temperatures, energies, concen- 

trations—electrons, ions, neutral atoms, 
magnetic fields, low frequency oscillations 
in ionosphere [Bloc cooperation). 

Oreol 2 1.SS5-407 Charged particles— protons, electrons /on 

composition, numbers, energy distribu- 
tion, auroras of upperatmosphere [French). 


IK-11 526-484 Solar UV and X-ray, upper atmosphere 

study [Bloc cooperation). 

IK-12 7G8-264 Atmospheric composition and structure- 

numbers, character, energies in iono- 
sphere, micrometeorites [Bloc cooper- 


IK-13 1,714-296 Magnetosphere dynamics, processes of polar 

ionosphere, low frequency electromag- 
netic waves [Bloc cooperation). 

Ariabat... 619-563 X-ray astonomy, solar gamma and neutrons, 

particle flows and racialion in ionosphere 

I K— 14 1,707-345 Low-frequency electromagnetic wave fluc- 

tuations in magnetosphere, structure of 
ionosphere, micrometeoritic intensity 
[Bloc cooperation). 


1. To the extent possible, the scientific missions using the C-l launch vehicle have been isolated for inclusion in this 
table. Two C-l flights do not seem to fit in the military category, yet no scientific results have been found published in the 
literature. Kosmos 426 which roughly resembles Kosmos 378 m3y belong in the same miscellaneous category as Kosmos 
660, or it may be a payload whose instrumentation failed to function. Kosmos 546 somewhat resemLles Interkosmos 11 
but no findings have been published, so may be a scientific payload whose instrumentation failed to function. 

2. Two other payloads launched by the C-l and whose external patterns are wrolly consistent with other C-l flights 
strongly believed to be military seem to have carried supplemental experiments which are scientific in nature. Kosmos 256 
which may be a navigation or geodetic satellite also returned data on solar and cosmic radiation. Kosmos 610 which may 
be an electronic ferret or elint flight also is said to have carried a biological experiment. 

3. The flights included have been grouped by year, inclination, and type of orbit, with mission data summarized from 
widely scattered, sometimes overlapping references in Soviet scientific journals and COSPAR reports. 

4. Interkosmos flights are abbreviated as IK prefix initials plus the number. These are cooperative flights with countries 
in the Soviet Bloc. Additionally the table reflects French and Indian payloads launched on the C-l vehicle. 

SOURCES: Basic flight data from Soviet TASS bulletins. Followup mission descriptions sometimes appear in articles in 
the regular Soviet press. Others appear in references in the scientific literature even years later; and some references are 
found one or more years later in Soviet reports to COSPAR. 

3. Use of the A-l and A-2 for Scientific Supplemental Payloads 

In addition to flights which serve primarily a scientific purpose, 
the Russians have used spare capacity on military flights, often allow- 
ing recovery of the data in the case of military photographic missions, 
which would probably not justify their cost if operated as separate 
scientific missions. 

But analysis of these flights is difficult, and is dependent upon Soviet 
announcements often which are not available until years after fee 
flight. Analysis is difficult because in many cases the flights are 
launched into low Earth orbit, and after some days are recalled, and 
no external clue is revealed that the same flight is doing something 
else which may be scientific. 


As the Russians have ultimately revealed something of the nature 
of supplemental experiments, one can rotrospectly draw some tentative 

For example, one series of military photographic flights also gave 
engineering support to the techniques of launch, control, and recovery 
of manned flights to follow. Another group carried sensors and tele- 
vision cameras that gathered weather data which later led to a separate 
series of weather satellites in sustained, non-recoverable flight. 

A working hypothesis has been that the military recoverable flights 
were essentially unmanned Vostok capsules, carrying camera sys- 
tems instead of human crews. This belief was encouraged by the fact 
that an occasional Soviet photograph in a factory showed more Vostok 
capsules being manufactured than were ever required by the flights in 
the Vostok program that occurred. Also, just as most manned flights 
have been preceded by unmanned precursors, some of the Vostoks 
were preceded not only by the dog-carrying Korabl Sputniks, but 
also by military Kosmos flights which stayed up the same number of 
days as Vostoks which shortly followed. 

If this is correct, then the military Kosmos payloads which carry 
supplemental experiments probably carry them for the most part in 
the main recoverable capsule. The military flights for some years were 
typically of about eight days duration. However, in 1968, a change 
occurred. Military flights started to stay up typically 12 or 13 days, 
and a very considerable number of them began to separate a com- 
ponent part toward the end of the flight. The Royal Aircraft Estab- 
lishment (RAE) estimates this type of separated object as being about 
2 meters in diameter. This raises a real possibility that the Vostok 
shell has been replaced by a Soyuz shell, consisting of a recoverable 
module with some lifting, steering capability during reentry, a more 
versatile service module which could have solar panels but may op- 
erate with chemical batteries alone as do the Soyuz ferry craft which 
went to Salyut 3 and 4, and also a third compartment equivalent to 
the orbital work compartment of Soyuz, and perhaps this is what is 
abandoned by most of the military recoverable photographic missions 
of recent years. If so, then the main cameras and film serving their 
military purpose are contained in the recovery module, while supple- 
mental payloads are carried in the third compartment left in orbit, 
soon to decay without recovery. Some of these capsules seem to be an 
extra maneuvering unit which accounts for the many orbital adjust- 
ments these flights often make. Others of these may contain the sup- 
plemental scientific payloads. As such, they add to our statistics on 
number of functional payloads the Russians put up. The Russians do 
not help us because they have never discussed or otherwise disclosed 
what they do on these large payload military flights which constitute 
the largest single element in the Soviet program. 
m Analysis is difficult in the absence of Soviet information. The RAE 
lists all the capsules, not distinguishing between possible maneuvering 
units and containers for supplemental payloads. There is a good corre- 
lation among the appearance of these capsules late in flight, the 
changes of orbit during flight signifying maneuvers, and the collec- 
tion of data on telemetry and beacon signals by Geoffrey E. Perry of 
the Kettering Group. Perry's data show which ones should maneuver, 
and they usually do, which ones should not maneuver and not separate 


a capsule, also borne out, and finally those that will not maneuver but 
will separate a capsule. These several bits of analytical procedure 
make it possible to sort out a tentative list of flights on which there 
ma}' be supplemental scientific pay loads, and to a point this works 
very well. By waiting patiently for the annual COSPAR report, one 
can learn from the Russians that indeed some of the flights Perry 
tagged did carry scientific payloads as well as their main military 
photograph system. 

Put there are complications. A few of the maneuvering military 
payloads that cast loose a capsule that hypothesis says are maneuver- 
ing engines also turn out to have scientific experiments on board. Are 
they carried in the capsule or in the main recoverable portion ? Some 
capsules abandoned by non-maneuvering military payloads never have 
later scientific accounts of experiments. Perhaps some of the supple- 
mental payloads are military instead of scientific. 

On the basis of all this foregoing discussion, it will be recognized 
how tentative the list which follows must remain until the Russians 
make a fuller explanation. It does at least provide a starting place 
for better analyses in the future. 



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The text lias already explained that most Kosmos flights serve mili- 
tary purposes. These are treated in detail in a separate chapter, and 
have been discussed here only in the context of identifying which are 
which and also those military flights which carry supplemental 
scientific payloads. 


All that is necessary here is to provide a checklist of Kosmos flights 
which almost certainly were engineering tests and development flights 
leading to operational systems which carried other names. This class 
in some small degree may overflap space failures, which will be identi- 
fied presently. 

Voskhod Precursors (A-2 vehicles) 

Kosmos 47 
Soyuz Precursors (A-2 vehicles) 
Kosmos 133 
Kosmos 140 
Kosmos 18G 
Kosmos 188 
Kosmos 212 
Kosmos 213 
Kosmos 238 
Kosmos 496 

Zond Precursors {D-l-e vehicles) 
Kosmos 146 

Man-Related Special Precursors 
Kosmos 379 (A-2-m vehicle) 
Kosmos 398 (A-2-m vehicle) 

Venus Precursor {A-2-e vehicle) 

Kosmos 21 
Meteor Precursors (A-l vehicles) 

Kosmos 44 

Kosmos 58 

Kosmos 100 

Kosmos 118 

Kosmos 122 

Molniya 1 Precursors 

Kosmos 41 (A-2-e vehicle) 

Kosmos 57 

Kosmos 573 
Kosmos 613 
Kosmos 638 
Kosmos 656 
Kosmos 670 
Ivosmos 672 
Kosmos 772 

Kosmos 154 

Kosmos 434 (A-2-m vehicle) 
Kosmos 382 (D-1-m vehicle) 

Kosmos 144 
Kosmos 156 
Kosmos 184 

Kosmos 206 
Kosmos 226 

Kosmos 637 (D-l-e vehicle) 


These are discussed in the context of their missions and all that is 
needed here is a checklist of mission failures which received Kosmos 

Luna Failures 

Kosmos 60 (A-2-e vehicle) Kosmos 300 (D-l-e vehicle) 

Kosmos 111 (A-2-e vehicle) Kosmos 305 (D-l-e vehicle) 


Venus Failures {A-2-e vehicle) 
Kosmos 27 
Kosmos 96 
Kosmos 167 

Mars Failure {D-l-e vehicle) 

Kosmos 419 
Salyut Failure (D-l vehicle) 

Kosmos 557 


So much detail has been provided in the sections above that it may 
be helpful to recapitulate on the number of Soviet flights which have 
carried the name Kosmos, have carried other names, or have been unac- 
knowledged, by various classes of missions for the time span 1957-1975 
inclusive. Such a table follows : 




Other name 




Earth Orbital Science. . 

Earth Orbital Engineering.. 





Vehicle Tests 












Geodesv -------- 

Earth Resources _ 

Earth Orbital Man-Related or Biology.. 




Earth Orbital Manned... 



Lunar Man-Related or Biology 



Lunar Manned 

Moon (Unmanned) 

Venus, Mercury 

Mars, Jupiter, Saturn 







Military Recoverable Observation 



Mapping and Geodesy 

Minor Military (Environmental Monitoring, Radar Calibra- 
tion, Electronic ferret?) 



Elint, Ferret 



Navigation and Geodesy 



Military communications (Store-Dump) 



Early Warning 



Fractional Orbit Bombardment System 




Ocean Surveillance 



Inspection Targets 



Inspector Destructors 

7 . 



Orbital Launch Platforms... 











1. The headings are those used in Table 2 of Chapter One, to increase comparability of the two tables. 

2. The count of Kosmos flights matches the total number of Kosmcs numbers announced by the Russians. 

3. Other names are those also shown in Table 4 of Chapter One, and 25 such have been introduced during the course 
of the Soviet space program. 

3. The unacknowledged payloads include 8 which were primarily missions whose very existence has never been ac- 
knowledged by the Russians, 16 which were planetary landers or lunar sample returners, and 40 possible pickabacks. 

4. The table shows the mixed use of Kosmos for civilian and military purposes, but the more dominant use of the name 
for military missions. 

SOURCES: Data are derived from Appendix A, supplemented from the text of the study. 

Kosmos 359 
Kosmos 482 



1. Overview of All International Orbital Flights 

While the Soviet program of international cooperation in space 
flight started later than that of the United States, it has finally 
achieved fairly respectable scope. The principal organization for con- 
ducting shared experimentation has been the Interkosmos Ofiice of 
Moscow, headed by Academician Boris N. Petrov. Most of these flights 
carry the designator Interkosmos, and are an extension of the scien- 
tific portion of the regular Kosmos series. For this reason, the table 
of Kosmos scientific flights, already presented, summarized in that 
context the experiments to the extent known of the Interkosmos flights 
as well. 

Table 2-6 which follows puts these Interkosmos flights into the con- 
text of all the known international cooperative flights to give a clearer 
impression of their total scope. Another chapter of this report will 
discuss the details of negotiation and operation of the cooperative pro- 
grams, while this section is more concerned with the science and tech- 
nology of Interkosmos, and there will follow in the next section similar 
details on other flights not carrying the Interkosmos label. 

It will be noted from the table that Interkosmos originally used the 
B-l vehicle from Kapustin Yar. Then one time, for Interkosmos 6, it 
used the A-2 for a recoverable flight from Tyuratam, and by Inter- 
kosmos 8 added use of the Plesetsk launch site. Actually cooperative 
flights from Plesetsk had come earlier, but at that time Plesetsk was 
not open even to Soviet Bloc technicians, so the pay loads were labeled 
Kosmos 261 and 348. Starting with Interkosmos 10, the C-l vehicle, 
with higher capabilities, displaced the smaller B-l, both from Plesetsk 
and Kapustin Yar. 



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2. Interhosmos Flights of the Period 1968-1970 

Kosmos 261 was identified as a cooperative flight of seven Soviet 
Bloc countries to study the upper atmosphere and the nature of the 
northern lights, including study of electrons and protons, electronics 
of superthermal energy, and changes in the density of the atmosphere 
during auroral activity. This flight in late 1968, and its follow-on in 
1970, called Kosmos 348, were from Plesetsk, and at the time, non- 
Soviet technicians or scientists were not allowed to be present for the 

When the more open program began in 1969, including introduction 
of the designator Interkosmos, the flights were from Kapustin Yar, 
and representatives of the cooperating countries were able to attend 
the launches, with their national flags displayed, presumably adding 
to the festive air. 

Interkosmos 1 was launched on October 14, 1969, with equipment 
from the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, and Czech- 
oslovakia. The countries additionally participating in readout of data 
were Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. All seven flags were 
flown. The purpose of the flight was to study solar ultraviolet and 
X-ray radiation and the effects of these on the structure of the Earth's 
upper atmosphere. 

Interkosmos 2 followed on December 25, 1969 with instruments 
from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and 
the Soviet Union. Cuba joined the list of countries sharing in the read- 
out. The flight studied the concentration of electrons and positive ions 
of the Earth's ionosphere, and electronic temperature near the pay- 
load, as well as mean electron concentration between the payload and 
the ground receiving stations. The principal tracking stations were 
2 in Poland and 7 hVthe U.S.S.R. 

Interkosmos 3 was launched on August 7, 1970 with Czechoslovakian 
and Soviet experiments. It studied the interactions between solar ac- 
tivity and the radiation belts of Earth, including the nature and 
spectrum of low frequency electromagnetic oscillations in the upper 

Interkosmos 4 was launched on October 14, 1970 with equipment 
from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the 
Soviet Union. It was in effect a repeat of Interkosmos 1 but with more 
sensitive instruments to measure a wider range of energies. 

3. Interhosmos 5 

Interkosmos 5 was launched on December 2. 1971 at Kapustin Yar, 
using the B-l launch vehicle. It carried equipment built in Czech- 
oslovakia and the Soviet Union in continuation of the work begun 
with Interkosmos 3. It studied the compositon and variations in 
streams of charged particles over time; recorded and analyzed the 
spectrum of low frequency electromagnetic waves in the range of 
70 Hz to 20 kHz. The work was coordinated with synoptic readings 
taken at ground stations in the cooperating countries of the Inter- 
kosmos agreement. Actual flight operations were jointly controlled by 
the Russians and the Czechs. Ground stations received data from the 
satellite in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the German Demo- 
cratic Republic. Where the predecessor payload had carried about 1,000 
transistors and diodes, it had now been possible to simplify the cir- 
cuits to only about 500. 


Interkosmos 6 

Interkosmos 6 was launched on April 7, 1972, for the only time in 
this program using the large A-2 launch vehicle, from Tyuratam, in 
order to carry a much greater weight and to permit recover)' of the 
payload. The main purpose was to study cosmic rays, particularly pri- 
maries in the energy range of 10 12 to lb 13 electron-volts, and to deter- 
mine their chemical composition and energy spectrum. Additionally, 
the craft was to measure meteoritic particles in near-Earth space. In 
order to measure the cosmic rays, the payload carried a photoernnlsion 
unit and an ionization calorimeter, weighing a total of 1.070 kilo- 
grams, manufactured in the Soviet Union to specifications developed 
in Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and 
Czechoslovakia. The meteorite experiment was developed and manu- 
factured jointly in Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. 

After launch, the payload was oriented to point toward the oncoming 
streams of particles. As the flight proceeded, and data were received, 
the instrumentation was calibrated and adjusted to maximize the ac- 
curacy of the data recorded. After four days, the flight was recalled 
to Earth, and recovered. The block of material was shipped to Dubna 
for detailed analysis. Later, it was a surprise when the trace of a 1,000- 
billion electron volt particle was found in the block. 

A vear later, more details were provided. The stack of nuelear photo- 
emulsion material had a volume of 45 liters, consisting of 805 layers 
each measuring 600 by 200 millimeters with a thickness of 450 ^m. 
Under the main stack were additional layers to measure electron- 
photon showers. Two spark chambers monitored the stack. The side 
walls of the stack had coordinate marks so that stereo- photographs 
could be taken of the path of any particles with an accuracy of 1 mm. 
A scintillation counter participated in the control of registry and in- 
dicated the charge of the entering particles, to distinguish among 
protons, alpha particles, and heavy nuclei. By having ten separate 
sections, it was possible to get some spatial resolution of the par- 
ticles. Aii auxiliary scintillation counter helped distinguish between 
transiting primary particles and the shower of secondary particles. 
It took two months to develop the entire stack at Dubna. 

5. Interkosmos 7 

Interkosmos 7 was launched on June 30. 1972 in a continuation of the 
work begun by Interkosmos 1 and 4. The equipment Was built in the 
German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. 
All three countries shared in controlling the satellite in flight. The 
instrumentation measured short wave solar radiation in the range of 
1.200 to 1.800 angstroms, which do not reach the surface of the Earth, 
being absorbed by molecules of oxygen. Other instruments measured 
hard X-rays from the Sun, which also typically are absorbed in the 
atmosphere. By measuring these, many solar flares were found that 
are missed by terrestrial observatories. Six Soviet Bloc countries car- 
ried out studies in parallel with the flight of Interkosmos 7. 

6. Interkosmos 8 

Interkosmos 8 was the first flight of the Interko c mos name to be 
launched at Plesetsk, which occurred on December 1, 1972. It carried 
equipment as follows : an ion trap and Langmuir probe from Bulgaria. 


a Mayak transmitter and recorder from the German Democratic lie- 
public, a high frequency probe from Czechoslovakia, and an iono- 
spheric gas discharge counter and other equipment from the Soviet 
Union. The equipment was designed to record streams of electrons 
with an energy in excess of 40 kiloelectron volts, and protons with an 
energy of more than one megaelectron volts. Specialists of all four 
countries were at the launch, signaling the greater openness about 
Plesetsk which has yet to be identified as a launch site in any Soviet 
public release. 

7. Interkosmos — Kopemik 500 

In honor of the 500th birthday of Copernicus, the number 9 was not 
associated with this payload, but the next in sequence became number 
10 on its later launch. This ninth launch came April 19, 1973 at Kapus- 
tin Yar. 

This payload carried equipment to measure solar radiation and the 
ionosphere. It was developed jointly by the Soviet Union and Poland. 
The telemetry system was Czechoslovakian. The instrumentation meas- 
ured sporadic changes in radio waves of decameter range. (0.6 to 6.0 
MHz). The radio spectrograph was built in Poland, and low frequen- 
cy-high frequency ionospheric probes were built in the Soviet Union. 
Data were received at ground stations in the Soviet Union and in 
Czechoslovakia. Simultaneous ground observations were made in the 
participating Soviet Bloc countries. 

8. Interkosmos 10 

Interkosmos 10 was the first to use the C-l class of launch vehicle 
in the Interkosmos series. It was launched at Plesetsk October 30, 1973. 
It carried instrumentation to determine the concentration and tempera- 
ture of ionospheric electrons, using equipment from the German Demo- 
cratic Republic and Soviet Union; to measure magnetic field varia- 
tion, electric fields in the range of 0.7 to 70 Hertz, and electron, ion, 
and neutral atom fluxes in the range of 0.05 to 20 kiloelectron volts 
with Soviet apparatus ; and to study low frequency electric oscillations 
of plasma in the range of 20 to 22 kiloHertz (designed and built in 
Czechoslovakia). It carried a Czech telemetry system and Soviet tape 
recording systems. Ukrainian experiments also were carried. 

B. N. Petrov saw the flight initiating a new stage beyond explora- 
tory experiments to making a concentrated attack on complex issues. 
He said the synoptic recording of much data would increase the value 
of the results 100-fold. Flight of the satellite was coordinated with 
launches of German-Soviet weather rockets. 

9. Interkosmos 11 

Interkosmos 11 was launched May 17, 1974 as the first C-l Inter- 
kosmos launch at Kapustin Yar. It continued studies of the solar ul- 
traviolet and X-ray radiation, and interactions with the upper at- 
mosphere. The experiments were provided by the German Democratic 
Republic, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. Again, ground sta- 
tions in Soviet Bloc nations made synoptic readings. 

10. Interkosmos 12 

Interkosmos 12 was launched October 31. 1974 at Plesetsk to con- 
tinue studies of the atmosphere and ionosphere and flow of micro- 

67-371—76 10 


meteorites. Instruments were prepared in Bulgaria, Hungary, the Ger- 
man Democratic Republic, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Czecho- 
slovakia. The participating nations sent representatives to the launch, 
and tracking was done in Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as the Soviet Union. The equip- 
ment was further improved over those used in earlier flights. For ex- 
ample, the micrometeorites were not only counted but classified as to 
their physical character, energy, and destructive power, and more 
accurate measurements were made of the composition and structure 
of the neutral atmosphere. 

Specifically, the micrometeorite analyzer experiment was prepared 
in Hungary, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia ; the electron con- 
centration was measured by a German instrument; the positive ions 
and electron temperature by Bulgarian and Russian equipment; the 
mass spectrometers by Russian and Czech scientists; the mass spectro- 
meter calibrator in Romania; the memory unit in Germany, and the 
Mayak radio transmitter in Czechoslovakia. 

11. Interkosmos 13 

Interkosmos 13 was launched March 27, 1975, to study dynamic 
processes in the magnetosphere and the polar ionosphere, earning 
Soviet and Czechoslovak equipment. Coordinated ground observations 
wore made by stations in Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic 
Republic, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. 

12. Interkosmos 11}. 

Flags of nine socialist states were flying at Plesetsk when Interkos- 
mos 14 was launched on December 11, 1975, with representatives of 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R. present, since 
their experiments were being carried. The C-l vehicle was used to 
place the payload in an orbit 1,707 by 345 kilometers at an inclination 
of 74 degrees, and with a period of 105.3 minutes. 

The purpose of the flight was to continue research on low-frequency 
electromagnetic fluctuations in the magnetosphere, study the structure 
of the ionosphere, and measure micrometeoritic intensity. 

On December 20 and 21, 1975, Perry and Dalberg picked up signals 
on 20.004 MHz from the Mavak ionosphere beacon transmitter. Fail- 
ure to pick up further signals before the end of the year implies that 
this beacon operates "on command". 

III. Other Recent Scientific Flights 


1. Prog 7? 02 1 

While the Russians had gathered some solar data in a variety of 
flights, they had not operated in the most recent past complex multi- 
purpose space laboratories doing such work. Current and comprehen- 
sive data are viewed as important not only to support the general ad- 
vance of science, but to aid the weather reporting work by cloud cover 
picture- takers, and also to aid solar flare predictions when manned 
flights are planned. 

Kosmos 159 looked as if it might be such a satellite when it was 
launched on May 17, 1967 into an orbit ranging between 60,600 and 


380 kilometers at an inclination of 51.83 degrees. However, no findings 
have been noted in the literature and the flight was not repeated. 

Prognoz 1 was launched on April 14, 1972 into an orbit ranging 
from 200,000 and 950 kilometers, using the A-2-e launch vehicle, and 
placed in an orbit inclined at 65 degrees with the launch occurring at 
Tyuratam. It was described as intended to study corpuscular, gamma, 
X-ray, and solar plasma interactions with the magnetosphere. The 
weight was given as 845 kilograms. 

Later, pictures were released to show the probe as being a pressurized 
cylinder with hemispherical ends, 4 solar panels, and various external 
instruments and antennas. The pay load was put in its highly elliptical 
orbit from an Earth orbiting platform, and then after separation from 
ite probe rocket, it used special memory devices to orient itself toward 
the Sun and spin-stabilize it. 

It carried an X-ray spectrometer and proportional counter in the 
1,500 to 30,000 electron volt range, and scintillation spectrometer for 
gamma rays in the 30.000 to 350,000 electron volt range. Another 
spectrometer measured the proton flux in the 1 to 35 million electron 
volt range. It had a Cerenkov counter for electrons in the 40,000 to 
140.000 electron volt range, and a scintillation spectrometer for pro- 
tons in the 30,000 to 210,000 electron volt range. Other devices meas- 
ured the solar wind, and radio emissions in the 1.6 to 8 kiloHertz 
range and also in the 100-700 kiloHertz range. It also had a mag- 
netometer, orientation detectors, and dosimeters. 

2. Prognoz 2 

Prognoz 2 seems to have been virtually a repeat of the earlier flight. 
It was launched on June 29, 1972 into an orbit ranging from 200,000 
kilometers to 550 kilometers at an inclination of 65 degrees. In addi- 
tion to the experiments as listed for its predecessor, it also carried a 
French solar wind experiment. 

3. Prognoz 3 

This flight came on February 15, 1973. It carried about the same 
instrumentation as its predecessors. The orbit ranged from 200,000 to 
590 kilometers, at an inclination of 65 degrees. 

A followup report in early 1974 implied all three payloads were still 
active, but was not quite so specific as to state this. It said that the 
devices were calibrated periodically, and were returning data. A still 
later report on February 16, 1974, as Prognoz 3 began its second year, 
mentioned only Prognoz 3 as active. There had been 160 radio sessions 
with it to report data on solar activity and on solar-terrestrial 

Jf . Prognoz If, 

After a lapse, the Prognoz program was renewed with the launch 
of Prognoz 4 on December 22, 1975. It was described as being in gen- 
eral like its predecessors, except the weight was a little higher at 905 
kilograms. It was designed to study the corpuscular and electro- 
magnetic radiations of the Sun and magnetic fields near Earth. The 
orbit was 199,000 by 634 kilometers at a 65 degree inclination, with 
an orbital period of 95 hours, 40 minutes. It was launched by an A-2-e 
rocket system from an orbital launch platform. 



1. Oreol 1 

On December 27, 1971, the Russians used a C-l launch vehicle at 
Plesetsk to put into orbit a French payload. Oreol 1 (Aureole 1). The 
orbit, inclined at 74 degrees, ranged between 2,500 and 410 kilometers. 
This payload was part of a cooperative program called Arcade 
(Arkad). Its purpose was as a follow-on to the Soviet Bloc experi- 
ments with Kosmos 261 and 348. both of which made auroral and 
ionospheric studies. Although the payload was French, cooperating 
ground observatories were in Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Demo- 
cratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R. 

Apparently some of the instrumentation was from the Space Re- 
search Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to supplement what 
came from a French research center in Toulouse. It had been in prep- 
aration for three years. In general, the French experiments related to 
their special knowledge of low-energy ranges of electrons and protons, 
while the Soviet specialty lias been those in the high energy range, so 
that the two complemented each other very well. The instruments 
measured the spectra of particles over a broad energy range, including 
the integral intensity of protons and the ion composition of the 

The ship also carried an orientation system using a Sun-seeker, and 
a three-component magnetometer; a radio telemetry system, and a 
radio system for monitoring the orbital parameters and for sending 
commands from the ground. 

2. MAS-1 

MAS-1 was a small French pickaback which they called SRET-1 
which rode to orbit on Molniya 1-20 from Plesetsk on April 4, 1972. 
The orbit was about the same as that of the Molniya — 30,260 by 480 
kilometers at an inclination of 65.6 degrees. The purpose of the French 
experiment was an engineering test of the characteristics under flight 
conditions of different kinds of solar cells. Later the weight was listed 
as 15 kilograms. Its shape was that of two pyramids, base to base. 

3. Progrwz 2 

The French part of Prognoz 2 was only supplemental instrumenta- 
tion. This was designed to study the solar wind, outer regions of the 
magnetosphere, gamma rays of the Sun. and search for neutrons of 
solar origin. The flight occurred on June 29. 1972 from Tyuratam at 
an inclination of 65 degrees, and ranging between 200,000 and 550 

4. Oreol 2 

Oreol 2 was launched on December 26. 1973 at Plesetsk, using a C-l 
vehicle. The orbit ranged from 1.995 to 407 kilometers at an inclination 
of 74 degrees. It carried essentially the same equipment as Oreol 1 
of two years earlier. Its orbit permitted extensive probing of the 
regions where polar lights occur. The belief is that the upper layers 
of the atmosphere heat to a degree sufficient to initiate a controlled 
thermonuclear reaction, a temperature harder to achieve in a labora- 
tory. Hence, the hope was that such studies would contribute toward 
the goal of initiating on Earth controlled thermonuclear reactions for 
power purposes. 


As with the previous payload. there were coordinated ground obser- 
vations made in various Soviet Bloc countries. 

i MAS-2 

A second French pickaback was carried by Molniva 1— '30, launched 
June 5, 1975. This was called MAS-2 by the Russians, SRET-2 by 
the French. The orbit ranged from 40.890 to 450 kilometers at an 
inclination of 63 degrees, after its launch from Plesetsk. 

The payload was another engineering test, weighing 29.G kilograms, 
about double that of its predecessor. It was to do research on the 
thermal protection of pay loads in space conditions, to perfect equip- 
ment for a future weather satellite. The device had different radiation 
systems, and thermally insulated coatings of teflon, kenton, and other 

The French were not allowed to attend the launch of their payload. 
6. Further French Experiments 

In 1976, the Russians will launch a French satellite to study gamma 
rays and carry "Cytos", a biological experiment, and S-2. a solar 
energy test. In late 1975. a French experiment was carried on Kosmos 
782, the biological satellite flight. 15 


/. Antecedents 

Another chapter of this study discusses in detail the cooperative 
relationships between India and the Soviet Union in the field of space. 
India operates in its own territory in south India the Thumba interna- 
tional range, to date used only for sounding rockets and other short 
range flights. Indian airports have been used to a limited extent as re- 
fueling bases for Soviet long range aircraft which patrol the Indian 
Ocean area on potential air search missions connected with Soviet 
space flights. When Zond 5 was returned from the vicinity of the Moon, 
it was picked up in the Indian Ocean, and transported by ship to 
Bombay where it was transferred for air lift to the U.S.S.R. 

Just as India has worked to broaden its capabilities in nuclear power, 
including thermonuclear research, and in nuclear explosives, it has 
also moved toward development of a comprehensive space program. 
It hopes in time to have its own launch vehicles as well as variety of 
scientific and applied mission satellites. To gain time and experience, 
it has been working with the Russians for Soviet support in launching 
its first pair of satellites. Later it hopes to have its own communica- 
tions satellites, early warning weather satellites to give notice of 
potential natural disasters, and Earth resources satellites. 

2. Arydbhata 

The Soviet Union and India negotiated in August 1971 an agree- 
ment which was finally signed on May 10. 1972 by whose terms, a joint 
effort would be mounted to launch a satellite. India tad some 200 
specialists at work in Bangalore, of whom 50 eventually went to 
Kapustin Yar for the launch. The satellite was the heaviest first satel- 
lite of any nation yet to enter the field of space flight. It was announced 
on April 9, 1975 that the satellite, had been shipped from India to the 
launch site, some months later than orgmally planned. 

18 Le Fi?aro. Paris. October 2, 197.1. p. 13. 


The launch of Ariabat (Aryabhata) came on April 10, 1975 at 
Kapustin Yar. It was put into an orbit ranging from 619 to 5G3 kilo- 
meters at an inclination of 50.7 degrees. The C-l launch vehicle had 
been used. The payload weighed 360 kilograms. Tracking was done 
from the Soviet Union until the orbit was well established, and then 
thereafter was done both in the U.S.S.R. and in India. The name 
Aryabhata honored an Indian mathematician of antiquity. 

The experiments covered the fields of X-ray astronomy, solar gamma 
and neutron radiation, and particle flows and radiation in the iono- 
sphere. While most of the equipment had been built in India, the solar 
cells and memory units were Soviet. The third day after launch, the 
main control was passed from Moscow to Hyderabad. The principal 
tracking stations were at Bears Lake near Moscow and Sriharikota 
near Madras. The payload was spin-stabilized. 

After five days of flight, 60 orbits, the payload was shut down 
because of power supply problems. Later these were resolved, and full 
operation began again. By June, it was reported it was still working 
well with 950 orbits completed. Other reports discount the return to 
full operations. 

S. A Second Flight 

The Delhi domestic radio announced on April 23, 1975 that a second 
space agreement had been signed between India and the U.S.S.R. On 
May 8, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced the second Indian 
satellite would be launched in 1977 or 1978 by the U.S.S.R. There was 
speculation it might be an Earth resources satellite. 

By December 1975, the second Indian satellite was described as 
planned to have two TV cameras to return real-time pictures of a 325 
kilometer square area at a time, plus radiometers to measure ocean 
surface temperatures and land humidity. It will be spin-stabilized. 16 


With little fanfare. Sweden has begun space cooperation with the 
Russians. Local Swedish newspapers quoted Swedish scientific sources 
as saying a Swedish experiment and a Czech experiment were lost in 
early June, 1975 in a failure at launch of a B-l class vehicle at 
Kapustin Yar. 17 

A second Swedish payload is to be launched by the Soviet Union 
in 1976. Even more ambitious plans lie in the years following, accord- 
ing to private conversations with Swedish engineers. 


1. National Flights 

The record of major Soviet vertical sounding rockets is incomplete, 
but even these that are known show they have made a sijrnificant con- 
tribution to the total program and to orbital flights which followed 
them. Most of the major sounding rockets have been launched at the 
Volgograd Station, otherwise known as Kapustin Yar. Smaller sound- 
ing rockets and weather rockets have been launched not only there but 

19 Flight International, London, December 11, 1975, p. 865. 

" See also press release of the Swedish Space Corporation dated Jan. 22, 1976, describing 

the exporinient and the failure. 


at such places as Kheys (Hays) Island, on Soviet scientific research 
ships at sea, and even in Antarctica. 

The largest sounding rocket the Russians have named is one they 
call the A-3, which in U.S. nomenclature is the SS-3, and which 
NATO calls the Shyster. It is possible that the major international 
cooperation flights use the Sandal or SS-4, that is, the first stage of 
the B-l. One mission was so far ahead of the rest in its reach that it 
is more likely it used the SS-5 Skean, that is, the first stage of the C-l. 

In May 1957, the Russians announced they had sent a rocket 211 
kilometers up, which carried five dogs. The payload weighed 2,196 

On February 21, 1958, a very complex geophysical rocket with a wide 
range of atmospheric and solar experiments was sent 473 kilometers 
up. The payload weighed 1,515 kilograms. 

On August 27, 1958 a payload of 1,690 kilograms was sent up to 
452 kilometers, carrying two dogs, Belyanka and Pestraya. 

On July 2, 1959, a rocket carrying about 2,000 kilograms of payload 
was sent 241 kilometers up. It carried dogs named Otvazhnaya and 
Snezhinka, and a rabbit named Marfusha. 

On July 10, 1959, another rocket with a payload of about 2,200 kilo- 
grams was sent about 211 kilometers up, this time carrying several 
dogs including Otvazhnaya again. 

On June 15, 1960, a rocket with a payload of 2,100 kilograms was 
sent 221 kilometers up. Included this time were a rabbit and two dogs, 
including Otvazhnaya on a fifth flight. 

There were similar sounding rocket flights on June 6 and June 18, 
1963. The first went 563 kilometers up. 

On September 20 and October 1, 1965, rockets were sent about 480 
to 500 kilometers up doing wide ranging geophysical experiments in- 
cluding taking various measurements of the ionosphere and photo- 
graphs and spectrographs of the Sun in the ultraviolet and X-ray 

By looking at the parameters of these flights, they were probably 
all conducted with use of the A-3 (SS-3 Shyster) geophysical rocket. 

A new series of flights began in 1966, quite possibly with the same 
launch vehicle or perhaps its SS-4 Sandal successor, but adding to the 
usual range of geophysical experiments some unusual propulsion ex- 
periments as well. The first was called Yantar 1, launched on Octo- 
ber 13, 1966. It made studies of electron concentrations and photo emis- 
sions in the ionosphere. But it also scooped up atmospheric nitrogen, 
after attaining speed through its rocket motor, to sustain a special ion 
electrical rocket with propellant. This was seen as leading toward fu- 
ture hypersonic aircraft. In 1969 there were more Yantar flights, but 
the dates and the performance have not been reported in detail. All the 
flights seem to have operated in the altitude range of 100 to 400 

On October 12, 1967, a single, much more ambitious sounding rocket 
flight was made, and it seems likely that a larger launch vehicle had 
to be used, such as the first stage of the C-l (SS-5, Skean). Pictures 
released of the payload showed an instrument container much like a 
small Kosmos satellite. If the larger rocket was used, it probably wont 
from Tyuratam, as no pad had been used at Kapustin Yar by that 
year for such a larger vehicle. 


The payload was designed to make a variety of solar and ionospheric 
measurements, including measures of the concentration and location 
of electrons and positive ions. The flight lasted 52 minutes, during 
which time it readied an altitude of about 4,400 kilometers. The pay- 
load was separated from the rocket body by more than 100 kilometers 
to minimize distortion of data which might occur in a location close to 
the carrier rocket. 

In 1970 there were additional geophysical rocket launchings. One of 
these came on October 3, and flew up to about 500 kilometers. It did 
solar ultraviolet and X-ray studies. 

On September 24, 1971, a geophysical rocket was sent to an altitude 
of 230 kilometers. A similar rocket was launched on October 9, 1971 to 
an altitude of about 500 kilometers. 

2. The Vertikal International Program 

The Interkosmos organization of Soviet Bloc countries has spon- 
sored geophysical sounding rocket flights under the name Vertikal. 
Vertikal 1 was launched on November 28, 1970 at Kapustin Yar, prob- 
ably using the first stage of the B-l (SS-4 Sandal), but possibly still 
using the SS-3 Shyster, or Soviet designated A-3. The payload was 
sent about 500 kilometers up. It weighed 1,300 kilograms. The rocket 
was 23 meters long with a diameter of 1.66 meters. Instrumentation 
measured the X-ray spectrum, and the concentration of electrons and 
positive ions, as well as electron temperature. These instruments had 
been manufactured jointly by the German Democratic Republic and 
the Soviet Union to specifications also supplied by Bulgaria and 

On August 20, 1971, Vertikal 2 was launched and it flew to an alti- 
tude 1 of 463 kilometers. The description of payload weight, dimensions, 
and participants seemed to match those of the earlier flight. The pay- 
load section separated from the single stage carrier rocket at about 90 
kilometers, carried by momentum to the high point of the flight. Para- 
chute recovery was used to retrieve the payload. 

On September 2, 1975, Vertikal 3 was launched at Kapustin Yar, at 
0740 Moscow time, presumably with the same B-l first stage or Soviet 
designated A-3 sounding rocket. It reached a maximum altitude of 
502 kilometers, following separation from the single stage carrier 
rocket at 97 kilometers altitude. The experiments continued the pre- 
vious work on interactions between solar shortwave radiation and the 
ionosphere and upper atmosphere. The assembly and launch itself 
were conducted by representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the 
German Democratic Republic, and TJ.S.S.R. Two weather rockets with 
Bulgarian and Soviet equipment were launched at the same time, and 
various ground stations made measurements at the same period. 

It was interesting that during the summer of 1975. the Russians put 
on display in the usual Moscow museum a replica of the Vertikal Day- 
load, but referred to the payload as a Prognoz, the name reserved for 
the three flights which had ranged out in very eccentric Earth orbits. 
This replica or one like it was at the Paris Air Show in the spring of 
the same year. 


IV. The Second Generation of Planetary Flights 


Despite its many failures along the way, the Soviet commitment of 
hardware to exploration of both Venus and Mars has been impressive. 
The brief table which follows summarizes by launch opportunity 
what use the Rusians made of these : 

M ors Venus 
1960—2 failures 1961— Tyazheliy Sputnik 4, Ven- 

1962 — 2 failures. Mars 1 era 1 

1964— Zond 2 (Zond 3, delayed) 1962—3 failures 
1967— None 1964 — (Kosmos 21 test) Kosmos 
1969 — Rumored failures 27, Zond 1 

1971— Kosmos 419, Mars 2, Mars 1965— Kosmos 96, Vencra 2, Ven- 

3 era 3 

1973— Mars 4, Mars 5, Mars 6, 1967— Kosmos 167, Venera 4 

Mars 7 1969 — Venera 5, Venera 6 

1975 — None 1970 — Kosmos 359, Venera 7 

1972— Kosmos 482, Venera 8 

1973— None 

1975 — Venera 9, Venera 10 

The programs to both planets at first used the A-2-e launch vehicle 
with multiple launch attempts at every opportunity from 1960 on. Then 
a Mars oportunity was skipped in 1967, to be followed by predictions 
of Soviet scientists that the 1969 opportunity would see an expanded 
and improved effort to Mars. There followed r: imors in 196? that (there 
were launch attempts which failed. When flights resumed in 1971 and 
thereafter, the launch vehicles had been upgraded to the D-l-e size. 
The corresponding skipping of a Venus opportunity came in 1973, and 
predictions were borne out when the resumption of the program in 
1975 also reflected an upgrading of the effort to use of the D-l-e larger 
launch vehicles. But even this vehicle was not equal to carrying such 
payloads to Mars during the 1975 opportunity and no Mars flights 
occurred on the Soviet side. 

An earlier seetion of this chapter reviewed all the A-2-e flights. 
This section reviews what is known about the second generation flights 
usino; the D-l-e. 


Although the rumors of the summer of 1968 were that there would 
be new major Mars attempts late in 1969, there were no successful 
launches announced and no Kosmos hidden failures in Earth orbit 
at appropriate windows. 18 However, there were multiple rumors of 
launch failures at the appropriate window. The 1971 opportunity was 
taken by both the Soviet Union and the United States. 

1. Lannrh Failures 

The United States was unsiiccessru] on Mav 8, 1971 in sending 
Mariner 8 ^n its way to Mars. The Centaur stage w~nt out of control 
and the payload fell in the Atlantic near Puerto Eico. 

"Flijrht International. London, March 27, 1971. p. 798. 


Loss publicized was the Soviet launch of Kosmos 419 on May 10, 
two days later. Although the Russians named the launch, they did not 
add the usual statements about everything going well. It attained 
Earth orbit, but did not fire its Zond rocket which would have launched 
it toward Mars and given it a Mars name. By inference, it almost 
certainly was like the flights which followed shortly in being launched 
by a D-l-e. Within two days it had decayed from orbit. 

2. Launch of M ars 2, Mars 3. and M ariner 9 

Moscow announced the successful launch of Mars 2 on May 10 as 
soon as it was clear that its Zond rocket had launched it on a trajec- 
tory toward Mara from its orbital launch platform. It was announced 
as weighing 4,650 kilograms, not including the weight of the accom- 
panying rocket stage. This was a D-l-e launch. Telemetry was being 
received on 028.4 MHz. 

The same kind of announcement came on May 28 that Mars 3 was 
also on the way to Mara in a virtually identical pattern, and with the 
same weight, except that Mara 3 also carried a French Stereo experi- 
ment designed to supply readings of solar radio emissions and cosmic 
rays in the interplanetary medium as part of synoptic measurements 
to be made in France and in the Soviet Union. 

Mariner was successfully launched on May 30, preceded by the 
usual U.S. detailed explanation of its intended purposes and instru- 
mentation. Also as usual corresponding details on the two Soviet craft 
were missing at that time, only to be revealed much later. 

3. In-flight Progress 

The Soviet releases of news presently were expanded to report both 
their flights would be measuring data from the interplanetary medium, 
although only Mars 3 carried the French experiment. The Russians 
said the directional antennas on the two craft would greatly increase 
the flow of data over that of earlier experiments. 

On June 8, a course correction was made by Mara 3 to bring it more 
nearly to its intended trajectory. A similar course correction was car- 
ried out by Mars 2 on June 17. 

By July 27, it was announced there had been 43 communications 
sessions with the craft, with continuing measurements of solar cor- 
puscular radiation and of galactic cosmic rays. 

On August 21, a similar announcement also added that each craft 
carried 8 separate spectrometers to determine the speed, temperature, 
and composition of the basic components of the solar wind over time, 
in the range of energies from 30 to 10,000 electron volts. This was the 
last known public reference to the flights for manv months, and some 
Western observers began to suggest the flights had failed. 19 

As had been done with the fights from Venera 4 on, each Mars craft 
had its analog operating in a vacuum chamber on Earth to receive the 
precise commands being sent to the real craft, providing an opportu- 
nity to see how they responded, and also to aid in the solution of prob- 
lems which might arise. For the real craft at the distances involved, 
the signal to fire a rocket and to receive confirmation back took longer 
than the firing itself. 

"Flight International, London, Oct. 7. 1971, p. 592. 


4. Mars 2 Arrival 

The Russians waited until November 30 to announce that on Novem- 
ber 27, 1971, Mars 2 had entered on orbit around Mars, with an 
apoapsis of 25,000 kilometers, a periapsis of 1,380 kilometers, an orbit 
inclination of 48°54' to the Mars equator, and a period of 18 hours. 
As the payload first approached the planet, a capsule was separated 
from the main bus, and was delivered to the surface of the planet at 
45°S., 58°E. It carried a pennant bearing the coat-of-arms of the 
Soviet Union. The main bus was to continue a study of the planet 
from orbit. There had been further course corrections on November 20 
and 27. 

o. Mars 3 Arrival 

Not until December 7 did the Russians announce that Mars 3 had 
reached the planet in similar fashion, on December 2, 1971. This time 
the lander was referred to as a descent craft which parachuted to 
land at 45 °S., 158 °W. after which it transmitted signals to Earth. 
Both Mars 2 and 3 were described as opening the way to conducting 
a search for life, but were not themselves equipped for this purpose. 
The Mars 3 lander also carried Soviet insignia to the surface. The Mars 
3 bus was put into a more eccentric orbit with a low point 1,500 kil- 
ometers above the surface, and an 11-day period of orbit. Presumably 
tho inclination was similar to that of Mars 2, and the high point should 
have been about 190,700 kilometers. Signals from the surface were 
transmitted by a weak omnidirectional system to the orbiting bus where 
they were recorded and later played at a slower data rate via the high 
gain antenna pointed toward Earth. Braking of the lander was accom- 
plished by aerodynamic ballistic entry, and after a marked slowing 
of the craft, a drogue chute was released, followed by the main para- 
chute. A rocket braking system supplied the final reduction in velocity 
to permit a survivable landing. This brake was activated by a radio 
altimeter 20-30 meters above the surface. It was stated that the signals 
from the surface had been brief, and were replayed from the Mars 
3 bus over the period December 2 to 5. 

The landing site of the Mars 3 vehicle was in a relatively featureless 
rounded hollow about 1,500 kilometers across. Orbital television cam- 
eras with a resolution of 0.3 kilometers could detect no craters, even 
though beyond a surrounding area of ridges and cliffs, there were 
numerous craters. 

On December 18 it was further reported when the Mars 3 lander 
reached the surface and was stabilized, that after a lapse of 90 seconds, 
the several instruments and television system were activated. The TV 
began to take a panoramic view, but after 20 seconds of transmission, 
all signals from the lander ceased. The small portion of picture, when 
retransmitted to Earth, revealed no noticeable contrast or details. 

Obviously, the lander portions of the two flights must have been a 
disappointment to the Russians. They were probably mechanically 
similar. Mars 2 failed to survive its landing, and Mars 3 ceased to func- 
tion very shortly thereafter, when it might have been expected to oper- 
ate for some hours or days before its batteries ran down. The cause of 
the failure is unknown. 

Aviation Week on March 6, 1972 reported that the real problem was 
a failure in the relay antenna on the Mars 3 bus which malfunctioned, 


while the lander probably continued to transmit data and pictures 
from the surface, w hich ccukl not be relayed to Karlb. Most observers 
today do not consider this tba most likely explanation, find surest 
rather that dust storm conditions on the surface overwhelmed the 

6. Instruments on the Landers 

The December IS Soviet account of M:.r> 3 prebVu'y applied to both 
landers. Mars 3 carried atmospheric tempera&iire and pressure sensors, 
a mass spectrometer to determine atmospheric components, a wind 
velocity meter, devices to measure the chemical and mechanical prop- 
erties of the soil, and a television system to supply panoramic views 
of the surroundings* The lander has not, been pictured deployed, except 
possibly on a, 1972 postage stamp, but probably was an outgrowth of 
the self-righting petal design used for Luna 9 and Luna 13. The 
landed weight (not revealed at the time) was 685 kilograms. 20 

7. The Orbital Buses and Their Acfivit y 

The Russians announced on December lp, 1071 that both Mars 2 
and 3 had taken photographs of the planet at different distances and 
the pictures had been transmitted to Earth Jjy facsimile after develop- 
ment in an automatic on-board laboratory. On December 18, further 
details supplied described the camera system as including both a wide 
angle lens and a 4° narrow angle lens, and there were different light 
filters as well which could be shifted over the lenses on command. The 
continuing dust storm on Mars which hampered the much more am- 
bitious picture taking by Mariner 9 plagued the Russians as well. 

Another Soviet announcement said the French Stereo experiment 
carried by Mars 3 used a data compression system reducing by 100-fold 
the burden of transmitting significant results to Earth. 

Pravda carried a more complete account of the bus instrumentation 
in December 19 for both Mars 2 and 3 : 

An inf rared radiometer to construct a Mars surface temperature dis- 
tribution chart (8-40 microns) . 

An instrument to determine water vapor concentrations by spectral 
analysis of absorption in the 1.38 micron line. 

An instrument to study surface relief by measuring the amount 
of carbon dioxide along a sighting line, according to the intensity of 
the 2.06 micron absorption band (an infrared spectrometer). 

An instrument to study the reflectivity of the surface and atmos- 
phere in the visible spectrum of 0.3 to 0.6 centimeter range, and for 
determining the dielectric permeability of the surface and temperature 
to a depth of 35-50 centimeters. 

An instrument to determine the density of the upper atmosphere and 
the concentration of atomic oxygen, hydrogen, and argon — an ultra- 
violet, photometer. 

Two television cameras on the same axis, one wide angle, and the 
other narrow ongle. (It was not clear how the television descriotion 
squared with the alternate Soviet report of photographic film being 
developed on board for facsimile transmission to Earth.) 

Tn general, th^ Kn hnse c seem to have performed about as planned. 
On December 27. 1071, the Eus^ians announced the diseoVery of atom*' 1 

80 O.ia. Heikki, in Spnceflight. London. July 1975, p. 279. quoting a Soviet scientist. 


hydrogen and atomic oxygon in the upper atmosphere of Mars. By 
January 9, 1972, they said work was proceeding in orderly fashion, 
and that the dust storm seemed to be subsiding. Pictures taken with 
the red filter were showing dark areas of "seas^ again, while ultra- 
violet pictures again showed bright clouds. A routine progress report 
was issued on January 29. 

TASS further reported on March 1, 1972 that the dust storm was 
over. The soil temperature on Mars at a depth of several tens of cen- 
timeters was found to be largely independent of the time of day. The 
ionosphere was defined as beginning at a height of about 80-110 kilo- 
meters, with electron concentrations sharply increasing, then gradu- 
ally diminishing with height. The orbital buses were said to be con- 
tinuing to explore the structure and surface of Mars, taking pictures 
of the planet, and measuring the temperature, pressure, density, and 
chemical composition of its atmosphere. A second bulletin that day 
said that by March 1, Mars 2 had made 127 orbits of the planet, and 
Mars 3 had made 7 orbits around Mars. It concluded saying, "The 
program for the work of stations Mars 2 and Mars 3 which are orbit- 
ing Mars as its artificial satellites is nearing completion. 21 This was 
attributed to the growing distance of Mars from Earth. 

Only over a period of time as analysis proceeded did more of the 
findings become available. On March 22, 1972, it was reported that 
photography had played a minor role compared with the other data 
gathered. Mars 3 did three surveys of the planet during the dust storm 
and four more afterwards. The estimate was that billions of tons of 
material had been on the move during the dust storm. Water vapor 
was found to be about 1/2.000 that of the Earth, with a measurement 
in the range of from 50 to under 10 microns. 

In April it was revoaled the camera systems used had a 52mm foral 
length for the wide angle camera and an unspecified longer length for 
the narrow angle. Color filters were red, green, and blue. Some 12 
frames were exposed and automatically developed on board, then 
scanned with 1000 lines of 1000 elements each, for transmission to 
Earth where they were recorded both on magnetic tape and on electro- 
chemical paper. 

Although the main work program ended in March, the two orbiters 
were still being contacted in July at a distance of 3S5 million 

The program was reported formally completed by August 22, 1972. 
By then Mars 2 had Completed 36*2 orbits and Mars 8. 20 orbits of the 
planet. Thev had returned internlanetarv data, and done inteorrtpd 
studies of the surface and atmosphere of Mars in visible. IK. and T V 
ranges, plus radio stud'es. They measured thermal differences b*r re- 
gion and variations in altitudes. The estimate on woter vapor was low- 
ered to 1 '5.000 that of Earth. The JJV studies revealed the structure. 
he ; Mit, composition, and temperature of the upper atmosphere. The 
radio studies gave the pressure and temperature at the surface. Dust 
particle size and concentration was measured. The magnetic field was 

The temperature rancre was found to be between 13° C. and —03° C. 
except at the north pole where it was —110° 0. The temperature drops 

^ TASS. March 1. 1972. 1446 GMT 


quickly with darkness. There was about a 10° difference between seas 
and continents with the seas being wanner. Mountains up to 3 kilo- 
meters high were found, and depressions ran to a depth of 1 kilometer. 
The maximum water vapor reading was 5 microns (1/2,000 of Earth) . 
The air was mostly carbon dioxide, but at high altitudes, separated 
into carbon monoxide and atomic oxygen, while water also broke into 
atomic hydrogen and atomic oxygen. The temperature rose with alti- 
tude. The ionosphere was about one tenth as dense as that of Earth, 
with its maximum strength at 140 kilometers. The magnetic field was 
about 8 times as strong as in the interplanetary medium. Air glow 
showed in photographs of the terminator. 


The year 1973 was more difficult than 1971 in terms of the energy re- 
quirements for sending payloads to Mars. Consequently, when the 
Soviet flights came, they fell into a different pattern. There were two 
pairs of flights, each made up of an orbiter and a lander, with ability to 
switch communications between members of pairs in order to increase 
redundancy. Launching a total of four D-l-e vehicles represented a 
very considerable Soviet investment. 

1. The Launches of Mars If. Mtirs 5\ Mars 6, and Mars 7 

Mai-s 4 was launched on July 21. 1973 at 2231 Moscow time. Soviet 
observatories were able to make optical observations as the payload 
sped toward Mars after departure from an Earth orbiting platform. 
Soviet accounts spoke of the elaborate controls at the launch center 
with monitoring television screens and reference data available at 
the touch of a button. In the Atlantic were three ships to monitor 
the escape from the platform. These were the AJcademik Sergey Koro- 
lev* the Bezhltsa. and the Ristna. Molniva was used as a link to the 

Mars 5 was launched on July 25. 1973 at 2156 Moscow time, and it 
departed from its Earth orbital platform at 2315 Moscow time. It was 
described as being like Mars 4, intended to study Mars and its sur- 
rounding space. 

Mars 6 was launched August 5 at 2046 Moscow time. It was described 
as different from the two earlier flights, and intended to work pri- 
marily with Mars 4. It was also said to carry French experiments for 
solar studies. This time the three ocean tracking ships named before 
also had the Morzhovets in the Atlantic to help out. Soviet observa- 
tories extended their reach to make optical searches for Mars 6. The 
Crimean observatory found the payload at distances up to 465.000 
kilometers from Earth, and the carrier probe rocket was located first 
at 435.000 kilometers. 

Mars 7 was launched on August 9. 2000 Moscow time, being put into 
an intermediate Earth orbit, and then sent on its way. It was to work 
closely with Mars 5, and Mars 7 was like Mars 6 in carrying French 
solar study equipment. The Alma At a observatory was reported to 
be doing optical tracking of both Mars 7 and its carrier rocket. 

2. The Flight En Route. 

Midcourse corrections were made to Mars 4 on July 30 and to Mars 5 
on August 3. This time the French experiment for solar studies en 


route was called Zhemo. This was for study of the distribution and 
intensity of fluxes of solar protons and electrons. Other French equip- 
ment of the Stereo type was for making solar radio emission studies. 
Course corrections were applied to Mars 6 on August 13 and to Mars 7 
on August 16. Though still generalized, a more complete description 
than usual of the mission of the four craft was issued on September 22, 
relating to the studies to be done both from orbit and on the surface of 
the planet, including studies of the physical characteristics of the sur- 
face rock, and surrounding terrain including use of photography, and 
also studies of the atmosphere. As the voyages continued, update 
reports were issued about monthly. 

3. Arrival at Mars 

Mars 4 reached Mars on February 10, 1974. The retrorocket failed 
to fire, so it did not enter orbit around the planet, instead making a 
close pass at 2,200 kilometers. It was able to take photographs for 
development on board and transmission to Earth by facsimile scan. 
The payload continued to gather interplanetary data thereafter. 

Mars 5 reached Mars on February 12 at 1845 Moscow time, firing its 
retrorockets to be placed in an orbit around Mars with an apoapsis of 
32,500 kilometers and a peri apsis of 1.760 kilometers. The orbit was 
inclined at 35 degrees to the Martian equator, and had a period of 
25 hours. All of these steps were accomplished by an on-board autono- 
mous navigation system. 

Mars 6 reached the vicinity of Mars on March 12, 1974. While its 
bus continued in heliocentric orbit, it separated a descent module 
which used aerodynamic braking in the atmosphere and then a para- 
chute svstem to reach the surface of the planet. It landed at 24° S.. 
25° W. 

Mars 7 reached the vicinity of Mars three days earlier on March 9. 
Its bus also continued in heliocentric orbit. Its descent module sepa- 
rated as planned, but a malfunction of an onboard system made it 
miss the planet by 1,300 kilometers. 

.[. Follow-up Details of the Flights 

Even the first announcement noted that the probes through use of a 
wide range of observed wavelengths had been able to answer ques- 
tions on Mars relief, temperature, heat conductivity, soil structure and 
composition, chemical composition of the lower atmosphere, and struc- 
ture of the upper atmosphere. More water vapor was found in some 
places this time than had been the case two years earlier. 

It was then disclosed that contact with Mars 6 had ceased 148 sec- 
onds after the parachute had opened, in the immediate proximity of 
the surface. All data up to that point were relayed from the landing 
module to the bus for further relay later to Earth. Dried river beds 
were detected. 

Soviet papers carried followup articles by leading Soviet scientists 
who were drawing conclusions from the most recent flights, almost as 
if to fill the gap in real information, as it was too early for new data 
to be fully interpreted. R. M. Sagdayev. Director of the Institute of 
Space Research, said that Mars was more Earth-like than had been 
supposed, and he spoke of its being geologically active at least in the 
past and possibly having had water at some stages. He gave a refined 
figure for the orbital period of Mars 5 as 24 hours, 53 minutes. He 


explained that Soviet measurements of thickness of atmospheric strata 
were revealing differences in ground elevation which were not appar- 
ent from photographs. lie noted that the III da! a and daily rha nge.- 
told about soil thermal conductivity and hence structure. Study of 
the surface in visible and near-IR wavelengths as to brightne ss and 
polarization could answer questions of soil composition. The gamma 
spectrometer readings revealed the nature of rocks. The photometer 
gave localized readings as high as GO microns for water traces in the 
atmosphere, several times what had been read by Mars 3, and giving a 
5-fold range among tested localities on this flight. He said the UV 
photometer revealed some ozone traces. He reported the outer atmos- 
phere as atomic hydrogen at 1,216 angstroms. The magnetic field is 
30 gammas near the planet, helping to divert away the solar wind. 

I [e said that Mars 4 and 5 both took pictures of Mars at resolutions 
ranging from 1 kilometer down to 100 meters, from a distance of about 
2,000 kilometers. Through the use of the adjustable filters, color pic- 
tures had been created. In the southern hemisphere, several strips 1,000 
kilometers long had been taken. He also said that the Mars 6 lander 
had been separated at a distance of 48,000 kilometers from the planet, 
and the bus had passed the planet at 1,600 kilometers. Aerodynamic 
braking had lasted 5 minutes. Pressure at the landing site had been 
6 millibars, about 1/100 the level of Earth. 22 

What was especially significant is that Mars 6 managed to send back 
from its lander the first direct readings of pressure, temperature, and 
chemical composition of the atmosphere. 

The Russians finally published color photographs of Mars taken by 
Mars 4 and 5. They revealed that the plains are orange, the mountains 
blue, and the craters bluish-green. Mountains may range up to 8 or 
even 11 kilometers high with gentle slopes 23 Later U.S. scientists criti- 
cized the pictures as lacking adequate calibration for scientific 
purposes. 24 

The first complete review of findings was published in January and 
February 1975, with a whole issue of the journal devoted to the four 
pay loads. 25 

Apparently the lenders for Mars 6 and 7 were 685 kilograms each. 2 " 
Other summary findings Were carried in the OOS'PAR report on 
1D74 activities. 27 The findings were consistent with the earlier brief 
reports, but gave greater details. Mars 6 had hit at atmosphere at a 
speed of 5.6 kilometers per second at 12 :05 :53 Moscow time. Air drag 
slowed the speed to 600 meters per second by 12 :08 :32, when the para- 
chute opened. It readied the surface at 12 :11 :05. and the radio signals 
ceased at that moment. This meant it had taken 2 minutes, 39 seconds 
to slow in ballistic flight, and 2 minutes, 33 seconds more for the 
parachute to bring it to the surface. 

The mass spectrometer was not set to function until after touchdown, 
so did not return data. Other sensors during the flight down to the 
surface disclosed that 35 ± 10 percent of the atmosphere was an inert 

22 Pravda, Moscow, March 17, 1974, p. 3. 

23 TASS November 11, 1974, 0912, citing Zemlya 1 Vselennaya. 

24 Aviation Week, New York. February 10, 1975, p. 11. 

25 Komicheskiye Issledovaniya, Moscow. Vol. XIII, No. 1 (Not available to this study). 

26 Oja, Heikki, in Spaceflight, London, July 1975, p. 279. 

27 Space Research Conducted in the U.S.S.R. in 1974. COSPAR Report, ISth Plonary 
Session. Translated into English and republished as JPRS 65778, September 29, 1975 bV 
the Joint Publications Research Service, pp. 2-21. 


gas, perhaps argon. At the landing site, the air pressure was measured 
as being 6 millibars, and the temperature 230° K. (—3° C). 

Meanwhile the orbiting vehicle, Mars 5, was returning a wide variety 
of other data. It made a radio probe of the atmosphere at 8-32 cm. It 
used a radio telescope at 3.5 cm. Its infrared radiometer worked in the 
8-26 fjm range. The spectrometer with an interference filter worked 
in the 2-5 fxm range. A narrow band photometer with interference 
filter studied the C0 2 band at 2 /an. Another narrow band photometer 
with interference filter studied the H 2 band at 1.38 /an. There was a 
photo-television complex of instruments to take pictures, develop the 
lilm, and scan these for facsimile transmission to Earth. Another 
photometer with interference filter covered the 0.3-0.8 /um range. Two 
polarimeters covered 9 narrow bands in the range of 0.35-0.8 /an. An- 
other photometer studied the ozone band at 2,600 angstroms. A differ- 
ent photometer measured the intensity of scattered solar light in the 
Lyman alpha range of 1,215 angstroms. There was also a gamma 

Several experiments were duplicated among the four main vehicles. 
Magnetometers were carried on Mars 4 and 7, as were plasma traps. 
Multichannel electrostatic instruments were carried by Mars 4 and 5. 
Mars 6 and 7 carried micrometeorite sensors and cosmic ray sensors. 
It was Mars 7 that also carried a French solar radio wave experiment. 

Mars 5 made a study of the chemical composition of the atmosphere 
measuring the amount of water vapor and ozone. Mars 3, after the 
dust storm two years earlier had found only 10-20 /mi of water vapor. 
But Mars 5 found some readings of up to 80 /*m of water vapor, with 
variations of 2 to 3 fold even within short distances of a few hundred 
kilometers. Mars 5 found that the amount of ozone by volume was 10~ 5 
percent, with the layer at 30 kilometers. 

Between them. Mars 4 and 5 took 60 photographs, often of high 
quality. Those with resolutions as good as 1 kilometer were taken 
with a camera whose focal length was 52 mm. Other pictures with a 
resolution ranging up to 100 meters were taken with a camera with a 
focal length of 350 mm. Pictures scanned for return to Earth were 
done so either at 1,000 by 1,000 fineness or at 2,000 by 2,000 fineness. 
Mars 4 used a red filter. Mars 5 used a blue filter. 

Apparently, not only was there the photo-television system, but also 
an optico-mechanical TV scanning system. In addition to the general 
tilrers referenced above. Mars 5 used other red, blue, and green filters, 
and a special orange light filter. From the pictures taken, rectified 
maps were produced which provided control points and links with 
the pictures taken two years earlier by Mariner 9. In one region it was 
possible to do a geomorphological study. 

In summary, although the payloads collectively did much less than 
hoped of them, the mission was not the total loss some Western publi- 
cations seem to have assumed. Further details are carried in the refer- 
enced Soviet reports. 

A small amount of supplementary detail was carried in another 
Soviet publication. The Mars 4 and 5 photo TV systems were described 
as designed to attain 700 and 100 meter resolutions at best for survey 
purposes. The camera already described as having a focal length of 
52 mm was called Vega. It was f/2.8, providing a 23 by 22.5 mm frame 
and its look angle was 35°42'. The other camera already described as 

67-371—76 11 


having a focal length of 350 mm was called Zufar. It was f/4.5, again 
with a 23 by 22.5 mm frame, and its look angle was 5°40'. 28 


/. Launch of Venera 9 and Venera 10 

As expected, the Russians upgraded their Venus exploration effort 
by the use of the D-l-e class vehicle for the first time in launching 
Venera 9 on June 8, 1975. It was described as a new type of Venus 
spacecraft. Using the standard Earth orbital platform approach, the 
probe was sent toward Venus, with the announced purposes of studying 
Venus and surrounding space, and for doing studies of the interplane- 
tary medium on the way. Radio Moscow added that the launch vehicle 
was larger than the one used for Soyuz (the A-2). Ships were placed 
in the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific to support 
the launch, with the Molniya 1 used for relay purposes. The flight 
was controlled from the Deep Space Communications Center at 

On June 14, Venera 10 was launched, and it was announced as simi- 
lar in design and mission to Venera 9. It was launched in the same 
manner to put it on its trajectory. 

2. En Route to Venus 

TASS announced on August 8 that the flights were going well, and 
that Venera 9 would reach Venus on October 22, while Venera 10 
would arrive there on October 25. Soviet sources noted that while 
earlier Venera probes had required many commands from Earth to 
control their course, this time there were on -board digital computers 
which made many of the necessary calculations, adding flexibility to 
the operations. Orbital corrections were made on June 21 and Octo- 
ber 18. and there were 90 communications sessions, for Venera 9. Pre- 
sumably the handling of Venera 10 was similar. 

3. Landing of Venera 9 

On October 20, Venera 9 was divided into separate lander and 
orbiter craft. On October 22 at 0658 Moscow time, the lander entered 
the atmosphere of Venus at a speed of 10.7 km/sec. It was protected 
within a two-hemisphere shell, and was able to withstand temperatures 
up to 2.000° C. (20.000° C?) and 300 tons pressure. It used aero- 
dynamic braking until it had slowed to 250 meters/sec. Then it cast 
loose one hemisphere and in succession used three parachutes. On 
the way down, it studied the cloud layers in detail. At 50 kilometers 
altitude it cut loose the main parachute, and relied on a disc-shaped 
aerodynamic brake for the rest of the descent, impacting at 6-8 meters/ 
sec. The landing came at 0813 Moscow time. To cushion the impact, 
there was a compressible "doughnut" metal ring at the base of the 
lander, separated by struts, and this exhausted air under impact. Be- 
cause the lander instrumentation had been precooled to minus 10° C. 
and its exterior equipment to minus 100° C. before entry, it was able 
to survive in functioning condition for 53 minutes on the surface. A 
special system of circulating fluids distributed the heat load. The 
lander carried a metal pennant with the Soviet coat-of-arms. It stood 

28 Tekhnika Kinol Televidenlya, Moscow. No. 9, 174, pp. 55-60. 


approximately 2 meters high, and was equipped with flood lights to 
take a surface picture. 

Preliminary findings suggested that the clouds through which it 
passed were 30 to 40 kilometers thick, with a base 30 to 35 kilometers 
high. The upper layers may have contained hydrogen chloride and 
hydrogen fluoride, while farther down there may have been bromine 
and iodine. The surface pressure was about 90 Earth atmospheres and 
the temperature 485° C. 

The real surprise was to find that the lighting was as bright as 
Moscow on a cloudy June day, so that the floodlights were not required. 
Some 15 minutes after landing, a television panoramic picture began 
to emerge on Earth. There was no noticeable dust, and the picture was 
(mite clear even without further processing. Details were good out to 
50-100 meters. There was a scattering of rocks 30-^0 cm across, and 
a large stone on the apparent horizon. The panorama generally reached 
out to 1G0 meters, and the horizon may have been 200-300 meters away, 
but this was in doubt and probably an understatement. There was a 
defined curvature between surface and air at this horizon. The fact) 
that rocks cast shadows suggested that direct sunlight was reaching 
the surface, in contrast to the expected solid cloud cover. Surprisingly, 
also, the rocks were not eroded, but showed sharp cleavages as if 
relatively young. 

Because the landing occurred on the sunlit side away from Earth, 
the data had to be relayed from the surface to the orbiter for further 
relay to Earth. With the Sun close to the zenith, it was believed the 
li^ht was probably 20 to 25 times as intense as during the Venera 8 
mission where the Sun was only 4.5° above the horizon. 

If. Landing of Venera 10 

On October 23. Yenera 10 was divided into separate lander and 
orbiter. The lander arrived on October 25. It approached its landing 
site at a 20° angle. The temperature rose to 12,000° C. and the dynamic- 
pressure reached 168 G's during aerodynamic braking. At 60 kilo- 
meters, the parachutes opened, and then we were dropped at about 49 
kilometers. At 42 kilometers, the pressure was 3.3 Earth atmospheres 
and the temperature was 158° C. At 15 kilometers, the pressure was 37 
Earth atmospheres, and the temperature was 363° C. Some 75 minutes 
after entry began, the landing came at 0817 Moscow time. After this 
the lander operated 65 minutes on the surface. It had also been pre- 
eooled inside to minus 10° C, and its interior temperature at landing 
was 23° C, and its pressure was 2 Earth atmospheres. The surface 
pressure was 92 atmospheres and the temperature was 465° C. The 
wind was 3.5 meters/sec. The landing occurred about 2,200 kilometers 
away from the Venera 9 lander. 

As with its twin, Venera 10 was successful in sending back a 
panoramic view of its surroundings. Picture transmission was over 
by 0922 Moscow time, and was relayed via the accompanying orbiter 
craft. This time the view showed large pancake rocks, possibly with 
cooled lava or other weathered rocks in between. At the control center, 
the telephotometer picture emerged from the receiving machine on 
paper tape, with breaks every so often to permit other data to be 
received. It took about an hour for the picture to be received. 


The estimate was that Venera had landed in alpine-type country 
about 2,500 meters elevation, while Venera 10 had landed in lower 

5* The Venera 9 and 10 Orbiters 

Both orbiters were put into their respective orbits the same day as 
their landers went to the surface of Venus. As indicated above, each 
served as a relay station for data from the respective lander. Each 
carried a metal pennant with a bas-relief of Lenin. 

The Venera 9 orbiter was estimated to be in an orbit with a high 
point of 112,000 kilometers and a closest approach of 1,300 kilometers, 
with the orbital period 48 hours, 18 minutes. 

The Venera 10 orbiter was estimated to have a high point of 114, 
000 kilometers and a closest approach of 1,400 kilometers, with its 
period 49 hours, 23 minutes. 

The mission of the orbiters is to explore the cloud layers of the 
planet, their structure, temperature, and radiation, using spectrom- 
eters, radiometers, and photopolarimeters. By using radio sounding, 
they were measuring" the density of ions and electrons, and at high 
-altitudes the energy spectra directly with ion traps. They were also 
measuring weak magnetic fields and particles in the solar wind stream. 

Pictures taken in the U V range showed dark areas of equatorial 
circulation, like Mariner 10. Data are taped for later replay to Earth. 
The most recent reference was published November 21, when Venera 
9 had made 15 revolutions and been contacted 40 times. Venera 10 
had made 13 revolutions and been contacted 35 times. It was then 
revealed that France had supplied the UV spectrometers in use. Other 
equipment was used to measure the ratio of hydrogen to deuterium in 
the upper atmosphere. 

V. The Third Generation of Lunar Flights 

The first generation of lunar flights used the A-l class of vehicle 
for direct infection into flight toward the Moon. This permitted the 
sending of about 400 kilograms and limited the variety of missions 
which could be performed. As explained earlier in this study, the fairly 
northern location of Tyuratam also limited the Soviet capacity to fly 
many space missions by the direct injection technique. So they shifted 
to the more powerful upper stage and to the orbital launch platform 
technique so that the escape path could be initiated near or over Africa. 

This second generation system using the A-2-e raised the capacity 
of the basic rocket to send as much as 1,600 kilograms to the vicinity 
of the Moon. Within the limits of this newer basic craft, the Russians 
were able to accomplish a number of scientific and engineering "'firsts". 
They had already been the first to fly by the Moon, to strike the Moon, 
to take photographs of the far side. Now they added the first surviv- 
able camera landed on the surface, the first orbit of the Moon, and 
the first pictures from orbit. The first generation flights had included 
Tuna 1 through 3 : the second generation were those of Luna 4 through 
14, plus some unacknowledged partial failures in Earth orbit. 

The weights carried by the second generation were still too small to 
carry out additional automated missions the Russians had in mind. 
The creation of the Proton or D class of vehicle with added upper 
stages provided the opportunity to do more. The new D-l-e class of 


launch vehicle was first committed to a program to send men around 
the Moon. These Zond flights, numbered 4 through 8 before the 
program was abandoned, are treated in a separate ciiapter. 

A. LUX A 15 

As the summer of 1969 approached, the Americans had already had 4 
their previous Christmas flight of Apollo 8 to lunar orbit, and in the 
spring had practiced rendezvous operations in lunar orbit with Apollo 
10. The Soviet Union had its full crop of rumors, confident predictions, 
and contradictory accounts about what the Russians were going to do 
to offset or even beat the upcoming Apollo 11 flight to the Moon with 
the goal of landing men for the first time. These rumors and their 
possible validity are treated in a different chapter. 

By late June or early July there were rumors in Moscow that the 
Russians were about to do something spectacular within a few days 
related to the Moon. Several accounts tied these rumors to the big G-l-e 
vehicle in the Saturn V class. Rumors say it was launched, but failed 
to reach orbit. It is known that tracking ships which had been on sta- 
tion in various oceans including the Indian Ocean shortly departed 
their stations for port. But despite this possible setback, a different 
kind of important launch came on July 13 from Tyuratam. It used 
the D-l-e vehicle and was named Luna 15. It was put into the usual 
kind of intermediate orbit from which it was sent toward the Moon. 
The typical midcourse correction was executed on July 14 and on 
July 17, it was braked into lunar orbit. Apollo 11 was launched with 
its human crew toward the Moon on July 16, with the target date of 
July 20 for landing on the surface. The Soviet flight and its successors 
of the same series flew a slower course than used previously in order 
to maximize payload capacity, despite use of a more powerful launch 

There was some concern in the United States as to whether this 
somewhat mysterious flight, whose detailed goal had not been re- 
vealed, would interfere with the manned mission. All the Russians had 
said was that Luna 15 was designed to study the space around the 
Moon, the gravitational field of the Moon, the chemical composition 
of lunar rocks, and provide surface photography. American astro- 
naut Frank Borman who had recently been in the Soviet Union made 
a personal appeal to Soviet officials for the orbital elements which had 
not been announced at first, and asked for assurances that the flight 
would not interfere with the Apollo mission. He was given the orbital 
data of 203 by 55 kilometers, with a period of 120.5 minutes, and was 
told that there was no intention of endangering the Apollo flight. 

On July 19, TASS announced an orbital change to an inclination of 
126 degrees, with the orbit ranging between 221 and 95 kilometers, 
with a period of 123.5 minutes. On July 20, this was modified again to 
an inclination of 127 degrees, and the range from 110 to 16 kilometers, 
with a period of 114.0 minutes. This happened just before the landing 
of Apollo 11. It looked like either a Soviet readiness to take high 
resolution pictures of future landing sites, or a preparation for an 
immediate landing by Luna 15 itself. 

The next Soviet announcement came on July 21, while the Americans 
were on the lunar surface. Luna 15 had fired a retrorocket and had 
"reached"' the lunar surface in the "preset" area. A total of 86 com- 


munications sessions had been held with the craft and it accomplished 
52 revolutions of the Moon. The station was described as greatly 
improved over its predecessors, being able to land in many parts of 
the Moon through its orbital adjustment abilities. Even at the time 
there seemed little doubt from the wording of the Soviet statements 
that Luna 15 was intended to make a soft landing on the Moon to con- 
duct further experiments, and in this it failed. The Jodrell Bank ob- 
servatory estimated from the Doppler shift of signals that the payload 
impacted the surface of the Moon with a residual speed of about 
480 kilometers an hour, which would seem a good confirmation that 
the mission was to slow it for a landing, not merely redirect it to 

Even with the advantage of hindsight, in the absence of a Soviet 
explanation, we have no conclusive answer as to the intended mission of 
Luna 15. On the one hand, there were the Moscow rumors of early 
July that the Russians would attempt an automated sample return 
flight, a mission accomplished later by Luna 1G. But these rumors re- 
quire further assessment which will follow in a later chapter of this 
report on manned flight. On the other hand, the flight might have been 
intended to land a roving vehicle as did Luna 17. Luna 15 and Luna 17 
both flew in retrograde orbits while Luna 16 flew a posigrade orbit. 
Luna 15 and Luna 17 made landings in daylight portions of the Moon, 
while Luna 16 made a landing in the night portion. Moreover, the 
geared electric motors for the Lunokhod drive had already been tested 
in lunar orbit on board Luna 12 and Luna 14. If the Russians were 
trying to beat the Americans in returning a lunar sample to Earth, 
they were cutting it very close by lingering four days in lunar orbit 
before collecting their sample, so that the sample collection would 
come after Apollo 11 had gathered samples, even though the Russians 
with an unmanned vehicle might have made a faster return flight. 


Kosmos 300 was launched on September 23, 1969 to a low Earth or- 
bit. The time of launch and the nature of the debris in Earth orbit both 
suggested another lunar flight bad been attempted which was not suc- 
cessful in leaving Earth orbit. The payload survived separation from 
the orbital launch platform even though it did not go into deep space, 
because of the nature of the orbital maneuvers which it was able to 
make during its four-day life. Because the relation of this flight to 
phases of the Moon was not like Zond 7, but did resemble Luna 16 and 
17, it is a reasonable supposition that this was another in the series be- 
gun by Luna 15, and was launched by the D-l-e vehicle. 

Kosmos 305 was launched one lunar month after Kosmos 300, coming 
on October 22, 1969. It may have been even less successful than its im- 
mediate forerunner, because the Russians did not announce an orbital 
period for the payload. This almost certainly means the payload de- 
cayed before the end of the first revolution. Some debris remained in 
orbit about two days, perhaps residue of the carrier rocket and the 
orbital launch platform of the D-l-e vehicle. 

c. LUNA 10 

Luna 16 was launched on September 12, 1970 at 1626 Moscow time, 
and entered a preliminary low Earth orbit from which it was fired 


toward the Moon in the second half of its first revolution around the 
garth about 67 minutes after launch, using the orbital launch plat- 
form technique. Left behind in orbit were the typical 4 meter-diameter 
by 12 meter-long stage and an irregular launch platform. This stage 
of about 4,000 kilograms was typical of the D-l-c. 

A midcourso correction was made on September 13, and after 26 
radio sessions with the payload, it was braked on September 17 into a 
low circular orbit of the Moon at 110 kilometers an inclination of 70 
degrees, and a period of 119 minutes. Further orbital adjustments on 
September 18 and 19 brought the orbit to between 106 and 15 kilo- 
meters, and the inclination to 71 degrees. On September 20, the retro- 
rocket was fired for final descent. At an altitude of 600 meters this en- 
gine was turned on again to begin the controlled landing. It was 
switched off at 20 meters, and two smaller engines were turned on to 
burn until the altitude was 2 meters. The descent had been controlled 
by a combination of preprogramed instructions and radar altimeter 
measuring both distance and rate of descent. By this time 68 radio ses- 
sions with Earth had been held. At 0818 Moscow time, Luna 16 was 
safely on the surface of the Moon on the Sea of Fertility at 0° 41' S 
and 56° 18' E., as planned. To this point the mission of Luna 16 was 
still undescribed, as were its size, appearance, and equipment. 

The first pictures to be released after the landing proved to be only 
generally indicative of the craft — an artist's impression without ref- 
erence to the real craft. Later drawings were much more detailed and 
eventually replicas were put on display, starting with Moscow on No- 
vember 12, 1970. The craft consisted of a multi-purpose, self-contained 
landing stage made up of various spherical tanks and cylinders bound 
together by open trusswork. It had four very short shock-absorber legs. 
In the lower center was a large bell-shaped nozzle for the main descent 
and maneuvering engine which was liquid fueled with a multiple burn 
capability. It was supplemented by two independent lower-thrust 
braking engines, and various small vernier engines for orientation. The 
device had chemical batteries and transformers, radios and their an- 
tennas to operate in several wave bands, optical and accelerometer sen- 
sors for orientation, gyros, computers, timing devices, a heat-regulating 
system, and a radar altimeter. Some equipment was in the main struc- 
ture; others were in separate exterior compartments. Specialized to 
this class of mission, there was an extendable arm which could be con- 
trolled from Earth to reach out beyond the immediate blast area of 
touchdown. At the end of the arm was an elaborate drilling rig which 
could draw a sample of the lunar soil, and then manipulate it back 
for insertion into a special container. Telephotometers were placed to 
guide the Earth-bound remote operator of the drill rig. 

Mounted on top of the multi-purpose landing stage was an ascent 
stage made up of spherical propellant tanks and a liquid-fueled main 
engine, plus vernier engines for steering. These were all fastened to- 
gether by exposed trusswork. Atop the propulsion section was an in- 
strument cylinder with its electronic computing equipment, various 
sensors, gyros, radios, chemical batteries, transformers, and 4 project- 
ing radio antennas. Strapped to it was the actual recoverable portion, 
a sphere heavily protected by ablation material. Inside was the con- 
tainer to receive the lunar sample in its cylinder, packed parachutes, 
radio beacon, batteries, and antennas. It is hard to judge the true size 


of the total assembly of two stages and associated equipment, but it 
must have been close to the 4 meters diameter of the D-l-e r<> 
(also estimated as 3.72 meters), and also stood about 4 meters high. 

Because the D-l-e vehicle is used for the third generation series of 
unmanned lunar programs, we can estimate the weight brought to es- 
cape speed to be on the order of 5,000 to 6,600 kilograms. After ret ro- 
fire to slow into lunar orbit, the weight may lie in the range of 4.<h»' - to 
4,500 kilograms. Further braking to achieve a landing should give a 
number in the range of 1,800 to 2.000 kilograms. These are very rough 
estimates. In the case of Luna 16, the Russians finally announced a 
landed weight of 1,880 kilograms. 29 

As events of the flight unfolded at the time, no advance warning 
was given of the specific intended mission, but over the weeks follow- 
ing, more detailed accounts were made public. The first task of the 
craft, once on the surface of the Moon, was to review its own house- 
keeping functions to insure that all subsystems were in working order. 
It had to establish not only its exact location on the lunar surface, but 
also find the local vertical. Then the arm attached to the Landing stage 
was extended out, generally beyond the immediate blast area of the 
braking rocket. Its special drilling unit, consisting of a hollow cyl- 
inder with cutters at the end went to work, with controllers on Earth 
sensing remotely how fast to cut in relation to the apparent hardness 
of the lunar material. The drill was allowed to cut into a depth of about 
35 centimeters. The Russians are not certain whether at this point they 
reached bed rock or an isolated hard stone. But rather than risk dam- 
age to the equipment, drilling ceased. The sample in the tube consist- 
ing of soil ranging from fine dust to more granular sand was carried 
on the same sampler arm up to the ascent stage and inserted into the 
recovery capsule which was then hermetically sealed. 

Then preprogramed information plus instructions from Earth pre- 
pared the spacecraft for launch. After 26 hours and 25 minutes on 
the surface, the ascent stage took off at 1043 Moscow time on Septem- 
ber 21, using the descent stage as its launch platform. The lower stage 
remaining on the Moon continued to broadcast to Earth data on local 
temperature and radiation conditions. 

According to the Bochum radio space observatory in the German 
Federal Republic, strong and good quality television pictures were 
returned from the craft. Such pictures were not made available in the 
United States either by Bochum or by any other source, so the report 
has to be accepted with reservations. 

The return flight to Earth was made without midcourse corrections. 
In contrast to the Zond flights which were to have been precursors to 
manned flights, and hence made with as low a G-load. and as low heat 
load return as possible from the Moon, the Luna 16 payload made a 
straight ballistic return to Soviet territory. The time and area of re- 
covery was announced in advance by the Soviet Government. As it 
came closer, the ground complex calculated its point of return with 
increasing accuracy. On September 24, the recovery capsule with its 
sealed cylinder of lunar soil was separated by a pyrotechnic device 
from its lunar launch rocket, while approximately 50.000 kilometers 
from Earth. The capsule hit the dense atmosphere at 0810 Moscow time. 

» TASS, October 3, 1970, 1035 GMT. 


After aerodynamic braking, which put a 350 G-load on the capsule, 
and raised its surface temperature to about 10,000° C, it slowed down 
still more. At 0814 the braking parachute and then the main parachute 
were deployed, together with the antenna for the radio beacon. As 
it came down on its parachute at the predicted location, both aircraft 
and helicopters of the rescue force heard the radio beacon and made 
a visual sighting of the parachute. It landed at 0826, and soon was 
retrieved. The total flight has lasted 11 days, 1G hours. 

The landing was announced about two hours after the event with the 
repoit the capsule had come through in good condition. No weight for 
the sample was given at that time. Western observers assumed it was 
fairly small, perhaps only a kilogram or so. Later it w T as revealed to 
be only 101 grams. Even so, this afforded an important resource to 
analysts in the Soviet Union. After the helicopter pickup, the special 
factory facility in the area removed the hermetically sealed container 
with the core sample from the capsule without repressurizing it. The 
container was then flown to Moscow to the major lunar receiving 
laboratory. As an aid to quarantine, the container was placed in a 
stainless steel chamber with glass portholes. Then pumps lowered the 
pressure to a high vacuum, following which a sterilizing gas was intro- 
duced to kill any Earth germs on the exterior of the container. A va- 
riety of remote control devices, like those used at Houston, opened the 
core-containing tube, and passed portions of the lunar material to var- 
ious sealed sublaboratories equipped with more manipulators and 
chambers with built-in rubber gloves. Precision scales, electric heaters, 
binocular microscopes, vibration mills, and special sealed samples in 
separate bags for biologists and geochemists were all provided. Thin 
slices were polished to transparency for further detailed analysis. Any 
outgassing from the lunar material was subjected to 800° C. heat to 
insure sterility. 

The early descriptions of the actual material were very similar to 
those from Houston — some disagreement over the exact color, and 
clinging external dust on the container. The color had first been de- 
scribed as dark blue, but later was more generally called gray, with 
the appearance of being green or brown at some lighting angles. The 
average density was 1.2 grams per cubic centimeter in original con- 
dition, but shook down to about 1.8 grams. Analysis was continuing, 
and small samples were made available to scientists in other countries, 
including a direct exchange with the United States. 

The many articles by Soviet scientists which discussed Luna 16 put 
heavy stress on the eventual use of the Luna 16 techniques for explora- 
tion of Mars, Venus, and the planetoids. While Luna 16 was extolled 
as cheaper for exploring the Moon than the manned Apollo flights, the 
Russians also stated that their exploration of the Moon would use sev- 
eral techniques in the future, including both automated devices and 
manned expeditions. 

1. Comparative Cost of Lima 16 and a Typical Apollo Mission 

The question of comparative costs has been raised in both Soviet and 
U.S. discussions, with some very wide-ranging estimates. There is no 
definitive answer, but perhaps a reasonable perspective can be sug- 

(a) In the first place, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet program has 
been aimed at purely scientific objectives. To the degree that their 


respective programs have been designed to build a general capability 
in space flight, or to create an image of success, or to fulfill non-quanti- 
fiable goals of exploration, no comparison of scientific returns in re- 
lation to the costs is statistically valid anyway. 

(b) If one makes the arbitrary and even invalid asumption that the 
only goal sought is science, then there are still difficulties in the com- 
parison. If the goal was simply to have brought home a token sample, 
this Soviet Luna approach is cheaper. But if the ability to bring 
home 101 grams is compared with many tens of kilograms on each 
flight, the U.S. unit cost per kilogram is lower. The Soviet sample 
was not only small, but was selected virtually at random. U.S. samples 
ideally were carefully selected for variety and interest, and could be 
described and documented as to their original location. Our crews were 
capable of ranging over a fairly wide territory. 

(c) Xo direct cost comparison is possible between Soviet flights 
and U.S. flights because the Russians do not make available cost data. 
Even if they did, verv careful definitions would have to be drawn up 
as to whether costs related to total programs including their research 
and development, and what arbitrary share of joint costs should be 
allocated to a particular project such as for flight to the Moon. The 
closest approach one can make is to consider what it would cost us to 
conduct a Luna 16-type mission, and then perhaps to compare the out- 
of-pocket costs for this automated mission with an Apollo mission. 
The full anal\ T sis goes beyond the scope of this study, but a conserva- 
tive estimate is that a manned Apollo round trip with the maximum 
amount of supporting equipment and doing many things besides 
bringing home rock samples costs on the order of $450 million. Using 
the Saturn I B or Titan III E with Centaur stage, and new lunar 
landing and return- stages would give an out-of-pocket cost of about 
$100 to $120 million for each Luna 16 type flight if the program con- 
tained as many flights as were planned for Apollo. This means an 
Apollo cost about four times as much as the equivalent of a Luna 16. 
An Apollo flight brings more than four times the variety and amount 
of scientific returns as one Luna 16 flight, regardless of the impressive- 
ness of the Soviet automatic svstem. 

(d) As will be developed later in this study, the Soviet Union did 
not .10 the Luna 16 rou^e to save money compared with the manned 
lunar landing route. It also has spent the lar<re sums needed to support 
a manned lunar landing 1 , but has not produced the visible result in 
this regard which the United States has achieved. Looking beyond 
out-of-pocket costs, the United States committed about $35 billion to 
the Apollo program ($21.35 billion to achieve the first manned land- 
ing, and the Russians by spending for both an advanced unmanned 
and its two manned lunar programs (built around Zond and around 
the missinc G-l-e) probably committed the equivalent of about $49 
billion for such programs if these were intended to b^ of about the 
some scope and duration as the Apollo program of the United States. 
This country earlier had program planners who would have been very 
rinocno 1 to have fjhe equivalent of the automated lunar programs un- 
dertaken bv the Russians (called by the planners. Prospector) . but the 
ultimate decision was we could not afford ps many p^ocrram elements 
n<5 the "Russians have undertaken, and hence these Prospector plans 
were not implemented with hardware. 



1. Flight of Luna 17 

About two lunar months after the launch of Luna 16, Luna 17 was 
launched at 1744 Moscow time on November 10, 1970. It followed 
the usual Soviet practice of entering an Earth parking orbit from 
which the usual Zond probe rocket was fired, leaving behind the sepa- 
rated carrier rocket and orbital launch platform. At a distance of about 
289,000 kilometers from Earth the payload was observed by the Ka- 
zakh Astrophysical Institute using a telescope fitted with an electronic 
television enhancement system. Midcourse corrections were conducted 
on November 12 and 14, and 36 radio sessions were held. On November 
15, the braking rocket brought Luna 17 to a circular orbit around the 
Moon at an altitude of 85 kilometers and a retrograde orbit of 141 
decrees to the lunar equator. On November 16. an orbit adjustment 
lowered the perilune to 19 kilometers. 

On November 17, the main braking engine was turned on to begin 
final descent to the surface, which was reached at 0647 Moscow time, 
with the location of 38° 17' N. and 35° W. in the Sea of Rains. The 
landing stage was essentially the same as used for Luna 16, except that 
in place of the drilling arm, it carried a flat platform on top with dual 
ramps on opposite ends. Instead of the Luna 16 payload of an ascent 
rocket assembly, it carried a mobile vehicle, Lunokhod 1. 

2. Description of Lunokhod 1 Roving Vehicle 

The Lunokhod 1 was shaped like an old-fashioned bath tub, 
equipped with eight wheels, four to a side, and a large convex lid to 
the tub-like compartment. This lid was hinged at one edge to lift up 
and over exposing on its underside an array of solar cells. The vehi- 
cle carried a cone-shaped antenna, a highly directional helical an- 
tenna, four television cameras, and special extendable devices to im- 
pact the lunar soil for density and mechanical properties tests. Both 
the landing stage and the roving vehicle carried Soviet metal pennants 
and coats of arms. 

The Lunokhod 1 is undeniably a remarkable vehicle. It was built of 
unspecified light-weight materials designed to withstand the stresses 
of flight from Earth and the great extremes of temperatures on the 
Moon. It had to avoid the use of plastic materials which deteriorate 
in the radiation environment of space, and also to minimize the use 
of moving parts which might weld together in a high vacuum. Its eight 
wheels were independently powered, and a special suspension system 
was designed to overcome the unevenness of the terrain (lurain) which 
it might cross. In order to develop the electric motors for the wheels, 
these were test, flown on both Luna 12 and Luna 14, and were found 
to be successful. The device was controlled by a four-man crew on 
Earth, and it had the ability to move at two speeds, either continually 
or in short increments. The device could move forward or backward, 
and by applying power in opposite directions to the wheels on each 
side, it could turn in its tracks. Automatic sensors and safety devices 
would stop the vehicle if they discovered that through inadvertence 
the human crew on Earth had directed the vehicle up or down too steep 
a grade, or if it tilted too much to one side. The two gangways on the 
lander platform were to insure that if a boulder blocked descent in 
one direction, there would be a second chance to move off the platform. 


The four television cameras permitted observation in all directions; 
also they permitted stereo views; and views could be close up or of 
distant panoramas. The TV cameras weighed under 1.5 kilograms 
each, used 2.5 watts of electricity each, and could take pictures with 
500 elements for each of 6,000 lines. Data could be sent back to Earth 
for display at various rate — near real time, or slowly for detailed fac- 
simile reproduction. The vehicle contained various radio systems, com- 
puter elements, chemical batteries, a thermal regulating system of 
pipes circulating fluid and adjustable louvres at the heat exchanger. 
The experimental gear was fairly diversified. Soil properties could 
be measured both by the impacting devices and by optical studies of 
the vehicle tracks. An X-ray spectrometer permitted analysis of soil 
constituents. Cosmic ray detectors permitted analysis of intensity and 
energy levels of protons, electrons, and alpha particles, measuring also 
their direction. Solar flares could be studied. An X-ray telescope per- 
mitted detailed search of the heavens for sources, recording the data 
in the memory units for later broadcasts to Earth. 

The lid top to the vehicle during daylight turned over showing the 
underside of solar cells to expose them to the Sun for current opera- 
tions and recharging chemical batteries. At night, the lid closed down 
to minimize damage to the cells, and a radio isotope heat source main- 
tained an adequate level of internal heat to permit the equipment and 
chemical batteries to survive the lunar night. 

3. Review of Operational Life 

On November 17, at 0720 Moscow time, radio links with Lunokhod 1 
were checked out, and at 0831 the first television pictures were re- 
turned. At 0028, Lunokhod 1 descended the steep ramp to reach the 
surface of the Moon, and began its travels in low gear. Its separate 
weight was 756 kilograms. 

Designed to operate for three lunar days, it continued to function 
at least in part for 11 or 12 lunar days, making an impressive record 
by any standards. During the almost year-long period it operated, it 
occasioned a continuing flood of TASS reports and commentary. 
Rather than repeat in narrative form the highlights of all the activi- 
ties reported, much of this information has been summarized in a sin- 
gle table, below, and supplementary comments will be added to supply 
details and interpretations. 

The first operating day was short because it was about half over 
when the landing was made. Fairly detailed accounts reviewed all the 
activities for the first three lunar da} T s. After that, the accounts were 
still frequent but more sketchy on precise numbers and details. Sample 
reports of the early period follow : 

On the first lunar day of operation, between November 17 and 22, 
when it parked for the lunar night, Lunokhod 1 traveled 197 meters, 
and in 10 radio sessions with Earth sent back 14 close-up pictures, 
more than Luna 9 and 13 combined; it also sent back 12 panoramic 


During the first lunar night, the supplemental French-supplied 
laser reflector experiment (12 tetrahedra) prisms) was tested, and on 
the first tries, both December 5 and 6, a reflected signal was picked up 
by the Russians. The French were not successful in their first attempts, 
and there was speculation in the Western press that the Russians bad 
temporarily withheld precise pointing instructions from the French 
to enable themselves to be the first to reflect laser signals. During the 
first lunar night two radio sessions were held with the vehicle to assure 
that systems were still operating. 

On December 9, the solar cell panel was reopened and pointed to- 
ward the Sun. On December 10, further travel began, and now at 
higher speed. On December 14 to 1G, no travel was undertaken and 
the available power was used to operate other experiments. These in- 
cluded generating stereo pairs of pictures, and the X-ray spectrometer 
experiment. When travel resumed, Lunokhod 1 descended into a crater 
3 meters below the level of the Luna 17 lander, and then came out 
again. By the end of the second operating day, total travel amounted 
to 1,179 meters, and the vehicle was 1,370 meters away from the lander. 
Some 33 telepanoramas had been returned to Earth, and additionally 
some 7 astronomical panoramas had been conducted, to permit a very 
precise definition of the vehicle's location. 

Apparently close to real time television was used to direct the travel, 
while panoramic studies were conducted for accurate location, topog- 
raphy, and astronomy. Soil chemistry studies took enough power that 
they were done in periods of no travel. These ceased after the ninth 
lunar day. Astronomy tests for X-ray measurements and mapping 
of radio sources were referred to without quantitative counts either 
after the first three days or in summation. Soil mechanical tests were 
quantified for the first three days and in total but not mentioned after 
the ninth day. A few discrepancies between lunar day totals and cumu- 
lative totals for travel show tip in the announcements. The figure for 
the eleventh day became a vague "almost 100 meters'', which by sub- 
traction can be established as 88. Finally the experiment ceased offi- 
cially on Ocetober 4, 1971, the anniversary of Sputnik 1. The reason 
given was that the radio isotope supply used to keep the instrumenta- 
tion functional despite the rigors of the lunar night had been too 
reduced in heat output. If so, the complete absence of reports that the 
vehicle had been contacted during the eleventh lunar night, and the 
absence of any announcement of its reactivation about September 30, 
and no reference to any work during the twelfth lunar day strongly 
suggest that to all intents and purposes, the final performance of 
Lunokhod. 1 came with its shutdown on September 15. It may be that 
October 4 was the day the team of operators abandoned any further 
attempt to revive the pay load. This minor evasiveness about the tim- 
ing of its end should not detract from the outstanding accomplish- 
ments of the first automated roving vehicle on the Moon. 








Lunar night 





Soil tests 

ical Chemical 



Nov. 17 

Nov. 22 

2 radio, 1 laser 








Dec. 10 

Dec. 22 

3 radio 








Jan. 8 

Jan. 20 

2 radio 








Feb. 8 

Feb. 19 

2 radio 








Mar. 9 

Mar. 20 

2 radio 

2, 004 







Apr. 8 

Apr. 20 

1 radio, 1 laser 








May 7 

May 20 

1 rauio 







June 5 

June 18 

1 radio 







July 4 

July 17 

1 radio 








Aug. 3 

Aug. 16 




Aug. 31 

Sep. 15 
Oct. 4 





Sea. 30 

Total 10,540 >20, 000 206 >500 25 (?) 

* Cumulative. 

1. The table shows what portion of each lunar day the Lunokhod 1 was activated. During lunar nights while the solar 
panel was generally closed and no movement occurred, some radio contacts were made to monitor that the vehicle was 
still operable though quiescent. The listed number of laser reflection tests probably understates what was done, considering 
both the Russians and the French were interested in testing the reflection. 

2. The statistics for each day were compiled by a review of individual TASS bulletins numbering in the scores over a 
period of 10.5 months. Data became more sparse over time, either because of less news value or as experiments became 

SOURCES: Mostly from many individual Soviet TASS bulletins. The summary figures on total performance were 
carried in: Aviatsiyai Kosmonavtika, No. 1, 1972, pp. 33-35. 

b. Scientific Findings 

By its very nature, the Lunokhod 1 received more continuing cover- 
age in Soviet reports than most other space activities, although as 
manned station.- are put to longer use they reflect some of the same 
kind of coverage. Many tindings were made by Lunokhod 1, only some 
of which have been published. The data were said to be yielding very 
detailed topological maps and information on soil structure and com- 
position of the area explored. Features not visible in orbital photo- 
graphs were found. Instead of the expected basalt plain, the area 
turned out to bo one of complex lava flows with considerable terrace 
stratification. Also there were folded ridges, with the soil much 
stronger on top of the ridges. 

The instrument named Rifma was used both for measuring the chem- 
ical constituents of lunar soil and for interpreting the signals from 
space received through the telescope. By searching sectors of the sky 
with this telescope in conjunction with television panoramas of the 
sky, it was possible to pinpoint X-ray star sources. Measurements were 
made at levels between 2,000 and 10,000 electron volts in the 1 to 6 
angstrom wavelength range. Although normally the Lunokhod 1 
cover was closed during lunar nights, there were some special experi- 
ments conducted. On February 10, during the lunar day, an eclipse 
put the vehicle in darkness, and the temperature of the environs 
dropped from plus 138 degrees Celsius to minus 100 degrees Celsius. 
This three-hour test of rate of heat loss showed it came through un- 
damaged. In another test, the television system was turned on March 7 
during darkness and kept operational toVatch the arrival of sunrise. 

Several methods of navigation were used during the travels of 
Lunokhod 1. Laser ranging from the Crimea and also from Pic du 
Midi in France permitted some very precise measurements. A second 
approach was the use of dead reckoning, keeping a plot on where the 
vehicle had been. A third approach was to look for landmarks, and 

to estimate from changes in angles to these points the location of the 
vehicle. A fourth method was to take pictures of star fields and to 
measure the position of the Sun with a sextant in order to establish 
the vehicle's location. 

The Russians reported the telemetry coming from Lunokhod 1 was 
so extensive that just the engineering data on the behavior of the wheels 
produced a greater data flow than was obtained from all spacecraft 
combined for the years 1957-1 960. The vehicle experienced many vicis- 
situdes as it climbed into and out of craters and occasionally met 
boulders. Sometimes the list was 30 degrees. But by changes of course, 
and backing when necessary, it managed very well. Some areas of dust 
were found with depths up to 20 centimeters. Then the ninth wheel, 
a distance measuring device, would not always turn, and other data 
were required to establish the actual distance covered. 

Another interesting phenomenon was measurement of a 1,000-fold 
increase in the level of low energy protons between April 7 and 10, 
1971, after a solar flare had been observed from Earth on April 6. 

As the table shows, during the seventh lunar clay, little travel was 
accomplished, and it was feared that deterioration of systems would 
require restriction of experiments to static ones. But in fact, it came 
back to good performance the eighth day, with a rapid deterioration 
thereafter. When the last of its travels were over, it was positioned so 
that the passive laser reflector supplied by the French could continue 
to be used for many years to come. 

5. Relative Merits of Manned Versus Unmanned Roving Lunar 


The success of Lunokhod 1 inevitably brought back the recurring 
questions about the relative merits of manned versus automated flights 
to the Moon. This same kind of analysis has been offered on return of 
lunar samples. No clear cut answer was possible in that instance, but 
it was hard to escape the conclusion that Apollo flights at costs up to 
$450 million each, out of pocket, bringing back 90 kilograms of docu- 
mented samples selected with some care over many kilometers of ter- 
rain (lurain) should have greater scientific merit for analysis than 
a Luna flight at roughly $100 million or so bringing back about 100 
grams from a site selected at random. 

The closest parallel between the Luna 17 with Lunokhod 1 mission 
would be Apollo 15, which was the first to carry a manned roving 
vehicle : 



Total dis- 

Useful life 


weight (kg) 

tance (km) 


Power source 


Lunokhod 1 




Solar cells 


Apollo 15 rover. 




Chemical batteries. 

. Astronauts. 

SOURCES: Weight of Lunokhod 1:TASS,8 Feb. 1971,1152 GMT. Distance for Lunokhod 1:TASS, 9 Oct. 1971, 1222 
GMT. Apollo 15 rover data from NASA press kit and subsequent press releases. 

It will be observed this is something of an apples and oranges com- 
parison. Time is of the essence with a manned flight to the Moon, and 
the greatest mobility and practical speed are important. But if there 
is time for an unmanned vehicle to recharge its batteries, and for sci- 


entists on Earth to study each small advance and discovery so that 
new tasks can be planned with care, then the extended life of the 
automated vehicle even with slow speed gives a useful result. 

Both roving vehicle types were undoubtedly expensive to develop, 
although the automated Lunokhod system should cost many times 
more, including its Earth control units. The mission costs probably 
were on the order of $450 million for the manned rover and $120 
million or more for the one-way trip of the automated rover. The 
contrast is that men can bring observational powers, deploy certain 
experiments, collect the most interesting rocks, and make some types of 
repairs on a scale not yet possible under the Soviet plan. But the Soviet 
plan permitted improvements in performance and interpretations of 
experiments which could be used to adjust the further program of the 
same mission working month after month. Essentially, one expendi- 
ture for an Apollo flight would do the tasks of both Luna 10 and Luna 
17. The American approach brought back better samples and permitted 
men to have experiences remote study cannot duplicate. The Soviet 
approach gave more time for intellectual development of surface ex- 
ploration. It seems reasonable to suggest that the Lunokhod and 
Apollo approaches are complementary rather than competitive, and 
in fact even the Russians acknowledge this officially even though 
they have stressed the comparative cheapness of their automated 

E. luxa is 

The next Soviet lunar flight was that of Luna 18, launched on Sep- 
tember 2, 1971 at 1641 Moscow time. It was launched with the D-l-e 
vehicle and carried the same basic third generation bus that had been 
used since Luna 15. It was observed by Soviet astronomers at a dis- 
tance of 100.000 kilometers from Earth. 

On September 7, Luna 18 was put into lunar orbit at 100 kilometers 
circular orbit, and an inclination of 35 degrees to the lunar equator, 
with a period of 119 minutes. 

The Russians announced on September 11 that there had been 85 
radio sessions with Luna 18, and that it had completed 54 orbits of 
the Moon. It was then braked to make a landing which occurred at 
3° 34' N. and 56° 30' E. in high terrain. They said the topography 
was unlucky, and signals ceased at touchdown at 1048 Moscow time. 

F. LUXA 19 

Luna 19 was launched on September 28, 1971, using the same launch 
vehicle and bus as its fairly immediate predecessors. The initial em- 
phasis in the press release was on research from lunar orbit. Astron- 
omers were able to spot Luna 19 on the way to the Moon at a distance 
of 120,000 kilometers. A day later (September 30), the number of 
fixes obtained on the payload had risen to 60 as more observatories 
found it. 

On October 3, after 26 radio sessions, the Luna 19 payload was 
braked into lunar orbit, 140 kilometers circular, at an inclination of 
40° 35', and with a period of 121.75 minutes. 

A minor orbital adjustment on October 7 made the orbit 135 by 
127 kilometers, and a period of 121 minutes. After that there were 
progress reports about monthly, but not many details. Through De- 


cember 31, 1971, there had been 31G radio sessions with Luna 10. By 
January 30, it had completed 1,358 orbits, doing studies of magnetic 
h'elds, cosmic radiation, solar data, and meteoroids. By March 10, at 
1300 Moscow time, the count was up to 1,810 orbits, and 516 radio ses- 
sions. Emphasis in the release now was on gravitational studies, which 
suggested that more elaborate experiments might have shut down by 
that time. On March 19, the report was amplified to repeat the list of 
missions which had been mentioned in January, and to say that selec- 
tive panoramas of the surface had been taken by camera and facsimile 
transmission to Earth, covering the region from 30° to 60° 6. and 
from 20° to 80° E. 

On October 3, 1972, Luna 19 had completed over 4,000 revolutions. 
It had carried 19 experiments. TASS said it was near the end of its 
mission. Findings from radio wave propagation suggested a plasma 
around the Moon from the interactions of solar radiation and the 
lunar surface. The Luna 19 mission had taught more about the energy 
spectrum, and the charge components of cosmic rays in space. There 
had been over 1,000 communications with the pay load. The study of 
orbit changes during the mission had helped to map the location of 
inascons. On ten occasions, surges of solar activity were studied, with 
the results combined with data from Venera 7 and 8, Mars 2 and 3, 
and Prognoz 1 and 2. 

Later some more details of the findings were published. The plasma 
found near the Moon appeared on the lighted side with the greatest 
concentration at 10 kilometers altitude. It was detected by using a dis- 
persion interferometer sending out coherent signals on 32 cm. and 8 
cm., with receipt of the signals on Earth. Some 15 sessions had been 
held in May and June 1972 to gather the data. 

G. LUXA 2 

1. Flight of Luna 20 

Luna 20 was launched on February 14, 1972 at 0628 Moscow time, 
using the D-l-e vehicle and the usual orbital platform technique for 
injection into translunar flight. A midcourse correction was made on 
February 15, and then it was braked into lunar orbit on February 18. 
The orbit attained was 100 kilometers circular, at an inclination of 65 
degrees and a period of 1 hour 58 minutes. A day later, the perilune 
was lowered to 21 kilometers. On February 21 at 2219 Moscow time, 
Luna 20 was braked to a landing at 3° 32' N., 56° 33' E. in moun- 
tainous terrain near the Sea of Fertility. It may be observed that the 
landing site was very close to that selected for the failed soft landing 
of Luna 18. The braking burn took 267 seconds. Free fall then was 
permitted to an altitude of 760 meters. Here, there was a second burn 
that lasted until the payload was 20 meters above the surface where 
the main engine w T as turned oil', and small thrust braking took over. 
The landing site was about 120 kilometers north of the Luna 16 site, 
but in uplands rather than in a mare. 

2. Surface Activity 

After landing, the standard platform turned on its television system 
to take panoramic pictures of the surroundings. Then it activated its 
extension arm to place its drill on the most promising spot with in 
reach to drill a sample from hard rock, with the work proceeding in 
stages. The drilling system used a percussion rotary drill designed to 

67-371—76 12 


preserve the natural strength of the roek sample, and oil vapor lubri- 
cation to prevent its parts from sticking. After each brief applica- 
tion of the drill, there would be a pause for a fresh television view. The 
sample acquired was one with both sand and hard rock. The drilling 
arm had been rigged to emerge vertically from the platform, rotate 
to the desired azimuth, and then was lowered to the ready position for 
drilling. All this took 7 minutes. After television inspection, there 
were 2 more minutes spent to adjust the direction of the drilling arm, 
and 3 minutes for final descent to surface contact. The drill operated 
at 500 rpm, and it took just 7 minutes to extract the sample. After 
this was completed, the arm lifted up the drilling unit with its intact 
sample to line it up with the recoverable capsule and insert it. This 
was hermetically sealed. There followed a 20 hour wait to insure that 
when launch came for the return flight to Earth it would be carried to 
the selected area of the Soviet Union. 

3. Return Flight and Recovery 

Launch occurred at 0158 Moscow time on February 23. The sample 
was w r ell shielded by ablative material on the recovery capsule. After 
separation of the capsule from the launch rocket, it made a ballistic 
entry with aerodynamic braking, and then further slowing by para- 
chute. Its radio beacon was picked up by aircraft. The landing took 
place on an island in the Karakingir river at 67° 34' E. 48° N. Three 
tracked rescue vehicles trying to reach it broke through river ice, and 
pickup had to await the availability of a helicopter and daylight. The 
bright orange parachute was then spotted. About 5 mm of material 
h:id been ablated from the capsule surface. The sealed container with 
the lunar sample was taken out and transported to the lunar receiving 
laboratory where 14 hours after the return the contents were put into 
a steel tray. The landing had occurred at 2212 Moscow time on Febru- 
ary 25, 40 kilometers northwest of Dzezkazgan in Kazakhstan. The 
landing conditions were ones of blizzard and low clouds. The search 
area had measured 80 by 100 kilometers. This time the entry was at 
an angle of 60 degrees, providing a lower G load than that experienced 
by the return of Luna 16. However, temperatures ran higher. 

The sample container was opened in a helium atmosphere. The sam- 
ple itself proved to be lighter in color than that returned by Luna 20. 
It was described as light to dark brown, and also as light gray, again 
demonstrating the difficulties associated with describing the colors of 
most lunar samples. 

Later, the Luna 20 return vehicle was referred to as a VLAS (re- 
turnable lunar automatic station), said to have considerable micro- 
miniaturized equipment to make it function. Luna 16 and 20 were 
described as essentially the same except for minor regrouping of 
components to improve conditions. It was noted that this time the 
landing had been made in daylight in order to gain better quality 
stereo telephotos of the landing site. 

£. Scientific Results 

This flight provided an opportunity for further scientific exchanges. 
The United States was given 2 grams plus photographs, in exchange 
for 1 gram from Apollo 15. Earlier the United States had supplied 
material from Apollo 11 and 12 for material from Luna 16. The 
French had been given material from Luna 16, also, and now received 
a sample from Luna 20. 


Soviet analysis of the sample found traces of TO chemical elements. 
The highlands sample, as indicated, was lighter and had more huge 
particles. Their density was described at 1.1 to 1.2 grams/cm 3 , com- 
parable to 1.7 to 1.8 grams/cm 3 . The rock was called anorthosite. 

For the future, the Russians saw opportunities to bring home sam- 
ples from the far side of the Moon. But this will require a trans-Earth 
injection burn from lunar orbit on the far-side of the Moon, and may 
require a lunar orbiting communications satellite correctly positioned 
as well, to maintain links with Earth. 


/. Flight of Luna 21 

Luna 21 was launched on January 1973 at 0955 Moscow time using 
the D-l-e vehicle and translunar infection from an Earth orbital plat- 
form in the regular manner. An orbital correction was made on J anu- 
ary 9. The Tadzik observatory tracked the flight from 86,000 kilome- 
ters to 224,000 kilometers, using an electronic optical enhancer. 

On January 12, Luna 12 was braked into an orbit around the Moon 
with parameters of 100 to 90 kilometers, an inclination of 60 degrees, 
and a period of 1 hour, 58 minutes. On January 13 and 14, the perilune 
was lowered to 16 kilometers, and then on January 16 at 0135 Moscow 
time, it Avas braked to a soft landing at the eastern edge of the Sea of 
Serenity in Le Monnier crater. 

Luna 21 circled the Moon 40 times before preparing to land. The 
braking rocket was fired at 16 kilometers altitude, then going into free 
fall to an altitude of 750 meters. The second firing lasted to 22 meters 
altitude when the main engine was cut off and smaller thrusters oper- 
ated to a height of 1.5 meters where at cut off it was allowed to drop 
the remaining distance. This would be equivalent to a 40 centimeter 
drop on Earth. 

Pyrotechnics were fired to separate the transported lunar rover from 
the landing stage. 

The landing stage w r as one of the standard platforms now in regu- 
lar use. It carried a bas relief of Lenin and the Soviet coat-of-arms. 

2. Operations of Lunokhod 2 

Lunokhod 2 was an improved roving vehicle of 840 kilograms (com- 
pared with 756 for its predecessor). After television inspection of the 
surroundings and lowering of the landing ramp, Lunokhod 2 rolled 
down the landing ramp at 0414 to the surface of the Moon. Gear was 
checked and more television pictures were taken. It also carried a bas 
relief of Lenin and the Soviet coat of arms. Again, a French-supplied 
radar reflector was incorporated to aid in laser tracking and distance 
measuring. It remained stationary 30 meters away from the lander 
until January 18 to charge batteries after opening its solar panel lid. 

On January 18, Lunokhod 2 sent TV panoramas and began to move. 
It also studied the X-radiation of the Sun and studied soil mechanical 
properties. More battery charging followed. This time, the rover also 
had kept its solar panel open during most of the flight from Earth in 
order to save time in battery charging, folding the lid to closed position 
only during dynamic operations. 

Lunokhod 2 reapproached the lander to within 4 meters to take pic- 
tures of it, and then from a distance of 6 meters took a panorama 


of the surroundings. It was then moved several meters, going through 
a narrow passage and turning sharply to get into a good viewing posi- 
tion. As with Lunokhod 1, a complete review of daily Soviet accounts 
over several months would become tedious, so a summary table will 
be presented with general comments and interpretations on these data. 


Lunar night Travel Soil tests 

Vehicle Vehicle contacts— dis- TV TV Astron- 

Lunar acti- shut tance pic- pano- Mechan- Chemi- omy 

day vated down Radio Laser (meters) tures ramas ical cal tests 

1 Jan. 16... Jan. 24 1,260 

2 Feb. 8.... Feb. 23 9,806 

3 Mar. 11.. Mar. 23 16,533 

4 Aor. 9.... Apr. 22. 8,600 

5 May 8 800 

(June 3) 

Total (?) >4,000 37,000 >80,C00 






1. The table shows what portion of each lunar day the Lunokhod 2 was activated. During the lunar nights while the solar 
panel generally was closed and no movement occurred, thare were both radio contacts to monitor quiescent systems and 
laser reflection tests to measure vehicle location and lunar or Earth celestial mechanics data. 

2. The statistics on this operation were not reported in quantitative form except for the distance traveled. The numoers 
shown were constructed by compiling data from scores of individual TASS bulletins over a period of 4.5 months. 

3. While the experiment was reported as concluded on June 3, 1973, this time is suspect since it was in the middle of 
the lunar night when the vehicle would be inactive anyway. Normally, shut down would come at the end of a lunar day, 
like May 20 or 21, with the failure discovered at time of revival around June 6 or 7. Since the travel reported fcr the fifth 
unar day was so small, failure may have come as early as the second week in May. 

SOURCES: Mostly from many individual Soviet TASS bulletins. The summary figures on total performance were carried 
as a TASS announcement in Pravda, Moscow, June 4, 1973, p.l. 

It was not possible to build quite as specific a table this time as with 
the previous surface rover. But in general, the distance was three 
to four times as great ; television pictures were four times as numerous ; 
television panoramas were perhaps 40 percent as numerous, soil me- 
chanical tests half again as many, and no counts were provided on 
other activities although all were carried on and with improved 

It was noted by the Russians that Lunokhod 2 was at work in an 
area only 180 kilometers north of the landing site of Apollo 17. The 
region was one of transition from the Sea of Serenity to the Taurus 

A more detailed description was provided of the functions of the 
human controllers on Earth. A five-man crew was now used. Com- 
mander, driver, navigator, radioman, and engineer. Their task was 
made more demanding by giving the Lunokhod 2 double the speed of 
its predecessor. Physiological monitoring was done of the ground crew 
and they were found to work under heavy stress, yet with their high 
competence, they remained fairly "cool"'. 

The vehicle had been modified for this mission to add in a higher 
position an extra television camera so that the Earth driver could see 
farther ahead and direct the vehicle with more confidence. The pic- 
tures formed on the Earth screen once every three seconds. 

Another new instrument was an astrophotometer. It was used to de- 
termine the night skyglow on the Moon ( important to guide planning 
of future observatories on the Moon which might be discouraged if 
there developed the news that a dust ring circled the Moon). It also 
looked for Zodiacal light in the plane of the ecliptic. It also was seek- 
ing clarification on the spectral composition of the Milky Way. This 


instrument previously had been tested on Kosmos 51 and Kosmos 213 
in Earth orbit. 

The laser reflector work went even better with this flight, being used 
successfully both from the Crimea and the French Pic du Midi Ob- 
servatory. It proved possible to gauge distances from Earth to Moon 
with an accuracy of 20 to 30 centimeters, and to measure shifts of the 
Earth's pole of as little as 10 centimeters. 

The Lunokhod 2 "9th wheel'' soil tester was a conical punch with 
cruciform blades. As it turned, sinking its blades in the soil, the resist- 
ance to displacement and compression could be measured. 

Another new device was a magnetometer mounted on a pole pro- 
jected ahead of the vehicle 2.5 meters. It was applied typically in one 
crater study in which it moved away from the crater four times at 90 
degree angles to measure any associated magnetism. 

In a number of tests, the vehicle was repositioned to correct for any 
solar influences in the soil measurements. In mid-February one day, as 
it moved, it crossed a one meter long plate with a surface so smooth 
that no tracks were left — highly unusual in the experience of these 

Sky glow tests after sunset showed from 10 to 15 times Earth level 
suggesting a dust atmosphere. 

When Lunokhod 2 went up 25 degree slopes, there was 80 percent 
slippage in the wheels. On another occasion, the vehicle traveled 800 
meters in a single hour. After climbing an 18 degree slope to the rim 
of a crater, it went down to a depth of 100 meters in the crater to study 
it ; then half way out, the wheels sank to a depth of their hubs, and it 
had to back off, and find another way out. 

In March, the Russians revealed the radioactive heat source used to 
keep Lunokhod alive during the lunar night. It was Polonium 210, 
converted from Bismuth, with a half life of 20 weeks. This isotope has 
a low neutron and gamma ray output and mostly emits alpha particles, 
minimizing shielding problems. 

As the Lunokhod 2 left the seabed and climbed into continental 
areas, it was at an elevation about 400 meters higher than the Luna 
21 lander. A clue to the level of activity was provided by the record of 
the second lunar day. There had been 6,490 radio commands, 65 hours 
of communication, including one that lasted 12 hours, with more than 
120 turns. The average session had been about 6 hours. For each 10 
kilometers traveled, there were over 200 mechanical tests with the 
rotating penetrometer, as well as continuing magnetic surveys with 
corrections for solar wind effects. The daytime lunar sky was found 
to exceed Earth sky luminosity by 13 to 15 fold, giving a poor prog- 
nosis for lunar observatories in the future, if the finding was confirmed. 

A tectonic fracture 300 meters wide and 16 kilometers long was 

An explanation of Soviet picture taking systems was supplied in 
connection with Lunokhod 2 which helped to' explain the not always 
clear descriptions given in connection with Soviet space flights. There 
are three kinds. (1) An optical mechanical system for direct images, 
as used on Luna 9 and later missions for preparing panoramas. They 
make possible high resolution pictures at low power levels using simple 
antennas, by scanning only one line at time from a stationary position. 
(2) Photo television, as used for Luna 3, Zond 3, Luna 12,' and Mars 


2 and 3. These record pictures on film, which is developed on 
board and later scanned for facsimile transmission to Earth. (3) Elec- 
tronic for slow frame television and photo television. While not as 
fast as television on Earth because of technical complications, it served 
the purposes of steering Lunokhod 1 and 2 and for making other 

In genera^, the Russians praised their design approach as preferred 
for some years over the more hasty work that astronauts must perform. 
They saw coming not only use of roving automated vehicles on Mars 
or Venus, but also coupling a rover with a sample gatherer to load an 
Earth return rocket. 

On the fourth day, Lunokhod 2 made further studies of the rille it 
had discovered, with stereo pictures of its walls, physical and chemical 
studies of the soil and by making a .."i kilometer perpendicular excur- 
sion from the rim, and back by the same route to make more precise 
magnetic measurements. It found one to two-meter sized rocks near 
the edge of the rille, making this difficult to approach. It did find that 
magnetism changed significantly in approaching the rille. The con- 
clusion of magnetic studies was that the Moor, has a weak global field, 
which is stronger locally, and that meteorites tend to demagnetize areas 
they strike. It discovered there was a definite magnetic anomaly asso- 
ciated with the rille up to 150 to 200 meters from it. 

While it was announced as resuming travel on May 9, as it left its 
long study of the rille to move toward the Taurus Mountains, there 
were no more daily accounts of activity and by subtraction from the 
total travel the known travel on previous days, it looks as if it moved 
possibly 800 meters on the ninth, and then traveled no more. The 
announcement that its mission was complete came on June 3 which 
should have been some time in the lunar night. Without any progress 
reports during the intervening 25 days, one suspects the mission ter- 
minated without immediate announcement, and the next several weeks 
of diagnostic work and improvisation failed to revive the vehicle. 
Even so. it exceeded its designed life of three lunar days and was a 
more comprehensive mobile laboratory than its predecessor. Ap- 
parently, premature failure prevented parkin? the vehicle to permit 
continuing use of the French-supplied reflectors for laser experiments. 

A more complete review of its equipment and operations did not 
come until November 1973. The landing site was finally pinpointed 
at 30° 27' E. and 25° 51' N. The principal equipment listed included 
its magnetometer, Eifma-M X-ray spectral analvzer. its phvsical- 
mechanical impact wheel, a special reference plate with 39 shades for 
c< )ihparison by the television cameras, and the Rubin 1 radiometer, an 
astrophotometer, and the French laser corner reflector. Those devices 
which were new or additional compared with Lunokhod 1 were the 
magnetometer, astrophotometer. the Rubin 1. and the improved Eifma. 
The television equipment was enhanced in capacity and helped by 
having the cameras placed higher on the vehicle. 

The same article reviewed the topography, craters, and rille which 
were explored and mapped. At the landing site, the soil was found to 
be 24dr4 percent silicon, 8±1 percent calcium, 6dz.6 percent iron, and 
9±1 percent aluminum. This contrasts with the 10-12 percent iron 
found by Eunokhqd 1. As Lunokhod moved up into the hills, it found 
that i~on dropped to A ~±A ^o.roent and aluminum rose to 11.5dtl per- 


cent. Laser ranging proved accurate to 40 centimeters. The Rubin 1 
laser emission photodetector returned a radio signal to Earth when- 
ever a beam from Earth hit it. There were more than 4,000 hits, and 
there were 1,500 photos of the Moon to show the vehicle's location. 
Sky brightness was measured 14 times. 30 

The Rifma-M fluorescent spectrometer used on Lunokhod 2 was 
described in greater detail together with its findings on chemical 
composition of the Moon in 19T4. 31 

I. LUNA 2 2 

Luna 22 was launched on May 29. 1974 at 1157 Moscow time using 
the D-l-e class of vehicle and making use of the standard Earth 
orbital launch platform technique. It was described as designed to 
study the Moon and space near the Moon. The Georgia Astrophysical 
Observatory was able to observe the payioad at a distance of 250.000 
kilometers from Earth. A path correction was made on May 20. After 
23 radio sessions, it was braked into lunar orbit on June 2. The orbit 
was 220 kilometers circular at an inclination of 19° 35' to the equator 
of the Moon, and a period of 2 hours 10 minutes. 

The mission was described a few days later as that of continuing 
the work done by Luna 19, the big orbiter which had preceded it. 
Its geophysical studies were to include taking pictures of large areas, 
studying magnetic fields, cosmic radiation, and gravitational data. It 
was known it would speed up slightly and dip over lunar seas. It was 
also believed the far side would show a distention of 2 to 4 kilometers. 

On June 9. the orbit was modified to 244 by 25 kilometers to permit 
the taking of high resolution pictures at perilune. and to couple these 
with altimeter readings and gamma ray analysis of lunar rock 

Other orbital activities included measuring meteoritic density and 
the spectrum of solar cosmic rays and concentration of circumlunar 
plasma and magnetic fields. 

After the picture taking was over, on June 13. the orbit was raised 
to 299 by 181 kilometers to continue gravitational studies. 

The next major announcement came on Xovcmber 11. 1974 indicat- 
ing that by 1800 Moscow time on November 11. Luna 22 had com- 
pleted 1.788 orbits of the Moon and now the orbit had been adjusted to 
1.437 by 171 kilometers, at an inclination of 19° 33', and with an 
orbital period of 3 hours 12 minutes. 

By 1100 Moscow time on April 2, 1975. Luna 22 had completed 
2.824 orbits of the Moozi. and its orbit was 1,409 by 200 kilometers at a 
21° inclination, and still a period of 3 hours 12 minutes. It continued 
to supply data related to lunar gravity, magnetic fields, and surface 

By 1200 Moscow time. June 2, it had completed 3.296 orbits and the 
"Deep Space Communications Center had held 2.175 radio sessions with 
Luna. 22. The full one-year program was completed, but it still 

There was a surprise announcement on September 3. 1975. On Au- 
gust 24. the orbit of Luna 22 had been adjusted to lower the perilune 

M Prflrtffl. Moscow. X^vpnbpr "?n. 1973. r.. 3. Interview with Vinopr.idov. 
« Doklady Akademli Nauk SSSR. Vol. 214. No. 1, pp. 71-74. 


to 30 kilometers. Here, the camera system was activated to take another 
photograph for development on board and facsimile transmission to 
Earth. A good quality image was obtained. Afterwards, the orbit was 
c hanged to 1,28b' by 100 kilometers, at 21 degrees inclination, and a 
period of 3 hours. It was unusual in Soviet practice to be able to ac- 
tivate a camera system after a one -year lapse and to carry out all the 
steps to return a picture to Earth. Ivegular operations were reported 
us continuing. 

In mid-October, the Luna 22 flight was reviewed, to cover its 15 
months of operation. It had observed several hundreds of thousands of 
square kilometers. Because of the lack of atmosphere, it was able to 
iiy much closer to the surface of the Moon than Earth satellites can ap- 
proach Earth, hence taking high resolution pictures. These low orbits 
it intermixed with high orbits for picture taking over larger regions. 
The satellite studied the composition of lunar rocks based on their 
gamma radiation, circumlunar plasmas, and solar cosmic rays. It also 
studied meteoritic density, solar long wave emissions, and Jupiter 
emissions. It studied mascons. There w r ere 1,500 trajectory measure- 
ments made during 2,400 radio sessions with Earth. The controllers 
sent 30,000 radio commands to Luna 22. It was able to measure meteor- 
itic material down to one one-hundred-trillionth of a gram. Its maneu- 
vering fuel was exhausted on September 2. 32 

The Western press reported mission completion in earty November 
1075. 33 One radio broadcast from Moscow apparently included a 
statement to the effect that the mission would prove of great help to 
future manned flights to the Moon, but it has not been possible to pin- 
point the time this statement was made. 3 * 

J. LUNA 2 3 

Luna 23 was launched on October 28, 1974 at 1730 Moscow time 
using the D-l-e launch vehicle and the orbital launch platform tech- 
nique. It was described as intended to do further re.-earch into the 
Moon and of space around the Moon. A telescope equipped with tele- 
vision enhancement at the Zayliskiy Alatav Mountains was able to 
i rack the flight. Alma At a Observatory was able to track it two nights, 
at ' .000 kilometers and at 200,000 kilometers. 

An orbit correction was made on October 31. Then on November 2, 
the braking rocket was fired to put it into a lunar orbit of 104 by 94 
kilometers, at an inclination of 138° to the lunar equator (retrograde ) . 
The orbital period was 1 hour 57 minutes. 

November 4 and 5 the orbit was adjusted to 105 by 17 kilometers. 
On November 6, it was further braked to land at 0837 Moscow time 
in the south part of the Mare Crisium. The landing was achieved and 
signals returned, but the terrain was unfavorable. The attached drill 
on the platform was damaged and not able to function. It had been in- 
tended to drill a sample to a depth of 2.5 meters, and to test other 
equipment. As a consequence, communications with Luna 23 were ter- 
minated on November 9, after operation of a reduced research 

m Sot?ialisticheskaya Inchistriya. Moscow. October 15. 1975, p. 3. 
88 Flisrht International. London. November 6, 1975, p. 705. 
i* Perry, G. E., private communication. 


VI. Statistical Tables on Deep Space Missions 

The tables which follow are intended to supply a quick reference 
check on the flights of all nations intended to go to lunar distance or 
beyond. Table 2-10 summarizes flights which went to lunar distance, 
or were intended to go there and failed their purpose, to the extent 
known. Table 2-11 does the same for interplanetary- flights. The chron- 
ological nature of the tables permits the addition of cumulative na- 
tional weight totals to the extent known to permit one kind of com- 
parison of relative effort. 


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By Marcia S. Smith* 
I. Early Years 

Although principal attention in this report will be given to man-re- 
lated flights occurring between 1971 and 1975, it is useful to under- 
standing the program in its entirety to review accomplishments prior 
to 1971. Thus a summary of the earlier period is included in this 


Through the 1950's, the Soviet Union fired an increasingly ambitious 
series of vertical probe rockets from the Kapustin Yar launch site with 
adapted military rockets, apparently ranging from modified versions 
of the German V-2 on up through the medium range surface-to-sur- 
face missile which the Western powers call the SS-3 or Shyster. Shy- 
ster was the immediate forerunner of the SS-4 or Sandal, famous for 
its involvement in the Cuban missile crisis and for launching the 
small Kosmos payloads from Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk. 

While the United States was making tests with monkeys and apes, 
the Russians concentrated on dogs, and occasionally sent smaller ani- 
mals. By 1952, the Soviet Union claimed to have sent 12 animals up 
in 18 flights to altitudes of 96 km. The effort had improved to the 
point that in the spring of 1957, a single rocket with a payload of 2,195 
kg had carried five dogs. That June the Russians announced that dogs 
would participate in the Soviet part of the IGY program. On Au- 
gust 27, 1958, the dogs Belyanka and Pestraya were flown to 452 km 
in a payload of 1,690 kg. On July 2, 1959, in a payload of 2,000 kg, 
Otvazhnaya and another dog were flown to 241 km. On Jury 10, 1050. 
Otvazhnaya and several other dogs were flown to 211 km in a payload 
of 2,200 kg. Otvazhnaya made yet another flight on June 15, I960, this 
time accompanied by another dog and a rabbit. This rocket had a pay- 
load of 2,100 kg and was flown to 221 km. These and other repetitive 
flights gave opportunities for testing a variety of life support compo- 
nent systems and for linking the behavior of animals, even if briefly, 
to the hazards of rocket acceleration, radiation, micrometeorites, 
weightlessness and recovery. 

1. Sputnik % 

The first flight to carrv an animal to orbit was described in Chapter 
Two (page 83). The cabin carrying Layka was cylindrical in shape, 
hermetically sealed with a regenerating system for the air, a thermal 

•Ms. Smith Is an analyst in science and technology. Science Policy Research Division, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 


67-371—76 13 


regulation system, and was supplied with food. The dog was wired so 
as to radio back to Earth its pulse, respiration, blood pressure, and 
electrocardiograms. The cabin environmental parameters were also 
telemetered back to Earth. Automatic devices controlled the quality, 
component gases, temperature, and circulation of the air supply. The 
dog was trained over a period of time in preparation for the flight] 
including exposure to vibration, and periods up to weeks in a sealed 
cabin of small dimensions. 

Layka withstood the launch and flight environment successfully, 
returning considerable useful data. However, because the ship was only 
powered by chemical batteries and was not designed for recovery, after 
one week, a prearranged system killed the dog and terminated that 
part of the experiment. 


K or ubl Sputnik 1 

By adapting the A-l vehicle, earlier used for direct ascent flights 
to the Moon, the Soviet Union was able to create an Earth orbital sys- 
tem which could carry at least 4,700 kg to low orbit. This found its first 
successful use on May 15, 1960 with the launch of Korabl Sputnik 1. 
It was described as weighing 4,540 kg consisting of 1.477 kg of instru- 
ments and equipment and a self-sustaining biological cabin of 2.500 kg. 
In the cabin was the dummy of a man with characteristics of body con- 
struction and function like a man. designed to check on the operation 
of the life support system and stresses of flight. The ship radioed 
both extensive telemetry and also prerecorded voice communications. 
The Kussians some years later told how they wanted to avoid Western 
claims that they had flown a man on this mission and lost him, so 
rather than taping a pilot's voice sending typical flight data, they in- 
stalled the tape of a Russian choral group singing. 

After four days of flight, the reentry cabin was separated from its 
service module and retrorockets were fired. Unfortunately, the atti- 
tude was incorrect, for the cabin moved to a higher orbit, and it was 
five years before it finally decayed from orbit. 

Korabl Sputnik 2 

This launch came on August 19, 1960 and carried the dogs Strelkaj 
and Belka. This time the period of flight was reduced to one day to 
minimize the risks of equipment malfunction, and recovery was suc- 
cessfully accomplished, for the first time in history, with the two dogs 
becoming national heroes and put on display, obviously healthy 
despite their experience. 

3. Korabl Sputnik 3 

Apparently this launch of December 1, 1960 was a repeat of the 
previous flight except that the perigee was lowered to assure auto- 
matic decay within the reserve capacity of the life support system. 
After one day, retrofire was ordered, but the angle may have been 
too steep, for the cabin was burned beyond successful recovery. The 
dogs Pchelka and Mushka became the first important casualties of 
orbital flight. 

Jf. Korabl Sputnik If 

Launched on March 9, 1961, this flight carried both a dummy cosmo- 
naut and the dog Chernushka. Successful recovery was made after 
a single orbit. 

5. Kordbl Sputnik 5 

On March 25, 1961 the fifth in this series of flights was launched, 
again carrying a dummy and a dog, Zvezdochka. As with Korabl Sput- 
nik 4, recovery was made after one orbit. 

This brought the Russians to the point where they had a large 
backlog of short vertical probe biological flights, with synoptic geo- 
physical data, the Sputnik 2 data from a week of flight carrying a dog, 
and five actual manned-precursor flights, three of which were re- 
covered, including four of the six dogs used. Not only was a ship in 
excess of 4,500 kg fairly commodious, but it provided a fair amount of 
redundancy. The dogs not only provided telemetered data and usually 
were available for post-flight tests, but all the Korabl Sputniks had 
provided live television coverage from orbit, permitting further exam- 
ination of their state during flight. Rumors were strong that maimed 
flights were about to begin. 


1. Vostoh 1 

On April 12, 1961, Major Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin became the 
first man to orbit Earth. His ship, Vostok 1 (code named Kedr) made 
a single orbit from Tyuratam and was recovered in Kazakhstan. The 
electrifying news produced the same kind of shock waves in the world 
as Sputnik 1 had, despite the advance notice which should have been 
gleaned from the Korabl flights. 

Vostok 1 was launched by an A-l rocket, and the spacecraft consisted 
of a near-spherical cabin covered with ablative material, with three 
small portholes for vision, and external radio antennas. The capsule 
contained a life support system, radios, instrumentation, and an 
ejection seat both for escape on the launch pad and as a part of the 
optional recovery system. The manned cabin was attached to a service 
module resembling two truncated cones base to base, with a ring of 
gas pressure bottles on the upper cone close to the cabin. This module 
carried a considerable weight of chemical batteries, orientation rockets 
and the main retro system, plus added support equipment for the 
total system. 

On launch, all five engines of the booster rocket fired, and then the 
four outer sets of tankage and engines fell away, leaving the central 
sustainer engine still burning. This stage also was abandoned suborbit- 
ally, and the upper lunar stage then fired to place itself and the 
payload in orbit. After burnout, this stage was separated from the 
payload, and continued in its own orbit a derelict, to decay after a 
few days. 

The payload was allowed to tumble slowly to even out heat loads, 
but could be stabilized on command for observation of the Earth, sig- 
nal transmission, and most importantly for correct retrofire on re- 
entry. As on the precursor flights, television was transmitted from the 


2. Vostok 2 

Major German Titov became the second man to reach orbit on 
August 6, 1961, remaining up for a day to complete 17 orbits. In most 
respects the flight was like that of Vostok 1. There is some inconsist- 
ency in Soviet accounts with regard to the final phase of recovery in 
the Vostok program. The implication, although contradicted by other 
reports, is that Gragarin rode in his ship all the way to the surface of 
the Earth. But is seems clear that from Titov on through the rest of 
the Vostok program as 7,000 meters the cosmonaut fired open the hatch 
and then the ejection seat to come down separately from the main 
cabin. The cabin, after being slowed by air pressure and protected by 
ablative material, apparently still struck ground hard enough that even 
the cosmonaut in a contoured couch would not enjoy the landing. Like 
tho dogs which preceded them, most of the cosmonauts were fired out 
free from the main ship on their seat, which was mounted on rails 
pointed toward an escape hatch. After coming well clear, the cosmo- 
naut would then free himself from his seat and come down on a 
personal parachute. 

3. Vostok 3 

Major Andriyan Nikolavev was launched on August 11, 1962 into 
a flight which lasted four days. It can be noted that a flight of similar 
duration had already been made by a Kosmos military observation 
satellite using essentially the same hardware but without a life support 
system; and Korabl Sputnik 1 with the complete Vostok equipment 
had flown for four days when retrofire occurred. All the Vostoks flew 
in orbits which would experience natural decay in less than ten days. 
From the outset every flight carried life support of air, water, food, 
and electricity to last for ten days, even though no flight lasted that 

4- Vostok 4 

Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Popovich was launched August 12, just 
a day after Vostok 3, into a close co-orbit so that the two ships ap- 
proached within 6.5 km of each other in clear visible range. This was 
impressive both in terms of the ground support at the launch site in 
readying the facilities for so quick a turnaround (unless two pads were 
used), and also for the accuracy in timing the launch and controlling 
the flight parameters to guide the second ship to the same location as 
the first. This group flight was heralded as a portent of future 

5. Vostok 5 

On June 14, 1963, Lieutenant Valeriy Bykovskiy was launched into 
orbit for five days of flight, matching the time of a predecessor Kos- 
mos military observation satellite. This set a Soviet manned duration 
record of 119 hours, 6 minutes — not exceeded until Soyuz 9. 

6. Vostok 6 

It is possible that this launch was a day late, because it went up on 
June 16, 1963, and on an orbit which would not permit a sustained 
rendezvous with Vostok 5. The orbit did, however, permit a brief pass 
at a distance of only 5 km. The pilot was Valentina Tereshkova, the 
only woman to fly in space to date, and she remained in orbit for three 


days. In contrast to the other cosmonauts who were experienced mili- 
tary test pilots, Ms. Tereshkova had worked in a textile factory, took 
up sports parachuting, and then was trained for her flight. Although 
she did not have the background of experience common to her Russian 
and American counterparts, she gained more orbital experience in time 
than all the flights in the U.S. Mercury program combined. Her flight 
emphasized that the Vostok system was designed to maximize use of 
automatic devices, with manual override to be used only in emergencies 
or experimentally. This feature prevailed through later Soviet pro- 
grams as well, as all systems have been tested through complete mis- 
sions unmanned first. It also strengthens the supposition that the 
transition from Vostok flights to Kosmos military photographic 
recoverable flights made a minimum of redesign necessary. Measure- 
ments on the Kosmos flights by Alan Pilkington, formerly of the 
Scarborough Planetarium, in England have revealed they are of the 
same dimensions and brightness as the Vostok payloads. 


On October 6, 1964, Kosmos 47 was put into an orbit 177 x 413 km 
and after just one day was retrofired to come back to Earth while its 
carrier rocket flew for eight days. Just six days later a manned flight 
(Voskhod 1) came with elements of 178 x 409 km and also stayed 
up one day. 

On February 22, 1965, Kosmos 57 was put into an orbit 175 x 512 km. 
This time something went wrong, for the payload was exploded in 
orbit. Voskhod 2 did not follow as closely after this precursor as had 
happened the previous fall. One can surmise that it required a little 
time to determine that whatever went wrong with Kosmos 57 would 
be unlikely to occur in the manned flight to follow. Hence the follow- 
up flight was delayed 24 days and then entered a 173 x 495 km orbit. 


1. Voskhod 1 

Voskhod 1 was launched on October 12, 1964, and based upon infor- 
mation released after the fact, we can determine that it was put up 
by an A-2 launch vehicle, which permitted increasing the payload 
weight from the 4,700 kg range to 5,320 kg. The payload itself has 
been shown only while covered with its launch shroud, but this was 
so similar to that of the Vostok series that Voskhod seems to be only 
a modified Vostok. 

The principal modification of this first flight was removal of the 
heavy ejection seat on its rails. Then within the approximately 2.5 
meter sphere of the cabin, it was possible to place three seats side-by- 
side, but with the center seat raised. By this time such confidence had 
been gained in the reliability of the basic system, that the cosmonauts 
did not wear cumbersome protective space suits and helmets, but com- 
fortable coveralls. This practice was followed until the Soyuz 11 
tragedy, when the three-man crew died due to a pressure leak in their 
cabin. Without ejection seats, the landing of the ship with crew on 
board was eased by use of a final braking rocket. 

Voskhod 1 was the first multi-manned flight. The crew was led by 
Colonel Vladimir Komarov, accompanied by a military physiologist, 


Lieutenant Boris Yegorov, and a civilian technical scientist, Konstan- 
tin Feoktistov. Although the fliglit lasted only one day, the special 
crew made it possible to obtain much more comprehensive medical 
data as well as operate more complex checks on the payload systems 
and external experiments. The flight also returned live television pic- 
tures from orbit. 

There is an interesting political sidelight to this mission, for while 
in orbit Premier Khrushchev sent congratulations to the crew and 
promised to see them on the reviewing stands in Moscow on their 
return. They landed less than 24 hours later, but when they reached 
Moscow, Mr. Khrushchev had been replaced by Party Secretary 
Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin. 

2. Voskhod 2 

Still another variant of the original Yost ok hardware was provided 
by this flight which was launched on March 18, 1965. Again the A-2 
vehicle was used, and the payload weight was raised to 5,682 kilograms. 
Although no pictures of the actual payload have been released, the 
shroud view in the assembly building showed a large bulge well for- 
ward. This flight carried only two seats, and added instead an extend- 
able air lock to permit egress into space without evacuating the main 
cabin of air. An obscure Soviet photograph recently became available 
showing a Yoskhod training exercise using a Yostok-shaped cabin. 

The ship was commanded by Colonel Pavel Belyayev, the first cos- 
monaut with a naval air force background, accompanied by Lieutenant 
Colonel Aleksey Leonov. Leonov won a place in history by becoming 
the first man to perform extra-vehicular activity (EYA). During 
flight he donned a completely self-contained life support system back 
pack. Having switched to a supply of air enriched with oxygen in 
order to purge much of the nitrogen from his blood, he then entered 
the extendable air lock, sealing the hatch behind him, and then after 
depressurization opened the second hatch to look out into space. 
Finally he pushed free to float at the end of a tether line in the weight- 
less, airless medium of space, with his eyes shielded from the Sun by a 
special visor. Beneath him in a few minutes passed a good part of the 
Soviet Union. 

The event was recorded by a preplaced external television camera, 
and he also took along a hand-held motion picture camera. As might 
be expected, his physiological indicators showed he was under consid- 
erable stress. In general, his suit was so cumbersome that he could do 
little more than float awkwardly at the end of his tether and wave for 
the cameras. The whole event amounted to about 20 minutes exposure 
to the vacuum conditions, of which about 10 were outside the ship on 
the tether. Leonov explained later that he had some difficulties in his 
big suit getting back in without losing his camera, and Colonel Bel- 
yayev had to repeat the orders to get him to come in, as he not only 
experienced the tension of being the first to go out, but the same eu- 
phoria several American EYA astronauts displayed. 

As had happened after previous Soviet flights, the claims of 
Leonov's EYA came under some dispute in the West. Complaints cen- 
tered around analyses of the Soviet-released pictures which included 
not only blurred views, and the better motion pictures, but a number 
of sequences to fill in with simulation what would have been harder to 

provide during the real event. This explains the question "Who was 
holding the camera for the clear shots of his emergence from the air 
lock?" and also some process shots taken either in a water tank or 
with guide wires in another view. One can dispute particular pictures, 
but the total evidence that EVA occurred is reasonably compelling. 

While preparing for reentry after 16 orbits, the crew discovered that 
the automatic orientation devices necessary for retrofire were malfunc- 
tioning, so they were authorized to orbit one more time and then make a 
manually controlled reentry. This moved the landing site into Euro- 
pean Russia instead of Kazakhstan, and for some reason reentry was 
delayed long enough to carry the ship hundreds of kilometers north 
into Taiga where they landed amidst pine forest. It took several hours 
for the recovery team to locate the ship, and about a day for ground 
parties to cut through the forest to reach the cosmonauts and bring 
them home. As wolves howled nearby, the crew kept close to their cap- 
sule for protection. 

II. The Sotuz Program 


When expectations of continuance of the Voskhod program were not 
fulfilled, Western observers debated whether the Soviet Union had 
abandoned manned flight or whether they had paused in order to make 
much more fundamental changes in their systems. The pause was 
fairly long, almost 22 months, but at last on November 28, 1966 came 
a routinely announced Kosmos flight, 133, which had the telltale signs 
of low perigee, fairly circular orbit, a radio beacon frequency usually 
reserved for manned flights, and recovery after only two days of flight 
instead of the eight typical of military recoverables. 

Kosmos 140 was put into a similar orbit on February 7, 1967, and 
again stayed up only two days. Then rumors began to build that a 
manned flight was coming. 


1. Soyuz 1 

In April 1967, after a period of two years in which the Russians 
did not fly any manned missions and the i^mericans were establishing 
one record after another in their Gemini program, rumors of the most 
ambitious and spectacular manned flight operation became very strong 
in Moscow. Thus on April 23, 1967, Col. "Vladimir Komarov/the first 
Russian to make a second trip into orbit, was launched into space by 
an A-2 vehicle in a pay load which probably weighed about 6,570 

Soviet reports indicated that all was going according to plan, their 
standard description, but one could infer the opposite when his ship 
was ordered to land after only one day in orbit with nothing spectacu- 
lar to show for the flight. It is possible that another craft was sup- 
posed to be launched and a link-up obtained, although the precursor 
flights, Kosmos 133 and 140, were only two day flights and a longer 
flight would probably have been in order if docking was the goal. The 
rumors of a spectacular flight could have alluded to the entire Soyuz 
program, not this particular mission. 

Komarov accomplished retrofire on his 18th orbit, an unusual step 
since when recovery is planned after one day it normally occurs after 


16 or 17 orbits in order to bring the ship down in the prime recovery 
area in Kazakhstan. However, the 51.8° inclination of the flight also 
brought the 18th orbit to the regular recovery area. One gathers that 
to this point the pilot was in no immediate danger, since Soviet space- 
craft are equipped with backup safety features. (Data made available 
during ASTP raises some safety questions.) Retrofire and passage 
through the upper atmosphere where radio blackout occurs is said to 
have passed routinely. But what happened after that is still unclear, 
for in the last few kilometers of descent, the parachute system which 
should have given Komarov a steady ride down to the surface for a 
final rocket soft landing failed, remaining furled and twisted with its 
lines so that the ship, and pilot, were destroyed in the hard impact. 

Speculation as to what happened has included whether the aero- 
dynamics of the flight had not been tested enough, since Soyuz was 
a different shape from its predecessors, to the rumor that while the 
ship was on the pad water seeped into the parachute compartment, in- 
terfering with the system's effectiveness. This seems unlikely, since all 
manned payloads have a shroud until they are outside most of the 
atmosphere, a protective environmental blanket while on the pad, and 
a large escape rocket assembly on top of the Soyuz class ships which 
should cover the parachute compartment. 

Komarov's death was, of course, a great shock to the Russians, 
especially since only three months earlier the United States had lost 
the crew of Apollo 1 in a pad fire as they were running tests a few 
days prior to launch. Although the Soviet Union sent a message of 
sympathy, it was coupled with claims that the U.S. accident was a 
direct outgrowth of a reckless race to be first on the Moon and the 
greed of U.S. private enterprise willing to cut corners in safety and 
quality, even for manned flights. The statements implied that such 
considerations were nonexistent in the Soviet Union. 

Although the f raility of human planning was revealed in the Apollo 
fire, which only in retrospect became so clearly deficient in design, the 
Soyuz 1 accident showed that accidents are not tied to economic or 
political systems, but to design, quality control, and sometimes simply 
lack of knowledge or human error. 

Just as the American manned space effort was delayed for almost 
two years for investigations into the Apollo fire, the Eussian manned 
program waited for 18 months before seeing another launch. 

2. Kosmos 186 arid 188 

Just in time to highlight the 50th anniversary of the Soviet State in 
early November 1967, the Soviet Union conducted a double space oper- 
ation with unmanned Soyuz prototypes. On October 27, 1967 Kosmos 
186 was put into a low circular orbit for a period of four days. While 
Kosmos 186 waited in orbit, Kosmos 188 was launched on October 30 
for a three-day flight. This was a direct ascent, first orbit rendezvous 
launch, which brought it within about 24 km of Kosmos 186. At this 
point the ships were programmed to conduct a completely automatic 
close rendezvous and docking on the side of the world away from 
Soviet territory, later passing over the U.S.S.H. in docked configura- 

When the seeking devices on both ships found each other, they were 
oriented into a head-on position and Kosmos 186 became the active 


vessel, moving in until its docking probe was inserted into the recepta- 
cle of the other ship. Further automatic devices then completed a tight 
lock and made electrical connections so the two ships could operate as 
a single unit. They remained docked for 3.5 hours and after 2.5 orbits 
accomplished an equally automatic undocking over Soviet territory 
and resumed separate flights. A day later Kosmos 186 made a soft 
landing in the usual recovery zone and two days after that Kosmos 188 
was recovered in a similar fashion. 

This succesful operation showed that modifications had been made 
in Soyuz and drawings were finally released to the public showing the 
approximate appearance of the two ships as they approached each 
other. (One must say approximately because it later developed that 
some essential elements of the design had been airbrushed out, and it 
was many months before the actual shapes became apparent.) The first 
drawings showed a cigar-shaped craft with docking collar and probe 
or receptable at the forward end, and, a propulsion unit at the other. 
Special acquisition and distance-measuring radars extended out from 
the ships on hinged lattice-structure arms. Most distinctive were the 
solar panels which unfold after orbit is attained and look like rectan- 
gular gull wings. The Russians developed these as a source of elec- 
tricity as opposed to the American fuel cells. 

m Kosmos 212 and 213 

On April 14 and 15, 1968, Kosmos 212 and 213 respectively were 
placed in a low circular orbit, each remaining for five days. Prior to 
the second launch, Kosmos 212 made slight orbital corrections which 
brought it very nearly over the launch site to simplify rendezvous. 
At the time the carrier rocket was separated from the Kosmos 213 
payload, the controllers on Earth had accomplished a first orbit, direct 
ascent rendezvous which brought Kosmos 213 to within 5 km of Kos- 
mos 212, and the velocity difference was only about 108 km per hour. 
After mutual radar search and lock-on, Kosmos 212 became the active 
partner and completed the exercise. Main propulsion which could be 
turned on and off was used for most of the closing, but when the ships 
were within a few hundred meters of each other, low thrust propulsion 
was employed, and the difference in their relative speed was between 
0.5 and 1 km per hour. This time, by Soviet claim, docking was con- 
ducted over the Soviet Union (this is hard to reconcile with other 
Soviet data), but the follow-up rigid mechanical lock and the inter- 
linking of electrical connections occurred some minutes later over the 
Pacific Ocean, 47 minutes after launch. On the next pass over the 
Soviet Union external television cameras on the ships showed how they 

The ships remained linked together for 3 hours 50 minutes, and then 
undocked on radio command over Soviet territory. Each ship then 
made further maneuvers repeatedly to continue group flight, but at 
a distance sufficient to avoid mutual interference. 

4. Kosmos 238 

On August 28, 1968, still another flight was made which had the 
orbital path and radio frequency characteristics of a manned precur- 
sor. It was never commented on by the Russians after the initial launch 
announcement under the Kosmos cover name, but after four days in 
orbit it was called down. Apparently it represented a final check of 
on-board systems as a step in man-rating. 


5. Soyuz 2 

Soyuz 2 was launched without any immediate announcement on 
October 25, 1968 and was placed in the typical low parking orbit of 
the other Kosmos precursor flights. It remained in orbit for three day$ 
and was the target for the manned flight which followed. Despite its 
unmanned status, the mission was given a Soyuz name instead of the 
Kosmos designation for unknown reasons. 

6. Soyuz 3 

On October 26, 1968, 18 months after the ill-fated flight of Komarov, 
the Soviet Union launched Soyuz 3 carrying Colonel Georgiy Bere- 
govoy. After achieving a co-orbit with Soyuz 2, the ship made an 
automatic approach to within 200 meters. After that, the pilot took 
over manual controls and made repeated approaches toward Soyuz 2, 
coming very close and reducing the differences in velocity to less than 
one kilometer per hour. For some unknown reason he was unable 1 to 
accomplish actual docking although this was clearly his objective. 1 
Television coverage of these operations was provided by external 

More details about the ship itself emerged, revealing that there were 
two passenger compartments, a fact less clear from earlier drawings] 
Beregovoy slept in a separate work compartment, while piloting was 
done in the command module, which was also the recoverable part 
of the ship. The total volume of the two compartments, which were 
connected, by an air lock, was about 9 cubic meters. The ship had a 
30-day stay time capability and some versions could fly up to 1,300 km 
above the Earth. The descent portion had special aerodynamic quali- 
ties which permitted precise landings at pre-selected points, and the 
lift cut the G-load to between 3 and 4 G's compared with 8 to 10 G's 
for a ballistic reentry, although the latter could still be used in an 
emergency to save time. 

Retronre was provided from a 400-kilogram-thrust liquid rocket 
engine with a completely duplicate engine in reserve. If both failed, 
normally the residual fuel of the orientation steering rockets would be 
sufficient to return a ship from orbit. On reentering, a drogue para- 
chute was deployed at 9 km, followed by the opening of the main 
parachute, with a second parachute in reserve. Just before final touch- 
down, at a height of about one meter, a gunpowder rocket was fired 
as a final brake to soften landing. 

During his four day flight, Beregovoy monitored the flight systems, 
gathered geophysical data, and took pictures of the Earth's surface 
for resource studies. Except for the strong implication (although 
explicitly denied) that docking was intended and failed, the flight 
was a good proving effort for the Soyuz hardware. At a much later 
date, a specific weight of 6,575 kg was filed for the ship. 

7. Soyuz h and 5 

Soyuz 4 was launched on January 14, 1969, a novel launch time for 
the Russians since until now they had avoided the winter season when 
either an aborted launch or off -course landing might mean a delay in 
crew rescue under severe weather conditions. However, not only did 
the ship have an enhanced water-landing capability so a sea landing in 

1 Moscow Radio October 2S, 1968, 0200 GMT. 


the tropics could occur if necessary, but the Russians were by now fully 
confident of their systems. Put into the typical low Soyuz orbit, the 
ship was piloted by Col. Vladimir Shatalov. The next day Soyuz 5 
was launched with a three man crew: Lt. Col. Boris Volynov, com- 
mander; Master of Technical Sciences Aleksey Yeliseyev, flight 
engineer ; and Lt. Col. Yevgeniy Khrunov, research engineer. 

After a number of orbital corrections by both ships, the docking 
exercise began on Soyuz 5's 18th orbit, and Soyuz 4's 34th. The auto- 
matic system brought the ships to within 100 meters of each other 
whereupon Shatalov completed a manual approach. On the 35th orbit 
of Soyuz 5, Khrunov and Yeliseyev donned pressure suits and self- 
contained life support systems, entered the orbital work compartment, 
sealed, the inner hatch, then opened their outer hatch, and transferred 
to Soyuz 4, floating and using handrails on the outside of the crafts 
for assistance. Both men were outside for about an hour, with tele- 
vision cameras recording the entire affair and constant radio communi- 
cations maintained. Khrunov made the transfer over South America 
while Yeliseyev did so over the Soviet Union. In turn, the orbital 
work compartment of Soyuz 4 served as an airlock. 

The ships remained docked for 4 hours 35 minutes. Soyuz 4 returned 
to Earth after three days, now carrying a crew of three instead of 
one, and, Soyuz 5 landed after three days with only one man aboard 
instead of three. Soyuz 4 and 5 were later registered as weighing 6,625 
kg and 6,585 kg respectively, for a total weight of 13,210 kg. As a 
result of maneuvers and usage of other expendables, their combined 
mass at the time of docking is estimated as being 286 kg lighter, or 
12.924 kg. 

The combined ships have always been hailed in the Soviet press as 
the world's first space station in which a total of four men were housed. 
Although the combination can be considered a station in that a fair 
amount of working space was provided by the orbital work compart- 
ments, the general view of a space station suggests a longer duration 
of usefulness and no need for EVA to go from one work compartment 
to another. The ships' orbit was low enough that it would have de- 
cayed in about ten days, and the main life support systems, solar pan- 
els, and orbital adjustment rockets were in the after-service modules, 
separated from the orbital compartment by the command modules. 
Thus the "station" could not have been left behind in orbit for visits 
from other crews. 

New pictures were released showing the true shape of Soyuz: a 
spherical work cabin at the front end separated by a hatch from a bell- 
shaped command module with its slightly convex reentry shield facing 
aft, and at the rear, the cylindrical service and propulsion module with 
its two solar panels. 

8. Soyuz 6,7 and 8 

Launched on three successive days, Soyuz 6, 7 and 8 were to per- 
form group flight with orbital assembly the prime mission. Soyuz 7 
and 8 were meant to dock with each other for joint experiments, but 
Soyuz 6 was almost incidental to the mission since it could have flown 
any time after Soyuz 4 and 5. Reasons why the Russians might have 
waited include the possibility that other projects had a higher prior- 
ity for the tracking system and data central during the middle months 
of the year. Second, putting it up in conjunction with the next two 


Soyuz flights would reduce the cost of maintaining ocean tracking 
ships on station in all parts of the world. Third, by having three 
manned ships up at one time, the abilities of the computers and opera- 
tions people to handle a much more complex data management system 
was given a good test. Fourth, having seven men up at once has a cer- 
tain appeal as a portent of things to come. 

The flights were terminated after five days each. There were rumors 
in the "West that other ships were to have been launched and that the 
flight was to have run much longer. But it should be noted that before 
the first launch occurred, Moscow unofficial reports said that three 
ships would be involved with at least six cosmonauts, for a total period 
of one week. 2 

a. Soyuz 6. — Launched on October 11, 19C>9, this flicrht was piloted 
by Lt. Col. Georgiy Shonin and flight engineer Valeriy Kubasov. Tt not 
only tested the Soyuz systems, but also contributed to gathering Earth 
resources data. Its most important and significant experiment, though, 
dealt, with alternate methods for welding in the high vacuum and 
weightlessness of outer space. 

The Russians consider welding as necessary in future space opera- 
tions if very large permanent stations are to be assembled and if such 
stations are also to be used for the assembly of expeditions to visit the 
planets. Thus they built into the Soyuz 6 work space remote handling 
equipment to conduct welding experiments, after first opening the 
cabin to vacuum conditions. The welding unit. Vulkan, was controlled 
remotely by electric cable. They tested three methods : a low pressure 
compressed arc, an electron beam, and arc welding with a consumable 
electrode. Only the electron beam experiment was reported as cate- 
gorically successful. 

b. Soyuz 7. — This launch occurred on October 12 with a crew of Lt. 
Col. Anatoliy Filipchenko, Flight Engineer Vladislav Volkov, and 
Research Engineer Viktor Gorbatko. The ship carried docking equip- 
ment and was meant as the passive target for Soyuz 8. Aside from 
group flight activities, its principal task was Earth resources and re- 
lated research. 

c. Soyuz 8. — Launched the day after Soyuz 7. the flight was com- 
manded by Col. Vladimir Shatalov, accompanied by Flight Engineer 
Aleksey Yeliseyev, both veterans of the Soyuz 4/5 operation. Designed 
as the active partner in docking with the larger crew in Soyuz 7. 3 
many maneuvers were made between the two ships but docking was 
never accomplished. Although Soviet accounts vary from outright 
denial of docking plans to evasion on this point, it seems likly that a 
pair of ships equipped with docking gear instead of other experiments 
are meant to dock. What is unclear is whether automatic docking 
routines would have been successful as in the double Kosmos missions, 
or whether a mechanical problem precluded either automatic or 
manual docking. 

9. Soyuz 9 

Sovuz 9 was launched on June 1. 1970 from Tyuratam with Col. 
Andriyan Xikolayev as pilot and Vitaliy Sevastyanov as flight en- 

9 First renorted by Paris AFP on Oct. 9. 1969, naming three ships and docking: then re- 
ported on Oct. 10 by Moscow UPI as Imminent: then stated on Oct. 13 by the Yugoslav 
agency Tanyug as belne for one week. All these rumors were confirmed by events. 

8 TAPS. October 15, 1969, 1846 GMT. 


ginecr. This ship lacked rendezvous and docking systems and was sent 
on a solo flight to test for a longer period of time than other flights, 
the capacity of both the hardware and the human crew. On the fifth 
orbit the ship was raised from its initial orbit to protect its orbital 
life from early decay. On the 17th orbit, the perigee was raised again 
to establish a still more durable circular orbit. 

Medical-biological research effects of long term exposure to space 
conditions were probably the primary mission of this flight, but it also 
afforded a good opportunity to enhance capabilities related to Earth 
resources observation. These concentrated on both visual observ ation 
and photographing geological and geographic objects, weather forma- 
tions, water surfaces, snow and ice cover, and conducting other ground 

Onboard television cameras gave the ground controllers and Soviet 
public live coverage of activities on the ship during some orbital 
passes. The crew found the ship comfortable, and slept for eight hours 
at a stretch on couches in the work compartment, using sleeping bags. 
A stove provided hot meals of a wide range of conventional foods, 
and shaving was accomplished with both the shaving cream method 
and a dry electric razor. Lacking a shower they resorted to twice-daily 
rubdowns. A vacuum cleaner was used to maximize the cleanliness of 
their living spaces. 

As far as the ship itself was concerned, the Russians claimed that 
the 14 square meters of solar panels with chemical buffer batteries were 
more reliable than the American fuel cells used in Gemini and Apollo. 
They also felt that their use of two cabins made it possible to provide 
a work and sleep area with no threat of clutter and interference to the 
flight and recovery operations conducted in the command module. 
Also, the pilot would have no need to put on a pressure suit if his com- 
panion (s) conducted EVA exercises through a hatch from the work 

On the 14th day of flight, the orbit was lowered as a precaution for 
later recovery, particularly if retrofire should not be successful. But 
retrofire occurred as expected, and the command module separated 
from the work and service compartments for landing on June 19 in 
Kazakhstan. The crew was immediately picked up and although they 
were in good condition, after 18 days in space they had a harder time 
adjusting to full Earth weight than American crews who had stayed 
up for 14 days. The men were taken to a new quarantine laboratory 
whose description sounded very much like the Houston lunar receiv- 
ing laboratory. In the later Moscow celebrations, Xikolayev was pro- 
moted to Major General. 

The following experiments were conducted : 

Medical. — The crew made measurements of their condition before 
and after exercise, noting arterial pressure, pulse and respiration. They 
checked the contrast sensitivity of their eyes and made many tests of 
their vestibulary sensitivity in weightlessness. Samples of air breathed 
before and after exercising was collected in plastic bags for analysis 
on Earth, with expectations that the ratio of carbon dioxide and oxy- 
gen would give a measure of energy expenditure. The dynamics of 
pain sensitivity were checked and maximum hand strength tested with 
a dynamometer. 

During the 13th day of flight, a test of Sevastyanows mental capa- 
bilities was made by exposing him to a simulated set of commands 


which had been preprogrammed into the on-board computer, as a com- 
parison with his corresponding capabilities earlier in the flight. 

Other Biological. — Experiments were performed relating to the 
micro and macro genesis of flowering plants, the division of cells of 
chlorella, the propagation of bacterial cultures in liquid media, and 
the propagation and development of insects. 

Earth Resources. — On the fifth day the crew watched a large tropi- 
cal storm in the Indian Ocean and observed surf on a continental shore. 
The next day they observed forest fires in Africa near Lake Chad. 

They used both black and white and multispectral color film to pho- 
tograph the Earth's surface which was expected to throw light on 
problems of identification of different kinds of Earth rock and soil, the 
moisture content of glaciers, the location of schools of fish, and estima- 
tion of timber reserves. 

The crew also made studies of aerosol particles in the atmosphere by 
observing twilight glow. 

Navigation. — Astronavigation was practiced by locking onto Vega 
or Canopus and then using a sextant to measure its relation to the 
Earth horizon. Spectrographs measurements of the horizon were taken 
to define it better for navigation purposes. Arcturus and Deneb were 
later added as sighting targets for navigation tests. 

On the 4th day, using on-board navigation and measuring equip- 
ment, the orbital elements were refined to three decimal places — that is, 
to an exact number of meters for apogee and perigee, to an exact num- 
ber of thousandths of a minute for period, and to the exact number of 
thousandths of a degree in inclination. 

Astrophysical. — In addition to observing celestial bodies, the cos- 
monauts made photographic studies of the Moon. 

C. FURTHER TESTS: KOSMOS 379, 382, 398 AND 4 34 

A new series of tests ran from late 1970 to mid- 1971. These were as 
follows : 

[Altitudes in kilometers] 







Kosmos 379 

Nov. 24, 1970. 

Original Announcement- 




Nov. 25 

After Maneuver 




Nov. 30 

After Maneuver 

14, 035 



Kosmos 382 

Dec. 2. 

Original Announcement 

5, 040 



Dec. 7 

After Maneuver 

5, 072 



Dec. 8 

After Maneuver 

5, 082 



Kosmos 398 

Feb. 26, 1971. 

Original Announcement 




Feb. 27 

After Maneuver 




Feb. 28. 

After Maneuver 

10, 903 



Kosmos 434 

Aug. 12 

Original Announcement 




Aug. 15 

After Maneuver. 




Aug. 27 

After Maneuver 




SOURCES: TASS announcements and RAE registers 

Clearly three of the flights fit one pattern, while the fourth (Kosmos 
382) is unique. Although all four used an orbital platform, the three 
similar ones abandoned their rocket stage at the low initial orbit, aban- 
doned the platform at the intermediate orbit, and the payload then 
provided its own propulsion to the highest orbit. The Royal Aircraft 


Establishment (RAE) report suggested, however, that Kosmos 382 
used a double burn of the launch vehicle rocket stage, for their register 
lists it as first appearing in the initial orbit and then shifting to the 
intermediate, where the platform was released. The RAE apparently 
misinterpreted events, though, or one would have to assume the rocket 
stage actually made a separate maneuver equal to that of the launch 
platform. They probably relied on poor information from NOR AD 
which the latter organization did not correct or qualify. Since this is 
contradictory, the object reported by RAE close to the initial orbit 
of the pay load must not have been the same rocket casing listed at the 
intermediate orbit. 

The nature of the initial orbits of the three similar flights was very 
similar to a Soyuz orbit, and indeed the signal formats and frequencies 
used also resembled Soyuz, so an A-2 launch vehicle was used. But 
Soyuz class ships have repeatedly been listed by the Russians as having 
a maximum altitude of 1,300 km. The use of an orbital launch platform 
like a lunar or interplanetary flight and the further climb with on- 
board propulsion to more than 10,000 km is clearly beyond the Soyuz 
capability. This, then, was the first use of the A-2-m vehicle, a much 
more maneuverable version of the A-2. 

Kosmos 382, though, differed from the other flights not only be- 
cause the perigee was raised instead of the apogee, but a very substan- 
tial plane change was accomplished in the final maneuver. If this pay- 
load was similar to that of the other three, then only a D class vehicle 
could have been used to make maneuvers of such magnitude, and that 
apparently was a D-l-m. 

Mr. G. E. Perry of the Kettering Grammar School in England cal- 
culated the delta Vs involved in Kosmos 379 and found a very close 
match to what might be expected for lunar orbit insertion and for 
trans-Earth ejection. 4 He concluded that all four flights involved 
testing of a Soviet equivalent of the American SPS engine used for 
the Apollo command service module on lunar flights. The assignment 
of the three similar flights to the Earth-orbit category in the 1966-70 
edition of this report resulted in some criticism. That all four were 
Moon precursors is a logical explanation, but knowing the limitations 
of the A-2 vehicle and keeping to a very conservative analysis, the 
original designation of Kosmos 379, 398 and 434 as Earth-orbit related 
and Kosmos 382 as part of the lunar program stands until such time 
as an overt program clarifies the situation. 


1. Soyuz 10 and 11 with Salyut 1 

By the earlier criteria listed under Soyuz 4 and 5 for a space station, 
the world's first such station was launched by the Soviet Union in 1971. 
Two missions, Soyuz 10 and 11, were sent to work with the station and 
it remained in orbit for about six months. 

m a. Salyut 1. — Very early on April 19, 1971, the unmanned space sta- 
tion Salyut l was launched from Tyuratam by a D-l vehicle into a 222 
x 200 km orbit inclined at 51.6°. Initial announcements were vague, as 
usual, stating the purpose of the mission as a test of elements of the 

* Perry, G. E. Flight International, London, December 10, 1970, p. 923. 


systems of the space station, and to conduct scientific research and ex- 
periments on board the craft. The station was described simply as 
multipurpose and complex, for carrying out diverse plans. 

It was not until the launch of Soyuz 11 that more details were re- 
leased about Salyut, and it was initially described as 20 meters long 
with a maximum diameter of 4 meters. Since the original announce- 
ment, however, the length has alternately been given at 21.4 meters 5 
and 23 meters 6 with a maximum diameter of 4.15 meters. 7 Later in this 
chapter one will see that Salyut 3 was announced as being 21 meters 
long, and Salyut 4 as 23 meters. It seems unlikely, due to technical and 
development cost constraints, that each space station would be a dif- 
ferent length, so it is suspected that external attachments such as radio 
transponders are sometimes counted as part of the overall length and 
other times they are not. 

Salyut is made of several compartments and the measurements for 
each of these seem uniform from one version to the next. The com- 
partment that serves as a transfer tunnel from the ferry craft to the 
space station is 3 meters long and 2 meters in diameter. The main 
habitable portion is comprised of three sections : The small cylinder 3.8 
meters long and 2.9 meters in diameter: the large cylinder 4.1 meters 
long and 4.15 meters in diameter: and a cone connecting the two which 
is 1.2 meters long. An unpressurized service module completes the sta- 
tion, and it is 2.17 meters long and 2.2 meters in diameter. 

The internal area of the space station is consistently listed as 100 
cubic meters, and the weight of the combined Salyut/Soyuz system is 
consistently "over 25 metric tons". Since Soyuz is about 6,575 kg, 
Salyut would be in excess of 18,425 kg (estimates usually place this 
weight at 18,600 to 18.900 kg). 

Television views showed a considerable amount of space with big 
chairs and several control panels. Later it was revealed there were 
eight chairs, seven at work stations. Altogether there were 20 port- 
holes, some unobstructed by instruments to give a good view of the 
Earth and outer space. 

Externally, there were two double sets of solar cell panels, placed at 
opposite ends, extending like wings from the smaller diameter com- 
partments in much the same manner as the panels on the Soyuz. Also 
externally were the heat regulation system's radiators, the orienta- 
tion and control devices. Some of the scientific instrumentation was 
internal, some external. 

Because of the low orbit of Salyut during the time it served as Soyuz 
10's rendezvous target, the station would have decayed into the atmos- 
phere around May 3. Therefore, after Soyuz 10 had completed its 
mission, the onboard propulsion systems were fired to raise the orbit 
by about 50 km. At least twice during May the orbit was raised even 
more to offset orbital decay. 

This procedure was also followed after the Soyuz 11 visit, this time 
to test the longevity of the station and to keep open the option to send 
another crew. But finally on October 11. its engines were fired for the 
last time to insure decay over the Pacific Ocean. Pravda reported on 
October 26, 1971 that the Salyut tasks were solved in 75 percent of 

E "Saliout" devolle pour la premiere fols. Air et Cosmos, Paris, May 31, 1975. 

8 Salyut na Orbite, Moscow : Mashinostroyeniye, 1973. page 8. 

T Les Stations Orbitales "Saliont", Moscow : Mashinostroyeniye, 1975, page 14. 


cases by optical moans, in 20 percent by radio-technical means, and the 
small balance by magneto-metrical, gravitational, and other studies. 
Often synoptic readings were taken in both the visible and invisible 
parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. 

b. Soyuz JO.— At 2354 GMT on April 22, 1971. Soyuz 10 was 
launched by an A-2 vehicle into a 246 x 208 km orbit inclined at 51.6°. 
The crew consisted of Col. Vladimir Shatalov, Flight Engineer Alek- 
sey Yeliseyev, and Nikolay Rukavishnikov, described as responsible 
for operation of systems in the Salyut station. 

Instead of making a fairly direct ascent to rendezvous with Salyut, 
almost 24 hours passed before this was accomplished. Salyut was 
maneuvered four times ; Soyuz 10 made 3 principal maneuvers. One of 
these came 13 hours 35 minutes into the flight on instructions from the 
new, large tracking ship. Akademik Sergey Korolev, stationed in the 

Automatic devices did the actual work of rendezvous until the two 
craft were 180 meters apart. Shatalov then took over manual control, 
commenting later that due to the difference in size. Soyuz seemed like 
a train entering a railway terminal. The crew said they were not able to 
see Salyut until it was only 15 km away, and then they used an optical 
device to see it. They described the station as very impressive, and 
painted in more brilliant colors than they had noticed while it was on 

The docking was apparently quite nerve- wracking, with Shatalov 
steering while his colleagues monitored various instruments on the 
status of systems. Soviet commentan- noted that the problems of 
docking with a large mass, unmanned, nonmaneuvering station 
were quite different from the docking of two Soyuz ships, each able to 
adjust its position. The Russians reported that new telemetry, rendez- 
vous and docking equipment was used for this mission. 

The ships remained docked for about 5.5 hours. Television cameras 
mounted externally on both ships had watched the procedures of ap- 
proach, docking, and separation. After the undocking. Soyuz 10 flew 
all around the station to take a variety of pictures, and then prepara- 
tions were made for return to Earth. Retrorockets were fired at the 
first opportunity which would permit return in the normal recovery 
area, and reentry occurred as expected. The flight lasted just short of 
two days, and the predawn landing near Karaganda was another 
first in the Soviet program, since all other landings had taken place 
in daylight. 

The early return of Soyuz 10 and the failure of the crew to transfer 
into Salyut suggested that the mission had not accomplished all its ob- 
jectives. The Russians said that although the flight had been short, it 
had been scheduled to a very tight degree for the research and testing 
tasks which were successfully accomplished. It seems reasonable to ac- 
cept the statement that the mission achieved its primary objectives of 
exercising the new telemetry, docking and control systems, and to re- 
cover the men, with further unmanned experiments continuing with 
the Salyut. But it also seems likely that the total mission fell short of 
its engineering capabilities and Soviet hopes. Some Western observers 
read significance into the report that the crew was met by a smaller 
delegation of officials than other returning cosmonauts, although the 
traditional welcome was accorded the three men in the formal recep- 
tion in the hall of the Great Kremlin Palace. 

67-371—76 14 


Possible signs of trouble in the mission include : 

(1) The failure of the crew to transfer into the station after a suc- 
cessful mechanical clocking seems surprising, especially because 
Rukavishnikov was a specialist in the Salyut systems. Either the 
hatches and air locks were not functioning properly, or there was some 
threat of trouble which might require a quick disconnect and return to 

(2) The early return to Earth at the first opportunity suggested 
either trouble in Soyuz 10, or such dependence upon equipment, con- 
sumables, and systems of Salyut that when these were found to be un- 
available, there was no point in prolonging the mission. 

(3) When all previous Soyuz flights are plotted on a graph to com- 
pare hour of launch with number of days in flight until recovery, a very 
regular relationship is revealed. On this basis of estimation, the pre- 
dawn launch of Soyuz 10 seemed to suggest a 30-day flight, and yet the 
flight terminated after only 32 orbits (2 days), with a pre-dawn 
landing. 8 

c. Soyuz 11 — On June 6, 1971 at 0455 GMT, Soyuz 11 (code named 
Yantar or Amber) was launched with a crew consisting of Lt. Col. 
Georgiy Dobrovolskiy, Flight Engineer Vladislav Volkov, and Salyut 
Test Engineer Viktor Patsayev. 

The first day of flight passed routinely, with appropriate maneuvers 
to effect a rendezvous until Soyuz 11 was 6-7 km from Salyut, about 
0426 GMT June 7. At 100 meters Dobrovolskiy took manual control. 
The complicated process of docking, which wasn't completed until 
0745 GMT, required: initial engagement (soft-dock), making the 
connection mechanically rigid (hard-dock) , engaging various electrical 
and hydraulic links, and a thorough process of establishing air-tight 
seals (hermetic sealing) . After pressure was equalized between the two 
ships, the locks were opened and Patsayev transferred into the space 
station, soon followed by Volkov. After they turned on the systems 
and switched command functions of the combined craft to the central 
control panel in Salyut, Dobrovolskiy joined them. 

After crew transfer, the Russians announced their mission as : 

( 1 ) To check and test the design, units, onboard systems and equip- 
ment of the orbital piloted station; 

(2) To try out the methods and autonomous means of the station's 
orientation and navigation as well as the systems of controlling the 
space complex while maneuvering in orbit : 

(3) To study geological-geographical objects on the Earth's surface, 
atmospheric formations, the snow and ice cover of the Earth with the 
aim of developing methods of using these data in the solution of eco- 
nomic tasks; 

(4) To study physical characteristics, processes and phenomena in 
the atmosphere and outer space in various ranges of the spectrum of 
electromagnetic radiation : 

(5) To conduct medico-biological studies to determine the possibili- 
ties of performing various jobs by the cosmonauts in the station and 
to study the influence of space flight factors on the human organism. 

A summary of the cosmonauts' activities by day is presented in Table 
3-2, which provides both a picture of what happened each day on this 

8 Clark, P. S., Journal of the British Astronomical Association, London, December 1973, 

pp. 34-35. 


mission and serves as a sample for other space station missions in this 

In general, health monitoring and exercises for the crew were con- 
tinued throughout the mission. Some monitoring was close to con- 
tinuous, some was periodic, and some was supplemented with more de- 
tailed self-administered tests. Other biological specimens and a hydro- 
ponic farm for growing plants were carried and used in experiments. 
Work related to Earth resources and weather was extensive. Detailed 
astronomical work began about midway through the mission, although 
various radiation studies had been conducted earlier. Ship systems and 
instrumentation got considerable testing. 

When looking at the table of daily activities, an intriguing change in 
the routine occurs on June 17. The Soviet press gave no reports of scien- 
tific work or television transmissions, but only mentioned "minor cor- 
rection work'*, adding that the ship was equipped with tools, spare 
parts and safety devices. On June 18 the routine returned to normal, 
but G. E. Perry of the Kettering Grammar School in England detected 
telemetry transmissions on the Soyuz 11 frequency. This might have 
signalled that the trouble of the day before was forcing an early return, 
but the mission continued. 




On June 29 the crew prepared for return to Earth, loading scientific 
specimens, films, tapes and other gear aboard Sovuz 11. The ships un- 
docked at 1828 GMT and retrofire occurred at 2234 GMT. The normal 
follow-on routines of casting off the work compartment and service 
module were carried out prior to entering the dense atmosphere. Under 
its automatic systems, the ship oriented itself and steered to the in- 
tended recovery area. Radio communication with the crew came to an 
abrupt end at the moment of separating the work compartment, prob- 
ably at 2247 GMT, even before the normal ionospheric blackout. The 
drogue and main parachute systems functioned, and a normal landing 
was made at about 2317 GMT, giving a total flight duration for the men 
of 570:22 hours, and 383 orbits, including 18 prior to docking, 3G2 
docked, and 3 after undocking. 

Upon reaching the capsule, the recovery team was horrified to dis- 
cover the three cosmonauts dead on their couches. Although the Rus- 
sians did not release information concerning the cause of death for 
quite some time, in 1973 U.S. negotiate rs for the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project pressured them into releasing the first detailed explanation. 

Soyuz is equipped with two valves that open for spacecraft descent 
venting, the first at about 5,300 meters, the second at about 4,350 meters. 
One of the valves failed as the work module separated from the descent 
module. It appears that venting took about 40-50 seconds to reach 
the point where the ship's atmosphere could no longer support life. 
The crew became aware of the problem both because they could hoar 
the pressure leak, and because the discharge of the air resulted in a 
spacecraft attitude change, causing an automatic thruster to fire to 
compensate. The crew tried to close the leak with a crank apparatus, 
but was unable to do so before losing consciousness and subsequently 
died of pulmonary embolisms. 

The deaths dealt a major blow to the Soviet space program, which 
entered a slowdown even in its unmanned practical applications for 
many months. Only late in the year did flights begin to pick up again. 

2. Kosmos Jf96 

After the long pause in man-related activities caused by the death of 
the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts, the Russians launched, without announcing 
much more than routine parameters, Kosmos 496. This was on June 26, 
1972, with an apogee of 342 km and a perigee of 195 Ion. at an inclina- 
tion of 51.6°. The flight was recovered after six days. TASS in Mos- 
cow noted that it used the 20.008 MHz frequency common to the 
Soyuz. On the basis of orbital calculations from Perry in the United 
Kingdom, Sven Grahn in Sweden was not able to find signals on 20.008 
MHz, but did discover that each time the ship reached the radio 
horizon of Yevpatoriya in the Crimea, the ship sent signals on 922.75 
MHz, which had been used in the manned program previously. There 
were three carriers with high-speed commutated telemetry sidebands. 
The strong inference was that the Russians were testing an improved 
Soyuz to correct the problems of Soyuz 11, and further manned flights 
could be expected. 

3. Sahjut 2 

On April 3, 1973 Salyut 2 was launched into a 260 x 215 km orbit, 
with a period of 89 minutes and an inclination of 51.6°. The next day 


Cosmonaut Yevgenly Khrunov announced that cosmonauts were en- 
gaged in preparations for new flights, supposedly to link up with 
Salyut, and on April G Victor Louis of the London Evening Ncics re- 
ported that a Soyuz spacecraft was ready for launch. Thus when no 
launch followed Salyut 2, there was speculation that the Soyuz launch 
had failed. On two occasions the space station was in a position for 
rendezvous, but no launch occurred. When on April 8 Salyut 2's orbit 
was raised to 268 x 248 km, above an appropriate rendezvous orbit, ex- 
perts concluded that whatever had dela}*ed the Soyuz launch was more 
serious than originally thought. Some suggested that solar flare activity 
on the 4th and 5th of April prevented the launch rather than equipment 
failure, but when April 11 came and there was still no launch, general 
opinion was that either Salyut or Soyuz was having major difficulty. 

Spaceflight magazine reported that Salyut 2's initial orbit was 
higher and more elliptical than Salyut l's. possibly due to poor per- 
formance of the D-l booster. Numerous fragments detected in the 
orbital path suggested the D-l had exploded, although in retrospect 
it seems likely these early pieces of debris were no more than the rou- 
tine releasing of equipment and window covers. 

The real trouble came on April 14 when Salyut was reported to 
have undergone a "catastrophic malfunction'' which ripped off the 
solar panels and boom-mounted rendezvous radar and radio trans- 
ponder, leaving the vehicle tumbling in space without telemetry return. 
The craft may have separated into many pieces, some large enough to 
be tracked, but most were rather small and decayed quickly. Either an 
explosion or a misfiring thruster were blamed, although the most 
widely held theory was that the D-l upper stage had exploded with its 
debris damaging the space station. 

On April 28 TASS reported that Salyut "had concluded the pro- 
gramme of flight," and although the official statement said it had com- 
pleted its mission, the word "successfully" (used in the most nom- 
inally successful flights) was omitted. This suggests that the Russians 
wrote the mission off as a failure. The main body of the station decayed 
through air drag on May 28, 1973, and reentered near Australia. 

Noting that the telemetry transmissions from Salyut 2 were similar 
to those used by Soviet reconnaissance satellites, Aviation Week and 
Space Technology^ concluded that the mission was not a Salyut at all, 
but that the Russians were simply trying to mislead the Soviet press 
and information agencies. The manned Salyut 3 a year later, however, 
used the same telemetry and suggests that Salyut 2 was the first of the 
military Salyut s. 

4. Kosmos 557 

On May 11, 1973, shortly- after the failure of Salyut 2. the Russians 
launched Kosmos 557 into" a 226 x 218 km orbit inclined at 51.6° and 
with a period of 89.1 minutes. Speculation abounded as to its purpo-e, 
since virtually no information was reported in the Soviet press. Its 
telemetry resembled Salyut 1, typical of the manned programs, 
rather than Salyut 2, typical of the unmanned military reconnaissance 
program. (It was not until a year later that the discovery was made 
that these military frequencies could be used for a manned station 
dedicated to military uses.) 

Western experts "thought there was a good chance that this was 
another Salyut, possibly of a different design, that failed so earlv in 


its mission that it was listed as a Kosmos. Tracking ships deployed for 
the expected manned flights to Salyut 2 were reported heading back for 
their home ports "before Cosmos 557 decayed" 9 during the week of 
May 21. Whether they realized early on that no manned missions 
would be sent up, or whether there was no intention of sending men 
to it is unclear. However, no unmanned tests of Salyut stations had been 
conducted previously, if for no other reason than cost, so if one as- 
sumes Kosmos 557 was a Salyut, one can conclude that manned flights 
to it were planned, but that the station failed. 

Other theories did prevail about the nature of Kosmos 557, though. 
Thomas O 'Toole of the Washington Post reported it as an unmanned 
Soyuz sent to investigate and photograph the damaged Salyut 2, stat- 
ing that its orbit was "almost identical to the Salyut orbit." 10 Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, while agreeing that it was an unmanned 
Soyuz, said that the two craft were too far apart for it to be an inspec- 
tion mission, that there was "no way of Cosmos 557 approaching Salyut 
2 without major orbital change." 11 (The difference in interpretations 
can probably be explained by noting that the NORAD data cited by 
both sources did give similar orbital elements for the two craft, but 
they were in different planes.) 

With the passage of time and the experience with 1974 Salyut 
fliirlits. it is now reasonably safe to conclude Salyut 2 and Kosmos 
557 were parts of parallel but different space station programs, one 
military and one civilian. 

5. Kosmos 573 

After the failures of Salyut 2 and Kosmos 557 to operate for ex- 
tended periods and to be visited by manned Soyuz, the Russians did 
send up another unmanned test craft. This was Kosmos 573, launched 
on June 15, 1973, almost a year after Kosmos 496. and flying in a very 
similar orbit. TASS. Moscow, announced it as having an apogee of 
329.2 km, a perigee of 190.2 km, and an inclination of 51.6°. Again, 
they announced that it used the 20.008 MHz frequency common to 
man-related flights. This time the ship stayed up only two days, the 
pattern Soyuz 12 was to follow. 

6. Soyuz 12 

Soyuz 12 (Ural) was the first manned flight by the Soviet Union 
after the tragic deaths of the Soyuz 11 crew in 1971. The Russians 
delayed their manned program for two years to check systems and 
spacecraft desist to ensure the incident would not occur again. Soyuz 
12 was primarily a test of the new designs, including introduction of a 
new launch escape rocket, so the only experiment scheduled was Earth 
photograph v. 

^ Launched into an initial orbit of 249 x 194 km at 1218 GMT on 
September 27, 1973, the ship was piloted by Lit. Col. Vasiliy Lazarev 
and Fligfht Engineer Oleg- Makarov. It was inclined at 51.6° and had 
a period of 88.6 minutes. In a test of the control systems, the orbit was 
changed to 345 x 326 km, 91 minutes on the second dav of flight. Sven 
Grahn suggested that this forecast the flying of a Salyut at higher 

o Coctyios 557 decav. Aviation Week and Space Technolocrv. May 28, 1973 : 25. 

10 O'Toole, Thomas. Craft Sent to Inspect Crippled Salyut. Washington Post. May 15. 
1073 : A 16. 

11 Soviets Trv to Salvage Salyut Mission With Unmanned Vehicle. Aviation Week and 
Space Technology. May 21. 1973 : 16. 


orbit, and his prediction was confirmed by the placement of Salyut 4 
in late 1974. 

Both days were devoted to checking onboard systems and photo- 
graphing the Earth in various spectra, using a nine-objective camera. 
As the spacecraft photographed a region of the planet, airplanes 
simultaneously took pictures of the same area for comparison purposes 
to discover what distortions were introduced by the atmosphere. 

Soyuz 12 landed September 29, 1973 at 1134 GMT, 400 km south- 
west of Karaganda, Kazakhstan. To be on the safe side, the cosmo- 
nauts wore pressure suits during reentry, as they have for all missions 
following Soyuz 11. 

7. Kosmos 613 

On November 30, 1973, Kosmos 613 was sent to a 295 x 195 km orbit 
inclined at 51.6°. No purpose was given beyond the routine, but West- 
ern observers noted it seemed like a Soyuz. Without announcement, 
the orbit was raised on December 5 to 396 x 255 km, still at 51.6° 
inclination. Signals were found on 922.75 MHz, typical of man-related 
flights. On reaching the higher orbit, little was heard from it, and it 
appeared to be in powered-down condition. Then toward the end of 
the flight, it became electronically active again, and recovery was made 
after a total flight duration of 60.1 days on January 29, 1974. 

With the advantage of hindsight, it now seems likely that this was 
a first long-duration test in powered down condition for the flight of 
Soyuz 18 which will be described below. 

8. Soyuz 13 

Soyuz 13 was launched on December 18, 1973 at 1155 GMT and code 
named Kavkaz (Caucasus). Primarily conceived as an orbiting- 
astronomical observatory, the cosmonauts aboard, Major Petr Klimuk 
and Flight Engineer Valentin Lebedev, had undergone extensive 
training at the Byurakan Observatory in Armenia on the operation of 
the astronomical equipment on board (Orion-2). On the fifth orbit, 
Soyuz 13 was put into a 272 x 225 km orbit, inclination 51.6°, period 
89.22 minutes. 

Since the orbit was similar to that planned for the Apollo-Soy uz 
Test Project in 1975, some speculated that this flight was a demon- 
stration mission. But Salyut 2 and Kosmos 557 had failed shortly be- 
fore this flight and it is quite possible that the Russians decided to 
modify the Soyuz so that Salyut-like experiments could continue until 
another space station was orbited. Two modifications were made to 
the Soyuz ship : the addition of the Orion-2 system which was mounted 
outside the ship in the position of the docking assembly, and the 
orbital section was transformed from a place for rest and relaxation 
into a space laboratory. 

Klimuk and Lebedev remained in space for eicrht days, landing on 
December 26 at 0850 GMT, 200 km southwest of Karaganda, Kazakh- 
stan. Five minutes later they were outside walking around. 

The main projects for the mission were : astrophysical experiments 
with Orion-2, research into the production of protein mass in ST)ace 
with Oa zis— 2 (both of these had predecessors on Salyut 1), experi- 
ments with higher plants, biomedical checks with the Levka apparatus, 
earth observation, and navigation. 


Medical. — The Soviets are especially interested in blood circulation 
to the brain in a weightless environment (blood tends to redistribute 
itself towards the upper part of the body in the absence of gravity). 
In the Levka (Lion's Cub) experiment, the cosmonauts stretch a 
special expander with a force of 15 kg at a rate of 30 times per minute. 
The heart responds by pumping more blood, and electrodes on the 
cosmonauts measure the response in cerebral vessels. The response is 
recorded by telemetric devices. 

Other Biological. — Oazis-2 consists of two interconnected cylinders 
for the study of regeneration. One cylinder cultivates water-oxidizing 
bacteria which use hydrogen from water electrolysis for growth. Oxy- 
gen is formed here and passes into the second cylinder containing 
urobacteria (which break down urea). The urobacteria absorb the 
oxygen and release carbonic acid which in turn is passed back to the 
first cylinder and used for synthesis of biomass. Thus the waste prod- 
ucts of one type of bacteria are the initial material used by other 
bacteria to accumulate protein mass: regeneration. During Soyuz 13's 
flight the biomass increased 35 times. This is important for long dura- 
tion spaceflights where food, air and water might be regenerated so 
vast quantities of these perishables need not be carried on board. 

Higher plants studied during this mission were chlorella and duck- 
weed. Chi ore! la absorbs carbon dioxide and returns oxygen to the 
air, so the Russians want to see how well it grows in space, since ani- 
mals, including people, exhale carbon dioxide and need oxygen to 
breathe. Duckweed is interesting because in the winter it goes into 
hibernation and exists in the form of turions, small bodies with in- 
hibited vital activity. In the spring the turions multiply by division 
and again become duckweed. The cosmonauts put turions into a vessel 
and added kinetin to restore the vital activity. They then added a 
nutrient to see how the duckweed would assimilate it. 

Earth Resources. — The cosmonauts again studied natural forma- 
tions on the surface of the planet as well as the atmosphere. For the 
former, a nine lens camera which exposes three strips of film simul- 
taneously photographed several areas of Earth. Two of the films are 
sensitive to visible light, the third to infrared. Each lens has color 
filters so many spectra can be taken and selection can be made as to 
which are the most valuable for specific missions. 

An RSS-2 spectrograph studied the atmosphere by photographing 
day and twilight horizons. This can lead to better weather knowledge 
and information on air pollution. In addition, the spectrograph re- 
corded the reflection of solar radiation from natural formations on 

Astro-physical. — Orion 2. unlike Orion 1, was mounted entirely on 
the outside of the ship and had a wide field meniscus telescope which 
could cover an area 20 degrees square. A canopy surrounded the tele- 
scope to protect it from temperature extremes as the ship travelled 
into and out of the Earth's shadow, and the optical components were 
made of crystalline quartz. A window in the canopy opened during 
observation, with exposure times ranging from 1 to 20 minutes. 

Designed by Grigor Gurzadyan of Armenia, the telescope is mounted 
on a three-axis platform which can stabilize the system with an ac- 
curacy of 2-3 seconds of arc. This is vital for successful observation. 
Pointing is accomplished by positioning the spacecraft within a few 


degrees of the area to be studied. The two reference stars are then 
found, whereupon Orion-2 itself takes over with an automatic point- 
ing system accurate to 3-5 angular seconds. The instrument has 13 
electric motors for drive. Although some of the Orion-2 system is 
automatic, both cosmonauts are needed for these experiments ; one to 
orient the ship, the other to work Orion. 

Also mounted on the Orion system is an instrument for studying 
X-ray emissions from the Sun. These studies were done on the 65th 
orbit. The camera has several channels and can take photographs 
simultaneously in several ranges of the X-ray band, and has a 70 
degree field of view. Observations were carried out at the same time 
from Earth for comparison purposes. 

During the mission, the cosmonauts made 10,000 spectrograms of 
more than 3,000 stars in the constellations Taurus, Orion, Gemini, 
Auriga and Perseus. The spectrograms were in spectral classes from 
2,000-3.000 angstroms (these cannot be studied from Earth since the 
atmosphere absorbs emissions less than 3,000 angstroms) and the stars 
were of the 10th magnitude generally, although the cosmonauts were 
able to photograph some even of the 12th. Special sensitive film was 
supplied by George Low of NASA for this project. 

Navigation. — Experiments were continued into autonomous navi- 
gation, specifically to determine the accuracy of control systems and 
the testing of new instruments for orientation using the Earth and 

9. Kosmos 638, 656, and 672 

Kosmos 638 was launched on April 3, 1974 into a 325 x 195 km orbit 
inclined at 51.8°, that intended later for the Apollo-Soyuz Test 
Project (ASTP). It stayed up ten days before recovery. Kettering 
found signals on 20.008 MHz. 

Kosmos 656 was launched on May 27, 1974 into 354 x 194 km orbit. 
This time the inclination was 51.6°, that used for ferry flights to 
Salyut stations. The mission lasted just two days, suggesting that it 
was like Kosmos 573 and Soyuz 12, probably ferry versions of Soyuz 
without solar panels. 

Kosmos 672 was launched on August 12, 1974 into a 239 x 198 km 
orbit, inclined at 51.8°. The orbit was adjusted to the ASTP position, 
approximately, when apogee was moved to 238 km and perigee to 227 
km. Later, like Kosmos 638, it was confirmed by the Eussians to be 
an ASTP test flight. 

10. Kosmos 670 

Kosmos 670 is worth a special look because it differed from other un- 
manned Soyuz flights of the period. It was launched on August 6, 1974, 
into a 307 x 217 km orbit. What was unique is that the inclination was 
50.6°, not used on any other flight launched by an "A" class vehicle. 
The flight lasted only three days before recovery. In some respects, its 
external flight parameters hardly distinguished it from military re- 
coverable observation flights. The inclination was close to that which 
Western published rumors had predicted would be that used by the 
big "G" class vehicle. There was speculation that this might be the 
first test of a ferry vehicle to a new large space station to be put up 
by the G-l at some future time. Without more information, no firm 
conclusions can be drawn. 


11. Soyus H and 15 with Salyut 3 

In 1974 the Soviet Union launched their second successful space 
station, Salyut 3, which remained in orbit for seven months. It was 
intended to be host to two manned crews, Soyuz 14 and 15. The first 
docked successfully and conducted joint experiments for 14 days, while 
Soyuz 15 was unable to achieve a link-up. 

a. Salyut 3. — Salyut 3 was launched June 25, 1974 into an orbit 
270 x 219 km, inclined at 51.6° and with a period of 89.1 minutes. This 
Salyut was of an improved design (details will follow) and had sev- 
eral characteristics about it which suggest its mission was military 
rather than civilian. 

All four men sent to work with Salyut 3 were from the military : 
usually in the Soyuz program Eussian crews are comprised of both 
military and civilian persons. On board was a 10 meter focal length 
high resolution camera, 12 and the Eussians announced that for the first 
time Salyut 3 was constantly oriented toward Earth with the help of 
an electro-mechanical stabilization system. Although this could simply 
indicate Earth resources photography, as the Eussians announced, the 
low orbital parameters of the space station and the long focal length 
camera with its folded optics suggest high resolution photography of a 
nature not needed for Earth resources work. Also, during the success- 
ful docking of Soyuz 14, the crew transmitted on the 121.75 MHz fre- 
quency normally used by Soyuz missions, but once they entered the 
space station the frequency was changed to 143.625 MHz (Salyut 3 
itself transmitted fifteen spacecraft hardware parameters on 19.946 
MHz, previously used by Salyut 2) . 

The Eussians announced that Salyut 3 was 21 meters long (see 
page 188) with an internal volume of 100 cubic meters. The aggregate 
weight of the Salyut/Soyuz system remained at over 25 metric tons. 
On September 23, after hosting the crew of Soyuz 14 and then being 
unmanned for more then two months, a module separated from Salyut, 
went through a reentry procedure, and was recovered, quite likely 
indicating that photography had continued on board Salyut 

Salynt 3 functioned for more than twice its design life, reentering 
the atmosphere by command over the Pacific on J anuary 24, 1975. By 
December 25, 1974, after completing 2,950 revolutions around Earth 
(by 1500 GMT), the space station had hosted 400 scientific and tech- 
nical experiments, had 8,000 control commands transmitted to it, more 
than 200 dynamic operations were performed, there had been 70 tele- 
vision and 2.500 telemetric communication sessions, 500,000 firings of 
the stabilization engines, and 5,000 kilowatt hours of power had been 
produced by the solar panel energy supply system. An atmospheric 
pressure of 835-850 mm Hg and a temperature of 21-22°C were main- 
tained throughout. 

Some of the changes to Salyut were : 

(1) Miniaturized circuitry in control loops ; 

(2) A more efficient power supply and life support systems, includ- 
ing better thermal control. Solar panels capable of rotating 180° were 
substituted for the stationary kind used on Salyut 1 so the station itself 

" Major Redesign Marks Salyut-3. Aviation Week and Space Technology, New York. 
July 15. 1974: 293. 


did not have to be constantly turned to face the Sun. Although there 
were only three panels instead of the four on Salyut 1, they were 
larger ; 

(3) A general redesign of the interior. The single, large four-meter 
diameter working compartment was subdivided into control, working 
and living sections, with a corridor along the left side of the ship, from 
front to back, connecting the various sections to each other and the 
entry tunnel. All the sections were served by the same life support 
system, and there were no pressure bulkheads between them. 

In a scheme to make the cosmonauts' new home more familiar, the 
floors and ceilings were painted different colors (dark for the floors, 
light for the ceiling) with Velcro-like material on the floor to permit 
more ease in walking. 

The living quarters, which occupied the narrow front portion of the 
space station just forward of the control compartment, had four win- 
dows. Besides being equipped with a special sofa for medical experi- 
ments, there was one fixed position and one swinging bed (coming out 
from the bulkhead to conserve space). There were hot and cold water 
sources, a table for eating, storage space for clothes, linen and enter- 
tainment gear (which included a tape recorder for music, a chess set 
and small library) , and a shower and toilet. 

b. Soyuz H.—On July 3, 1974, at 1851 GMT, Soyuz 14 (Berkut or 
Golden Eagle) was launched into a 270 x 219 km orbit, inclined at 
51.6°, and with a period of 89.1 minutes. Piloted by Col. Pavel Popo- 
vich and Lt. Col. Yuriy Artyukhin, the ship's mission was to dock with 
Salyut 3 for joint experiments. When orbit was achieved, Soyuz was 
3,500 km behind Salyut. After four orbital corrections, the cosmonauts 
were in a position for docking, and 100 meters from the station the 
crew took manual control. Their speed at this point was 1 meter per sec- 
ond, which was reduced to 0.3 meter per second by the time the ships 
were 40 meters apart. Using the usual probe/drogue docking system, 
the ships soft docked at 2100 GMT July 4 (midnight Moscow time), 
followed by hard dock and pressure verification. When the crew dis- 
covered that the pressure inside their ship was slightly lower than 
that of the space station, they raised their pressure to match. During the 
docking procedure, both cosmonauts wore the pressure suits they had 
worn during lift-off and removed after orbital insertion. At 0130 GMT 
July 5, Flight Engineer Artyukhin entered the Salyut, turned on the 
lights, and checked the life support systems. 

Soyuz 14 differed from other manned Soyuzes in that there were 
no solar panels. Intended only as a ferry craft to take crews back and 
forth to the space station, internal battery power was considered suf- 
ficient for the short time it would be in solo flight, and removal of the 
panels created a more maneuverable ship. A porthole below the control 
panel between the two crew members allowed a clear view of the dock- 
ing approach (although a television image was also provided on the 
control panel) and manual control of the ship was provided by two 
handles resembling automobile gear shifts (although much smaller). 
The left stick controlled the up, down, left, right, forward and back- 
ward motions, while the right controlled rolls along the main axis. 

Two very interesting aspects of the flight surfaced in Russian news 
reports. First was Vladimir Panarin's announcement that this Soyuz 
had a water recovery capability. A practice exercise was described 


where the cosmonauts exited the spacecraft after "splashdown'' into 
the water wearing red flotation jackets. They carried packs with food, 
water and a miniature radio, and flares to be released both into the 
air and water to mark their location. The cosmonauts were then helped 
into lifeboats, which had remained alongside the capsule and the crew 
during the entire drill. 

The second development worth noting was an announcement that 
this was the first mission to be in continuous communication on all 
channels — voice and telemetry — with the manned space flight center 
near Moscow. The mission had tracking support from the Kosmonavt 
Yuriy Gagarin in the western Atlantic and the Kosmonavt Vladimir 
Komarov in Cuban waters, assisted by the Molniya satellite. Western 
sources were skeptical of the report, however, since during several 
communication sessions the space crew was heard to use the Gagarin 
or Komarov call signs rather than that of the space flight center, and 
at one point Popovich said he would relay greetings from the Ko- 
marov to Moscow. 

The work of the Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 crew included : studies of geo- 
logical-morphological objects of the Earth's surface, of atmospheric 
formations and phenomena with the aim of obtaining data for the 
solution of economic tasks (in other words Earth resources pho- 
tography) : studies of the physical characteristics of outer space; 
medico-biological research to study the influence of space on the 
human organism; and tests of the station's improved design. The 
cosmonauts reportedly had similar eating tastes, with a typical break- 
fast consisting of bread with ham, cottage cheese with black currants, 
a honey bun, coffee with milk, and vitamins. Popovich was an avid 
football fan, so when the world football game was broadcast over the 
radio, he was given extra work so he wouldn't be tempted to listen in. 

An exact copy of Salyut 3 was occupied on the ground to duplicate 
the actions of the space crew in case any problems developed. For ex- 
ample, when one of the space crew complained of a ventilator that 
was causing a draft and asked if it could be turned off. the ventilator 
on the ground-based Salyut was turned off to see if it had any effect 
on life support systems or other instruments. When no problems de- 
veloped, the plan was approved. 

During their trip in space, the cosmonauts received a congratulatory 
message from American astronauts visiting Star City in preparation 
for the July 1975 Apollo-Soyuz joint mission. Several solar flares 
erupted from July 4—8, but did not affect the crew or the station, 
although close watch was kept on dosimeter readings to ensure the 
crew's safety. The normal daily schedule was eight hours of sleep, 
eight of work, and the remaining eight for exercise, rest, cleaning and 
making log entries. 

After undockmg from Salyut 3 at 0903 GMT July 19 and firms 
their retrorockets as planned, the crew of Soyuz 14 landed at 1221 
GMT just 2 km from their planned target 140 km southeast of Dzhez- 
kazgan, Kazakhstan. 

Experiment? performed on this mission included : 

Medical. — With the Polinom-2M equipment, the cosmonauts studied 
blood circulation to the brain and blood velocity in the arteries before 
and after physical activity. They also took samples of exhaled air for 
study on Earth to determine the level of energy expenditures at rest 


and while active. For physical conditioning, a universal trainer was 
provided to mimic walking, running, high and long jumping, and 
weight-lifting. These exercises were performed every morning and 
evening. The trainer consisted of a running track or treadmill and a 
special suit with elastic pulls attached to the belt. The other end of 
these pulls was attached to the track so that the crew member was 
pulled onto the apparatus with a force equal to 60% of his body 
weight. This force was transmitted not only to the waist and legs, but 
to the shoulders as well, an improvement over the Skylab bicycle 
according to Russian medical experts, since all muscles were thus 

Other Biological. — A microbiological cultivator was on board and 
the crew daily sowed bacterial cultures into a growth medium to show 
the development of bacteria in space. 

Earth Resources. — Listed as one of the prime projects on this flight, 
the cosmonauts spent a great deal of time photographing the Earth's 
surface and atmosphere. This was described as Earth resources work 
(of a civilian nature) but the station's characteristics equally or better 
fitted military reconnaissance work. 

The areas mentioned by the Russians as being photographed by the 
team were: Soviet central Asia, the Pamirs, the eastern coast of the 
Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, the Ustyurt Plateau, and the Atlantic 
Ocean where research into global atmospheric processes was being 
carried out in connection with the international Tropex-74 program 
(this area was simultaneously photographed by the Meteor satellite). 
Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that objects were 
placed outside the Tyuratam launch facility during passes by the space 
station to test the reconnaissance potential of the station. 

The crew also made observations of the polarization of solar light 
reflected by the Earth and its atmosphere during the night, twilight 
and day horizons for studying the dynamics of the development of op- 
tical phenomena. There also was a spectral investigation of the at- 
mosphere with an RSS-2 speetograph to measure the global distribu- 
tion of gas aerosol components and other atmospheric pollution. 

Navigation. — For autonomous navigation, there were measurements 
of the angular position of celestial bodies relative to atmospheric dust 
layers and the horizon. An improved Vzor of the type carried on Vos- 
tok and Voskhod was used for determining methods of orienting the 
ship in transitional lighting conditions (°roing in and out of the 
Earthy shadow), and orbital orientation when the Sun is low above 
the horizon and Earth is incompletely illuminated. If one marks the 
real horizon with a line marked on the instrument and the Sun is in a 
definite position on the screen, the ship will be oriented correctly. 

System^ Checks. — Another major duty of this mission was the check- 
ing of ship's systems. The cosmonauts were assisted in evaluating the 
exterior of the station by an optical instrument hinged to the outside 
which could relay images to them and to Earth via a television svstem. 
They also checked life support systems, including the parameters of 
Salyut 3*s atmosphere and the water regeneration block, thermo-regu- 
lation systems, and radio communication. 

Television.-— There were several television transmissions, one of the 
most interesting of which showed effects of vibration on various pen- 
dulum instruments. Since some high-precision instruments are affected 


by these vibrations, yielding incorrect readings, engineers were quite 
interested in this demonstration. 

c. Soyuz 15. — Launched by an A-2 vehicle on August 26, 1974 at 
1958 GMT, Soyuz 15 (Dunay or Danube) was reportedly a continua- 
tion of the scientific research and experiments started by Soyuz 14. Its 
initial orbit was 230 x 180 km. 

Altering the orbit to 275 x 254 km with a period of 89.6 minutes 
and an inclination of 51.6° on the second day of flight, the mission al- 
most immediately ran into trouble when attempts to dock with Salyut 
3 were unsuccessful. The pilots, Lt. Col. Gennadiy Sarafanov and Eng. 
Col. Lev Demin, made repeated approaches to the space station, but 
each time the ship came within 30-50 meters of its target, the auto- 
matic reaction control system aboard Soyuz made excessively long 
burns, causing it to close too fast. 

Since the ferry version of Soyuz does not have solar panels for en- 
ergy but only chemical batteries, its life in space is limited to about 
2.5 days. Thus Soyuz 15 was forced to land at night on August 28. The 
tracking ship Morzhovets, stationed in the Atlantic near St. Helena 
Island, reported the correct firing of the retrorockets and at 2010 GMT 
the cosmonauts landed 48 km southwest of Tselinograd in adverse 
weather conditions. Despite the emergency nature of the landing, res- 
cue teams located the ship quickly and 17 minutes after touch down 
reached the crew. 

The official Russian version, according to General Shatalov, was that 
the mission of Soyuz 15 was to test the automatic docking system 
aboard Soyuz for future tanker spacecraft missions to space stations. 
Thus when the automatic docking system failed there was no attempt 
to dock manually, although the cosmonauts could have done so. Usu- 
ally Soyuz closes to within 100 meters of the space station and then 
manual control is activated. Shatalov stated that even if docking had 
been accomplished, the cosmonauts would then have undocked and 
repeated the exercise for practice, rather than enter the space station 
for an extended visit. 

Western observers are skeptical of Shatalovs explanation if for no 
other reason than that to send a ship into space simply to practice 
docking techniques when an extended stay is possible is an extremely 
wasteful exercise. Also, the mission was announced as a continuation 
of Soyuz 14's work, and indeed both crew members were once again 
members of the military. So the Russian version that Soyuz 15 was 
only a docking exercise and that the repeated approaches to Salyut 
were meant only to gain further information on the malfunction in the 
reaction control system, are viewed with a great deal of doubt, which 
the Soyuz 20 flight does little to allay. 

12. Soyuz 16 

Soyuz 16 (Buran or Snowstorm), announced as a precursor flight 
for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, was launched December 2, 1974 at 
0940 GMT and piloted by the prime ASTP backup crew, Col. Anatoly 
FilipHienko and Nikolay Rukavishnikov. It was a test of the new sys- 
tems installed for the joint mission and most importantly, the docking 
procedure. Some biological and photographic experiments were 
aboard, including some to be repeated on ASTP. 

Modifications to the Soyuz included the docking gear, flight and at- 
titude controls, radio communication systems, some new controls added 


and consoles modified in the orbital module, addition of an automatic 
gas analyzer, and changes in the life support system to enable it to 
handle four people (two cosmonauts and two astronauts). Tests were 
made of the changes m pressure and air composition that would be used 
during ASTP. The Russians operate in space under normal atmos- 
pheric pressure (760 mm Hg) and a nitrogen-oxygen air content. The 
United States, however, works in a pure oxygen atmosphere at low 
pressure (260 mm Hg). In order to minimize the amount of time re- 
quired for adjusting in the docking module air-lock, the Soviet engi- 
neers agreed to reduce their pressure to 520 mm Hg and increase the 
percentage of oxygen to about 40%. These alterations were practiced 
during Soyuz 16 and the cosmonauts suffered no ill effects. 

NASA was told in advance that this would be an ASTP test, but 
did not know the exact date and time of launch, since the Russians in- 
sisted such information be secret and NASA refused to keep the news 
from the press. Once the launch was announced, joint tracking exer- 
cises were arranged. The tracking stations were : Bermuda and Tanan- 
arive (NASA operated) ; Antigua, Grand Turk, Eastern Test Range, 
Canton Island, Kaena Point (Hawaii), Kwajalein and Ascension 
(DOD operated). Mission control in Houston did not operate for this 

The Russians have never announced the initial orbit for Soyuz 16, 
but NORAD stated it was 137 x 190 nautical miles (352 x 254 km) . On 
the fifth revolution this was altered to 223 x 177 km, with an incli- 
nation of 51.8° and a period of 88.4 minutes. As an ASTP test, the 
craft had to achieve a 225 km circular orbit, and this was accomplished 
by two more burns : to 240 x 190 km at an unspecified time, and on 
the 17th and 18th orbits to the final 225 x 225 km, with a period of 
88.9 minutes. Although the Russians state that these corrections were 
part of the planned program in order to test fully Soyuz 's systems, 
some speculate that the initial orbit may have been a trajectory error. 

Docking exercises were of primary importance for Soyuz 16. A spe- 
cial practice imitating ring attached to the ship was moved away so 
Soyuz could maneuver and dock with it (the ring was pulled onto 
Soyuz with a force equal to that of Apollo) . The docking equipment 
incorporated some of the Soyuz/Salyut gear, for example a spring- 
mechanical type of shock absorber as opposed to the hydraulic type 
used by the United States. Some twenty technical operations were 
planned and carried out to test coupling, link-up and hermetic dock- 
ing, beginning in the 32nd orbit. The tests were successful. 

Filipchenko and Rukavishnikov landed 300 km north of Dzhez- 
kazsran at 0804 GMT on December 8 after six days in orbit. Other ex- 
periments carried out during the mission include : 

Earth Resources. — Photographs of the Earth were taken for the 
studv of natural resources, and of the horizon to determine the com- 
position and limits of the atmosphere. 

Astrophysical. — Photosrraphy of the Sun and stars was carried out 
in preparation for an ASTP experiment which used Apollo to block 
out the Sun and create an artificial solar eclipse for Soyuz. 

Bioloaical. — There were five biological experiments conducted. 

(1) The growth of microorganisms in space. Microbes were put in a 
nutrient medium the first day in space and the cosmonauts watched 
for their growth. There was a lag for the first few davs. but the mi- 
crobes soon became adjusted to the environment and grew normally. 

67-371—76 15 


(2) A determination of what direction sprouts would grow in with- 
out the Sun's rays. 

(3) The study of fish. In previous experiments, scientists discovered 
that adult fish lost their sense of spatial orientation in a gravity-free 
environment. On this mission, Danio rerio fish eggs were brought 
along. When the fish hatched, they exhibited no orientation problems 
as the adult fish had. 

(4) Samples of microbes were taken from different parts of the 
Soyuz craft and from the cosmonauts themselves (hair and skin) to 
test microbial transfer. This was repeated on the ASTP mission to de- 
termine if any contamination occurs when one space crew is visited 
by another, as might happen in long-duration space stations. 

(5) Zone-forming fungi were studied for two reasons. First, these 
fungi develop a new growth ring every 24 hours on Earth and sci- 
entists wanted to see how often one would grow in space where a 
"day" is only 90 minutes long. In addition, the fungi were placed 
inside a device called "Ritm" which had a dosimeter mounted on the 
outside to measure the amount of radiation entering the flask to see if 
it had any effect on the fungi. During ASTP, fungi were flown on both 
ships to see how different amounts of radiation in various areas of 
space would affect the organisms, since Apollo and Soyuz would travel 
in different parts of the sky except for the time they were docked 

13. Soyuz 17 and 18 with Salyut If 

Still in orbit at the time of this writing, Salyut 4 has already hosted 
two manned missions which totaled 93 days : Soyuz 17 for 30 days, and 
Soyuz 18 for 63. In turn these missions broke the Soviet space en- 
durance record and brought them closer the American record of 84 
days on Skylab 4. Salyut 4 also has accommodated one unmanned 
mission, Soyuz 20. 

a. Salyut 4- — Salyut 4 was launched on December 26, 1974 into a 
270 x 219 km orbit, inclined at 51.6°. This was soon raised to a 350 km 
circular orbit, higher than previous Salyuts, and done apparently to 
conserve fuel. There were again modifications to the space station, for 
example easier access was provided to certain mechanical areas of the 
ship for repair and replacement of parts. 

The length of the space station was announced as 23 meters (see 
page 188) with the same volume (100 cubic meters) and weight (over 
25 metric tons) . 

The solar panels were described as individually rotatable and having 
a total area of 60 square meters producing 4 kilowatts of power. The 
panels turn automatically on signals from solar gauges indicating 
what position the Sun is occupying at any given moment. There also 
was a third bank of solar batteries added. 

The space station has an MMMS, micrometeorite monitoring sys- 
tem, with 4 square meters of panels serving as sensors. At first par- 
ticles were measured acoustically, but now a capacitator type is used 
which registers both the impact and penetrating power of each par- 
ticle. Two thin metal plates, which are insulated by a layer of tenon, 
close together w,Hen struck by a particle and a pulse is sent to the con- 
trol center. The skin of the station (which reflects % of the light rays 
hitting it) serves as a shield from these particles. If a meteorite hits 


the ship with a velocity greater than 4 km per second, the particle ex- 
plodes on contact and a second layer of skin picks up the debris. 

The Russians also described their thermal control system. The walk 
of Salyut are made of "screen-vacuum" heat insulation which pre- 
cludes heat exchange between the station and space, and are made of 
many layers of synthetic film sprayed with aluminum (they claim a 
piece of dry ice placed between layers of this material would not melt 
for hours even in direct sunlight). To heat the station, an intricate 
system of radiators is used which both collects solar heat and throws 
off surplus thermal energy. Three or more backup systems are 

Salyut's interior was again described, broken down into three sep- 
arate areas : assembly, transfer and work. The assembly area is un- 
pressurized and contains the fuel tanks and orbital and orientation 
engines. The transfer area is the cylindrical part of the ship, two 
meters in diameter and three meters long, where two of the seven work 
posts are located at windows for navigation and scientific observations. 
The "Raketa" vacuum cleaner is kept here also. In this area there is a 
long sleeve of rubberized fabric which extends into the ferry craft to 
feed it fresh air. The walls in this part of the ship, as well as in the 
work area, are painted in soft greens, yellows and blues. 

The work compa rtment is the main part of the space station and con- 
sists of two cylinders connected by a conical bridge. The smaller 
cylinder is 2.9 meters in diameter and 3.8 meters long with the solar 
panels attached to the outside. The large cylinder is 4.15 meters in 
diameter and 4.1 meters long and has a cone which broadens down- 
ward where scientific instruments and equipment are kept at a work 
station. To the left and right of the cone are refrigerators for storage. 
The conical bridge is 1.2 meters long. 

The Russians gave the following description of Salyut 4 from front 
(near the transfer tunnel) to back. 

The main control panel, housing navigational instruments, clocks, 
radio communication monitors and controls, the Globus navigational 
indicator to show what part of the Earth is being passed over, and two 
keyboard command signaling devices, faces the transfer tunnel and 
has two work stations. To the left of the main panel are life support 
controls with regeneration cylinders for purifying the air on both 
sides of the panels. At the right of this is another work station for 
control of scientific instruments. Another work station for medical 
research is located in the conical bridge section. 

Behind the main command post, in the center, is a table for eating. 
To the left, looking from the transfer tunnel, and behind the panels, is 
a small cupboard for plates, knives, forks, etc. There are two heaters 
with tubes for soup and coffee. These are heated to 70° C and then the 
device turns itself off automatically. Hot and cold water are fed di- 
rectly to the table. 

Beyond the table on the side panels are grids covering the cooling- 
drying assembly which sucks in air, cools it, and feeds it back. Fans 
are provided for circulation of the air. 

Farther back is the medical area where a swivel chair is located for 
experiments on vestibular reaction, as well as a closet for medical in- 
struments. At the right is exercise equipment, and above them on the 
right is a tape recorder for music. At the end of this cylinder is the 


sanitary-hygiene area which is separate from the rest of the rooms and 
has forced ventilation. 

The Soviet press release did not mention the largest piece of equip- 
ment on board Salyut 4, the space telescope. From other sources its lo- 
cation in the center of the large cvlinder is known. 

Although both Soyuz 17 and 18 docked with Salyut in the usual 
manner, with manual control being engaged at 100 meters, the Rus- 
sians announced that manual control could be activated as early as 
200-300 meters from the station (although this might not always be 
wise since deviations in the course could occur) or the entire operation 
could be carried out automatically. They suggested the latter method 
was not always feasible due to an area of "silence" where a crew can 
respond more quickly than an automatic sensing device. 

b. Somiz 17.— The launch of Soyuz IT came at 2153 GMT on Janu- 
ary 10, 1975. Its crew, Lt. Col. Aleksey Gubarev and Flight Engineer 
Georgiy Grechko, were boosted into an initial low orbit which by the 
fifth revolution was raised to 354 x 293 km, inclined at 51.6° with a 
•90,7 minute period. At this point, Salyut was in a 350 Ion circular 
v>rbit. so two maneuvers were required to put Soyuz into a docking 
position. The actual docking occurred at 0125 GMT January 12 in the 
usual manner. 

The significantly higher orbit of this mission suggested that its tasks 
were astrophysical in nature, and indeed the Russians announced the 
following projects for the space crew: research into the physical proc- 
esses and phenomena in outer space, Earth resources photography, 
medico-biological research, and testing of the station's systems and 

Communications were supported by the Molniya satellite and three 
tracking ships in the Atlantic: the Akademik Sergey Korolev near 
Sable Island off Canada's east coast, and the Ristna and Nevel in the 
southern Atlantic. 

During the 30 day mission, the cosmonauts followed a cycle of six 
days of work and one of rest. They typically ate four small meals 
daily, with one-half hour of exercise before breakfast, one hour be- 
tween breakfast and lunch, and one hour between lunch and dinner. 
No shower was provided, so the cosmonauts washed themselves with 
moist gauze napkins moistened with lotion. Shaving was accomplished 
with either a safety razor or an electric one which sucked the whiskers 
into a container. During the flight, Gubarev lost 2.5 kg of body weight 
while Grechko lost 4.5 kg. Physicians explained the flight engineer's 
greater loss as a result of extra work performed at the expense of sleep. 

At 0608 GMT on February 9, Soyuz 17 undocked from Salyut and 
at 1103 GMT landed 100 km northeast of Tselinograd. The landing 
apparently took place in a blinding snow storm, with wind velocities 
up to 20 meters per second, a visibility of 500 meters, and a ceiling of 
250 meters. Despite the adverse weather, rescue teams were on the 
scene immediately, and within ten minutes the cosmonauts were on 
board a helicopter. 

The announced aggregate weight of the scientific apparatus on this 
mission was 2.5 tons, and was used for the following experiments : 

Medical. — A veloergometer (apparently part of the Polinom appa- 
ratus) was used to measure and predict the functioning of the cardio- 
' vascular system, tone of the blood vessels, venous circulation, and 


circulation of blood to the brain. They also checked the effects of 
decompression on the lower part of the body with a special (Chibbis) 
decompression suit that was worn not only during exercises, but also for 
hours at a time while the cosmonauts performed routine^ daily tasks. 
Samples of blood and exhaled air were taken for analysis on Earth, 
as well as microbes from various parts of the ship. The Russians also 
checked vestibular reaction by use of a swivel chair, and used a "Plot- 
nust" device for ultrasonic measuring of changes in the composition 
of bone tissue. There also was an electric muscle stimulator, Tonus, 
which could send pulses to any specific set of muscles to exercise them. 

Exercise equipment included the treadmill used on other flights 
(which was reportedly 90 cm long and 40 cm wide), and a new addi- 
tion, a bicycle. This was described as a comfortable chair with pedals, 
turned alternately by the feet and hands, connected to a generator 
which stored the electricity that was produced. They followed a regime 
of three days of regulated exercises, and then one day where they could 
choose whatever they liked. 

Other Biological. — Experiments continued with microorganisms 
and higher plants, as well as with certain biological species. An experi- 
ment called "Oazis" involved growing leguminous plants, specifically 
peas, which sprouted in three weeks. The relationship between this 
"Oazis" and the Oazis-1 and -2 on earlier flights is unclear. Fruit 
flies (Drosophila) and the embryos of frogs that developed in space 
were observed to check their biological development in a weightless 

Earth Resources. — Not a major experiment in Soyuz 17, the crew 
only performed a small amount of Earth photography covering the 
following areas : the Kurile Islands, the Caspian depression. Central 
Asia, the southern European portion of the Soviet Union, the Far East 
and Kazakhstan. 

Atmospheric. — The "Emissiya" system was used to study the red 
line of atomic oxygen in the atmosphere at a height of 250-270 km. 
Spectrographs in the rear part of the space station scanned the Earth's 
horizon in areas where the electron system was active. These studies 
will be valuable both for meteorology and for determining flight dy- 
namics for satellites. Related to those studies, the crew continued 
research into the characteristics of plasma flow just outside their space 
station to see how it affected the rate of orbital decay. 

Earth Radiation. — The Earth's radiation was studied with an infra- 
red telescope/spectrometer (ITS-K). The telescope has a 300 mm 
diameter mirror, and the slit of the spectrometer is precisely in the 
telescope's focus. Here the radiation entering the device hits a fluorite 
prism. The apparatus receives wavelengths from 1-2 to 7 microns and 
has a 10 x 20 minute field of view, and the spectrometer has a resolving 
power of 600 lines per millimeter. 

Although the Earth's surface, the Moon and the galactic planes were 
all studied by the infrared device, its main target was the Earth's 
atmosphere. Spectra of solar radiation which had passed through the 
atmosphere were recorded at sunrise and sunset. To do this, the slits 
of the spectrometer were placed parallel to the Earth's horizon. The 
information is needed for determining the temperature of the atmos- 
phere as well as distribution of water vapor and rare gases such as 
ozone. The atmosphere can only be explored to about 35 km with air- 


craft, and although sounding rockets can travel higher, they leave 
vapor trails which do not permit close examination of some aspects of 
the atmosphere's characteristics. 

In order for the readings to be accurate, the apparatus must be kept 
extremely cold. Until this mission, a conventional cold generator with 
compressors was used. But a great deal of energy was required for this 
method, so this time the Russians provided an ice coat of solid nitrogen 
which maintained the proper temperature quite successfully. 

Astrophysical. — Two X-ray telescopes were used to study radiation 
from various areas of the universe. A "Filin" set of spectrometers was 
mounted on the outside of the station to detect the radiation by sensors, 
and was linked in parallel with a set of two optical telescopes (70 cm 
long with a 6 cm diameter and 1 degree field of view) to identify 
exactly what object was emitting the radiation. They used two modes 
of observation : one with the axis of the telescope permanently fixed 
on one area of the sky, and the other where the ship's commander 
oriented the ship and the flight engineer positioned the telescopes, as 
had been done with Orion-2. The Russians announced that for the first 
time an autonomous system of stellar orientation was used to train the 
telescope, but provided no further details. The second X-ray telescope 
RT-4, was not described until the Soyuz 18 mission. 

During their extensive operation of this system, the crew studied the 
Crab Nebula, supernova explosion remnants in both the Vela and 
Puppis constellation, the Ori (sic) star (probably Rigel), white 
dwarfs, neutron stars and black holes, as well as the background radia- 
tion of the galaxy along its meridian. 

Solar Photography. — A telescope made in Crimea was used for 
studies of the dynamics of the Sun in the ultraviolet. The orbital solar 
telescope (OST) was equipped with a KDS (for Krymskiy Difrakt- 
sionnyy Spektrometer — Crimean Diffraction Spectrometer) and it 
studied specific areas of the Sun, not the entire disc at one time. Al- 
though the Russians announced that the telescope had operated for 
two weeks before the crew came aboard, they also reported that the 
pointing system had malfunctioned causing the Sun to blind the main 
mirror. (The apparatus had two mirrors, the main one 25 cm in 
diameter with a 2.5 meter focal length, and a rotating mirror.) To 
correct this and make the telescope operational for the remainder of 
the flight, experts at the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory decided 
to reposition the rotating mirror so that the Sun's rays would be re- 
flected into the main mirror. To accomplish this, the cosmonauts had 
to position the ship so that the telescope's axis was pointing directly 
at the center of the Sun. This was no easy task, for the crew had to 
measure the time it took for the rotating mirror to move from one sup- 
port to another in its normal mode of operation, so they could calculate 
where it had to be stopped to assist the main mirror. The only way to 
do this was by listening to the mirror's movements, which the crew did 
with a stethoscope from their medical kit. Not only did this make the 
device operational, but once again proved man's usefulness in space. 

Although the main mirror was in a conical niche to protect it from 
micrometeorites, the cosmonauts had to resurface it by spraying a new 
reflective layer onto it. The Russians were delighted that the process 
worked well, for it was a deciding factor in their astrophysical plans 
for future space stations. If the surface could not be recoated, there 


would be no use in sending up other telescopes for long duration 

The Sun was quiet during the Soyuz 17 mission, but good photo- 
graphs were taken of dim flocculi (light patches on the Sun barely 
discernible from Earth) which exhibited bright features. These areas 
were simultaneously photographed on Earth for comparison purposes. 

Navigation. — Two navigation systems for autonomous control of the 
station were mentioned, and their relationship to each other is vague. 
Reports stated that daily tests were made of the Kaskad (Cascade) 
autonomous navigation system, consisting of an onboard computer 
that makes navigation measurements and determines orbital parame- 
ters. The Russians hope it will reduce fuel consumption for orienting 
the ship. The "Delta" system was described in much the same way, al- 
though it seems as though this system was a functioning part of 
Salyut, not an experimental version like Kaskad. 

Communications. — A new method of communication was experi- 
mented with that utilized a teletype system called "Stroka." This time 
the crew only tested the system, so it was used primarily for personal 
communications from family and friends, press reports on the mission, 
and basic information on orbital parameters. The system apparently 
works the same way newspaper teletypes do, with the message coming 
out on a strip of paper. This has the advantages that a permanent rec- 
ord, is provided of communications from Earth, and it relieves the crew 
of the need to be present when the message arrives. They can read it 
whenever they have time. 

c. April 5th Anomaly. — On April 5, 1975 at about 1103 GMT, the 
Russians launched a spacecraft with the announced purpose of dock- 
ing with Salyut 4 and continuing scientific experiments. But a stage 
separation malfunction of the A-2 booster forced the mission to be 
aborted and the crew, Col. Vasiliy Lazarev and Oleg Makarov, found 
themselves landing in cold, snowy Siberia southwest of the town of 
Gorno-Altaisk, 1,600 kilomters away from the launch site and only 320 
kilometers north of the Chinese border. After the failure, the mission 
was renamed the "April 5th Anomaly" and the Soyuz 18 designation 
it would have received was given to the next craft in the series. 

TASS did not announce the shot until two days later, presumably 
to give the crew time to be rescued and their health assessed. It is sus- 
pected that they spent the night at the landing site before recovery 
teams could meet them. They reportedly exited the spacecraft shortly 
after landing and built a fire. 

The primary significance of this failure was its relationship to 
ASTP, to be launched only three months later. Konstantin Bushuyev, 
Soviet program director for ASTP, assured his American counterpart, 
Glynn Lunney, that the launch vehicle used in this instance was an old 
version of the one to be used in July, and that none of the systems in 
common were suspect in the malfunction. This raised a lot of eyebrows 
in the West for several reasons. First, there had been no suspicion that 
the A-2 vehicle had two versions, although experts were aware of dif- 
ferences in the Soyuz craft itself. Second, since the Soyuz's docking 
target, Salyut 4, was in a substantially higher orbit than that to be 
used for ASTP, it seemed unlikely that a less capable launch vehicle 
would be used. Third, the A-2 is used for unmanned as well as manned 
missions. Why the Russians would use the older version on a manned 
flight rather than using them up on unmanned missions is unclear. 


NASA did not appear overly concerned with the failure, however. 
The Russians were preparing two complete sets of hardware for 
ASTP, so if one failed another would be ready on the pad. Also, a 
failure before reaching orbit would not affect the safety of the Ameri- 
can crew. 

Senator Proxmire, chairman of the Senate subcommittee dealing 
with NASA's appropriations, did not concur however, and called for 
a CIA briefing on the capabilities and safety of the Russian space 
program. Comments on this classified briefing are given in the annex 
to this chapter. 

d. Soyuz 18. — Six weeks after the failure of the Soyuz flight, Soyuz 
18 was launched to dock with Salyut 4. At 1458 GMT on May 24, 1975, 
Col. Petr Klimuk and Flight Engineer Vitaliv Sevastyanov were 
boosted into orbit by an A-2 vehicle. By the second revolution their 
orbital parameters were 247 x 193 km, inclined at 51.6°, with a period 
of 88.6 minutes. After at least two maneuvers, a normal docking was 
achieved with Salyut 4 on May 25. The orbit after docking was 356 x 
344 km, with a period of 91.3 minutes. 

Although the Russians reported that the crew required a "normal" 
amount of time for adaptation to weightlessness, they noted that this 
period was ten days, somewhat longer than previous crews needed. In 
a new medical experiment, experts decided to adopt ten days as an 
adaptation period in reverse, that is, use the ten days before the end of 
the mission to begin preparing the cosmonauts for Earth conditions. 
Remarking that the Soyuz 17 crew found physical exercise inadequate, 
physicians placed Klimuk and Sevastyanov on a high salt diet and en- 
couraged them to drink a lot of water to increase body fluids. Although 
both reported feelings of dizziness such as those they had experienced 
during initial adaptation, after landing on Earth doctors reported 
the experiment was successful. 13 

The mission carried 90 scientific and experimental installations to 
work in the following areas : studies of the Sun, planets and stars in 
various bands of the spectrum ; investigation of geological-morpholog- 
ical objects on the Earth's surface; physical processes in the atmos- 
phere and in cosmic space; medical-biological tests; and tests of the 
station's systems and design. 

During the 63 day mission, the joint Apollo/Soyuz launches took 
place and two communication sessions ensued between the crews of 
Soyuz 18 and Soyuz 19. The issue of having two Russian manned mis- 
sions in space at the same time was another topic for Senator Prox- 
mire's CIA briefing. 

The crew landed on July 26 at 1418 GMT, 56 km southwest of 
Arkalyk, Kazakhstan. Although they set a new space duration record 
for the Soviet Union, they did not surpass the American record of 
Skylab 4. 

Since most of the experiments for Soyuz 18 were continuations of 
Soyuz 17 projects, there is no need to discuss them in detail here. The 
Polinom and Chibbis suit medical experiments were continued, onions 
and peas were grown in the Oazis system, and Drosophila development 
was studied. Research into the atmosphere was continued with "Emis- 

13 TASS, Moscow, July 29, 1975, 0600 GMT. In a subsequent report (TASS, September 18, 
1975) the Russians make no reference to this report, and say that the cosmonauts needed 
only 4 days for adaptation. 


siya," as was solar photography and other astrophysical observations, 
and the Stroka communication was utilized again. 
Other experiments included : 

Earth Resources. — A great deal of attention was given to Earth 
photography this time, supposedly so they can compare photographs 
of areas in winter with those taken in summer. Covered in this mission 
were: the European part of the Soviet Union, the Transcaucasus, 
northern Kazakhstan, republics of Soviet Central Asia, Primorye ter- 
ritory, Kurile Islands, Rostov and Volgograd oblasti, the Ukraine, 
Turkmenia, the Pamirs, Sakhalin Island, the eastern part of the 
Baykal-Amur railway, the Orenberg region, the Volga, maritime 
areas, mountains, sea currents, and shelves and deposits on beds of 
rivers at their mouths. All in all, over 8.5 million square kilometers 
were photographed. 

Atmospheric. — Experiments that had been conducted on previous 
flights into the nature of the space immediately surrounding Salyut 
were continued and given the name "Spektr." They involved investiga- 
tions of the physical properties of the cosmic environment, specifically 
interaction between space vehicles and space. An analyzer on board the 
station oriented in the direction of flight measures the density, com- 
position and temperature of particles striking the hull of the ship to 
see how they affect orbital decay. 

Astrophysical. — The two X-ray telescopes were used again, and a 
description of the RT-4 mirror X-ray device was given. This tele- 
scope was used to study soft X-radiation carrying photons with energy 
less than one kiloelectronvolt. It had a parabolic mirror with a diam- 
eter equal to 200 mm, a photon counter, a system of gas filling, and an 
electron device for primary processing of information. It looked at 
known sources of radiation rather than scanning for unknown sources 
as the Filin spectrometer had done, and had an independent orienta- 
tion system accurate up to 15 seconds of arc. The crew studied the 
constellations of Scorpio, Virgo, Cygnus and Lyra, focussing especial- 
ly on X-l Scorpio and X-l Cygni. The latter is suspected of being 
the ever-elusive black hole, although its correct classification now is a 
neutron star. Because of the atmosphere, exact readings on this object 
are not possible from Earth, and the Russians stated they could now 
measure its mass, size, luminosity, density and temperature. 

Navigation and Tracking. — A new tracking technique was tried out 
using lasers. The laser pulses were sent from Earth and reflected 
back by an optical corner reflector installed in the ship. These trials 
were successful. 

Concerning navigation, no real clues were given as to the distinction 
between "Delta" and "Kaskad." It is possible that Delta is the system 
presently being used, which has a radio altimeter and other instru- 
ments to compute orbital parameters, and Kaskad is an innovation 
for the future using only stars and other celestial objects for guidance. 

Systems. — The crew practiced thermal regulation and life support 
in various modes. They also used a freon installation to study how 
liquids are affected in orbital flight. The results will be used for creat- 
ing hydraulic systems for spacecraft. 

1J+. Soyuz 19, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 

Due to the significance of this first joint space mission, the subject 
is treated separately in the annex to this chapter. 


15. Kosmos 772. 

On September 29, 1975 the Russians launched Kosmos 772 into a 
320 x 201 km orbit, inclined at 51.8°. Soyuz-type telemetry on 20.008 
MHz was monitored in Kettering and Akrotiri, Cyprus. Like the 
Soyuz ferry ships, Kosmos 772 had no solar panels, but it remained in 
orbit for three days, like Kosmos 670 and a day longer than most other 
missions of its kind, suggesting either greater battery capacity or 
lessened electrical loads such as that which would be associated with a 
one-man crew. Some speculated that it might be a system test for re- 
turn to three-man crews. 

16. Soyuz 20 with Salyut 4. 

In mid-November the Russians launched an unmanned Soyuz 20 to 
dock with Salyut 4. After several days, they announced that on board 
the ship were biological specimens for parallel experiments 
with the Kosmos 782 mission. Since that places Soyuz 20 under the 
biosat category, the discussion of this flight is deferred to that section 
(see page 223). 

III. The Zond Program of Precursors to Manned Circumlunar 


The now inactive Zond program of precursors to manned circum- 
lunar flight began in 1968 (although earlier failures not officially 
linked to this program are suspected. ) After five flights, the program 
was terminated for reasons still unknown. Speculation as to what 
happened to this program as well as Soviet plans for manned lunar 
flight will be discussed later. 

The view had long been held that just as the U.S.S.R. was first in 
Earth orbit, so would they be first to send men around the Moon. The 
1965 missions in which Proton payloads were flown using the D class 
vehicle suggested that a launch vehicle was available to support such 
a mission. The same common wisdom suggested a Soviet Moon landing 
by 1972, and this was the estimate President Kennedy hoped to beat 
with Apollo. A vigorous and successful development of the D-l-e 
booster might have realized the first of these predictions and provided 
a stunning celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet state in 
November 1967. 

On two occasions in 1967, according to British measurements, the 
D-l-e was used for flights which attained Earth orbit only. These were 
on March 10 with Kosmos 146 and on April 8 with Kosmos 154. The 
flights occurred just one lunar month apart, so possibly were Zond 
precursors that failed, and if so, may have set back the Soviet timeta- 
ble. There may have been other, later attempts which were even less 
successful, as they did not reach Earth orbit. Newsweek magazine 
claimed that on November 22, 1967 and April 22, 1968, Zond flights to 
the Moon were attempted and failed. There are no official statements to 
prove or disprove that contention. 

a. zond 4 

On March 2, 1968 Zond 4 was launched 14 and it is now judged as a 

14 As detailed in Chapter Two, Zond 1-3 were planetary probes ; Zond 1 to Venus in 1964 ; 
Zond 2 to Mars in 1964 ; and Zond 3 past the Moon (where it took high quality pictures 
of the far side) and on to Mars. 


diagnostic engineering test of subsequent Zond flights (which the Rus- 
sians themselves identified as fully capable of carrying a human crew 
around the Moon). It wasn't until 1971 that a drawing was released 
showing the ship to be virtually identical in external appearance to 
Soyuz, but without the forward work module. The British Royal Air- 
craft Establishment has estimated its weight at 4,820 kg, with a length 
of 5.3 meters and diameter of 2.3 meters. This estimate may very well 
understate the weight which could have been as much as 5,800 kg. 

Zond 4 was launched one half lunar month away from the ideal time 
to launch toward the Moon, and was sent in a direction opposite to the 
Moon. Using the D-l-e, it was placed in a parking orbit around Earth, 
and then was fired from its orbital launch platform out to what the 
Russians called "outlying regions of near Earth space." Presumably 
it was intended to go out about as far as the Moon's orbit, but would 
afford a better opportunity for controlled return to Earth without 
lunar gravity being as operative as during a flight around the Moon 
itself. Considering the significance of a new program of such magni- 
tude and portent, the failure of the Russians to give any further report 
on the flight strongly suggests that it was not a success, but there is no 
evidence in the public domain either way. 

B. ZOXD 5 

On September 14, 1968, Zond 5 was launched in a similar fashion, 
but this time on a course to circle the Moon. On September 17 a mid- 
course correction was performed to bring it to the correct path to swing 
around the Moon at a distance of 1,950 km. Another correction was 
later made on approach to the Moon relating to its return to Earth. 

The ship was described as consisting of two compartments. One was 
the recoverable cabin, with its heavy layers of ablation material, para- 
chute packs, scientific instruments, radio communications equipment, 
heat regulating system and power supply. The other was the service 
module with two large solar cell panels extending like gull wings, a 
radio telemetry system, control equipment, orientation and stabiliza- 
tion systems, heat regulation system, chemical batteries, and rocket 
propulsion systems for course corrections. Optical sensors and radio 
antennas were also carried externally. 

_ Although the mission was primarily an engineering test, it also car- 
ried cameras and a biological payload. The cameras returned for the 
first time high quality photographs rather than radio facsimile pic- 
tures. The biological payload consisted of: turtles; wine flies; meal 
worms ; a spiderwort plant with buds ; seeds of wheat, pine and barley ; 
chlorella in various nutrients; lysogenetic bacteria of various types; 
and other unspecified living matter. Upon recovery, the turtles were 
active, but had lost about 10 percent of their body weight and had 
excessive glycogen and iron in their liver tissue as compared with 
Earth-based controls. In 1971 the Soviets revealed that the barley and 
pine seeds showed some changes, as expected because of their known 
sensitivity to radioactivity, but no changes in the other plants were 

Seven days after launch, Zond 5 returned to Earth. This was the 
first return of a spacecraft from a deep space mission (although similar 
high speed reentries had been simulated by U.S. craft) and it had to 


hit a reentry corridor between 35 and 48 km above the Earth. If the 
ship had approached Earth 10 km lower, it would have been destroyed 
by overloads of heat and pressure; 24 km higher and it would have 
skipped out of the atmosphere. 

Entering the atmosphere at 10,900 meters per second, it was slowed 
aerodynamically to 200 meters per second and then deployed a para- 
chute at 7 km altitude. The approach to Earth was over the South Pole, 
and Zond 5 then made a ballistic reentry, landing in the South Indian 
Ocean as it headed north at coordinates 32°38'S. by 75°33'E. The cap- 
sule had been exposed to heat levels of 13,000 °C during reentry. 

This was the Russians' first water recovery of a space capsule, and 
the Soviet account said it was especially difficult because the splash- 
down occurred at night and the payload had to be "discovered." Re- 
covery was directed by the Academy of Sciences rescue service and 
the tracking ship Borovichiy which used radio direction finders and 
searchlights. An oceanography ship, Vasiliy Golovnin, carried the 
•capsule to Bombay where it was transferred to a Soviet AN-12 cargo 
plane and flown to the U.S.S.R. 

c. ZOND 6 

Zond 6 was launched with a D-l-e on November 10, 1968. A total of 
three orbital corrections were made : the first on November 12, and the 
other two after passage around the Moon on November 14 at a distance 
of 2,250 km. 

Much of this mission was a repeat of Zond 5. Equipment was carried 
to study the effects of radiation on living creatures (although no de- 
scription of the biological payload was given) as well as a photoemul- 
sion chamber to record the paths of cosmic rays and a device to meas- 
ure the impacts of micrometeorites. 

More lunar photographs were taken with a standard aerial camera 
which had a focal length of 400 mm, frame size of 13 x 18 cm, and a 
resolution of 50 lines per millimeter. While Zond 3 facsimile pictures 
could provide 1.2 million data bits per picture, each Zond 6 photo- 
graph had 134 million data bits. Some of the views made stereo pic- 
tures of the Moon possible, both on the near and far sides. The film 
itself measured 29 cm wide and 28 meters long. 

On November 17, Zond 6 returned to Earth in the same manner as 
Zond 5 with one important difference. It approached at 11 km per 
second, used aerodynamic braking to slow to 7.6 km per second, and 
then the control mechanism on board was used to orient the craft so 
that it developed considerable lift and skipped outside the atmosphere 
again. Then it made a second reentry into the atmosphere and by con- 
tinued operation of its orientation system made a controlled landing in 
the Soviet Union in the "preset district." This was a very impressive 
achievement, to travel so many thousands of additional kilometers be- 
yond the point of ballistic reentry. 

The Russians explained that the South Pole approach was the only 
practical one for returning Zond payloads to the Soviet Union, because 
a direct ballistic approach would bring too heavy an overload for a 
human crew. The southern approach permits the long double entry, 
skip return. Academician G. I. Petrov noted, however, that the pro- 
longed reentry increased the effect of heat flow, and added a con- 


siderable strain to the structure of the heat protecting system. 15 He 
also stated that the G load for Zond 5 reached 10 to 16 G's and implied 
that for Zond 6 it was more like that for Soyuz (3 to 4 G's) . This was 
later reported to be 4 to 7 G's for the first immersion. 16 

The Russians finally made a formal announcement that Zonds 4, 
5 and G were all aimed at perfecting a manned space ship to go around 
the Moon. Although all the indications were that Zond 6 performed 
well, Academician Blagonravov stated that further unmanned tests 
would be required before men could be sent. 17 

D. ZOND 7 

The launch of Zond 7 came on August 7, 1969, with the announced 
purpose of further engineering tests and more photographs of the 
Moon's surface. On August 9 a course correction was made so that it 
circled the Moon on August 11 at a distance of 2,000 km. The craft 
returned to Earth August 14, in the same manner as Zond 6 and from 
all outward signs it Avas quite successful. Only two orbital corrections 
had been required. Recovery was announced more promptly than 
for earlier flights. 

The only difference between this mission and the others was that 
it took color as well as black and white photographs. Sessions 
of picture taking were held on August 8 for Earth, and on August 11 
for the Moon (twice) and the Earth as it set beneath the Moon's 
horizon. The hope was that color pictures from different angles 
would reveal differences in the microstructure of lunar material, and 
that new f eatures of the Earth would be discovered. 

E. ZOND 8 

The only Zond flight of 1970 and the last in the seizes was Zond 8 on 
October 20. When it was 328,000 km from Earth, the craft was observed 
by telescope at the Sternberg Astronomical Institute in the Transili 
Alatau of Central Asia. Photomultiplier tubes made it possible to 
find its movement against the star background to determine its tra- 
jectory very precisely. Similar pictures were taken at other times 
both by the Institute and the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory. 

On October 21, Zond 8 transmitted the first television images of 
Earth, from a distance of 65,000 km, and these continued for the next- 
two days. On the 24th, after a mid-course correction, the craft passed 
within 1,100 km of the Moon, and both color and black and white 
pictures were taken of the surface. 

This mission used a quite different approach to Earth upon reentry : 
over the North Pole instead of the South. This had the advantage that 
during most of the reentry, Soviet ground stations could control the 
flight. This also proved to be the second Russian water recovery, with 
the craft splashing down 725 km southeast of the Chagos Archipelago 
in the Indian Ocean, probably in a ballistic reentry. This time recovery 
ships were sufficiently well positioned to see the actual reentry, and 
although it was again at night, the capsule was quickly picked up by 

15 Izvestiya, Moscow, November 19, 1968, p. 2. 
10 Moscow Rural Life, Nov. 24, 1968, p. 4. 
17 Moscow Radio, Dec. 10, 1968, 1200 GMT. 


the Taman. It was then transferred to the Semyon Chelyuskin for 
the trip to Bombay, where it was put aboard a cargo plane for the 
flight back to the Soviet Union. 

IV. The Soviet Manned Lunar Landing Program 

'This section provides a brief discussion of whether the U.S.S.R. had 
a program for landing men on the Moon. A more detailed examination 
of this subject as well as an exploration of the entire range of possible 
future space missions can be found in Chapter Seven. 

The threat of the Soviet Union reaching the Moon before the 
United States gave the American space program the impetus (emo- 
tional and financial) it needed to achieve what it has today. Thus 
the question of whether there was indeed a "race" to the Moon or not 
is of no mean import to those who paid $25 billion to "land some clown 
on the Moon" as detractors are fond of saying. 

Unfortunately there is no definitive way to prove the case either 
way. All that is attempted here is an analysis of statements made by 
those who should have known the direction of their space program 
prior to Americans landing on the Moon in 1960, and their technical 


Prior to 1969 there was a wealth of statements reflecting the posi- 
tion that the Russians were interested in landing on the Moon and an 
extensive collection of these quotes (as well as statements on other 
aspects of the space program) are given in the 1966-70 edition of this 
report (pp. 359-384). If the case were to be proved on verbal evi- 
dence alone, there would be no question but that a manned lunar 
landing was high on the Soviet agenda. A sample of statements prior 
to July 20, 1969 : 

Cosmonaut Feoktistov outlined the Soviet space program as involved in four 
progressive steps: (1) Study of geophysics and solar phenomena, and unmanned 
flight to the Moon and planets; (2) study of space biology and man's adaptabil- 
ity; (3) learning to link up and assemble in orbit a launch facility, as a step to- 
ward landing an expedition of men on the Moon; and (4) sending landing 
expeditions of men to Mars and Venus with fundamentally new rocket and 
spacecraft systems. (TASS, December 31, 1964, 1524 GMT.) 

Professor Yelizavetskiy stated : "The launching of the Voskhod 2 and Leonov's 
space walk strengthens the confidence that the first people on the Moon will 
be Soviet people." (Moscow Radio, March 19, 1965, 0730 GMT.) 

Cosmonaut Leonov said there is a regular, scheduled preparation in the Soviet 
Union for the conquest of space and the time is approaching when men will land 
on the Moon. The task of landing has been solved. (Budapest MTI, April 6, 1966, 
0907 GMT. ) 

Academician Keldysh said it is now clear that soon man will land on the Moon 
and on other planets. (Moscow Radio, October 24, 1967, 1400 GMT.) 

Academician Konstantinov stated that landing a man on the Moon does not 
belong to the realm of fantasy any longer. This is an affair of the nearest, of 
the most imminent future. Everything is already prepared for this undertaking. 
There are a few details like radiation hazards, but these will be solved soon. 
Perhaps the Americans even will be first, but it is still a competition and a 
question of prestige. ( Vjesnik, Zagreb, January 21, 1968, p. 8.) 

Cosmonaut Shatalov told the Hungarian news agency correspondent in Mos- 
cow that the Soviet Union will require "six, seven, and perhaps more months" 


of preparations to land on the Moon. "Who makes the better preparations will 
get to the Moon first, and it is our wish to do so." (Belgrade TANYUG, April 9, 
1969, 1116 GMT.) 

Cosmonaut Leonov : "The Soviet Union also is making preparations for a 
manned flight to the Moon, like the Apollo program of the United States. The 
Soviet Union will be able to send men to the Moon this year or in 1970. We are 
confident that pieces of rocks picked from the surface of the Moon by Soviet 
cosmonauts will be put on display in the Soviet pavillion during the Japan World 
Exposition in Osaka in 1970. (Yomiuri, Tokyo, June 14, 1969, p. 10.) 

The above comments give a strong basis for the official American 
contention that there was a race to the Moon underway. Those who 
-disagree use two 1963 statements as the core of their argument. 

The first was made by Sir Bernard Lovell, Director of the Jodrell 
Bank Radio Observatory in England. Upon returning to London from 
a tour of several astronomical centers in the Soviet Union, Lovell 
reportedly said "the Russians are not interested in sending men to 
the Moon." Later, however, during a trip to Washington, Lovell 
maintained that the press had misquoted him and that he had "every 
reason to believe that the Russians are trying to reach the Moon every 
bit as fast as the Americans." 18 

The second comment was by then Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev 
in response to a reporter's question : "At the present time we do not 
plan flights of cosmonauts to the Moon. . . . We do not wish to 
compete in sending people to the Moon without thorough prepara- 
tion." 19 The first part of the statement was taken by U.S. critics as 
demonstrating that we were racing with no opposition. But the second 
phrase does not imply that the Soviets had no interest in the Moon, 
only that safety considerations should come first. 

One must also take into account that Khrushchev was an expert 
politician and he knew that if the American public could be con- 
vinced that there was no race, there was a good chance the U.S. space 
program would slow down, giving his country more time to develop 
their own hardware. 


In order for the Soviets to land men on the Moon they would have 
to demonstrate a technical capability in several areas. Three of the 
most crucial are discussed here: rendezvous and docking in orbit; a 
spacecraft with adequate controls for navigation and guidance, life 
support, and heat regulation ; and a launch vehicle capable of sending 
sizable payloads to the Moon. 

1. Rendezvous and Docking 

As the earlier sections of this chapter indicate, exercises related to 
the rendezvous and docking of two ships in Earth orbit have played a 
major role in the Soviet space program since its beginning. Their first 
manned "near pass" came with the Soviet Union's third and fourth 
spaceflights, Vostok 3 and 4. The mission was repeated with the next 
two flights, Vostok 5 and 6. 

18 Young, Hugo, Bryan Silcock and Peter Dunn. Journey to tranquillity. Garden City, 
New York, Doubleday. 1969 : back cover. 

16 Oberpr. James E. Russia meant to win the "moon race." Spaceflight, London, v. 17, May 
1975: 163-4. 


Docking was the next step, and may have been the mission for the 
ill-fated Soyuz 1 and a second ship never launched. After the death of 
Soyuz l's pilot, the manned program slowed down and docking exer- 
cises were practiced by unmanned ships. Thus in 1967 the Russians 
achieved their first docking, between Kosmos 186 and 188. After a 
second unmanned practice with Kosmos 212 and 213, an unsuccessful 
attempt was made with the manned Soyuz 3 and unmanned Soyuz 2. 
Not until the Soyuz 4 and 5 link-up could the Russians finally celebrate 
a success with manned ships. This was not until January 1969, how- 
ever, and the Americans had already sent three men into lunar orbit 
and brought them home again. The "race" had been won, for most 

2. The Spaceship 

Although a case could probabh T be made that all the manned flights 
and their precursors were devoted in some respect to developing sys- 
tems capable of long duration spaceflights, the focns here is on the 
Zond series, for the Russians themselves announced they were tests 
related to manned circumlunar voyages. 

The Zond capsule is a modified Soyuz, with the orbital workshop 
removed and a still unidentified object put in its place (there is specu- 
lation that this is a docking collar). A large parabolic radio antenna 
was added for long range communications, and the Zond may have a 
reinforced heat shield. These Zond missions were described in an earlier 
section of this chapter, so attention here will only be drawn to what the 
program demonstrated. Most notable was the reentry procedure prac- 
ticed with Zond 6 and 7 wherein the spaceship entered the Earth's 
atmosphere, skipped out to cool the heat shield, and then reentered 
for landing. This required a great deal of navigation and guidance 

Concerning life support systems, Oberg reports that without the 
orbital module, only a single-pilot, six-day mission was possible. 20 
This would be enough for a circumlunar flight, although not a landing. 
It does seem possible, then, that the Soviets could have sent a man 
at least around the Moon, although since no attempt has been made yet, 
the case cannot be proven. 

S. The Launch Vehicle 

The development of a launch vehicle capable of sending a payload 
heavy enough to accommodate men to the Moon is a hotly debated 
issue in the West. Some say there is no such vehicle ; others say it has 
been tested. 

The D class (or Proton) vehicle is the largest known launch vehicle 
available to the Russians and has been used for the Salyut space sta- 
tions, the Zond series, unmanned lunar and planetary landing pro- 
grams, and at least one Kosmos satellite possibly related to the Moon 
program (Kosmos 382). But for unknown reasons the vehicle has yet 
to be man-rated. Since it is possible that the D class is either part of the 
larger booster or at least its forerunner, its jack of total success could 
be the major factor preventing the Russians from developing a booster 
comparable to the American Saturn V. 

20 Obercr. James E. The hidden history of the Soyuz project. Spaceflight, London, v. 17, 
August-September 1975 : 284. 


The large vehicle, here designated the G-l-e, was first brought to 
public attention in America in 1967 when NASA representatives oegan 
testifying before Congress that the Soviet Union was developing a 
vehicle with thrust greater than that of Saturn V. Newsmen revealed 
that outside the hearing room NASA information was more specific : 
the thrust was in the 5-7 million kilogram range. 

To date, no successful test of the G-l-e has been conducted. There 
are rumors that in the first test (19G9) the vehicle blew up on the pad. 
Vick reports that the explosion was so great that the Nimbus weather 
satellite observed it and 18 months were required for rebuilding the 
launch facility. 21 Subsequent countdowns and tests of the vehicle also 

Without a vehicle equivalent to Saturn V, a lunar landing was not 
likely. With tests of the G-l-e beginning in 1969, there is a possibility 
that the Eussians either hoped to send men to the Moon before the 
scheduled Apollo landing (although this would have allowed little 
if any time for unmanned tests, their modus operandi) or expected 
the American program to be delayed, perhaps just enough to give them 
the extra time needed. Some American experts felt the Apollo time- 
table would slip by as much as a few years, so the Russians had some 
basis for their hopes. 


Taking into account not only statements by Soviet officials, but the 
early progress of their space program, evidence seems to support the 
view that the Russians were indeed aiming for the Moon as much as, 
if not more than, the Americans. In addition to what has been dis- 
cussed above, other indicators such as tracking and water recovery 
exercises are available. The death of Komarov in 1967 and repeated 
failures of the G-l-e caused severe setbacks in their ambitions, how- 
ever, and they lost the race. 

A further discussion of this issue, as well as the current status of the 
Russians' lunar landing plans, is given in Chapter Seven. 

V. Unmanned Biological Flights 
a. K0SM0S no 

At the time of the Voskhod flights, a number of statements were 
made indicating that further manned flights would occur. One can only 
speculate whether fiscal economies led to a cancellation of these mis- 
sions, or whether it was decided to apply the existing stock of launch 
vehicles to other programs while engineering a later generation 
manned ship. But apparently at least one more Voskhod flew, only it 
was unmanned. 

Designated Kosmos 110, it was launched on February 22, 1966 into 
a 904 x 187 km orbit by an A-2 vehicle and carried two dogs, Veterok 
and Ugolek. A television monitor was on board to add to telemetry 
from biological and cabin environment sensors. The flight set a dura- 
tion record of 22 days, following which the dogs were successfully 
recovered. Data from this mission considerably expanded Soviet infor- 
mation on the more prolonged effects of weightlessness and radiation. 

21 Vick, Charles P. Soviet Superboosters-2. Spaceflight. London, v. 16, March 1974 : 96. 



After a seven year hiatus, the Soviet Union launched another bio- 
logical satellite, although it is unclear whether a Vostok or Soyuz was 
used. A Soviet picture not published in the West seems to show a 
Vostok derivative. Kosmos 605 was launched from Plesetsk by an A-2 
vehicle on October 31, 1973 into a 424 x 221 km orbit, inclined at 
62.8°, with a period of 90.7 minutes. Aboard the vehicle was a cargo 
of several dozen white rats, six boxes of steppe tortoises, a colony of 
Drosophila fruit flies, flour beetles, a mushroom bed and cultures of 
living bacteriological spores. A control package was kept on Earth 
during the 21 day space flight, w T ith the only difference in conditions 
being the gravitational factor. 

A. Burnazyan, Deputy Health Minister of the Soviet Union, de- 
scribed the purpose of the mission as u to investigate what functions 
and processes at the cellular level of the organization of living sys- 
tems are particularly sensitive to the action of weightlessness and 
space radiation, and how substantial an effect these can have on the 
functioning of the organism as a whole." 22 

The condition of the animals was assessed by the amoimt of motor 
activity exhibited. This was measured by a special electric monitoring 
system which used the animals as cores in a weak magnetic field inside 
their cages. The amount of movement was registered every two hours 
and telemetered to Earth. 

After recovery of the spacecraft, equal numbers of space and con- 
trol specimens were subjected to autopsy at various time intervals. 
Some were examined immediately after the flight, others were kept 
up to 30 days, and still other were kept for prolonged study. A detailed 
discussion of the results of this mission are given in Chapter Four. 

C. KOSMOS 6 90 

A year after Kosmos 605, the Russians launched another mission 
dedicated to biological research. Again carrying white rats, turtles, 
Drosophila, lower fungi and microorganisms, Kosmos 690 was placed 
into a 389 x 223 km orbit inclined at 62.8° with an A-2 vehicle on 
October 22, 1974. 

The primary purpose of this mission, unlike Kosmos 605, was to 
study the effects of stronger radiation on animals and plants in space. 
For this, a cesium 137 gamma-ray source was used to dose the rats 
with 200-1000 rad daily on command from Earth (1,200-1,300 rad is 

After recovery on November 12, the space rats were not only less 
active than their controls, but they had developed hemorrhages m the 
lungs. Scientists concluded that exposure to radiation in space has a 
much greater effect than on Earth. A more detailed discussion of the 
biological aspects of this mission is in Chapter Four. 

D. KOSMOS 782 

Pursuant to an agreement between the two countries, the Soviet 
Union included U.S. experiments on the next in their series of biosats. 

22 Pravda, Moscow, Nov. 9, 1973, p. 3. 


Experiments were also conducted by specialists from Czechoslovakia, 
France, Hungary, Romania and Poland. The spacecraft, Kosmos 782, 
was launched from Plesetsk on November 25, 1975 into a 405 x 227 
km orbit, inclined at 62.8° with a period of 90.5 minutes. 

As a special feature, Kosmos 782 carried a centrifuge to study ef- 
fects of gravity on living organisms in space. Identical specimens were 
placed on the centrifuge and off it for comparison purposes. One joint 
US/USSR experiment studied the growth of cancer cells following 
up on a discovery by American scientists that the greater the force of 
gravity, the slower the rate at which cancer cells grow. Czechoslovakia 
provided a number of white rats for studying the overall effect of 
spaceflight on organisms, and a French/Romanian/Soviet experiment 
studied cosmic ray influences on organisms and seeds. 

Another joint US/USSR experiment was to study cosmic effects on 
the aging process in Drosophila which reproduce so rapidly that 
several generations can be studied on one space flight. Other U.S. 
experiments included: effects of prolonged weightlessness on plant 
systems, using carrot slices; detection of heavy particle radiation at 
different locations aboard the spaceship; and the effects of weight- 
lessness on vestibular systems of killifish. 

The Russians invited American scientists to participate in analysis 
of several of their experiments, including : stress reactions of animals 
during space flight; effects of weightlessness on the life span of red 
blood cells, hormonal content of the pituitary gland, and bone tissue 
development; and possible damage to the retina from high energy 
particle radiation. 

Kosmos 782 landed on December 15, after 19.5 days in space. The 
mission had originally been scheduled for 22 days, but snowstorms in 
the recovery area forced an early end to the flight. The Russians an- 
nounced that for the first time, a set of post-flight experiments were 
conducted at the landing site using a mobile field laboratory. Prelimi- 
nary analysis of the NASA experiments indicates that the program 
went very well. Shortly before the mission had been launched, NASA 
was invited to include experiments on the next biosat as well, to be 
launched in 1977. NASA officials seemed pleased to have an oppor- 
tunity to continue such tests, since they will have to wait until the space 
shuttle is ready before they can conduct their own biology experiments 
in space. 

E. SOYUZ 20 

After termination of the Soyuz 18 mission, Salyut 4 remained in 
orbit, prompting speculation that a third crew might be sent to work 
on the space station. This would have been a new feat, since the life- 
times of the Salyut 1 and 3 were limited, and each actually hosted only 
one crew. 

On November 17, 1975 the Russians did indeed launch another Soyuz 
mission to dock with Salyut 4, but surprisingly this was unmanned. 
Since during the Soyuz 15 mission the Russians had indicated that 
they were developing a tanker spacecraft to refuel space stations in 
orbit, preliminary speculation centered around the possibility that 
Soyuz 20 was the first such mission. There were many doubts, however, 
since there was no indication that the Salyut was equipped with a dock- 
ing port on the service module end, assumed a necessity for fuel trans- 


fer. All speculation ended, however, when Soviet ASTP technical 
director Konstantin Bushuyev, on a post-ASTP visit to Houston, 
stated that it definitely was not a refueling mission. He said only that 
the craft would conduct automatic rendezvous and docking tests and 
check out modifications to the Soyuz for that purpose. A few days 
later, on December 4, the Russians announced that Soyuz 20 was carry- 
ing out parallel biological studies with Kosmos 782. Aboard Soyuz 20, 
were turtles, Drosophila, cactuses, gladioli bulbs, vegetable seeds, corn 
and legumes. Soyuz 20 and Kosmos 782 had different microclimates for 
the specimens aboard, so comparison studies could be performed. 

VI. The Soviet Cosmonauts 

The biographical information provided here is the latest available, 
although there is uncertainty as to whether all of it is current, for 
such data are difficult to obtain. For example, some of the cosmonauts 
may have been promoted in rank, completed studies, or added to their 
families without further public announcement. 

It is likely that the cosmonauts were chosen in groups as the Ameri- 
can astronauts were, although members of such groups generally be- 
come known only after they have flown a space mission. Just as many 
astronauts have yet to fly in space for reasons such as no flight oppor- 
tunities, leaving the program for personal reasons, or death in non- 
space accidents, the same is probably true of the Soviet corps. Hence 
its total dimensions over the entire period since 19fi0 can on ] v bo cli- 
mated. A table of the probable dimensions of the corps follows (based 
generally on the research of James E. Oberg, Flight International, 
August i6,1973) : 




Est. Total 


Name and Year of First Flight 






Gagarin 61, Titov 61, Nikolavev 62, Ponovich 

62, Bykovskiy 63, Komarov 64, Belyayev 

65, Leonov 65, Volynov 69, Khrunov 69, 

Shonin 69, Gorbatko 69. 






Tereshkova 63. 



Test Pilots 



Beregovov 68, Shatalov 69, Filipchenko 69, 

Dobrovclskiy 71, Lazarev 73, Artyukhin 

74, Gubarev 75. 






Feoktistcv 64, Yegorov 64, Demin 74. 












Yelisevev 69, Kubasov 69, Volkov 69, 

Sevastyanov 70, Rukavishnikov 71, 

Patsayev 71, Makarov 73, Grechko 75. 









Dzhanibekov( ), Romanenko( ). 





Andreyev ( ), Ivanchenko ( ). 






Lebedev 73. 




It is unlikely that cosmonauts have been killed in space flights beyond 
the few names which will follow in this report, because all known 
flights have recognizable precursor flights, have been matched by ad- 
vance rumors of impending launch, have required positioning of sup- 
port ships world-wide, and have sent live television from orbit. To ac- 
cept the recurring speculative stories of other deaths in flight requires 
belief in a second, secret launch program using untried hardware, no 
support ships, and no television from orbit, and in which all crews are 
always killed. This strains credulity. 


The Oberg studies of Soviet still and motion picture films have 
shown men from the early days who clearly dressed like and acted like 
known cosmonauts in these same scenes; hence, they may represent 
men who have yet to fly, others who have been dropped from the pro- 
gram, trainees killed in non-space accidents, or simply instructors and 
support personnel. In the February 1974 issue of Spaceflight, Oberg 
announced that one of his unidentified cosmonauts was finally identi- 
fied as Yevgeniy Karpov, then director of the cosmonaut training 


Boris Dmitriyevich Andreyev; civilian; b. 1940, Moscow; married, two children. 
Graduated from Moscow's Bauman Higher Technical School, joined a design 
bureau in 1905 and became a cosmonaut in 1970. He was a member of the 
second backup crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 

Yuriy Peirovich Artyukhin; Lieutenant Colonel, Red Air Force; b. 1930, Per- 
shutino, near Moscow ; married, two children. Attended Serpukhov Air 
Force Technical School, served in the Air Force for several years, gradu- 
ated from Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy (1958), and joined 
the cosmonaut corps in 1963. He was the flight engineer on Soyuz 14/Salyut 3. 

Pavel Ivanovich Belyayev; Lieutenant Colonel, Red Naval Air Force ; b. June 26, 
1925 Vologda region ; d. January 10, 1970 from complications following an 
operation for stomach ulcers ; was married, two children. Attended the Air 
Force Academy and became a cosmonaut in 1960. He was the command pilot 
of Voskhod 2. 

Georgiy Timofeyevich Beregovoy ; Major General, Red Air Force; b. April 15, 
1921, Fedorovka, the Ukraine; married, two children. Attended Lugansk 
Military Air School, graduated from the Red Banner Air Force Academy 
(1956) and became a cosmonaut in 1964. He was the pilot of Soyuz 3 and it 
is speculated that he is no longer in active training for future flights. 

Valeriy Fedorovich Bykovskiy ; Colonel, Red Air Force ; b. August 2, 1934, Pavolo- 
Posad near Moscow ; married, one child. Became a cosmonaut in 1960 and 
attended Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy, graduating in 1968. 
He was the backup pilot for Vostok 3, pilot of Vostok 5, and was chief of 
cosmonaut training for the Apollo-Soyuz mission. It is speculated that he 
is no longer in training for future flights. 

Lev Stcpanovich Demin; Colonel, Red Air Force; b. 1926, Moscow; married, 
two children. Graduated from an Air Force communications school, Zhu- 
kovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy (1956), earned a degree as candi- 
date of technical sciences (1963), and joined the cosmonaut corps in 1964. 
He was the flight engineer on Soyuz 15. 

Georgiy Timofeyevich Dobrovolskiy ; Lieutenant Colonel, Red Air Force; b. 
June 1, 1928, Odessa ; d. June 29, 1971 during Soyuz 11 reentry ; was married, 
two children. Graduated from the Air Force School at Chuguyevo and be- 
came a cosmonaut in 1963. He was the command pilot of Soyuz 11/Salyut 1. 

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Dzhanibekov; Major, Red Air Force; b. 1942, South 
Kazakhstan region ; married, two children. Graduated from the Higher Air 
School as a pilot-engineer (1965) and became a cosmonaut in 1970. He 
was a member of the second backup crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 

Konstantin Petrovich Feoktistov; civilian; b. February 26, 1929, Voronezh: 
married, one child. Graduated from the Bauman Higher Technical School 
in Moscow with a master of science degree in engineering (1949) and now 
holds the degree of doctor of technical sciences. He became a cosmonaut 
in 1964 and was the technical scientist of Voskhod 1. Dr. Feoktistov has 
since returned to high-level engineering and played a major role in design- 
ing the Salyut space stations. 

AnatoUy Vasilyevich Filipchenko; Colonel, Red Air Force; b. February 26, 
1928, Davydovka village, Voronezh region; married, two children. Gradu- 
ated from Chuguyev Air Force School, from the Air Force Academy (1961) 
and became a cosmonaut in 1963. He was backup command pilot on Soyuz 
4, command pilot on Soyuz 7, commander of Soyuz 16 and a member of the 
primary backup crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 

Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin; Colonel, Red Air Force ; b. March 9, 1934, Gzhast 
Region, Smolensk Oblast; d. March 27, 1968 in a crash of a jet trainer; 


was married, two children. Attended Air School in Orenberg, Zhukovskiy 
Air Force Engineering Academy, and became a cosmonaut in 1900. lie was 
the pilot of Vostok 1 (first man in space) , and backup pilot for Soyuz 1. 
Viktor Vasiliyevich Gorbatko; Colonel, Red Air Force; b. December 3, 1934, 
Kuban River region, North Caucasus; married, two children. Entered the 
Bataysk Air Force School near Rostov in 1953, became a cosmonaut in 1900, 
and graduated from the Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy (1908j. 
He was the backup pilot for Voskhod 2, backup pilot for Soyuz 5, and pilot 
of Soyuz 7. 

Georgiy Mikhaylovich Grechko; civilian ; b. May 25, 1931, Leningrad ; married, 
two children. Graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Mechanics (1955), 
worked at a design bureau, received a master of technical sciences on the basis 
of work connected with landing automatic stations on the Moon, and became 
a cosmonaut in 1907. A leading spacecraft designer, he was the flight engineer 
for Soyuz 17/Salyut 4. 

Aleksey Aleksandrovich Guoarcv ; Lieutenant Colonel, Red Air Force; b. 
March 29, 1931, Kuibyshev, on the Volga ; married, two children. Graduated 
from the naval air force school, Gagarin Air Force Academy, and joined the 
cosmonaut corps in 1963. He was commander of Soyuz 17/Salyut 4. 

Aleksandr Sergeycvich Ivanchenkov; civilian; b. 1940, Ivanteyevka, near Mos- 
cow; married, one child. Graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute, 
joined a design bureau in 1964, and became a cosmonaut in 1970. He was a 
member of the third backup crew for the Apollo-Soyuz mission. 

Yevgcniy Vasilycvich Khrunov; Colonel, Red Air Force; b. September 10, 1933, 
Prudiy, near Tula ; married, one child. Graduated from Batay Military Avia- 
tion College (1956), became a cosmonaut in 1960, graduated from the Zhukov- 
skiy Air Force Engineering Academy (1968), and has since earned a master 
of science degree. He was the backup pilot for Voskhod 2 and the engineer 
pilot for both Soyuz 4 and 5, transferring from Soyuz 5 to Soyuz 4 during the 
flight. He has recently coauthored a book, Man as Operator in Cosmic 

Petr IVich Klimuk; Lieutenant Colonel, Red Air Force; b. July 10, 1942, Komar- 
ovka Village, Byelorussia; married, one child. Graduated from the Higher 
Air Force College in Chernigov (1964), served in the Air Force, and became 
a cosmonaut in 1965 (at the age of 23). He was the commander of Soyuz 13 
and Soyuz 18/Salyut 4, and since 1973 has been a student at the Gagarin 
Air Force Academy. 

Vladimir Milhaylovich Komarov ; Engineer Colonel, Red Air Force; b. March 16, 
1927, Moscow ; d. April 24, 1967 when Soyuz l's parachutes tangled during 
descent; was married, two children. Attended Moscow Air Force School, 
Third Sassov Air Force School, Serov Flying School in Bataisk, and the 
Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy, and became a cosmonaut in 
1960. He was backup pilot for Vostok 4, command pilot of Voskhod 1, and 
pilot of Soyuz 1. 

Valeriy Nikolayevich Kubdsov; civilian; b. January 7, 1935. Vyazniki : married, 
two children. Graduated as a mechanical engineer for aircraft building from 
the Moscow Aviation School (1958), received a master of science degree 
(1968), and joined the cosmonaut corps in 1967. He was the backup tech- 
nical scientist for Soyuz 5 and flight engineer on Soyuz 6 and the Apollo- 
Soyuz Test Project. 

Vasiliy Grigor'yevich Lazarev; Lieutenant Colonel, Red Air Force ; b. Febru- 
ary 23, 1928, Altai region of Southern Siberia ; married, one child. Received 
medical degree specializing in aviation medicine (1952), entered the Air 
Force school in Chuguyev, since 1954 has been an air force flyer, flight in- 
structor, test pilot and flight equipment tester, and in 1966 became a cosmo- 
naut. He was the backup pilot for Soyuz 9, commander of Soyuz 12 and of 
the April 5, 1975 unsuccessful Soyuz flight. 

Valentin Vital'ycvvch Lebedev; civilian; b. 1942, Moscow; married, one child. 
Graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute (1966), worked as an en- 
gineer in a design bureau, and became a cosmonaut in 1972. He was the 
flight engineer on Soyuz 13. 

Aleksey Arkhipovich Leonov; Major General, Red Air Force; b. May 20, 1934, 
Listvayanka, Altay Kray ; married, two children. Graduated from Chuguyev 
Air Force School, the Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy, and be- 
came a cosmonaut in 1960. He was the co-pilot of Voskhod 2 (first man to 
perform extravehicular activity in space), and command pilot for the Apollo- 
Soyuz Test Project. 


Oleg Grigor'yevich Makarov; civilian ; b. 1933, Kalinin region near Moscow ; 
married, one child. Graduated with an engineering degree from Moscow's 
Higher Technical School (1957), joined a design bureau where he took part 
in developing the control board of the Vostok spaceship as well as in desig- 
ing the Voskhod and Soyuz ships, and became a cosmonaut in 1966. He was 
the backup flight engineer for Soyuz 9 and flight engineer of Soyuz 12 and 
the April 5 unsuccessful Soyuz flight. 

Andriyan Grigor'yevich Nikolayev; Major General, Red Air Force; b. Septem- 
ber 5, 1929, Shorshely, Chuvash Autonomous Republic; married (to cosmo- 
naut Valentina Tereshkova), one child. Graduated as a pilot from an Air 
Force school (1954), became a cosmonaut in 1960, and graduated from Zhuk- 
ovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy (1968). He was backup pilot for 
Vostok 2, pilot of Vostok 3, backup commander for Soyuz 6, 7 and 8, com- 
mander of Soyuz 9, and possibly backup commander for Soyuz 16. 

Viktor Ivanovich Patsayev; civilian; b. June 19, 1933, Aktybinsk, Kazakstan; 
d. June 29, 1971 during Soyuz 11 reentry ; was married, two children. Gradu- 
ated from the Penzensk Industrial Institute (1955), joined the cosmonaut 
corps in 1969, and earned a master of science degree (1971). He was the test 
engineer on Soyuz 11/Salyut 1. 

Pavel Romanovich Popovich; Colonel, Red Air Force; b. October 5, 1930. Uzin, 
Kiev Oblast; married, two children. Graduated from an industrial tech- 
nicum (1951), a military aviation school (1954), Zhukovskiy Air Force En- 
gineering Academy (1968) and became a cosmonaut in 1960. He was the pilot 
of Vostok 4 and commander of Soyuz 15. Col. Popovich has written an auto- 
biographical work, Takeoff in the Morning. 

Yuriy Viktorovich Romanenko; Major, Red Air Force ; b. 1944, Orenburg Region ; 
married, one child. Graduated from the Higher Air Force School as a pilot- 
engineer (1966), and became a cosmonaut in 1970. He was a member of the 
third backup crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 

Nikolay Nikolayevich Rukavishnikov ; civilian; b. September 18, 1932, Tomsk, 
Siberia ; married, one child. Graduated from the Moscow Engineering and 
Physics Institute (1957), and joined the cosmonaut corps in 1967. He was 
the test engineer for Soyuz 10, flight engineer for Soyuz 16, and a member of 
the first backup crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 

Gennadiy Vastly evich Sarafanov ; Lieutenant Colonel; b. January 1, 1942 near 
Saratov ; married, two children. Graduated from the Balashov Higher Air 
Force Flying School, served in various air units, and became a cosmonaut in 
1965. He was the commander of Soyuz 15. 

Vitally Ivanovich Sevastyanov; civilian; b. July 8, 1935. Krasnouralsk, Sverd- 
lovsk region ; married one child. Graduated from the Moscow Aviation Insti- 
tute (1959), earned a master of science degree in engineering from the In- 
stitute (1965), and became a cosmonaut in 1967. He was the flight engineer 
on Soyuz 9 and Soyuz 18/Salyut 4. 

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Shatalov; Lieutenant General, Red Air Force; b. De- 
cember 8, 1927, Petropavlosk, Kazakhstan ; married, two children. Graduated 
from the Kachinsk Air Force College (1949), enrolled in the Air Force Acad- 
emy in Moscow in 1953, and became a cosmonaut in 1963. He was the backup 
pilot of Soyuz 3, command pilot of Soyuz 4, commander of Soyuz 8 and 
Soyuz 10. Gen. Shatalov is currently the Cosmonaut Corps Director of Flight 

Georgiy Stepanovich Shonin; Colonel, Red Air Force ; b. August 3, 1935. Rovenki, 
the Ukraine: married, two children. Attended Naval Air Force College, 
Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering Academy, and became a cosmonaut in 
1960. He was backup commander for Soyuz 5 and commander of Soyuz 6. 

Valentina Vladimorovna Tereshkova; Engineer Colonel, Red Air Force; b. 
March 6. 1937, Maslennikovo, Yaroslavl region; married (to Cosmonaut An- 
driyan Nikolayev), one child. Graduated from a textile technical school. 
She was the pilot of Vostok 6 and is the only woman to have flown in space. 

German Stepanovich Titov ; Colonel, Red Air Force ; b. September 11, 1935, Verkh- 
neye Zhilino, Kosikha Rayon. Altay Kray ; married, two children. Graduated 
from Volgograd Military Aviation College (1957) and became a cosmonaut 
in 1960. He was the backup pilot for Vostok 1 and pilot for Vostok 2. In 
1968 Col. Titov graduated from the Zhukovskiy Air Force Engineering 
Academy, and is currently Assistant to the Chief Editor of the Journal of 
Aviation and Cosmonautics. 


Vladislav Nikolayevich Volkov; civilian; b. November 23, 1935, Moscow; d. 
June 29, 1971 during Soyuz 11 reentry; was married, one child. Entered 
Moscow Aviation Institute in 1953, worked as an engineer, and became a 
cosmonaut in 1967. He was the flight engineer on Soyuz 7, and flight engineer 
on Soyuz 11/Salyut 1. 

Boris Valentinovich Volynov; Colonel, Red Air Air Force; b. December 18, 1934, 
Irkutsk, Siberia ; married, two children. Attended Zhukovskiy Air Force En- 
gineering Academy, and became a cosmonaut in 1960. He was the backup 
pilot for Vostok 5, backup command pilot for Voskhod 1, backup pilot for 
Soyuz 3, and command pilot of Soyuz 5. 

Boris Borisovich Yegorov; Medical Lieutenant, Red Air Force; b. November 26, 
1937, Moscow ; married, one child. Graduated from the First Medical Insti- 
tute in Moscow (1961), became a cosmonaut in 1964, received a Doctor of 
Medicine degree from the Humboldt University of Berlin (1965), and be- 
came a candidate of medical sciences in 1967. He was the physiologist for 
Voskhod 1, after which he returned to medicine and is no longer in training 
for future flights. 

Aleksey Stanislovovich Yeliseyev; civilian; b. July 13, 1934, Zhizdra ; married, 
one child. Attended Bauman Technical High School in Moscow, received 
master of technical science degree in engineering, and became a cosmonaut 
in 1966. He was the technical scientist for Soyuz 5 and 4. transferring in flight 
from Soyuz 5 to Soyuz 4, technical scientist for Soyuz 8 and Soyuz 10, and 
was the Russian flight director for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. 


Name Service/Rank Flights Comments 

Andreyev Civilian 

Artyukhin... AF/Lt. Col Soyuz 14/Salyut 3... 

Belyayev Nav. AF/CoL. Voskhod 2 Died of complications following an operation for 

stomach ulcers. 

Beregovoy AF/Maj. Gen Soyuz 3 Probably no longer in active training. 

Bykovskiy AF/Col Vostok 5 Probably no longer in active training. 

Demin. AF/Col Soyuz 15 

Dobrovolskiy AF/Lt. Col Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 Killed during reentry. 

Dzhanibekov AF/Major 

Feoktistov Civilian Voskhod 1 Returned to high level design engineering. 

Filipchenko AF/Col Soyuz 7, Soyuz 16—. 

Gagarin AF/Col Vostok 1 First man in space. Killed in crash of a jet trainer. 

Gorbatko... AF/Col Soyuz 7 

Grechko Civilian .. Soyuz 17/Salyut 4 

Gubarev AF/Lt. Col Soyuz 17/Salyut 4.... 

Ivanchenkov Civilian 

Khrunov.. AF/Col Soyuz 4'Soyuz 5 

Klimuk AF/Lt. Col Soyuz 13, Soyuz 

18'Salyut 4. 

Komarov AF/Eng. Col Voskhod 1, Soyuz l._ Killed in Soyuz 1 reentry. 

Kubasov Civilian Soyuz 6, Soyuz 19 


Lazarev AF/Lt. Col Soyuz 12, April 5 


Lebedev Civilian Soyuz 13. 

Leonov AF/Maj. Gen Voskhod 2, Soyuz 19 First man to perform extravehicular activity in 

(ASTP) space. 

Makarov Civilian Soyuz 12, April 5 


Nikolayev AF/Maj. Gen Vostok 3, Soyuz 9... 

Patsayev... . Civilian Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 Killed during reentry. 

Popovich Civilian Vostok 4, Soyuz 

14/Salyut 3. 

Romanenko AF/Capt. 

Rukavishnikov Civilian Soyuz 10, Soyuz 16. 

Sarafanov AF/Col Soyuz 15. 

Sevastyanov Civilian... Soyuz 9, Soyuz 18. 

Shatalov AF/Lt. Gen Soyuz 4, Soyuz 8, Currently Cosmonaut Corps Director of Flight 

Soyuz 10. Training. 
Shonin.... AF/Col Soyuz 6. 

Tereshkova AF/Eng. Col Vostok 6 Only woman to have flown in space. 

Titov AF/Col Vostok 2 Currently Assistant to the Chief Editor, Journal of 

Aviation and Cosmonautics. 

Volkov Civilian Soyuz 7, Soyuz Killed during reentry. 

11/Salyut 1. 

Volynov AF/Col Soyuz 5. 

Yegorov AF/Med. Lt Voskhod 1 Returned to medicine; no longer in active training 

for future flights. 

Yeliseyev Civilian Soyuz 4/Soyuz 5, 

Soyuz 8, Soyuz 10. 

SOURCE: Tass bulletins. 


VII. Statistical Tables on Manned Space Flight 

The first table (3-4) on the following pages compares the manned 
spaceflights of the United States and the Soviet Union. The table is 
set up in chronological order with the name of the spacecraft in the 
left column together with its popular label or call sign, if any. The 
next columns give the launch date, the crew, the payload weight in 
kilograms, the flight duration, and the national cumulative man hours, 
rhe figures for the national cumulative man hours are computed by 
:aking the cumulative man hours through the previous flight of the 
same country and adding the additional man hours of the new flight, 
[f there was more than one man on the flight, the flight time is multi- 
plied by the number of men. The last column gives the highlights of 
;he different missions. 

The second table (3-5) is more detailed, covering just the Soviet 
lights, but including the precursor missions and other biomedical pay- 
oads of principal significance. The number of orbits and revolutions 
s provided, as well as names of crew members with their rank (if 
my) and age at time of flight. 

The third table (3-6) lists the primary and backup crew members 
)f the various manned spaceflights by program. 

The fourth set of tables (3-7 and 3-8) compares the various manned 
light programs by number of flights, number of men, and man hours ; 
md reconciles the count of 41 U.S. astronauts who have made 31 flights 
md the Soviet cosmonauts who have made 27 flights. 

The fifth table (3-9) lists the comparative time spent on space mis- 
iions by astronauts and cosmonauts. 

The sixth and final table (3-10) lists the astronauts and cosmonauts 
vho have died either in the program or after leaving it, date, and 
:ause of death. 


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Crew size Flight duration Man-houri 


1 1 1:48 

2 ... 1 25:18 

3 1 94;22 

4 1 70:57 

5 ---- 1 119:06 

6 1 70:50 

Subtotal - 6 38 2:21 


1 3 24:17 

2 2 26:02 

Subtotal 5 50:19 


1 1 26:37 

3. " 1 94:51 

4(Shatalov). - 1 71:23 

(Yeliseyev, Khrunov) 2 (47:49) 

5(Volynov) 1 72:56 

6 . 2 118:42 

7 3 118:41 

8 2 118:50 

9 2 424:59 

10 3 47:46 

11/Salyutl. 3 570:22 

(undocked) (31:39) 

(docked) - - — . (538:43) 

12 2 47:16 

13. 2 188:55 

14/Salyut3_ 2 377:30 

(undocked)... ~ (17:27) 

(docked) (360:03) 

15 2 48:12 

16 2 142:24 

17/Salyut 4 2 709:20 

(undocked) » (33:27) 

(docked) (675:53) 

April 5 Anomaly 2 :20 

18/Salyut 4 2 1,511:20 

(undocked) « (30:54) 

(docked) (1,480:26) 

19 2 142:31 

Subtotal 39 4,832:56 

Total (U.S.S.R.) 1 50 5, 295:36 


382 :21 




3, 022:40 
(61 :48) 

10, 232:30 

10, 739:46 

NOTE: Figures in parentheses are subtotals, or would represent elements of double-counting. 

» TASS, 9 Feb 75, 1225 GMT reported the time of undocking as 0908 Moscow Time (0608 GMT) and this figure is used 
for this report. However, on 10 Feb 75, Pravda reported the time as 0809 Moscow Time (0509 GMT). The reason for the 
iiscrepancy is not known, but could simply have been a typographical error in the Pravda release. 

* No precise time was given for docking At 1221 Moscow Time (1821 GMT) Soyuz was reportedly 800 meters from the 
Station, so an estimation is made here of 1830 GMT for time of docking. 

« Breakdown for U.S.S.R.: 

Persons Number 

3 times 

2 times 

1 time 



SOURCE: TASS bulletins. 




Flight Crew Size Duration Man-Houu 

Mercury Redstone: 



Subtotal 2 :31 :31 

Mercury Atlas: 

6 1 4:55 4:55 

7 _ 1 4:56 4:56 

8 1 9:13 9:13 

9 1 34:20 34:20 

Subtotal 4 53:24 53:24 

Gemini Titan: 

3 2 4:53 9:46 

4 2 97:56 195:52 

5 2 190:55 381:50 

7 2 330:35 661:10 

6 2 25:51 51:42 

8 2 10:41 21:22 

9 2 72:21 144:42 

10 . 2 70:47 141:34 

11 2 71:17 142:34 

12 2 94.35 189:10 

Subtotal 20 969:51 1,939:42 

Apollo Saturn 1: 

7 3 260:09 780:27 

Apollo Saturn 5: 

8 3 147:01 441:03 

9 3 241:01 723:03 

10 3 192:03 575:09 

11 3 195:19 585:57 

12 3 244:36 733:48 

13 3 142:55 428:45 

14 3 216:02 648:06 

15 3 295:12 885:36 

16 3 265:51 797:33 

17 3 301:52 905:36 

Subtotal 30 2,241:52 6,725:36 


2 3 672:50 2,018:30 

(undocked) (19:45) (59:15) 

(docked). (653:05) (1,959:15) 

3 3 1,427:09 4,281:27 

(undocked) (11:35) (34:45) 

(docked) (1,415:34) (4,246:42) 

4 -.- 3 2,017:16 6,051:43 

(undocked). (11:44) (35:12) 

(docked) .. (2,005:32) (6,016:36) 

Subtotal.. 9 4,117:15 12,351:45 

Apollo-Soyuz test project. 3 217:28 652:24 

Total (U.S.) 1 71 7,860:30 22,503:49 

World total 121 13,156:06 33,243:55 

1 Breakdown for U.S.: 

Persons Number 

4 times 4 16 

3 times 3 9 

2 times 10 

1 time 25 26 

Total 43 71 

SOURCES: NASA press releases. 






Total hours: 



































































































U.S., 43 persons 

U.S.S.R., 34 persons. 
World, 77 persons... 

























689 03 






























301 :52 






















260 :09 










































94 :51 












47 49 






















22, 503:49 


10, 739:46 


33, 243 :3S 

SOURCES: TASS bulletins and NASA press releases. 



Name/Country Program" Date Cause of Death 

Adams/US MOL X-15 Nov. 15,1967 X-15 crash 

Bassett/US... NASA Feb. 28,1966 Jet crash 

Belyayev/USSR.. Jan. 10,1970 Complications from surgery 

Chaffee, US.. NASA Jan. ?7, 1967 Apollo 204 fire 

Dobrovolskiy,USSR June 29, 1971 Soyuz I! depressurization 

Freeman/US NASA Oct. 31, 1964 Jet crash 

Gagarin USSR Mar. 27, 1968 Jet crash 

Givens/US NASA June 6, 1967 Automobile accident 

Grissom/US NASA Jan. 27, 1967 Apollo 204 fire 

Komarov/USSR Apr. 24, 1967 Soyuz I crash. 

Lawrence/US MOL Dec. 8,1967 Jet crash 

McKay/US X-15 May ,197b Complications from 1962 X-15 crash; alter leaving 


Patsayev/USSR June 29, 1971 Soyuz II depressurization 

Rogers/US X 20 Seot. 13, 1967 F-105 explosion; after leaving program 

See,US NASA Feb. 28,1966 Jet crash 

Taylor/US. MOL Sept. 1970 Jet crash; after leaving program 

Walker/US X-15 June 8,1966 Jet Crash 

White/US NASA Jan. 27, 1967 Apollo 204 Tire 

Williams/US NASA Oct. 15,1967 Jet crash 

Volkov/USSR June 29, 1971 Soyuz II depressurization 

* The list of deceased cosmonauts is believed to be incomplete. It includes all publicly announced deaths, but a highly 
placed Russian space official indicated privately to his American counterpart in April 1974 that eight Soviet cosmonauts 
in training have been killed in aircraft or automobile accidents since 1960, before having had any opportunity to fly in space. 

••U.S. casualties include not only NASA astronauts but those men who achieved the astronaut rating in 
three other programs: X-15, X-20 DynaSoar, and Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL). Several have died sine* 
leaving (or termination of) their respective programs, but are listed for the sake of completeness. 

SOURCES: Assorted press releases. j 


By Vikki A. Zegel* 

The Soyuz 19 mission was the Soviet portion of the Apollo-Soyuz 
Test Project, (ASTP), a joint United States and Soviet space en- 
deavor in 1975. Launched July 15, 1975 from Tyuratam with cos- 
monauts Col. Aleksey A. Leonov and Valeriy N. Kubasov on board, 
the Soyuz 19 craft remained in orbit for 6 days. During this time, 
rendezvous and docking exercises, hardware tests, crew exchanges and 
joint experiments were carried out with the simultaneously orbiting 
United States Apollo spacecraft and crew. The Soviet portion of the 
mission was successfully completed on July 21, 1975, with the two 
cosmonauts landing safely near Arkalyk, some 2,000 km southeast of 

The ASTP had been provided for as part of an agreement between 
the United States and the Soviet Union on cooperation in the 
exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, signed May 24, 1972. 

Preparations for the project involved nearly three years of joint 
working group exchanges, engineering and technical design develop- 
ments, cosmonaut training sessions, language education, mission 
simulations, and a host of historically unprecedented cooperative 

The ASTP proved to be a project of both political and technological 
significance for both nations. The successful demonstration of the 
androgynous peripheral docking system (APDS), designed jointly 
by United States and Soviet engineers for the mission, was the major 
technological achievement. Politically, the successful completion of 
the mission was felt to have strengthened the spirit of detente between 
the two countries, and to have laid the groundwork for their pos- 
sible future cooperative efforts in space. In addition, the Soviet space 
program was, for the first time, brought more directly into public 
view, with unprecedented coverage by the media of launches, landings 
and mission highlights. This can only be viewed as a political "plus" 
for the Soviet Union, as public approval of an already popular pro- 
gram was thereby strengthened. 

In retrospect, the mission may be viewed as a political step forward 
for both nations toward the realization of the goals set forth in the 
May 24, 1972 agreement. 

I. Mission Summary 1 

Soyuz 19 was launched at 1220 GMT July 15, 1975 from the Bay- 
konur Cosmodrome near Tyuratam. Approximately seven and one- 

•Ms. Zegel Is an analyst in life sciences, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional 
Research Service. The Library of Congress. 

1 ASTP FACT SHEET, NASA Release No. 74-196, PP. 13-15. 



half hours later (1950 GMT) the United States Apollo craft was 
launched from the Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida. 
Launched in a north-easterly direction, the Soyuz 19 was inserted into 
a 188 by 228 km orbit at an inclination of 51.8°. On the fourth and 
seventeenth orbits the Soyuz completed two maneuvers to circularize 
the orbit at 225 km. The Apollo craft, also launched in a north-easterly 
direction, was inserted into a 150 by 167 km orbit, with the same in- 
clination of 51.8°. About one hour after Apollo orbital insertion, the 
Apollo Command and Service Module (CSM) began the transposition 
and docking procedure to extract the docking module from the launch 
vehicle. (The maneuver was very similar to the Apollo extraction of 
the lunar module employed during lunar landing missions.) The 
Apollo spacecraft performed its orbital circularization maneuver at 
the third apogee to establish a controlled Apollo rendezvous maneuver 
sequence. After several phasing maneuvers by both spacecraft to adjust 
altitude differences, a co-elliptical orbit was achieved, thereby estab- 
lishing a near-constant altitude differential between the two. 
Rendezvous and docking of the two spacecraft were completed at 1615 
GMT on July 17, 1975. The Soyuz and Apollo remained docked for 
two days, completed several un-dockiner and redocking maneuvers, and 
finally separated for the last time at 1530 GMT on July 19, 1975. Dur- 
ing the two days the spacecraft were docked, several crew transfers 
took place, but at no time were there more than three persons in one 
craft. Several joint experiments, which will be described in subsequent 
paragraphs, were also carried out during this period. Soyuz 19 landed 
safely at 1051 GMT July 21, 1975, near Arkalyk, some 2.000 km south- 
east of Moscow. (The Apollo craft splashed down at 2120 GMT in 
the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii July 24, 1075. "During their final 
descent, the three Apollo astronauts inhaled a small amount of nitro- 
gen tetroxide, a poisonous gas, which had leaked into the Apollo cabin. 
It was later determined that the leak occurred because the crewmen 
had failed to shut off manually the spacecraft's rockets after realizing 
that the automatic switch had not been activated by Astronaut Brand. 
That command had not been heard by Brand because of an excessive 
amount of interference noise in the spacecraft during re-entry. The 
astronauts were kept under close surveillance in sick bay at Honolulu 
Hospital for two weeks following the flight, and NASA doctors dis- 
missed them with clear health reports on August 7, 1975.) 


Four, two-man Soviet cosmonaut crews were named for the ASTP 
mission. These consisted of two prime and two backup crews, with the 
second crews prepared to launch after the first if there had been any 
delays in the United States Apollo launch schedule. As it turned out, 
the Soviet first prime crewmen, Col. Aleksey A. Leonov (Com- 
mand Pilot) and civilian Valeriy N. Kubasov (Flight Engineer) he- 
came the actual ASTP Soviet crew. (Others named included: second 
prime crewmen Col. Anatoly V. Filipchenko and Nikolay X. Ruka- 
vishnikov; first backup crewmen Maj. Vladimir Dzanibekov and Boris 
Andreyev; and second backup crewmen Maj. Yuriy Romanenko and 
Aleksandr Ivanchenkov.) 

The United States prime crew members were Brig. Gen. Thomas P. 
Stafford, Commander ; Vance D. Brand, Command Module Pilot ; and 


Donald K. ("Deke") Slaytonj Docking Module Pilot. The United 
States only named one astronaut backup crew, consisting of Capt. Alan 
L. Bean, Capt. Ronald E. Evans, and Lt. Col. Jack R. Lousma. 


Soyuz 19 was a modified version of the Soyuz capsule used for all 
the other Russian manned Soyuz flights since 1907. One major modifi- 
cation was the compatible rendezvous and docking system, jointly 
designed by United States and Soviet engineers. (This same apparatus 
was carried on the outward end of the Docking Module, carried by the 
United States Apollo craft during the mission.) Another major change 
involved the Soyuz craft pressure and air composition control systems. 
Soyuz pressure is ordinarily maintained at a normal atmospheric (sea- 
level ) pressure of 760 mm Hg. The United States works at a low pres- 
sure of '2C>0 mm Hg. In order to make crew transfers easier, the Soyuz 
pressure was reduced to 520 mm Hg. The oxygen content of the Soyuz 
nitrogen-oxygen air mixture was also increased to about 40% to bring 
it closer to the United States Apollo pure oxygen atmosphere. Several 
other modifications included changes in flight and attitude controls 
and radio communications systems, equipment additions, and adjust- 
ment of the life support system to enable it to handle more people 
during crew transfers. Those changes required design adjustments of 
the Soyuz craft, which were tested during the Soyuz 16 (ASTP pre- 
cursor) flight. The Soviet regular Soyuz launch vehicle was used for 
the ASTP. 

The United States used its Saturn I-B launch vehicle to put the 
Apollo module into orbit. The Apollo Command and Service Module 
itself was a modified version of the CSM used during the earlier Apollo 
lunar landing missions. Modifications included provision for experi- 
ments, extra propel! ant tanks, and the addition of controls and equip- 
ment required for proper operation of the Docking Module and the 
universal docking system. The Docking Module was cylindrical in 
shape, having a diameter of approximately 1.5 meters and a length of 
about 3 meters. It served as an airlock for the internal transfer of crew- 
men between the different atmospheres of the Apollo and Soyuz space- 
craft. The Docking Module was equipped with radio and TV com- 
munications, antennas, stored gases, heaters, and the displays and 
controls necessary for transfer operations. The Docking Module was 
designed to handle two crewmen simultaneously. Hatches having con- 
trols on both sides were installed at each end of the module. A universal 
docking system capable of functioning with similar components on the 
Soyuz-type spacecraft was located at the Soyuz receiving end of the 
Module. The Apollo end of the Docking Module used the same type 
of system that was used in the Apollo lunar landing missions for 
docking between the Command Module and the Lunar Module. 


The program of scientific experiments conducted during the mission 
included both unilateral and joint experiments. In the following para- 
graphs, these are designated as "U" (U.S.S.R. only) or "J" (joint ex- 
periments) : 

s Apollo-Soyuz Test-Project 1975 Soviet Press Release, pp. 121-152. 


1. Photography of the solar corona and zodiacal light against the back- 
ground of the night sky ( U) 

A number of shots of the night and dusk sky with the sun at differ- 
ent angles behind the Earth's horizon (conditions of solar eclipse by 
the Earth) were taken in an attempt to find coronal rays at large 
angular distances from the Sun. 

2. Investigation of refraction and transparency of the upper layers of 
the atmosphere (U) 

Atmospheric refraction was determined from solar disc image flat- 
tening in photographs taken of the Sun as it rose and set behind the 
Earth's horizon. Photographs were also taken of setting stars. 

3. Photography of daytime and dusk horizon ( £7) 

Visual observation and photography of light effects in the vicinity of 
the spacecraft were carried out in an attempt to determine the char- 
acteristics of light-scattering by atmospheric air, investigate various 
layers of aerosol, investigate certain t} 7 pes of clouds, and analyze the 
dependence of altitude aerosol distribution on geographical and 
meteorological factors. 

If,. Microorganisms Growth (U) 

To study the effects of weightlessness and space radiation and the 
Earth's magnetic field on the growth of microorganisms, a culture of 
protea vulgaris was placed in a thermostatically-controlled capsule 
known as a "Biokat" and observed. 

5. Fish embryonic development (U) 

To study the growth and development of water animals under space 
conditions, regular aquarium fish as well as their fertilized roe were 
inserted into "Biokat" aquaria for observation. 

6. Genetic Experiments (U) 

In order to study the effects of weightlessness on cell division and 
genetic mutation in biological organisms, various types of seeds were 
placed in one of the "Biokats" and observed. 

7. Artificial Solar Eclipse (J) 

A series of onboard photographs taken from the Soyuz of the solar 
corona "atmosphere" around the Apollo while it eclipsed the Sun pro- 
vided a record of the first solar eclipse produced by man. This experi- 
ment was of particular interest to scientists because of the relative in- 
f requency of naturally occurring solar eclipses. 

8. Ultraviolet Absorption (J) 

To measure the concentrations of atomic oxygen and nitrogen in 

space at the altitude of the mission, different types of mass-spectrom- 
eters were used on board. The method of resonance absorption within 
the ultraviolet spectrum was employed to determine the densities of 
these components of the outer atmosphere. 

9. Zone- forming Fungi (J) 

In order to study the effects of space flight factors on biological 
rhythms, two cultures of the Pushchino strain of Actinomyces levories 

(fungi) were observed. Each had been cultivated within different 
time zones (United States and Soviet Union) approximately 9 hours 
apart, 7 days prior to launch. 


10. Microbial Exchange Test (J) 

Microflora microbial samples were taken from cosmonauts and 
astronauts before, during and after the flight to determine the char- 
acter and conditions of microbial exchange among men confined in a 
sealed compartment. 

11. Furnace System Experiments (J) 

This series of joint "multipurpose furnace experiments" was con- 
ducted in order to determine the effects of weightlessness on some 
metallurgical and chemicrystallization processes in metals and semi- 

II. Historical Background 

Since 1957, the two themes of United States-Soviet space relations 
have been competition and cooperation. With the passage of time, the 
competition in terms of propaganda has diminished and the tentative 
efforts on both sides to propose limited sharing of information and 
some joint experimentation have gradually strengthened. 


The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was provided for as part of an 
agreement on cooperation in the exploration and peaceful uses of 
outer space, signed May 24, 1972 in Moscow by then President Nixon 
and Chairman Kosygin. Article Three of that document states the 
following : 3 

The parties have agreed to carry out projects for developing compatible 
rendezvous and docking systems of the United States and Soviet manned space- 
craft and stations in order to enhance the safety of manned flight in space and 
to provide the opportunity for conducting joint scientific experiments in the 
future. It is planned that the first experimental flight to test these systems be 
conducted during 1975, envisaging the docking of a U.S. Apollo-type spacecraft 
and a Soviet Soyuz-type spacecraft with visits of astronauts in each other's 
spacecrafts. The implementation of these projects will be carried out on the basis 
of principles and procedures which will be developed in accordance with the 
summary of results of the meeting between representatives of the U.S. National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences 
on the question of developing compatible systems for rendezvous and docking 
and manned spacecraft and space stations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., dated 
April 6, 1972. 


The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project was the first joint manned space 
mission involving the United States and the Soviet Union, but there 
have been several other cooperative space-related endeavors between 
the two nations. 

Efforts to develop U.S. -Soviet cooperation in space research may be 
traced back to the early space projects planning in 1955 for the Inter- 
national Geophysical Year (IGY). Further efforts were made at 
various times, but none of these was generally productive until 1962. 
The United States at that time made specific proposals which resulted 
in talks between the late Soviet Academician Anatoliy A. Blagon- 
ravov, and the late Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, who was then Deputy Ad- 
ministrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
As a result, a three-part, bi-lateral space agreement was drawn up in 

» Text of US/USSR Space Agreement. NASA NEWS Special Release, May 24, 1972. 


June 1962 which provided for: 1.) coordinated U.S. and Soviet 
launehings of experimental meteorological satellites, with data to be 
exchanged over a Washington-Moscow "cold-line"; 2.) launehings by 
both countries of satellites equipped with absolute magnetometers, 
with subsequent exchange of data to arrive at a map of the Earth's 
magnetic field in space; and 3.) joint communications experiments 
using Echo 2, the U.S. passive satellite. 

Unfortunately, the substance and timeliness of the weather data 
were disappointing, as were the results of the magnetic field maps 
agreement. Likewise, the passive communications efforts with Echo 2 
came to little. 

The Dryden-Blagonravov talks led to a second agreement in 
November 1965, for the preparation and publication of a joint U.S.- 
Soviet review of space biology and medicine. (This study has been 
completed, but, to date, has been distributed only in part.) 

A new phase of the TJ.S.-Soviet space relationship began in 1969, 
when NASA Administrator Dr. Thomas O. Paine wrote to Soviet 
Academy President Keldysh and Academician Blagonravov, inviting 
new initiatives in space cooperation, in general scientific fields, and in 
rendezvous and docking of manned spacecraft. It was agreed to pursue 
those suggestions. 

The ASTP talks actually began in October 1970 when rendezvous 
and docking discussions were initiated in Moscow. These related to the 
possibility of each nation decerning a manned spacecraft with a dock- 
ing mechanism compatible with that of the other nation. More general 
discussions on this topic were resumed in January 1971. In agree- 
ments resulting from these talks, procedures were outlined whereby 
the two countries could arrive at compatible systems, through a com- 
bination of coordination and independent action. Joint working 
groups were established which developed the technical understandings 
required for design of these systems. In April 1972. the necessary 
management and operational understandings were established to war- 
rant a government -level commitment to a joint test docking mission, 
the ASTP, in 1975. The possibility of using the compatible docking 
systems in future generations of spacecraft was also mentioned. 

In addition to the aforementioned talks which led to the decision on 
the ASTP, broader discussions on cooperation in space science and 
applications took place in January 1971 in Moscow. As a result of 
these talks, an agreement was reached which provided for: (1) ex- 
change of lunar samples obtained in Apollo and Luna programs: (2) 
exchange of weather satellite data between the United States >7ational 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Soviet 
Hydrometerological Service: (3) coordination of networks of 
meteorological rocket sounding along selected meridional lines: (-£) 
development of a coordinated program to utilize space and Earth 
resources survey techniques to investigate the natural environment 
in areas of common interest: (5) joint consideration of the mos^ im- 
portant scientific objectives for exchange of results from investigation 
of near-Earth space, the Moon, and the planets: and (6) exchange 
of detailed medical information of man's reaction to the space 



The following chronology traces the steps leading to the Apollo- 
Soy uz Test Project: 
October 28, 1970 : 

— Agreed to design compatible rendezvous and docking systems for future 
manned spacecraft. 

— Agreed to a procedure by which the two sides could, through a combina- 
tion of independent action and coordination, arrive at compatible systems. 

— Established three joint working groups. 
June 21-25, 1971 : 

— Agreed to study the technical and economic implications of early test 

missions using existing vehicles. 
— Agreed on coordinate systems to be used for rendezvous purposes. 
— Agreed on single documentation of requirements for atmospheres, hatches, 

and crew transfer techniques. 
— Agreed on air lock volume. 

— Agreed on placement of structural elements and equipment. 
— Agreed on optical and radio beacon characteristics. 

— Agreed on requirements for communications between spacecraft and be- 
tween spacecraft and ground stations systems. 
— Agreed on characteristics of control stations. 

— Agreed on docking system basic functions and design features, and space- 
craft mass properties. 
November 29-December 6, 1971 : 

— Agreed on technical feasibility of a test mission using existing spacecraft. 
— Agreed on objectives and preliminary documentation requirements for a 

possible test mission. 
— Substantially completed documentation on life support systems, coordinate 

systems and constraints on spacecraft configuration. 
— Identified guidance and control systems and on-board equipment of U.S. 

and U.S.S.R. spacecraft which would need to be compatible. 
— Substantially completed documentation on lights, docking targets and 

contact conditions, control systems and radio tracking. 
— Agreed to basic values for a compatible docking system including tunnel 

diameter for astronaut passage. 
— Reached preliminary agreement on the basis for design of an androgynous 

docking device. 
April 4-6, 1972 : 

— Confirmed the desirability of conducting a test mission using existing 
spacecraft in 1975. 

— Accepted, as the basis for joint specification of management and oi>era- 
tional guidelines for joint mission, documents on "Proposed Organization 
Plan for the Apollo/Soyuz Test Mission," "Apollo/Soyuz Test Mission Con- 
siderations," "A Project Technical Proposal Document," and "A Project 
Schedule Document." 
— Agreed on specific principles illustrative of those which will apply in the 
preparatory and operational periods : 
— Frequent direct contact between project personnel on both sides. 
— Detailed commitments to schedules. 

— A comprehensive test, qualification, training and simulation program. 
— Involvement of mission flight and ground crew personnel in joint 

working groups two years before the mission. 
— Engineering agreement in July 1972. 

— Control of own spacecraft and spacecraft situations, with certain 

preplanned guidelines to be worked out. 
— Consultation on control actions affecting joint elements of the mission. 
— Pre-planned in-flight information exchanges, including TV. 
— Reciprocal language familiarity among flight crews. 
—A public information program respecting the policies and practices 

of both sides. 

4 U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautieol and Space Sciences. Hearisg : "Space Agree- 
nents With the Soviet Union", Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office. June 23. 
L972, p. 61-62. 


1. Key Personnel 

M. V. Keldysh, President, Academy of Sciences of the USSR 
V. A. Kotelnikov, Vice-President, Academy of Sciences 

B. N. Petrov, Academician and President of Intercosmos 

K. D. Bushuyev, Apollo-Soyuz Test Project Director, Chairman of Joint 

Working Group One 
V. P. Legostayev, Chairman, Working Group Two 
V. S. Syromyatnikov, Chairman, Working Group Three 
I. P. Rumyantsev, Intercosmos 
United States: 

G. M. Low, Deputy Administrator, NASA 

D. D. Myers, Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, NASA 
A. W. Frutkin, Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, NASA 
R. R. Gilruth, Former Director, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, 
Houston, Texas 

C. C. Kraft, Director, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center 

G. S. Lunney, Apollo-Soyuz Test Project Director, Chairman, Working 
Group One 

D. C. Cheatham, Chairman, Working Group Two 
D. C. Wade, Chairman, Working Group Three 

III. Joint Preparations 

Soon after the May 1972 agreement was signed, numerous joint 
working group meetings and astronaut-cosmonaut and flight crew 
training sessions were planned to take place in both the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The first planning session after the signing of 
the agreement, took place in July 1972 at the Manned Spaceflight 
Center in Houston. Members of this group w r ere basically the same 
participants of the June 1971 meeting, who first discussed the feasi- 
bility of compatible docking systems for the joint project. Subsequent 
to the July 1972 meeting, working groups met regularly (some 
monthly) in both countries. In addition, the ASTP hardware under- 
went extensive verification testing at the NASA Johnson Space Center 
in Houston as well as at the U.S.S.R. Cosmodrome. 


Initial familiarization of Soviet cosmonaut and flight support crews 
with Apollo systems took place during a two- week session in Houston 
in July 1973. The United States crews were given an opportunity to 
work with the Soyuz craft during a subsequent joint session in Moscow 
in November 1973. The Soviet flight crews worked at the Johnson 
Space Center in late April and early May 1974, and were followed by 
a return visit of the United States crews to Moscow in June and July 

1974. The Soviet cosmonauts visited the United States in September 
1974 for a third joint crew training session, and they completed their 
fourth and final training session in the United States in February 

1975. This exercise at the Johnson Space Center in Houston was 
very extensive, including training in the command and docking module 
simulators and mockups, joint language training, briefings on experi- 
ments, contingencies and mission rules, and other related activities. 
United States crew members visited the Soviet Union in late April 
and early May, 1975, to complete the joint crew training. The U.S. 
astronauts became the first Americans to view Soviet launch facilities 
when they visited Tyuratam on April 28, 1975 for a tour of ASTP- 
related hardware. 



In addition to the planning sessions, joint working group meetings, 
and crew training sessions, three simulation sessions between flight 
controllers and ASTP crewmen in Houston and Moscow were con- 
ducted in preparation for the flight. These were May 13, May 15, and 
May 19, 1975 respectively. They involved communications links be- 
tween the two control centers, including voice, teletype, datafax, and 
television, and fully manned control center facilities. Final simula- 
tions were conducted June 30-July 1, 1975 by the Houston and Moscow 
control centers and crewmen. 

Beyond mission simulations tests, the Soviet Union ran a complete 
mission test of the Soyuz hardware modifications and ASTP docking 
procedures on the Soyuz 16 flight in December 1974. This ASTP 
manned precursor flight is discussed in more detail in an earlier section 
of this report. 


The Russians refer to the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project Docking Sys- 
tem as the "androgynous peripheral clocking system" or APDS. It 
was jointly designed by United States and Soviet engineers to provide 
a universal docking mechanism that could theoretically be used be- 
tween any two spacecraft for future unilateral or international space 
endeavors. Following is the description of the APDS development, 
which appears in the Soviet pre-launch ASTP Press Kit : 5 

1. APDS Development 

During the first meeting of the Soviet and American specialists in 
October 1970 both sides provided data to develop a principle structure 
scheme of docking system. 

It was necessary to develop an active/passive system capable of 
docking with any spacecraft of the given type (androgynous type). 
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. specialists provided different schematics of 
docking systems. In addition, an androgynous principle was defined 
(the so-called principle of reverse symmetry). 

The second meeting was held in June, 1971, in Houston, U.S.A. 
For this meeting the U.S.S.R. side had prepared a new draft of "Tech- 
nical Requirements for Docking Systems". The draft was used as a 
basis to determine technical requirements for development of the 

By the meeting in the fall 1971 the both sides had prepared their 
own drafts for a principle structure scheme. As a result of the dis- 
cussion joint features of the scheme, which were to meet the com- 
patibility requirements were worked out. It was also agreed upon that 
each side would develop its own system, and these systems could differ 
from each other. Most of the Soviet proposals on the principle scheme 
had been adopted. 

It was decided to provide to the U.S.S.R. and U.S. docking systems 
compatibility by using a common principle structure scheme and 
standardizing main dimensions of interacting elements when fulfilling 

6 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project — Information for the Press 1975 (Soviet prepared portion 

■of a two-volume U.S.-Soviet publicatios). 


the technical requirements for the structure. In addition, loads, tem- 
peratures and some other similar parameters were regulated. 

In the course of development and fabrication [the] docking system 
of each country was thoroughly worked at and tested separately and 
jointly by each side. 

First the U.S.S.R. and U.S. docking systems (D.S.) scale mock-ups 
were tested jointly, then their full-scale mock-ups. Development tests 
were performed as well as testing of docking systems, practically 
identical to those to be used during the mission. And at last the pre- 
flight mate check of U.S.S.R. and U.S. flight D.S. was performed. 
Moreover, the U.S.S.R. Docking System was installed on Soyuz 16 
and thoroughly tested during the space flight. In this flight, a special 
ring simulated the Apollo docking ring. Main docking and undocking 
operations, including the functioning of latches which provide rigid 
connection of spacecraft were checked. 


As discussed under ASTP Hardware aibove, the United States and 
Soviet Union normally maintain different spacecraft pressures and 
atmospheric compositions during spaceflights. Crew transfers between 
the 760 mm Hg/oxy gen-nitrogen Soyuz atmosphere and the 260 mm 
Hg/pure oxygen Apollo environment would have been extremely dif- 
ficult. Transfers from Soyuz to Apollo would have necessitated that 
the crews remain for long periods in the airlock to breathe pure 
oxygen to force nitrogen from their blood. The problem would have 
been analogous to that of deep^ea divers who surface too quickly and 
develop "the bends." The problem was avoided by changing the Soyuz 
spacecraft pressure and air composition to 520 mm Hg/40% oxygen 
for the transfers. This system had been tested on the Soyuz 16 flight 
(ASTP manned precursor) in December 1974. It proved to be a suc- 
cessful development on that flight, as well as during the ASTP. 


Two kinds of potential communications problems became evident 
during the course of the ASTP mission preparations. One involved the 
spacecraft-to-ground communications, the other involved the astro- 
naut-to-cosmonaut verbal communications across a language barrier. 
The first of these, (caused by a combination of low orbital altitude and 
limited number of available ground networks), was alleviated by 
using the United States Applications Technology Satellite (ATS-6) 
as a communications link during the flight. The second problem was 
solved by requiring the United States astronauts to speak Russian to 
the cosmonauts and the Soviet cosmonauts to speak English to the 
astronauts during the flight. Both solutions proved to be successful 
ones during the ASTP mission. 

IV. Political Issues 

Beyond its merits as a scientific and technical project, the ASTP 
was a highly political and somewhat controversial mission, acclaimed 
by some as a major contribution to U.S. -USSR detente, while as- 


sailed by others as an expensive waste of time. Politics affected both 
sides, both jointly and separately, alt various stages of the project de- 
velopment. In question were such issues as the value of the mis-ion 
in relation to detente, the Soviet safety record and its effect on United 
States confidence, and the feasibility of future U.S.-U.S.S.R. coopera- 
tive space endeavors. 


The Apollo-Soyuz Test Projects political achievement in strength- 
ening the atmosphere of detente between the United States and the 
Soviet Union may be judged by historians as the most significant 
aspect of the mission. Certainly the demonstration of meaningful co- 
operation between these two historically competitive powers is a posi- 
tive step in this direction. Both sides demonstrated that they have con- 
siderably changed their attitudes since the early days of the so-called 
"space race." The competition, of course, will continue, but it is hoped 
that the attitudes which were formed during the preparation and im- 
plementation of the mission will provide the basis for future coopera- 
tive efforts between the United States and the Soviet Union. 


In light of several Soviet Soyuz mission failures, doubts about 
Soyuz hardware safety and reliability were raised by some United 
States critics prior to the mission. In particular, the Soviet "April 5th 
Anomaly" (discussed in Chapter Three of this report) prompted 
United States Senator William Proxmire to call for a briefing by 
Central Intelligence Agency officials on Soviet space program capabil- 
ities. A closed hearing before the HUD and Independent Agencies 
Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee was held 
June 4, 1975. A summarization of the classified testimony of Carl 
Duckett, CIA deputy director for science and technology, reported 
that "I do not think they (the U.S.S.R.) are in good shape to handle 
two missions at once from the command point of view." 6 

Based upon this testimony, Senator Proxmire released a statement 
July 2, 1975 urging the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration to postpone the July 15 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project mis- 
sion "until the Soviet Union brings back to Earth the Russian (Soyuz 
18/Salyut 4) cosmonauts already in space." 7 

The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration re- 
sponded to this statement July 2, 1975, concluding that ". . . the Soyuz 
18/Salyut 4 mission does not constitute a hazard to ASTP." 8 

NASA also noted that their calculations indicated a tracking over- 
lap of the two missions would occur in only two instances, one lasting 
about 30 seconds, the other about 90 seconds. 

The ASTP was not postponed, and the joint mission went smoothly 
and according to plan. 

6 Summary Report of CIA testimony, Rtmarks of Senator Proxmire, Congressional 
Record, v. 121. July 14, 1975. "CIA Report on Appolo-Sovul Mission." 

7 Press Release from the Office of U.S. Senator William Proxmire. .Tulv 2. 1975. 

8 NASA Statement to Aerospace Daily, volume 74, number 3, July 3, 1975, page l<v 

67-371—76 18 



It has been reported that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union are committed to continuing their cooperation in space beyond 
the ASTP. Indeed, it is felt that much of the project's justification 

would be lost if nothing further were planned. 

At least two post- ASTP cooperative efforts have been agreed to by 
the two countries. The Soviet Union invited the United States to 
propose and furnish biology experiments which were carried aboard 
Kosmos 782, a Soviet biology satellite in November-December 1975. 
(For a more complete discussion of 'this flight, see Chapters Three and 
Four of this report.) The agreement for this experiment was 
negotiated at the fifth meeting of the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. working 
group on space biology and medicine, held from October 26 to Novem- 
ber 4, 1974 at Tashkent. In August 1975, the Soviet Union asked the 
United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration to 
provide experiments for a second biology satellite in 1977, similar to 
the 1975 mission. 

The United States experiments carried on the 1975 mission were : 
Plant tumor growth experiment to study the effects of prolonged 
weightlessness on plant systems and to quantitatively and qualitatively 
measure cellular responses to G forces. Carrot slices were used as test 

Carrot cell culture experiment to evaluate the effect of zero-G on 
plant systems and to determine the effects on normal embryonic tissue 
development. Carrot cell cultures were used in this experiment also. 

Heavy particle radiation experiment to measure the physical param- 
eters of high charge and energy particles on board the spacecraft. 
Stacks of detectors were placed in each of two biological experiment 
packages and ait four other locations in the spacecraft. 

Kiliifish experiment to evaluate the effects of zero-G on vestibular 
systems. A graded series of kiliifish embryos representing key develop- 
ment stages were evaluated. Post-flight analysis will center on normal- 
ity of vestibular functions and microscopic and physiological changes. 
Similar experiments with kiliifish were conducted during the U.S. 
Skylab flight and the U.S. portion of the ASTP flight. 

Embryonic development of fruit -flies to evaluate cosmic effects on 
the aging process of drosophila. This experiment was jointly prepared 
by scientists of the Moscow Institute of Medical and Biological Prob- 
lems and the United States National Aeronautics and Space Adminis- 
tration Ames Research Center. 

In addition, the Soviet scientists invited the United States experi- 
menters to participate in some seven other tests from the standpoint of 
post-flight specimen analysis. As a reciprocal gesture, the United 
States invited Soviet scientists to take part in its experiments. 

V. Summary 

In summary, it may be said that the successful completion of the 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project mission was a step toward the realization 
of the goals set forth in the May 24, 1972 agreement between the United 
States and the Soviet Union on cooperation in the exploration and 
peaceful uses of outer space. The technological cooperation between 


engineers and scientists and crew members afforded an opportunity for 
individuals really to work together on a personal level. The prepara- 
tions for the joint mission were perhaps as important as the flight 
itself from the standpoint of developing cooperative attitudes. History 
will be the ultimate judge of its success or failure, but it would appear 
that the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project has made a significant contribu- 
tion to the strengthening of detente, and laid the foundation for possi- 
ble future joint efforts between the United States and the Soviet Union. 


By Christopher H. Dodge* 

I. Introduction 

The Soviet Union was the first country to launch a live organism 
into an orbit around the Earth. This historical event, the November 3, 
1957 flight of Sputnik 2 containing the dog, Layka, ushered in a new 
era of biomedical research related to manned spaceflight. For one 
week, the dog orbited around the Earth in a state of weightlessness and 
was exposed to the then relatively unknown hazards of various ioniz- 
ing space radiations. After one week, an automatic device poisoned the 
dog and the experiment was terminated. This was the first indication 
that a higher vertebrate, fairly similar to man physiologically, could 
not only withstand the rigors of the rocket launch, but could also tol- 
erate for at least one week a variety of spaceflight factors. 

Other biological experiments were to follow (see Chapter Three, 
Table 3-5, p. 233) finally culminating in the historic flight of Yost ok 1 
on April 12, 1961 which contained the first human ever to orbit the 
Earth, Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin. As summarized in Chapter Three, 
Table 3-5, p. 233 of this report, there has followed a rapid sequence of 
progressively larger, longer duration, and more complicated manned 
spaceflights (Vostok 2-6; Voskhod 1 and 2; Soyuz 1, and 3-19; and 
Salyut 1-4) and biological satellites of the Kosmos series. All of these 
events have been supported by a very large and comprehensive re- 
search effort in the space life sciences. 


Before proceeding to review the Soviet space life sciences effort, it 
seems desirable to examine the many sources of information necessary 
to conduct such a review. In the early phases of the Soviet spaceflight 
program (roughly 1960-1967), it was difficult to obtain timely and 
detailed information about the program from the open literature, 
including scientific journals, monographs, and popular media such as 
newspapers. First, few people in the United States had a command of 
the Russian language. Second, it was quite difficult to obtain source 
material. Therefore, a concerted effort was made in this country to 
overcome this information gap. Private foundations, academic insti- 
tutions, and the Federal Government, including military and intelli- 
gence concerns, pooled and organized personnel with the proper lin- 
guistic and scientific background in order to screen systematically the 
Russian and East European scientific and technical literature. Some 

•Mr. Dodge is an analyst in life sriences. Science Policy Research Division, Congres- 
sional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 



early efforts toward this end were quite successful. One such organi- 
zation, the Aerospace Technology Division of The Library of Congress, 
provided the Federal Government and other interested concerns with 
timely compilations of bibliographic materials, abstracts of the Soviet 
and East European literature, and comprehensive reports synthesized 
from these materials. As new and more automated methods of process- 
ing foreign literature came into vogue, manual operations were phased 
out. Thus, the Aerospace Technology Division was terminated in 19G9. 

Since that time, a number of Federal Government and private con- 
cerns continue to provide translated and abstracted materials relating 
to the Soviet spaceflight effort. For example, the Federal Research 
Division of The Library of Congress provides abstracted materials in 
the Soviet space sciences for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA).* Other major organizations which provide 
published translations and abstracts of the Soviet and East European 
literature include NASA, the Joint Publications Research Service 
(JPRS), and a variety of non-Government translation agencies. Most 
translated and abstracted materials may be obtained from the National 
Technical Information Service (Springfield, Virginia 22151). The 
various Federal sources of information related to the Soviet space- 
flight effort in general and to the Soviet space life sciences effort in 
particular are provided in Figure 4—1. A non-government source of 
information on these subjects (Biotechnology Inc., Falls Church, Vir- 
ginia) is also depicted in Figure 4-2. 

*The extremely valuable assistance of Mr. Joseph Rowe of the Federal Research Divi- 
sion, The Library of Congress in providing most of the source materials for this Chapter- 
Is gratefully acknowledged. 


Aviation Space & E nvronmeniai Medicine 
Abstracts ot Current Literature 
(Aerospace Medical Association) 

Abstracts IIAA) 


Aerospace Medicine 
& Cology. Bibliography 




Government Reports 

NASA Requested 

& Technical 
Reports [STAR) 

National Technical 



Information Service 



(Dept. of Commerce) 

to Space 


D O D* Related 

Foreign Technology 
Navy Foreign 

Army Foreign 
Science & 
Technology Center 


Environmental & Pol 

Biological Radiation 


Selected Abstracts 
(Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress) 


Medical Literature 

(National Library 
of Medicine. NIH) 

Foreign Press & Radio Translations. • 

Soviet Union 
Space Biology & Aerospace Medicine 
Journal Translation 
USSR Academy of Medical 
Sciences Journal 
BioMedical Science* 
(Jomt Publications Research Service) 

Life Sciences Indtx ISCISEARCH] 
Social Sciences Index ISSCl) 
(Institute lor 
Scientific Information) 


Translations Register Index 
(National Translations Center. 
John Crerar Library) 


Figure 4-1 — Soviet literature agencies and interrelationships. 


| International 
I Aerospace 
Abstracts !IAA) 

NASA Requested 

to Space 


Aviation Space & Environmental Medicine 
Abstracts of Current Literature 
(Aerospace Medical Association) 

Aerospace Medicine 
& Biology, Bibliography 

Scientific & 
Reports [STAR] 

Government Reports 



National Technical 



Information Service 


(Dept. of Commerce) 

Selected Abstracts 
I (Federal Research Divisii 
Library of Congress) 

Foreign Press & Radio Translations — 

Soviet Union 
Space Biology & Aerospace Medicine 
Journal Translation 
USSR Academy of Medical 
Sciences Journal 
BioMedical Sciences 
(Joint Publications Research Service) 

Figure 4-2. — Soviet literature for life sciences digest. 

Since early 1967, there has been a dramatic increase in published 
information related to the Soviet manned space effort, particularly in 
the space life sciences. The trend began with the publication in 1967 
of the first Soviet bimonthly journal devoted exclusively to the aero- 
space life sciences, Space Biology and Medicine. Since January, 197-i, 
this journal has carried the title, Space Biology and Aerospace Medi- 
cine. The counterpart American journal is, Aviation, Space, and En- 
vironmental Medicine. 

The trend toward a more open exchange of information in the space 
life sciences has been enhanced by detente and the many individual con- 
tacts established by American and Soviet specialists at international 
conferences in the field. Such continuing series of conferences in- 


elude the "Man-in-Space", "International Aeronautical Federation" 
(IAF), "Committee on Space Research" (COSPAR), and annual 
meetings of the United States Aerospace Medical Association 
(ASMA) to which Soviet space life scientists are invited. .Most re- 
cently, the trend has been climaxed by the publication of a joint United 
States and Soviet publication entitled, "Foundations of Space Biology 
and Medicine". The topical outline for this series is summarized below 
(Table 4-1). * 

Table 4-1 — Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine 

Volume I 


Part I. Physical Properties of Space and Their Biological Significance. 
Chapter 1. Theories of the Origin and Nature of the Universe. 
Chapter 2. Physical Characteristics of Interplanetary Space. E. N. Vernov, 
Yu. I. Logachev, N. F. Pisarenko. 
Part II. Planets and Satellites of the Solar System from the Physical and 
Ecological (Viewpoints). 
Chapter 3. The Moon and Its Nature. Harold C. Urey. 

Chapter 4. Earth-Type Planets (Mercury, Venus, and Mars) M. Ya. Marov — 
V. D. Davydov. 

Chapter 5. Giant Planets and Their Satellites, Asteroids, Minor Planets, 
Meteorites (Including Cosmic Dust), and Comets. Samuel 
Gulkis, Raymond Newburn. 
Part III. Problems of Exobiology. 

Chapter 6. Biological Effects of Extreme Environmental Conditions. A. A. 

Chapter 7. Theoretical and Experimental Prerequisites of Exobiology. A. I. 

Chapter 8. Search for and Investigation of Extraterrestrial Forms of Life. 
A. B. Rubin. 

Chapter 9. Planetary Quarantine : Principles, Methods, and Problems. Law- 
rence B. Hall. 

Volume II 



Part I. Influence of the Artificial Gaseous Atmosphere of Spacecraft and Sta- 
tions on the Organism. 
Chapter 1. Barometric Pressure and Gas Composition. V. B. Malkin. 
Chapter 2. Toxicology of the Air in Closed Spaces. Ralph C. Wands. 
Chapter 3. Thermal Exchange and Temperature Stress. Paul Webb. 
Part II. Effect of Dynamic Flight Factors on the Organism. 

Chapter 4. Principles of Gravitational Biology. Arthur H. Smith. 

Chapter 5. Effect of Prolonged Linear and Radial Accelerations on the 

Organism. P. V. Vasil 'yov, A. R. Kotovskaya. 
Chapter 6. Impact Accelerations. James W. Brinkley and Henning E. von 

Chapter 7. Angular Velocities, Angular Acceleration, and Coriolis Accelera- 
tions. Ashton Graybiel. 

Chapter 8. Weightlessness. Siegfried J. Gerathewohl and I. D. Fc^to-. 

Chapter 9. Vibration and Noise. Charles W. Nixon, John Guighard, Henning 
E. von Gierke. 

•At the time of -writing, Volume II of the series has been published. The remaining 
volumes are in the final stages of preparation. 



Part III. Effect of Radiant Energy from Cosmic Space on the Organism. 

Chapter 10. Radiofrequencies and Microwaves, Magnetic arid Electrical 

Fields. Sol M. Michaelson. 
Chapter 11. Ultraviolet, Visible, and Infrared Rays. John H. Taylor and 
A. A. Letavet. 

Chapter 12. Ionizing Radiation. Yu. G. Grigor'yev and Cornelius A. Tobias. 
Part IV Psychophysiological Problems of Space Flight. 

Chapter 13. Biological & Physiological Rhythms. Ilubertus Strughold and 
Henry B. Hole. 

Chapter 14. Psychophysiological Stress of Space Flight. P. V. Simonov. 
Chapter 15. Physiology of Human Sensory Sphere Under Spaceflight Con- 
ditions. Ye. M. Yuganov, and V. I. Kopanev. 
Chapter 16. Astronaut Activity. Joseph P. Loftus, Jr. 
Part V. Combined Effects of Spaceflight Factors on Man and Animals : Methods 
of Investigation. 

Chapter 17. Combined Effect of Flight Factors. V. V. Antipov, B. I. Davydov, 
V. V. Verigo, Yu. M. Svirezhev. 

Chapter 18. Methods of Investigation in Space Biology and Medicine : Trans- 
mission of Biomedical Data. R. M. Bayevskiy, W. Ross Adey. 

Chapter 19. Biological Guidelines for Future Space Research. G. P. Parfenov. 

Volume III 


Part I. Methods of Providing Life Support for Astronauts. 

Chapter 1. Basic Data for Planning Life-Support Systems. Doris Howes 

Chapter 2. Food and Water Supply. I. G. Popov. 

Chapter 3. Air Regenerating & Conditioning. B. G. Grishayenkov. 
Chapter 4. Astronaut Clothing and Personal Hygiene. N. A. Azhayev, G. V. 

Kaliberdin, A. M. Finogenov. 
Chapter 5. Isolation & Removal of Waste Products. V. V. Borshchenko. 
Chapter 6. Spacecraft Habitability. Yu. A. Petrov. 

Chapter 7. Individual Life-Support Systems Outside a Spacecraft Cabin: 
Space Suits and Capsules. Walton L. Jones. 
Part II. Characteristics of Integrated Life-Support Systems. 

Chapter 8. Non-regenerative Life-Support Systems for Flights of Short and 

Moderate Duration. B. A. Adamovich. 
Chapter 9. Life-Support Systems for Interplanetary Spacecraft and Space 

Stations for Long-Term Use. Walton L. Jones . 
Chapter 10. Bioregenerative Life-Support Systems. Ye. Ya. Shepelev. 
Part III. Protection Against Adverse Factors of Space Flight. 

Chapter 11. Protection Against Radiation (Biological, Pharmacological, 

Chemical and Physical). P. P. Saksonov. 
Chapter 12. Therapeutic and Medical Care of Space Crews (Providing 
Medical Care, Equipment, and Prophylaxis). Charles A. 

Chapter 13. Descent and Landing of Space Crews and Their Survival in an 

Unpopulated Area. Charles A. Berry. 
Chapter 14. Protection of Life and Health of Crews of Spacecraft and Space 

Stations in Emergency Situations. I. N. Chernyakov. 
Part IV. Selection and Training of Astronauts. 

Chapter 15. Selection of Astronauts. Mae Mills Link, N. N. Gurovskiy, and 

I. I. Bryanov. 

Chapter 16. Training of Astronauts. Mae Mills Link and N. N. Gurovskiy. 
Part V. Future Space Biomedical Research. 

Chapter 17. An Appraisal of Future Space Biomedical Research. Sherman P. 

Source : Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 

Monographic sources of information concerning the Soviet Space 
life sciences are contained in a series entitled, "Problems of Space Biol- 
ogy." Topics considered since 1967 are listed below : 


Problems of Space Biology. Vol. 7. Human Operator Activity; Problems of 
Habitability, and Biotechnology (Collection of Articles). V. N. Chernigovskiy 
(Ed.). Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1967, 552 p. 

Ibid. Vol. 8. Adaptation to Hypoxia and Resistance To It. V. N. Chernigovskiy 
(Ed.). Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1968, 272 p. 

Ibid. Vol 9. Outline of Space Radiobiology. P. P. Saksonov et al. Moscow, 
"Nauka" Press, 1968, 350 p. (NASA TT-F-G04)* 

Ibid. Vol. 10. Neural Mechanisms of Vestibular Reactions. A. N. Razumeyev 
et al. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1969, 342 p. (NASA TT-F-605) 

Ibid. Vo. 11. The toxicology of Products of Vital Activity and Their Importance 
in the Formation of Artificial Atmospheres in Hermetically Sealed Chambers. V. 
V. Kustov et al. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1969, 129 p. (NASA TT-F-634) 

Ibid. Vol. 12. The Gravitational Receptor. V. N. Chernigovskiy (Ed.). Moscow, 
"Nauka" Press, 1971, 523 p. (NASA TT-F-720) 

Ibid Vol. 13. Prolonged Limitation of Mobility and Its Influence on the Human 
Organism. A. M. Genin et al. (Eds.). Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1969, 263 p. (NASA 

Ibid. Vol. 14. Radiobiological Aspects of the Reactivity of the Organism During 
Spaceflights. P. P. Saksonov et al (Eds.). Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1971, 398 p. 

Ibid. Vol. 15. Functional Morphology During Extremal Actions. Ye. F. Kotov- 
skiy et al. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1971, 383 p. (NASA TT-F-738) 

Ibid. Vol 16. General Topics. V. N. Chernigovskiy (Ed.). Moscow, "Nauka" 
Press, 1971, 351 p. (NASA TT-F-719) 

Ibid. Vol. 17, Pathophysiological Bases of Aviation and Space Pharmacology. 
P. V. Vasil'yev et al. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1971, 355 p. 

Ibid. Vol. 10. Problems of the Resistance of Biological Systems. B. N. Tarusov 
(Ed. ) . Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1971, 288 p. 

Ibid. Vol. 20. Mathematical Models of Biological Systems. Yu. M. Svirizhev 
et al. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1972, 159 p. (NASA TT-F-780) 

Ibid. Vol. 21. Tissue Oxygen During Extreme Flight Factors. Ye A. Kovalenko 
et al. Moccow, "Nauka" Press, 1972, 1972, 263 p. (NASA TT-F-762) 

Ibid. Vol. 22. Metabolism Under Extreme Conditions of Spaceflight and During 
Simulation. I. S. Balakhovskiy et al. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1973, 211 p. 

Ibid. Vol. 24 Problems of Water Supply for Space Crews S. V Chizhov et al 
Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1973, 268 p. 

Ibid. Vol. 25. Decompression Disorders. P. M. Gramenitskiy. Moscow, "Nauka" 
Press, 1974, 330 p. 

Ibid. Vol. 27. Radiobiology and the Genetics of Arabidopsis. V. I. Ivanov. Mos- 
cow, "Nauka" Press, Moscow, 1974, 191 p. 

In addition to the above, the proceedings of the aforementioned series 
of conferences are, as a rule, published in Russian and ultimately 
translated or abstracted. 

For those with Russian language background, it is possible to review 
the Soviet periodical literature directly for articles dealing with the 
space life sciences. A large number of sources regularly or occasionallv 
publish articles on the subject. An alphabetical listing of these sources 
is provided below (table 4-2) .f 

Table 4-2. — Space Life Sciences Source Journals Periodicity 

( — /(year) 

Akusticheckiy Zh. (Acoustics J.) 6/yr. 

Antibiotiki (Antibiotics) 12/yr. 

Arkhiv Anatomii, Gistologii i Embriologii (Archives of Anat- 
omy, Histology and Embryology) 12/yr. 

Arkhiv Patologii (Archives of Pathology) 12/yr. 

♦Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika (Aviation and Astronautics) 12/yr. 

Biologicheskiye Nauki (Biological Sciences) 12/yr. 

Biofizika (Biophysics) 6/yr. 

Biokhimiya (Biochemistry) 6/yr. 

tCitations in parentheses indicate translation availability. 

*Biblio£raphic citations used in this chapter have been translated into English. Table 
1-2 provides Russian transliterations of those citations. 


Table 4-2. — Space Life Sciences Source Journals — Continued Periodicity 

( — /(year; 

Byulleten' Eksperimental'noy Biologii i Meditsiny (Bulletin 

of Experimental Biology and Medicine) 12/yr. 

♦Doklady Akaderaii Nauk SSSR (Reports of the Academy of 

Science, USSR) 36/yr. 

Farmakologiya i Toksikologiya (Pharmacology and Toxi- 
cology) 6/yr. 

♦Fiziologicheskiy Zh. SSSR im. I. M. Sechenova (Physiological 

J. USSR in the name of I. M. Sechenov) 12/yr. 

Fiziologichiny Zh. [Ukr.] (Physiological J.) 6/yr. 

Gigiyena i Sanitariya (Hygiene and Sanitation) 12/yr. 

♦Gigiyena Truda i Professional 'nyye Zaholevaniya (Industrial 

Hygiene and Occupational Diseases) 12/yr. 

Izvestiya Akademii Nauk [A.N] Azerbaydzhanskoy SSR. 
Seriya Biol. (News of the Academy of Sciences [A.S.], Azer- 
baijan SSR. Biol. Series) 6/yr. 

Izvestiya A.N. Kazakhskoy SSR. Seriya Biol. (News of the 

A.S. of the Kazakh. SSR. Biol Series) 6/yr. 

Izvestiya A.N. Moldavskoy SSR. Seriya Biol. (News of the A.S. 

of the Moldavian SSR. Biol. Series) 6/yr. 

♦Izvestiya A.N. SSSR (News of the A.S. USSR) 6/yr. 

Izvestiya A.N. Tadzhikskoy SSR. Seriya Biol. (News of the 

A.S. of the Tadzhik SSR. Biol. Series) 6/yr. 

Izvestiya A.N. Turkmenskoy SSR Seriya Biol. (News of the 

A.S. of the Turkmen SSR. Biol. Series) 

Izvestiya A.N. Estonskoy SSR. Seriya Biol. (News of the A.S. 

of the Estonian SSR. Biol. Series) 4/ yr . 

Izvestiya Sibirskogo Otdeleniya AN SSSR. Seriya Biol. (News 

of the Siberian Branch, A.S. USSR. Biol. Series) 3/yr. 

Kazanskiy Meditsinkiy Zh. (Kazan' Medical J.) 6/yr. 

*Kardiologiya (Cardiology) 12/yr. 

Khimiya i Zhizn' (Chemistry and Life) 12/yr. 

Klinicheskaya Meditsina (Clinical Medicine) 12/yr. 

♦Kosmicheskiye Issledovaniya (Space Research) 6/yr. 

*Kosmicheskaya Biologiya i Aviakosmicheskaya Meditsina 

(Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine 6/yr. 

♦Kryl'ya Rodiny (Wings of the Homeland) 12/yr. 

Laboratornoye Delo (Laboratory Practice) 12/yr. 

Med. Radiologiya (Medical Radiology) 12/yr. 

Med. Tekhnika (Medical Equipment) 6/yr. 

Mikrobiologiya (Microbiology) 6/yr. 

Mikrobiologichniy Zh. [Ukr. with Russ & Eng. Absts'] (Micro- 
biological J.) fi/yr. 

Molekulyarnaya Biologiya (Molecular biology) 6/yr. 

♦Nciuka i Zhizn' (Science and Life) 12/yr. 

Neyrofiziologiya (Neurophysiology) 6/yr. 

Nervnaya Sistema (Nervous System) l/yr.[sk-] 

Oftal'mologicheskiy Zh. (Odessa) (Ophthalmological J.) 8/yr. 

♦Pntologicheskaya Fiziology and Experimental 'naya Tera- 

piya (Pathological Physiology and Experimental Therapy). 6/yr. 

Prikladnaya Biokhimiya i Mikrobiologiya (Applied Biochem- 
istry and Microbiology) 6/yr. 

♦Priroda (Nature) 12/yr. 

*Radiobiologiva (Radiobiology ) 6/yr. 

Sovetskaya Meditsina (Soviet Medicine) 12/yr. 

Sovetskoye Zdravookhraneniye (Soviet. Public Health) 12/yr. 

Sovetskoye Zdravookhraneniye Kirgzia (Soviet Public Health 

of Kirgizia) 6/yr. 

Sudebno-Meditsinskaya Ekspertiza (Forensic Medicine) 4/yr. 

Tekhnika-Molodezhi (Technology for Young People) 12/yr. 

Tsitologiya i Genetka (Cytology and Genetics) 6/yr. 

Tsitologiya (Cytology) 12/yr. 

Uppekhi Sovremennoy Biologii (Progress in Modern 

Biology) 6/yr. 

*Tn(Ur>ates 20 major journals. 
Zh = Zhurnal ; J = Journal. 


Table 4-2. — Space Life Sciences Source Journals — Continued ( — /(year) 


♦Uspekni Fiziologioheskikh Nauk (Progress in the Physio- 
logical Sciences) 4/yr. 

•Vestiiik Akademii Meditsinskikh Nank SSSR (Herald of the 

Acad, of Med. Sci's. USSR) 12/yr. 

Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSR (Herald of the Acad, of Sci's 

USSR) 12/yr. 

Vestnik Dermatologii i Venerologii (Herald of Dermatology 

and Venerology) 12/yr. 

Vestnik Leningradskogo Fniversiteta. Seriya Biol. (Herald of 

Leningrad University. Biol. Series) 24/yr. 

♦Vestnik Otorinolaringologii (Herald of Otorhinolaryngol- 

ogy) 6/yr. 

VestniK Oftal'mologii (Herald of Ophthalmology) 6/yr. 

♦Voyenno-Meditsinskiy Zh. (Military Medical J.) 12/yr. 

Voprosy Meditsinskoy Khimii (Problems of Medical Chem- 
istry) 6/yr. 

Voprosy Xeyrokhirurgii (Problems of Neurosurgery) 6/yr. 

♦Voprosy Filosolii (Problems of Philosophy) 12/yr. 

Voprosy Psikhologii (Problems of Psychology) 6/yr. 

Voprosy Pitaniya (Problems of Nutrition) 6/yr. 

Vrachebnoye Delo (Physician's Practice) 12/yr. 

Zdravookhraneniye Belorussii (Public Health of White 

Russia) 12/yr. 

Zdravookhraneniye Kazakhstana (Public Health of Kazakh- 
stan) 32/yr. 

Zdravookhraneniye Kirgizii (Public Health of Kirgizia) 6/yr. 

Zdravookhraneniye Moldavii (Public Health of Moldavia) 6/yr. 

Zdravookhraneniye Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Public Health of 

Russian Federation) 12/yr. 

Zdravookhraneniye Turkmenistana (Public Health of Turk- 
menistan) 12/yr. 

*Zemlya i Vselennaya (Earth and the Universe) 

*Zhurnal Vysshey Nervnoy Deyatel'nosti im. I. P. Pavlova 
(Journal of Higher Nervous Activity in the name of I. P. 

Pavlov) 6/yr. 

Zhurnal Mikrobiologii, Epidemiologii i Immunologii (Journal 

of Microbiology, Epidemiology and Immunology) 12/yr. 

Zhurnal Nevropatologii i Psikhiatrii im. S. S. Kosakova (Jour- 
nal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry in the name of S. S. 

Korsakov) 12/yr. 

Zhurnal Obshchey Biologii (Journal of General Biology) 6/yr. 

Zhurnal Evolyustionnoy Biokhimii (Journal of Evolutionary 

Biochemistry) 6/yr. 

Zhurnal Eksperimental'noy i Klinicheskoy Meditsiny (Journal 

of Experimental and Clinical Medicine) 6/yr. 

Superficial information of a more current nature is published in 
Soviet newspapers such as Pravda (Truth), Izvestiya (News), Kras- 
naya Zvezda (Red Star), Meditsinshaya Gazeta (Medical Gazette), 
and NedeVya (Weekly). A number of conferences on the subject of 
the space life sciences which do not involve international participa- 
tion are periodically held in the Soviet Union. These include "the 
All-Union Conferences on Space Biology and Medicine/' and meet- 
ings of the Aviation and Space Medicine Branch of the I. P. Pavlov 
Physiological Society. The proceedings of these conferences are often 
summarized in the aforementioned list of journals or are translated 
by XASA or JPRS. 

Biographic information on Soviet personalities involved in the 
snaee life sciences and the institutions in which they work are to be 
found in two recent studies prepared by The Library of Congress 

•Indicates 20 major journals. 

SOURCE : Federal Research Division, The Library of Congress. 


under the support of the Fogarty International Center of the Na- 
tional Institutes of Health. *• 2 

Many Soviet monographs dealing with the various disciplines of 
the space life sciences have been published, particularly within the 
past six years. Many of the major ones have been footnoted in the 
text of this report. A sizeable number are routinely abstracted and/ 
or occasionally translated by NASA or JPRS. 

The Soviet Union and the United States have made efforts to com- 
pile and organize the world literature on the space life sciences. The 
Soviet effort is reflected in a directory of Soviet and Western 
sources. 3 The United States effort is reflected in a series of publica- 
tions entitled, Aerospace Medicine and Biology: Bibliography 


From the foregoing review of the Soviet space life sciences litera- 
ture, it is evident that the Soviet research effort in this field is very 
large. In purely quantitative terms of personalities and facilities in- 
volved, it would appear to exceed substantially the comparable 
United States effort. In qualitative terms, the Soviet and United 
States programs are roughly equivalent. The general organization 
of the Soviet biomedical institutions involved in the space life sci- 
ences effort is summarized in Figure 4-3. 

1 Soviet Biomedical Institutions: A Directors Washington, D.C., U.S.D.H.E.W. Pub- 
lication No. (NIH) 74-608. 1974. 553 p. 

2 Soviet Personalities in Biomedicine. Washington, D.C., U.S.D.H.E.W. Publication No. 
(NIH) 74-699, 1974. 968 p. 

3 Medical and Biological Problems of Spaceflights. Moscow, "Nauka" Press 1972, 303. p. 
(Library of Congress. Federal Research Division (FRD) Abstract No. 1029) Federal' 
Research Division abstract citations will henceforth be indicated by, "(FRD # )." 















Figure 4-3. — Organization of Soviet Biomedical Institutions. 

The most prominent facility involved in the Soviet effort is the In- 
stitute of Biomedical Problems under the direction of Dr. Oleg 
Gazenko. This relatively new facility, constructed in the late 1960's, 
is under the Ministry of Health and is located on the outskirts of Mos- 
cow. Many of the articles published in the Soviet journal, Space 
Biology and Aerospace Medicine reflect the research being conducted 
in or supported by this facility although such articles seldom show 
instructional affiliation credits. The military Medical Academy imeni 
Kirov located in Leningrad also plays a prominent role in the Soviet 
space life sciences program. A great many academic centers and insti- 
tutes under the USSR Academy of Sciences provide additional sup- 
port to the program. A listing of some of the more prominent facili- 
ties is contained in the still valuable Aerospace Technology Report 
published in 1965. 4 

Topically, the Soviet space life sciences effort can, for convenience 
sake, be categorized into physiology and medicine, psychological and 
behavioral sciences, and human engineering. Under physiology and 
medicine, the following subjects are being investigated : 

4 Mandrovskiy, B. Soviet Bioastronautics and Manned Spaceflight. Program?, Organiza- 
tion, and Personalities. Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Aerospace Technology Di- 
vision Report No. P-65-14, 1965, 118 p. 


Acceleration and Deceleration Effects : 

Impact Accelerations. 

Coriolis Accelerations (vestibular effects). 
Acoustic Energy Effects. 
Altered and Normal Gas Atmospheres : 

Oxygen (hypoxia, hyperoxia). 

Carbon dioxide (hypercapnia, acapnia). 

Noxious gases (carbon monoxide, pyrolysis by-products etc.). 

Odors (food, body, chemical etc.). 
Biological Rhythms : 

Gircadian Rhythms. 

Work-Rest Cycles. 
Decompression Effects : 


Dysbarism (decompression sickness). 

Explosive Decompression. 
Diseases and Injury : 

Cause and Prevention. 

Treatment and Drug Therapy. 

Personal Hygiene. 
Nutrition : 



Natural and Synthetic Foods. 
Food Packaging. 
Radiation : 

Relative Biological Effectiveness. 
Dose and Dose Rate. 
Somatic and Genetic Effects. 

Protective Measures ( drugs, shielding, force fields etc.). 
Temperature and Humidity : 


Weightlessness : 

Motor Kinetics. 

Motion Sickness. 

Hypodynamia and Hypokinesia. 

Preventive and Prophylactic Measures. 
Work Capacity : 


Muscle Tone. 
Physical Training and Exercise. 

Subjects being investigated in the psychological and behavioral 
sciences include: 

Boredom and Confinement. 
Mental Fatigue. 
Motivation and Vigilance. 
Neuroses and Psychoses : 




Personality Dynamics : 

Group Interaction. 
Space Crew Problems : 


Selection and Screening. 


Task Analysis. 

Work Schedule and Performance. 
Weightlessness Effects: 

Work-Rest Cycles (sleep et). 


Human engineering subjects include : 

Air Conditioning : 

Spacecraft Temperature and Humidity Control. 

Atmosphere Control. 

Oxygen and Diluent Gas Management. 

Carbon Dioxide Removal. 

Photosynthesis of Lower and High Plants. 

Odor Management. 

Toxic Gas Management. 
Fire Hazard Management. 
General Life Support Management : 

Food Storage, Preservation, and Refrigeration. 

Personal Hygiene Equipment. 
Insulation (acoustic and thermal). 
Leisure, Exercise, and Recreation Equipment. 
Instrumentation : 

Biomedical Monitoring. 


Communications Equipment (radar, T.V., radio etc.) 
Radiation Protection (U.V., I.R., Ionizing etc.) : 
Individual Shielding. 

Electrostatic, Magnetic, or Electromagnetic Force Fields. 
Safety and Survival Equipment : 
Space Suits. 

Emergency Rescue Equipment. 

Emergency Pressure and Atmosphere Control. 

Repair and Maintenance Equipment. 
Sanitation Facilities : 

Waste Management, Disposal, and Storage. 
Space Vehicle Controls and Equipment : 

Manual and Automatic Controls. 

Cabin Atmosphere Controls. 
Vision : 

Lighting and Color Scheme. 

Instrument and Other Displays. 

Optical Controls (Periscope). 
Washing and Hygiene Equipment. 
Water Recycling and Purification : 

Respiration, Urine, and Perspiration Management. 

Problems of particular concern in the continuing Soviet space 
sciences effort include : 

Concentrated Ground Laboratory Studies : 

Effect of Hypokinesia (reduced movement) : 

Simulation of Prolonged Weightlessness (improvement in techniques) 
Energy Loss Studies : 

Gravitational Effects. 

Space-suit Limitations. 

Oxygen Deficiency Effects. 
Acceleration Effects : 

Hyperoxia (high oxygen or air pressures). 

Metabolic Studies. 


Biochemistry and Cell Physiology. 
Mechanism of Adaptation to Space Factors : 

Role of Neural and Neuro-humoral Mechanisms. 
Regeneration Processes (emphasis on blood cell replacement). 
Central Nervous System Conditioning. 
Inhibition of Cerebellar Functions. 
Vestibular Analyzer Conditioning. 
Eye Effects (vision generally). 

67-371—76 19 


Changes in Permeability of Cellular Structures : 
Ion Transport Mechanisms. 

Kinetics of Erythropoiesis (red blood cell formation). 

Gas Dynamics of Tissues. 

Changes in Homeostatic Constants. 

Alteration of Respiratory Processes. 
Functional Conditioning of the Cardiovascular System : 

Role of Brain Centers. 

Vestibular Mechanisms. 
Prolonged Artificial Hibernation. 
Automated Biochemical Sampling. 

Studies of Changes in Saliva Composition as a Rapid Indicator. 
Collection Techniques for Obtaining retailed Physiological Data in Flight : 

Biomedical and Psychological Monitoring. 

Voice Analysis. 

Computer Processing and Transmission of Medical Data. 
Protection against spaceflight factors : 

Altered Gas Atmosphere and Decompression. 

Many of the problems outlined above have been directly related to 
recent space missions. For example, the plvysiological aspects of altered 
gas atmospheres and the mechanisms of decompression disorders have 
received considerable attention since the 1971 Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 mis- 
sion in which the three cosmonauts were killed during re-entry due to 
rapid decompression when a valve failed in the landing module. Simi- 
larly, the physiological effects of weightlessness or weightless-like 
states (bed-rest, hypodynamia, confinement etc.) are of continuing 
concern as Soviet space missions become longer in duration and more 
complicated programmatically. 

In the paragraphs that follow, the more significant trends in the So- 
viet space life sciences will be reviewed. It is also the intent of this 
report to provide the reader with the most authoritative sources avail- 
able in the Soviet literature related to the subjects under review. 

II. Cosmonaut Selection and Training 


The Soviet process for selecting cosmonaut candidates, like that of 
the United States, has been refined and modified since the beginning of 
the manned spaceflight program. In the initial phases of that program, 
essentially the same principles were used to select cosmonauts as were 
used to select military aircraft pilots. Thus, the early Yost ok series, 
like the American Mercury series, of spaceflights were exclusively 
manned by former military pilots who had demonstrated in various 
rigorous physical, physiological, medical, and psychological tests that 
thev coufd be expected to withstand the anticipated rigors of space- 
flights. 5 - 6 

Early medical selection procedures for Soviet cosmonauts were ex- 
tensive because of a general lack of knowledge about the effects of 
spaceflight factors on humans. They were conducted at multiple sites 
near the applicants by teams of aviation medical specialists. Although 
they were conducted without the benefit of extensive equipment, they 

5 Rufcavishniknv, n. N. et al. The Cosmonaut as a Researcher. Moscow, "Inanive" Press, 
1973. R4 n. (NASA TT-f-15. 196). 

6 DeHart, R. Biomedical Aspects of Soviet Manned Spaceflight. Washington D.C. Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 1974, 71 p. (ST-CS-13-373-75). 


resulted in a 50 percent rejection rate. Causes of rejection were related 
to disorders of the ears, nose, and throat, visual acuity, internal dis- 
eases, neurocirculatory disturbances, and susceptibility to motion 
sickness. 7 

The medical examination was designed to reveal any pathological 
or functional disturbances which would disqualify the candidate. After 
a preliminary examination, a more comprehensive one was then con- 
ducted at the Institute of Aviation Medicine near Moscow. After the 
comprehensive examination, candidates were then exposed to simulated 
high altitude in pressure chambers to measure the effects of hypoxia 
and response to decreased atmospheric pressure. Ascent was made to 
a simulated altitude of about 39,000 ft. Loss of consciousness was ap- 
parently not an uncommon event in these early procedures. 8 

Extensive psychological tests, intelligence assessments, and coordi- 
nation measurements were conducted. Psychological tests were designed 
to ensure a good match between the cosmonaut and space vehicle con- 
trol system. Selection of the most appropriate candidate was considered 
from the viewpoint of recall ability, learning capacity, and other 
measurements. 9 

Essentially the same selection protocol persists with some modifica- 
tions, the difference now being that spacecraft are manned by multiple 
crews, not all of whom have an aviation background. The first such ex- 
ample of this in the Soviet manned spaceflight program was the Vosk- 
hod 1 flight in 1964. This vehicle, termed a "spacebus" by Soviet 
journalists, was manned by a medical doctor (B. B. Yeg-orov) and a 
candidate of technical sciences (K. P. Feoktistov), in addition to the 
pilot cosmonaut (V. M. Komarov). The doctor and scientific worker 
had no professional flight training. 10 They had passed a special medical 
selection process, and to the degree necessary, preflight preparation at 
the Zvezdnyy Gorodok (Star City) cosmonaut training center. The 
Voskhod 1 flight and postflight analysis showed that all of the crew 
members encountered no difficulty of any consequence. Since that time, 
the selection of cosmonauts with no formal flight training has become a 
common practice in the Soviet manned spaceflight program. At pres- 
ent, the crew of a spacecraft or orbiting laboratory has a fixed nucleus 
consisting of a pilot-commander and an onboard engineer. In addition, 
cosmonauts performing various specialized flight or scientific assign- 
ments are included in the crew. Preparation is such that an overlapping 
of function is assured should any one crew member become disabled. 11 " 12 

The Russians continue to place heavy emphasis on the vestibular sys- 
tem (responsible for balance and orientation) to cosmonaut candidates. 
This emphasis has its roots in the flight of Vostok 2 in 1961 during 
which cosmonaut German Titov experienced transient episodes of 
dizziness and nausea. Since that time, there has been concern that cos- 
monauts might experience illusions which would render orientation in 
space difficult or that vestibular-autonomic reactions would cause a 

'Link, M.M. an rl N.M. Gnrovskiy. Selection of Astronauts. In: Foundations of Space 
Biolocry and Medicine. Vol. Ill, Part 4.. Ch. 15. Washincton, P.C. NASA. 
8 TRi-bchikov, E. Russians in Space. Garden City, N.W., Doubledav and Co., 1971, p. 47-65. 
B Ibid. 

10 Rukav'shnikov. N.N. et aJ. The Cosmonaut as a Researcher. Op. Cit. 

11 Luxen'^ercr. B. and Zeerel, V. Astronaut Information: American and Soviet (4th Re- 
vision V Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Multilith No. 74-64 SP, 
April. 1f»74. 82 p. 

13 Yakovleva. I. Ya. et al. The significance of Coriolis acceleration summation tests for 
expert selecting. Vestnik Otorinolarlngologii (USSR), No. 1, 1974, 25-28 (FRD 1867). 


deterioration in well-being to the peril of the flight or flight program. 
Tests therefore continue to be developed to eliminate candidates with 
latent vestibular problems. One such test is the Coriolis Acceleration 
Summation Test in which candidates are rotated in a special chair at 
angular speed of 180 degrees per minute for 15 minutes. The Russians 
feel that this test is a valuable supplement to other tests of the vestibu- 
lar system (otolith reaction; Khilov swing etc.) because it affects all 
central nervous (cerebral) functions. It is therefore likely to disclose 
latent flaws that other tests might not detect. Presently, candidates 
with low tolerance to vestibular tests as exhibited by motion sickness 
or increased susceptibility to orientation illusions are eliminated. In 
general, the Soviets appear to place a heavier emphasis on the vestibu- 
lar testing of candidates than the United States. 13 

Other medical features of importance in the selection process include 
visual function and acuity, auditory function, the state of the immune 
system, respiration and gas exchange, water-electrolyte balance, and 
general metabolism. Because mineral (calcium) metabolism is a prob- 
lem in space, a wide variety of conditions which could lead to kidney 
stones and other disorders are used to eliminate candidates. These in- 
clude a history of renal colic, gall bladder disease, bloody urine, gout, 
and other diseases. 14 

In the early phases of the Soviet manned spaceflight program, the 
comprehensive testing of cosmonauts at the Institute of Aviation Medi- 
cine who had passed the initial selection process resulted in a rejection 
of 25-50 percent of the candidates examined. Thus, biomedical selec- 
tion procedures eliminated up to 75 percent of the total candidates 
otherwise qualified. This high rate of rejection has since been reduced 
by a more detailed early selection procedure. 15 

Soviet officials have never released information about the total num- 
ber of cosmonaut candidates evaluated as opposed to the number 
accepted into training. Indeed, with the exception of the Apollo-Soyuz 
cosmonauts, Soviet trainees seldom receive any visibility so that they 
are virtually unknown until after they have participated in a flight. 
However, German Titov, who piloted Vostok 2, is quoted as stating 
that in the 1960's, 51 men were selected for initial physical fitness train- 
ing, of which 12 were selected to become the nucleus of the manned 
program of the early and mid 1960's. 1 ® 

As the size and capabilities of Soviet manned spacecraft change in 
the future, there will probably be additional modifications in the cos- 
monaut selection process. However, in his book, "The Cosmonaut as 
a Researcher", cosmonaut N. Rukavishnikov (test-engineer on Soyuz 
10 and 16) speculates that two basic categories of cosmonauts will con- 
tinue to be selected for multi-manned orbital laboratories and inter- 
planetary spacecraft. The first category will consist of the command 
crew responsible for the flight and will be made up of pilots, on-board 
engineers, navigators, communications specialists, and doctors. The 
second category will consist of scientific and technical specialists se- 
lected for specific missions peculiar to the flight program. Thus, there 

u Khilov, K. L. Some problems of evaluating the vestibular function of aviators and 
cosmonauts. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 5, 1974. 47-52. 

"DeHart, R. Biomedical Aspects of Soviet Manned Spaceflight. Op. Cit. 32. 

18 Link, M. M. et al. Selection of Astronauts. In : Foundations of Space Biology and 
Medicine. Op. Cit. 

16 Caidin, M. Red Star in Space. The Crowell-Collier Press, 1963, p. 212-213. 


will likely be more changes made in the selection of specialty profiles 
than in the biomedical selection process itself. 17 


1. General Protocol 

In the early phases of the Soviet manned spaceflight program, the 
Soviet Air Force was responsible for cosmonaut training under Gen- 
eral Nikolai Kamanin, who until recently headed that program. 19 The 
first formal training site was located at Frunze Airport on the out- 
skirts of Moscow. In early 1960, the program was shifted to the new 
specialized facilities at Zvezdnyy Gorodok (Star Town) which is now 
the center for all cosmonaut training (also known as the Gagarin Cos- 
monaut Training Center). Secondary, specialized training facilities 
aro scattered throughout the U.S.S.R. These include a number of high 
altitude military stations in mountainous regions which are used for 
acclimatization to hypoxia (decreased ox}'gen) and general physical 
conditioning, various locations along the Black Sea which are used 
for underwater (simulated weightlessness) training, 19 and even Soviet 
Antarctic bases, such as Vostok which are used for stress physiologi- 
cal research of relevance to the space program. 20 " 22 

The basic principle adhered to in Soviet cosmonaut training pro- 
gram, as in the U.S. astronaut training program, is that each crew 
member must be able to control the spacecraft, to service the regular 
systems of the vehicle, to carry out basic missions during the flight 
and to land the spacecraft. At the same time, each crew member must 
be sufficiently specialized to carry out specific flight missions. The 
training program therefore satisfies mission specialization while assur- 
ing that the cosmonaut has a knowledge of a wide range of 
disciplines. 23 

The fundamental Soviet philosophy for training cosmonauts is to 
design training curricula which exceed the physiological and psycho- 
logical limits of the trainee and all situations anticipated in the space 
mission. To this end. there are distinct phases in the training program. 
The first involves general preparation which is administered to train- 
ees who have not previously flown a mission. Here, the trainee is 
administered lectures and examinations on such subjects as the mechan- 
ics of spaceflight, space navigation, general principles of the space- 
craft, astronomy, geography, meteorology, space biology, and 
medicine. 24 

The next phase involves technical preparation. This phase begins 
after crews have been established for a particular mission. The crews 
are familiarized with specific features of the mission through studies 
in the form of lectures and seminars with examinations which are con- 

17 Rukayishnikoy. N. TIip Cosmonaut as a Researcher. Op. Cit. 

18 Link, M. M. et al. Training of Astronauts. In: Foundations of Spacp Biology and 
Medicine. Vol. Ill, Part 4, Ch. 16. Washington, D.C.. NASA, 1975 (in press). 

19 Parin. V. V. Some important problems of space physiology. Aerospace Medicine, No. 9. 
19^0 p. 1 01 1 . 

20 Antosehenko. A. et al. At first in the water-then in space. Aviatsiva Kosmonaytika 
(USSR). No. 10. 1968. 75-77. 

21 Fnsisrned. Ayiatsiya i Kosmonaytika (USSR), No. 4, 1973, p. 45 (Library of Congress. 

r RI) 1 2^0) . 

(USRR) Si 8 I AT)ril 1973 at 4 the Cosmonaut Training Facility. Sotsialistlcheskaya Industrlya 

23 Rukayishnikov, N. et al. The Cosmonaut as a Researcher. Op. Clt. p. 45-50 
2 * Ibid. 


ducted by leading specialists in various spacecraft systems. In addi- 
tion, practical studies are conducted with the cosmonauts at fabrica- 
tion sites, and test and simulation facilities. The crew participates in 
the design of various systems, the compilation of flight programs, on- 
board flight documentation, and various technical conferences. 25 

In the flight-preparation phase the crew is exposed to various types 
of trainers and devices simulating programmed space operations. The 
number of devices involved in pre-flight preparation numbers several 
dozen. This phase also involves day and night parachute jumps from 
various types of aircraft, under various meteorological conditions, and 
in various types of terrain including deserts, mountains, and water. 
The most important feature at this stage is training on what the Rus- 
sians refer to as the "complex trainer". 26 This is an exact model of the 
spacecraft in which it is possible to simulate all control, signal, and 
indicator systems. 27 The pilot is also able to observe a simulated envi- 
ronment outside the spacecraft including the Sun, the stars, and the 
Earth's surface. The crew simulates all basic operations to be per- 
formed during the flight, from launch to landing. 28 

The Russians consider the medical and biological preparation of the 
cosmonauts to be a separate phase of training. Here, trainees receive 
periodic examinations in special trainers and their behavior is ex- 
amined under the influence of various uncomfortable conditions or 
"medical preparations". Emphasis is placed on preparation for long 
duration spaceflight. To this end, trainees exercise in special weight- 
loaded suits, and conduct various other physical exercises. At this 
stage, the final medical check and examination is given. The biomedi- 
cal training program will be discussed in more detail below. 29 

An additional important phase of training involves preparation for 
the scientific and technical experiments of the flight. At this point, the 
cosmonauts come into close contact with scientists who have designed 
the experiments. They perform simulated protocols in trainers, attend 
lectures, visit various scientific organizations and observatories, and 
compile and formulate the onboard documentation of data. 30 

Finally , the crew performs a mockup of the flight in the "complex 
trainer" which lasts from several hours to more than a day and in- 
cludes all of the major features of the flight. All flight conditions are 
simulated as completely as possible. This phase is under the guidance 
of a state commission which verifies that all flight procedures and 
systems are correct for final flight clearance. Inaccuracies simulating 
possible flight failures can be introduced and the crew is obliged to 
record these and spontaneously devise methods for controlling them. 
After successfully completing the mockup and passing examinations 
in all of the necessary disciplines, the state commission grants clear- 
ance for the flight. 31 

The Russians have continued to upgrade the cosmonaut training 
center. In 1972, a new training complex with modern equipment was 

* 5 Thiol. 
28 IMd. 

87 Khrunov, Ye. et al. Man-Operator in Space. Moscow. 1974, p. 297-306 (NASA TT 

P-15. 174). 

28 The cosmonaut prepares for flight, Kryl'ya Rodiny (USSR), No. 2, 1974. 10-14 (FRD 

89 Rukavishhnikov, N. The Cosmonaut as a Researcher. Op. Cit. 
*> Thirl. 
81 Ihid. 


added so that now it includes a new centrifuge, spacecraft docking 
niockups, and Soyuz and Salyut trainers. 32 

While there are fundamental similarities between the United States 
astronaut and Soviet cosmonaut training programs, there are also 
some major differences. For example, according to cosmonaut A. x\. 
Leonov of the ASTP crew, American astronauts have more flight 
training while Soviet cosmonauts heavily emphasize parachute jump- 
ing under a variety of situations. There is no formal or mandatory 
physical conditioning program for American astronauts who carry 
out physical training independently. This is in marked contrast to a 
mandatory and rigorous program of physical training for Soviet cos- 
monauts. The ASTP program has offered a unique opportunity to 
compare the relative merits of two training programs in detail. 33 

2. Vestibular Training 

Since the flight of Vostok 2 in 1961, in which cosmonaut Titov ex- 
perienced transient episodes of disorientation and nausea, the Russians 
have placed heavy emphasis on the vestibular training. This training 
involves both passive and active exercises designated to increase the 
resistance of the vestibular apparatus (inner ear) to the various linear 
and angular accelerations associated with spaceflight. The Soviet em- 
phasis on the vestibular system is particularly evident in the research 
literature which will be discussed in a subsequent section. 34 But it is also 
evident in various recent accounts of cosmonaut training. 35 36 

Prior to the training cycle, vestibular stability and sensitivity are 
evaluated on an individual cosmonaut basis. The protocol of the subse- 
quent vestibular training program is therefore tailored to the vestibu- 
lar profile of the cosmonaut. 37 

The category of "active" vestibular training is characterized by 
strenuous gymnastics and a number of sports which are known to 
stimulate the vestibular system. A variety of devices are used includ- 
ing the Loping swing (a rigid, standing, vertically rotating swing), 
trampoline, and a large wire-mesh drum which the trainee can rotate 
violently through a number of planes. Acrobatic exercises including 
swimming, scuba diving, running, and figure skating and ballet, are 
also commonly employed. Incorporated into these regimens are various 
standardized body and head movements designed to selectively stimu- 
late the vestibular system such as somersaults, various head and trunk 
movements, and jumping exercises which require total -body rotation 
through 90 ; 180, or 360 degrees. Parachute jumping (including free 
fall) and simulated weightlessness training in a water-filled drum is 
also included in the category of active vestibular training. 38 

Passive vestibular training, on the other hand, does not require the 
active muscular participation of the cosmonaut. Rather, it is a me- 
chanical type of training in which the cosmonaut sits or is strapped 

83 "Prospects for manned spaceflieht and life sciences In the Soviet space proem m accord- 
ing to 'Astronautics Day' discussions." Pravda. April 12, 1973. p. 3. CFRD #1230) 

3» Unsigned. Apollo-Soyuz joint flight training. Sovetskava Rossiya (USSR) , 28 July 1974, 
p. 3. fT?RD #1944). 

** Nikola yev. A. Space-Road Without End. Moscow. "Molodaya Gvardiya" Press, 1974. 
p. 42-4R fPRD #2186). 

^Unsismpd. Cosmonaut Training. Sovetskaya Estoniya (USSR) , Dec. 6, 1974, p. 3 
CFRT) if-21 83> . 

» Unsigned. The cosmonaut prepares for flight. Kryl'va Rodlny. No. 3, 1974, 10-13 
(FRT> #20R7). 
87 Nikolayev, A. Space-Rond Without End. Op. Cit. 
3-" Ibid. 


to a chair or other device which is mechanically rotated or agitated. 
Devices used for this training include: 1) the "universal rotating 
chair" which is mechanically rotated around its vertical axis in various 
horizontal planes and at various angular rates. This device exposes the 
cosmonaut to both angular and Coriolis accelerations; 2) the "floating'' 
chair, a mechanically rotated chair which is suspended above the floor 
by four compressed air jets. In this device, the head and upper torso 
movements of the cosmonaut must be applied to maintain the system 
in a state of relative equilibrium; 3) the Khilov or parallel swing 
(named after its inventor, a famous Soviet vestibular physiologist) 
which is a platform suspended by four bars which swings back and 
forth without changing vertical position; and 4) the "optokinetic 
drum'', a vertical rotating drum with black and white stripes painted 
on the interior surface. Inside the drum is a rotating chair which ran 
turn independently or in synchronism with the drum. The object of this 
device is to link the functions of the visual and vestibular systems. 39 

All of these vestibular training approaches are claimed to improve 
measureably the stability and function of the vestibular system of 
cosmonauts, at least under terrestrial conditions. However, what re- 
mains unclear is whether this rigorous training regimen has really im- 
proved the cosmonaut's tolerance of actual spaceflight conditions. For 
the problem of transient cosmonaut disorientation during spaceflights 
has stubbornly persisted, as it has throughout the American Apollo 
series of flights. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate the practical merits 
of the Soviet vestibular training program which has consistently been 
far more rigorous than its counterpart American prooTam. 40 

The Russians continue to evaluate and modify vestibular training 
regimens. Efforts have recently been made to compare the efficacy of 
active and passive training methods and a combination of the two. 
It was found that all types of vestibular training improve the accuracy 
of spatial orientation. The passive method, using linear accelerations, 
appears to yield the best results. Oddy enough, a prolonged course of 
training (9 months) in which both passive and active methods were 
emploved appeared to worsen the various indices of spatial percep- 
tion. 41 

3. Visual training. 

Most formal visual training is in the form of spatial orientation or 
passive vestibular tests such as the previouslv mentioned optokinetic 
drum. But there is some concern about possible decrements in visual 
function under spaceflight conditions. Accordingly, the Russians con- 
tinue to explore more accurate and definitive methods of determining 
and forecasting visual function in space crews. A recent approach 
which has been investigated involves the measurement of psychophys- 
iological factors (light and contrast threshold sensitivity) and gen- 
eral visual acuity (the perception of geometric, astronomic, and other 
photometric factors). As proposed, measurements could be made 
under normal laboratory or field simulation conditions. The procedure 
tvould be rapid (5 minutes) and testing devices would be light and 

w Ibid. 

"Yakovleva, I. Ta. et al. The function of perception of snatial coordinates by active, 
passive, and combined methods during vestibular training. Space Biology and Aerospace 
Medicine (USSR), No. 5, 1974. 60-66. 


compact. Two devices would be used: one would be a focusing pattern 
chart to measure visual acuity; the other would be designed to meas- 
ure visual contrast sensitivity. Thresholds of visual perception would 
be plotted as a function of the time required to complete the tests. 
Apparently the approach holds promise of finding practical applica- 
tion, since it has been tested successfully by Soviet bioastronautics 
experts during aircraft flights, during parachuting, and in simula- 
tors. 42 

h. Acceleration Training 

Both the Soviet cosmonaut and the American astronaut programs 
employ centrifuge training to prepare flight crews to withstand ac- 
celeration forces associated with the launch and reentry phases of 
spaceflight. Cosmonaut trainees are exposed to transverse accelerations 
of up to 12 times the Eartlvs gravity ( 12 G) . 43 

Exposure to the centrifuge is a gradual process. In the early phases 
of the Soviet spaceflight program, cosmonauts were exposed over a 
two month period to gradually increasing forces, starting with 2G 
and increasing in small increments to 10 or more Gs. A more recent 
variation of this training involves physical exercises prior to expo- 
sure. Using this approach, the total number of exposures has been 
approximately halved. With either approach, the increase in accelera- 
tion tolerance varies from 1.9 G to 3.2 G. Acceleration forces most 
commonly experienced by cosmonauts are in the 7-10-G range. The 
Russians claim that centrifuge conditioning is most effective in cases 
where initial tolerance of acceleration is low. The most effective ap- 
proach is to gradually increase the G-load while simultaneously in- 
creasing the time intervals between rotation. 44 

^ There are apparently several man-rated centrifuges in the Soviet 
Union. Recent modern additions to the Soviet centrifuge inventory 
are of Swedish manufacture. The firm ASEA most recently provided 
the Soviet Union with a centrifuge with an 82 foot long boom which 
can generate acceleration forces of up to 30 G at 36.8 revolutions per 
minute (rpm). The test cabin has three axes of movement and is 
equipped with humidity, temperature, and pressure controls. Medical 
monitoring equipment will measure up to 60 physiological functions 
during rotation. 45 

5. Weightlessness Training 

'While true weightless conditions are impossible to simulate on 
Earth, it is possible to attain brief periods (up to about one minute) 
of weightlessness in high speed (jet) aircraft which fly through a 
parabolic (Keplerian) trajectory. 46 Soviet cosmonauts as well as 
American astronauts have continued to use this technique for short- 
term weightlessness training in preparation for spaceflights. 47 Other 

" Ivan ° v « Y S- A - Methods of studying operator vision functions in small fUeht vehiele 
(PRD S #1433 S ) AkademiI Nauk USSR. Seriya Biologieheskaya, No. 5, 1973, 647-657 

, ,1 3 Stepantsov V. I- et al. Basic principles for formulating training programs on a cen- 
trifuge. Space Biolosy and Medicine (USSR). No. 6. 1969. 
" Link. M. et al. Astronaut Training. Op. Cit. 
" -*™tion Week and Snare Technologv. July 15. 1974. p. 17. 
8 Kopanev. V I. et al. Physiology of the'sensory sphere of man under the conditions 
Of space flight. Moscow. Academy of Sciences USSR. 1972. 79 n. (NASA TT F-14 530) 
.q,,^ 011 ^'™^ S. et al. In Open Space. Moscow, "Znaniye" Publishing House. 
o4 p. (t KL) ^xl3 i a) . 


approaches include immersion in water, including diving, free-fall 
parachute jumping, training on a special apparatus which simulates 
a support-free state, and prolonged bed rest and confinement. 48 49 

As is typical of linear and angular accelerations, human tolerance 
of weightlessness is subject to considerable individual variation. Some 
Western observers have noted that up to 50 to 60 percent of subjects 
exposed to brief periods of weightlessness during parabolic flights 
have experienced vertigo and nausea. Many of the subjects had no 
flying background. On the other hand, of 39 Russian flyers exposed to 
such flights, only one experienced unpleasant sensations. 50 

It has been established that there are three general categories of 
individual response to short-term weightlessness: 1) No response or 
sensations of euphoria and well-being; 2) illusory sensations after 12 
to 15 exposures; and 3) symptoms of discomfort experienced imme- 
diately upon exposure with subsequent difficulty in adapting to the 
factor. In the early phase of the Soviet spaceflight program, individ- 
uals in the third category were commonly eliminated from the train- 
ing program. Later, it was discovered that most persons, even those 
with initially low tolerance, gradually adapt to this factor so that 
they presumably need not be eliminated from further training. 51 

Short-term weightlessness training by cosmonauts takes place both 
in small, single or two-seat aircraft as well as in large, multi-enenned 
aircraft such as the TU-104. 52 The larger aircraft are called "flying 
laboratories" wherein fully outfitted cosmonaut trainees can simulate 
actual spaceflight situations such as extravehicular activities (EVA). 
Soviet cosmonauts are exposed to as many as 30 such flights. One 
Soviet cosmonaut reportedly completed 350 hours of total flying time 
(including weightlessness training) and conducted more than 100 
parachute jumps. 53 

The more experimental aspects of the problem of weightlessness 
simulation will be discussed in the section devoted to acceleration and 

6. Physical and Survival Training. 

The physical training program for Soviet cosmonauts includes both 
mandatory and voluntary regimens, whereas in the United States 
astronaut program, physical training is purely voluntary. The vari- 
ous mandatory exercise regimens for cosmonauts are designed to 
increase tolerance of specific spaceflight factors. For acceleration tol- 
erance, gymnastics and exercises on special equipment such as the 
Loping swing (a vertically rotating swing) and trampoline are 
conducted. To increase vestibular tolerance, there are midriff strength- 
ening exercises, various acrobatics, swimming, and exercises on swings 
and revolving chairs. For hypoxia training, there is track, cross-coun- 
try skiing, and swimming. Competitive sports of the cosmonaut's pref- 
erence such as basketball, handball, and wrestling are said to develop 
emotional stability and concentration. 54 

*s Nikola vev, A. Space-Road Without End. On. Cit. p. 47. 

49 L'nk. M. and N. N. Gurovskiy. Astronaut Training. Op. Cit. 

^Konaiipv, V. I. Physiology of the sensory sphere of man under the conditions of space- 
flicrht On. Cit. 

51 Link, M. et al. Astronaut Training. Op. Cit. 

52 TMfl. 

63 Tho flight of the manned scientific station Salyut 3, Aviation and Cosmonautics (USSR), 
No. «. 1074. 6-7 (FRT> #J 983) . 

M Makarov, R. Flight demands training. Aviation and Cosmonautics (USSR), No. 2, 
1974.44-45. (FRD#1662). 


The Russians also stress high altitude (mountain) adaptation and 
parachute jumping as important adjuncts to the physical training 
program. It is felt that high altitude training increases resistance to 
accelerations and hypoxia and increases physical work capacity. 
Moreover, high altitude training facilities are convenient for the 
psychological training of crews under adverse conditions. 55 

More recently, cosmonaut candidates have undergone survival 
training in the desert and in the Indian Ocean. Groups of cosmonauts 
with accompanying physicians were provided with survival kits and 
sufficient rations for one-fifth the daily intake of food and water. 
Medical examinations were conducted daily and the survival tests 
were continued for an unspecified length of time until the health of 
the subjects appeared to be endangered. 56 

7. Behavioral and Simulator Training. 

In the early days of the Soviet manned spaceflight effort, space 
psychology, like the social and psychological sciences in general, was 
looked down upon as a non-science. A prominent Soviet space life 
scientist was once quoted as proclaiming in a private conversation 
that space psychology was somewhat akin to the "rubbing of one's 
navel against infinity''. 57 

Since that time, the behavioral aspects of manned spaceflight have 
assumed increasing relevance. The terms "psychology" and "psycho- 
physiology" are now commonly encountered in virtually all aspects of 
the Soviet manned spaceflight program, from the theoretical to the 
practical. Ps} T chological or behavioral preparation is linked to every 
facet of the cosmonaut training program. Marxist-Leninist studies as 
well as physical conditioning are considered to contribute to the moral 
and psychological development of the cosmonaut. Space psychology 
is now defined to include all aspects of man-machine interaction as 
well as investigations of group compatability. Activities which are 
considered to promote psychological preparedness for spaceflight in- 
clude the piloting of various aircraft, particularly in groups; para- 
chuting, including free-fall; water immersion and diving: acrobatics; 
pressure and heat chamber training; centrifuge and vestibular train- 
ing; isolation and confinement; work-rest training; and, in general, 
all phases of cosmonaut training discussed in this section. 58 

Cosmonauts are under psychological scrutiny from the selection 
process throughout the spaceflight itself. Their behavior patterns are 
evaluated for each new situation encountered in the training cycle. In 
addition, the group compatability of each Soviet crew has been eval- 
uated in detail throughout the Soyuz-Salyut program. 59 

Dr. Yu. A. Senkevich, who participated in both the Heyerdahl (Ra) 
expeditions, investigated the compatability of international crews as 
it relates to cosmonautics. He concluded that although disagreements 
and "clique" formation are inevitable, they can be minimized by a 
scientific approach to group selection, particularly the group leader. 
Selection should be based on professional qualifications and particu- 

65 Link, M. et al. Astronaut training. Op. Clt. 

B6 Volovich, V. Soviet cosmonaut survival training. Aviation and Cosmonautics (USSR), 
No. 12. 3 973. 38-39. 
67 Mandrovskiy, B. Personal communication. 1965. 

58 Nikolayev, a. Moral and psychological training for cosmonauts Aviation and Cosmonau- 
tics 'USSR). No. 3. 1974. 40-41. (FRD #1717). 

59 Cosmonaut psychology. Literature Gazette (USSR), July 17, 1974, p. 1:10 (FRD 


"larly the individual's ability to relate to others. Special training can 
enhance the latter quality. 60 

One of the classical approaches to the psychological preparation 
and evaluation of cosmonauts has been isolation, confinement, and re- 
stricted activity (hypokinesia and hypodynamia) training. This has 
been carried out in the so-called "Chamber of Silence", a soundproof 
(anechoic) chamber in which the trainee is obliged to spend days at a 
time in strict isolation. This solitary confinement and relative inac- 
tivity is designed to test the psychophysiological and emotional sta- 
bility of the subject. During the exposure, the trainee lives and works 
m\ altered work-rest cycle corresponding to the anticipated spaceflight 
mission. Exposure times have ranged from 7 to 15 days for cosmonauts 
who participated in the Vostok program. Medical and psychological 
data are gathered throughout the exposure with emphasis on func- 
tional and behavioral changes caused by the experiment. Thus far, it 
has been concluded that all trainees have exhibited a high level of emo- 
tional and psychological stability and have adapted well to the vari- 
ous stresses. Special sets of physical exercises, including isometrics and 
exercises conducted with the aid of a bicycle ergometer and rubber 
expanders have been incorporated into the spaceflight program. 61 

Simulator training also falls within the sphere of psychophysiologi- 
cal preparation. Table 4-3 shows the various types of training devices 
from which psychophysiological data is derived and demonstrates, 
once again, that behavioral observations are incorporated into virtu- 
ally all phases of the cosmonaut training program. 82 


Dynamic simulators, Fixed simulators, 

Functional simulators Specialized simulators Complex simulators 

Spacecraft instruments and other systems. Control of life support (ecological) Space station. 


Manual control Approach mooring, and rendezvous Multimanned spacecraft. 

with other objects or spacecraft. 
Life support system Landing and takeoff from the moon, 1-man spacecraft. 

Mars, and other rlanets. 

Optical equipment Specialized systems (EVA) 

Radio equipment Piloting and navigation 

SOURCE: Leonov, A., et al., Psychological features of the activities of cosmonauts; Moscow: Navka Press, 1971, pp 54-66. 

In the opinion of P. V. Simonov, a specialist in space-crew psychol- 
ogy, simulator training in which malfunctions are programmed and 
special training for the most probable emergency situation should be 
viewed as the most important aspects of the cosmonaut training pro- 
gram and the most effective way of preventing neuroemotional stress. 
The development of skills should reach such a degree of perfection 
that optimum performance should be assured in the absence of con- 
firmatory feedback. As expressed by cosmonaut Khrunov: 

Sometimes it happens that a certain individual does everything completely 
correctly, but he is found to seek confirmation that this is true. If there is no 
such feedback, he becomes confused and begins to make mistakes. Another in- 

90 Psychological compatabllity of International crews. Medical Gazette (USSR), April 12, 
1974, p. 4 (FRD#1767). 
81 Link. M. M. et. al. Astronaut training. Op. Cit. 

83 Leonov, A. et. al. Psychological Features of the Activity of Cosmonauts. Moscow. 
"Nauka" Press. 1971. p. 54-66. 


dividual does not require such feedback. This confident individual is the future 
spacecraft commander. 83 

Recently, the Russians have been investigating the dynamics of voice 
patterns as an indicator of neuroemotional stress. Various elements of 
speech (intensity, stress point, word order etc.) arc analyzed as an in- 
dex of the cosmonaut's psychological and physiological state. The 
effects of various flight factors on voice dynamics are evaluated so I hat 
they can be later correlated with actual spaceflight situations. Speech 
profiles are established during the initial period of cosmonaut train- 
ing. Specially trained listeners monitor the cosmonaut's voices and 
their analyses are recorded and re-analyzed in a computer to obtain 
the most objective evaluation. Initially, an attempt was made to ana- 
lyze voice patterns directly by computer. However, this method proved 
to be slow. Investigations on this subject continue." 65 

In summary, the Russians are continuing to develop more accurate 
quantitative methods of assessing and predicting cosmonaut behavior 
and performance. Multifaceted analyses are being developed. Flight- 
related factors such as task complexity, duration and complexity of the 
flight program, task compatability with equipment, habitability fac- 
tors, and work-rest cycles are being evaluated. Personal factors such 
as background, health and emotional status, and psychophysiological 
characteristics are also being assessed. The quality of performance is 
evaluated as a function of error, accuracy and efficiency of work, and 
time required to complete the task. Quantitative factors continue to be 
developed. Once developed, probability parameters may be applied to 
the design of various man-machine systems as well as to spaceflight 
missions and associated training programs. 68 

III. Space Medicine 


Biomedical information was first transmitted to Earth from a space- 
craft during the November, 1957 flight of the dog, Layka. in Sputnik 
2. During this one week flight, certain vital functions such as heart and 
respiration rate were monitored. This and subsequent biological 
space missions demonstrated that higher vertebrates could successf ully 
withstand various spaceflight factors such as weightlessness and paved 
the way for the first manned missions of the early 1960'S. 67 

Since the very first Vostok flight in April, 1961, Soviet efforts to 
monitor the medical status of cosmonauts have become more elaborate. 
But certain basic parameters monitored have remained constant. Thus r 
physical parameters vital to cosmonaut health have included: tem- 
perature; humidity; atmospheric pressure; and the oxygen and car- 
bon dioxide content of the spacecraft atmosphere. Medical parameters 
have included: continuous heart rate; pneumography (lung func- 
tion) ; electrocardiography; seismocardiography ; electroencephalo- 

63 Simonov, P. V. Psychophysiological Stress of Spaceflight. Moscow. Academy of Science* 
USSR. 1972. 63 p. (NASA TT-F-14,863). 

64 Cosmonaut psychology. Op. Cit. 

65 Ushakov, A. Listening to the cosmonaut's voice. Kazakhstanskaya Pravada (USSRK 
Fob. 22, 1074. p. 4 (FRD #1695). 

66 Lebedev, V. et al. Indices of pilot-cosmonaut work quality during spacecraft control. 
Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 6. 1974, 42-^45. 

87 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space 
Programs, 1966-1970. Wash., D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1971, p. 258. 


graphy; electrooculography ; electromyography; thermography; and 
galvanic skin response. 68 Voice transmission and television have been 
available from the earliest Vostok flights for psychological analysis. 
Not all of the medical parameters listed above have received the same 
emphasis on every flight and each manned mission has been character- 
ized by emphasis on some particular facet of cosmonaut health and 
performance during the flight. 69 

Like the American astronauts, the medical monitoring of cosmonauts 
is initiated during the selection process, proceeds through the training 
process and the flight itself, and continues long after the flight is 
terminated. During the flight, various medical conditions are compared 
with pre-flight data. The function of medical specialists during a given 
manned flight is to compare the cosmonauts current physical condi- 
tion with his condition prior to the flight in order to attempt to predict 
his future medical status. Thus, the medical specialist has become 
intimately familiar with the cosmonaut's medical status over a long 
period of time and only those specialists involved in the cosmonaut's 
selection and training participate in medical monitoring and data 
analysis during the flight. The Russians are presently attempting to 
develop a variety of mathematical, clinical, and physiological ap- 
proaches with which to better predict the condition of cosmonauts dur- 
ing a given mision. 70 

Throughout the Soviet manned spaceflight program and especially 
during the Soyuz portion of that program, medical monitoring has 
been specially formulated to assess the various effects of the weightless 
state on cosmonauts. 71 Extensive examinations of the condition of the 
central nervous system, cardiorespiratory system, metabolism, blood 
chemistry, and water-electrolyte balance have been conducted before 
and after the flights. 72 Peripheral blood composition was studied be- 
fore and after the flights of Soyuz 9 and Soyuz 11/Salyut l. 73 74 Low- 
er-body-negative-pressure (LBNP) has been used to evaluate the con- 
clusion of cardiovascular systems of cosmonauts before, during, and 
after spaceflight since the Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 mission. 75 76 77 As Soviet 
manned space misions have become longer and more complicated, the 
cosmonauts themselves have been obliged to assume greater responsi- 
bility for carrying out a variety of medical tests which are used to 
evaluate their condition during the flight. 

«s Parin, V. V. et al. Soviet research in space medicine. Aerospace Medicine. No. 3, 1974, 


89 Bayevskiy, R. M. Physiological Measurements in Space and the Problem of Their Auto- 
mation. Moscow. "Nauka" Publishing House, 1970, p. 5-66 (FED #2243) 
»» Izvestiya. Feb. 8, 1975. p. 5 (FRD #2232). 

n Kakurin, L. I. Medicobiological investigations based on the Soyuz flight program. 
Vestnik of the Academy of Sciences USSR, Feb., 1972, 30-39. 
73 Parin, V. V. et al. Soviet research in space medicine. Op. Cit. 

73 Legenkov, V. J. Variations in the composition of the peripheral blood of cosmonauts 
during 18 and 24 day spaceflights. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), no. 1, 
1973, 39-44. 

74 Mandrovsky, B. N. Soyuz-9 flight, a manned biomedical mission. Aerospace Medicine, 
No. 2, 1971. 172-177. 

75 Gurovskiy, N. N. et. al. Some results of medical investigations carried out on the orbit- 
ing scientific laboratory, Salyut. Aerospace Medical Association, 43rd Annual Meeting, 
1972. 13 p. (unpublished). 

76 Major medical aspects of the flight of the Soyuz 12 spacecraft. 1973, 15 p. (unpub- 

77 Degtyarev, V. A. et al. Results of examining the Salyut crew during LBNP tests. Space 
Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 3, 1974, 47-52. 



As medical monitoring programs during spaceflights have become 
more complicated and demanding, the need for sophisticated medical 
instrumentation has increased. Therefore, the rather primitive medi- 
cal instrumentation used in the early biosatellites and Vostok series of 
manned flights has evolved into equipment which has been designed 
for flexibility, utility, and accuracy of data sensing. For example, elec- 
trocardiogram electrodes used in the early Vostok flights were pasted 
onto the skin whereas now they can be emplaced with tape. Similarly, 
EEG electrodes are now mounted in a helmet rather than pasted onto 
the skin. Seismocardiography, which provides data on the force, 
rhythm, and ejection of blood from the heart into major blood vessels, 
was first used on Vostok 5 and is now standard equipment in the 
Soyuz/Salyut series of vehicles. New instruments have also been 
developed to measure blood circulation in the head. In general, medi- 
cal monitoring equipment has become more compact, more reliable in 
operation, and simpler for the cosmonaut to use. 78 

The biomedical monitoring programs of Soviet and United States 
manned spaceflight and biosatellite missions since 1957 is provided in 
Table 4-4. 


Spacecraft, biosatellites, and Physiological measurement Features of onboard medical equip- 

year of launch methods ment and biotelemetry systems 

2d Soviet Earth satellite (1957).. .Electrocardiography, pneumography; ar- Equipment was turned on with a pro- 
terial oscillography, actography. grsmmed device. 

2d-5th Soviet spacecraft satellites EKG; pneumography; phonocardiogra- Commutator for successive measurement 
(1960-61). phy; sphygmography, electromyogra- of slowly changing parameters, electro- 

phy, actography; arterial oscillogra- cardiophone. 
phy; body temperature reading; seis- 

Vostok spacecraft (1962-65) EKG; pneumography; seismocardiogra- Placement of preamplifiers in cosmonauts' 

phy; kinetccardiography; electroocu- clothing; multipurpose use of amplifie 
lography; EEG; galvanic skin reflex. channels. 

Mercury capsules (1962-65) EKG; pneumography, arterial pressure; Automatic arterial pressure reading; sys- 

body temperature readings. tern of EKG and impedance PG tracing 

using common electrodes. 

Voskhod spacecraft (1964-65) EKG; PG; seismocardiography; EEG; elec- 2 units: medical monitoring and medical 

trodynamography; motor acts of writing, examinations; special medical monit- 
oring panel actuated upon going into 

Soyuz spacecraft (1957-75) EKG; PG; seismocardiography; body tern- Special medical monitor panel for record- 

perature. ing body temperature and pulse while 

going into orbit. 

Gemini spacecraft (196S-67) EKG; impedance PG; arterial pressure; Use cf special onboard tape recorder for 

body temperature; phonocardiography, medicophysiological parameters. 

Kosmos 110, artificial Earth satel- EKG; sphygmogram; seismo-cardio- Electric stimulation of receptor zones of 
lite (1966). gram; aortic pressure. carotid sinus using a programed 

device; automatic administration of 
pharmacological agents. 

Apollo spacecraft (1963-72). EKG; impedance PG. Upon exit on the Moon's surface pulse 

rate was retranslated in the lunar 
module and through its telemetry 
system to Earth. 

Biosatellite 3 (1959) EKG; impedance PG; EEG; changes in Automatic analyzer of calcium, creatine, 

blood pressure by catheterization of and creatinine in urine; special bio- 
pulmonary vessles; arterial and venous telemetry device with 10 channels 
system; brain temperature with im- operating at an access speed of 100/sec 
planted senscrs; study of behavioral and one "slow" channel (10/sec). 

78 Bayevskiy, R. M. and W. R. Adey. Methods of Investigation in Space Biolocry and 
Medicine : Transmission of Medical Data. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, 
Vol. II. Part 5., Ch. IS, Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975. pp. G6S-706. 



Spacecraft, biosatellites, and Physiological measurement 
year of launch methods 

Features of onboard medical equip 
meni and biotelemetry systems 

Kosmos 605 Biosatellite (1973) Motor activity of small animals (rats) Noncontact transducer and radiotelemetrv. 

Salyut orbital stations (1971-75).. EKG; PG; seismocardiography ; kineto- On-board tape recorder to record data; 

cardiography; sphygmography of special unit of melical research equip- 
femoral artery; arterial pressure ment (Polinom-2m). 
tachooscillographic method. 

SOURCE: Bayevskiy, R. M. and W. R. Adey in Foundations of Space Biology, vol. II, pt. 5., ch. 18 Washington, D.C , NASA 
1975 pp. 668-706. 

Note: The operating characteristics of biomedical monitoring systems for short-term, long-term, and interplanetary 
manned spaceflights are summarized in Table 4-5. 


Short flights (up to 5 days) 

Long flights (up to 1 month) 

Interplanetary flights 

During flight all sensors and elec- 
trodes are on the cosmonaut 

Cosmonaut is wired to onboard 

Onboard medical equipment is 

controlled automatically from 

Earth or onboard programed 


Physiological data are recorded 
only during periods of direct 
communication with land-based 

Physiological data are transmitted 
in the lorm of oscillograms. 

Only a minimum number of sensors and Sensors and electrodes of the medical 

electrodes for medical monitoring are monitoring system and all other sensors 

on the cosmonaut; most are applied by are applied by the onboard physician, 
him for brief examination periods. 

Incabin radio lines are used for medical Incabin radio lines are used for medical 

monitoring. monitoring. 

There is manual control in addition to The physician controls the equipment, 
automatic and programed. 

The bulk of physiological data is recorded 
by memory devices during periods 
without communication with Earth, 
with subsequent automatic transmis- 
sion of all data to Earth. 

Physiological data tramsmitted only par- 
tially in oscillogram form. Most data are 
transmitted in digital and summarized 
code form. 

Data are recorded by onboard devices 
with storage in processed form. Only a 
small part of summarized data is trans- 
mitted to Earth. 

Physiological data are transmitted 
Earth only in summarized form. 


SOURCE: Bayevskiy, R. M. and W. R. Adey, Foundations of Space Biology, vol. II, chap. 18. Washington, D.C, NASA, 
1975, pp. 668-706. 

It is evident that the state-of-the-art of Soviet medical monitoring 
and associated bioinstrumentation is advancing rapidly. Electronic 
arrays capable of the rapid and simultaneous measurement of several 
physiological parameters are in the advanced stages of testing. 79 A 
number of computers are being applied to physiological and neuro- 
psychological research. 80 81 Methodology and instrumentation for 
monitoring and analyzing cardiovascular and brain function are 
being improved. 82 83 Finally, quantitative methods for better predict- 
ing the physiological condition of the cosmonaut during space missions 
are being perfected. 84 85 

79 New Soviet "Express Monitor" of physiological indices. Medical Gazette (USSR), 
Oct. 26. 1973, p. — (FRD #1443). 

80 Chikhman, V. N. et al. Real-time operation of the Dnyepr-21 computer in a physiologi- 
cal experiment. Physiological Journal (USSR), No. 4, 1974, 644-647 (FRD ±-1857). 

81 KSI0-1 computer determines behavior during stress. Science and Life (USSR), No. 9, 
1974. p. 75 (FRD #2059). 

82 Simonov, P. V. et al. Characteristics of the electrocardiogram during physical and 
emotional stress in man. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, No! 2, 1975, 

63 Popenchenko, V. V. et al. Four-channel miniature radiotelemetric system for trans- 
mitting brain biopotentials. Journal of Higher Nervous Activity (USSR), No. 5, 1972, 
10S7-10S9 (JPRS 58056). 

84 Bayevskiy, R. M. Predicting man's condition during spaceflight. Physiological Journal 
(USSR). No. 6, 1972. 819-827 (JPRS 57660). 

85 Gurovskiy, N. N. et al. Some theoretical aspects of formulating a system of medical 
control for space missions. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 3, 1975, 



As Soviet and American spaceflights have increased in duration 
from a few days to many weeks, space medicine specialists have be- 
come more concerned that prolonged exposure to weightlessness will 
have a variety of deleterious effects on the physical well-being of cos- 
monauts and astronauts. Of particular concern has been a decondition- 
ing and degeneration (atrophy) of skeletal muscles, and most impor- 
tant, the cardiovascular system. The concern is a real one since it has 
been compellingly demonstrated that prolonged weightlessness as well 
as simulated weightlessness (bed-rest and hypodynamia experiments) 
lead to a deconditioning of both smooth and skeletal musculature as 
well as to changes in other bodily functions. Accordingly, Soviet medi- 
cal specialists, like their American counterparts, have continued to 
formulate exercise regimens for cosmonauts which will hopefully pre- 
vent, or at least minimize the deconditioning process. Exercise regimens 
have therefore become more rigorous as the Soyuz/Salyut and Apollo/ 
Skylab programs have progressed. 86 87 88 

The first prolonged Soviet manned spaceflight was the mission of 
the Soyuz 9 in June 1970. During that 18-day flight, physical exercises 
were performed by each cosmonaut for two one-hour periods every 
day. The exercises, formulated to enable the cosmonauts to withstand 
weightlessness and subsequent acceleration stress (re-entry) were de- 
signed to maintain high muscular, nervous system, cardiovascular, and 
digestive system tone. In order to maintain a sufficient load on major 
muscle groups in the absence of gravity, special elasticized garments 
were used, a practice which has persisted throughout the balance of 
the Soyuz/Salyut program. In addition, special springs were used to 
affix the body to the floor of the spacecraft with a tension of several 
kilograms, enabling the cosmonauts to simulate walking, running, and 
jumping in place. Chest expanders and a variety of isometric exer- 
cises were also used. Physiological parameters were monitored before 
and after exercise sessions to evaluate changes in work capacity and 
to relate physiological energy expenditure to the operation of the life 
support system. Curiously enough, this carefully graded exercise regi- 
men did not at first produce the desired results, for both cosmonauts 
experienced considerable orthostatic stress and intolerance to Earth's 
gravity in the post-flight period which required several days of rest 
and readaptation to correct. A satisfactory explanation for this rather 
disturbing phenomenon was never determined, although it was specu- 
lated in American space medicine circles that the cosmonauts may have 
been over-conditioned prior to the flight. There was also some specula- 
tion that the relatively advanced age of one cosmonaut (41) may have 
contributed to the problem, although the other cosmonaut (aged 34) 
experienced essentially identical symptoms. Above all, there was ap- 
prehension in the space medicine community that man might not be 
able to withstand such a long exposure to weightlessness. However, it 
is interesting to note that neither American astronauts nor subsequent 

86 Vorobyev, Ye. et al. Preliminary results of medical monitoring (Sovuz-6, 7, and 8). 
Medical Gazette. Jan. 23, 1970. p. 3. 

87 Berry. C. A. Medical legacy of Apollo. Aerospace Medicine. No. 9. 1974. 1046-1050. 

88 NASA doctors impressed at the physical state of astronauts. Washington Post, 
Sept. 27, 1973, p. A4. 


! 20 


Soviet cosmonauts have experienced similar difficulties after even 
longer duration spaceflights of up to 84 days. 89 90 91 

In the 24 day Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 flight, the three cosmonauts per- 
formed 2.5 hours of physical exercises each day. On the larger Salyut 
space station, the equipment available for physical exercises was more 
elaborate. For example, the cosmonauts were provided with a treadmill 
on which it was possible to walk, run, jump and perform a variety of 
other maneuvers. Once again, a special elasticized garment, called the 
"Penguin" suit, was provided to stress certain key muscle groups. 92 
Finally, a special antigravity suit to counteract an anticipated disrup- 
tion of circulation after re-entry was provided. Unfortunately, the 
cosmonauts were never to test these suits, for tragically, a valve linking 
the two compartments of Soyuz 11 stuck after they separated just prior 
to re-entry and all these cosmonauts perished. It was to be three years 
before the Russians attempted another prolonged mission to test the 
effects of their newly formulated exercise regimen and equipment. 
However, from all indications the Soyuz 11 cosmonauts were in good 
health prior to their fatal re-entry and the physical conditioning regi- 
men evidently contributed to that condition. In other words, there were 
no reasons to believe that the cosmonauts would not have re-adapted 
successfully to Earth's gravity after their return. 93 

During the 15 day Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 mission of July, 1974, exten- 
sive physical exercises initiated in the second week of the flight were 
designed to assess the effect of physical conditioning on eventual re- 
adaptation to Earth's gravity. Once again, a treadmill was provided 
and a new variant of the special elasticized suit ("Penguin" suit) was 
tested. The suit was connected to the floor by elastic bands from the 
waist and shoulders to simulate gravitational stresses on major sup- 
porting muscle groups. Exercise sessions were scheduled at the begin- 
ning and end of each working day. When this exercise program was 
started after the fourth day in orbit, some evidence of re-adaptation 
to simulated gravity was noted, an indication that the program was 
conferring the desired results. 94 95 

During a longer mission, the 29-day Soyuz 17/Salyut 4 flight of 
January, 1975, the cosmonauts exercised three times per day for a 
total of 2.5 hours. Every fourth day, the selection of exercises was 
optional. In this mission, a bicycle ergometer was available which 
could be pedaled either with the hands or feet. An additional new 
approach to physical conditioning was electrical stimulation of various 
muscle groups using a special apparatus called "Tonus". 96 Presum- 
ably, a variant of this exercise program was continued during the 
Soyuz 18/Salyut 4 mission. Evidently, the exercise regimens formu- 
lated for Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts have been suc- 

89 Mar.drovsky, B. Soyuz-9 flight. A manned biomedical mission. Op. Cit. 

90 Chirkov, V. A. Energy expenditures of the Soyuz-9 spacecrew during an 18 dav 
flight. Space Biology and Aviation Medicine (USSR), No. 1, 1975, 48-51. 

81 Berry, C. A. Medical legacy of Apollo. Op. Cit. 

92 Umanskiy, S. P. Man in Space Orbit. Moscow, "Mashinostrovenive" Press, 1974, p. 26 

(NASA TT-F-lf>973). 

93 Gurovskiy. N. N. et al. Some results of medical investigations carried out on the 
orbiting scientific laboratory, Salyut. Op. Cit. 

94 Soviet Salyut-3 crew focuses on medical-biological tests. Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, July 22, 1974, p. 15. 

96 Spacemen keep in shape by "running" on Salyut. Washington Post. July 9, 1974, p. 4. 
98 Soyuz-17/Salyut-4 : Daily routine and life support systems. Sources: Various Soviet 
newspapers, 22-24 Jan. 1975. (FRD #2196 and 2216). 


cessful in minimizing physical dcconditioning brought on by pro- 
longed exposure to weightlessness. 

New approaches to the problem of physical dcconditioning in space 
continue to be developed. In order to prevent the unfavorable effects 
of weightlessness, A. S. Barer, a noted Soviet gravitational physiol- 
ogist, recommends the use of a pressure suit which exerts axial pres- 
sure on the body and resists extremity movement. This approach to 
skeletal muscle conditioning would be yet another variant of the pre- 
viously mentioned "Penguin" suit. Another suit recommended by 
Barer would impart negative pressure to the lower body (LBNP) for 
the purpose of conditioning the cardiovascular system. 97 In addition, 
methods to monitor and to electrically stimulate selected muscles, a 
form of biofeedback, are also being developed to complement physical 
exercise programs. 93 

At the same time, there is some evidence that the physical exercise 
and instrumentation approaches used in the manned spaceflight effort 
are finding some application in clinical medicine. For example, the 
treadmill used by the Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 cosmonauts is being used 
in a Soviet clinic to aid patients in exercising after long periods of 
complete bed rest. 99 This provides additional evidence that exercise 
programs and equipment designed for cosmonauts and astronauts are 
helpful in preventing dcconditioning brought on by prolonged weight- 
lessness or periods of inactivity. 


Compact drug kits have been carried aboard Soviet and American 
manned spacecraft since the early phases of both programs. In the space 
capsule series (Gemini, Apollo, Yost ok, Voskhod, and the early Soyuz 
series (3-10) ), a relatively limited supply of routine medications such 
as aspirin, antihistamines, sedatives, topical ointments, anti-motion 
sickness drugs and a few injectable drugs for emergencies were carried 
along. In the Soyuz 6, 7, and 8 flights, and presumably in the subse- 
quent Soyuz 9 and 10 missions as well, it was reported that ground- 
control medical specialists were ready to render emergency "space" 
aid to the crew at any moment. For this purpose there was a drug kit 
which contained intestable and injectable drugs. Fortunately, the 
Soyuz crews did not have occasion to use this kit. 100 

As the relatively short duration space capsule missions evolved into 
the longer orbiting laboratory missions of Skylab and Salyut, the 
problem of routine and emergency medication became more com- 
plicated. Therefore, the list of medications and emergency drugs in- 
creased so that the orbiting laboratories were essentially self-contained 
space pharmacies complete with a wide variety of intestable, topical, 
and injectable preparations. One crew had the benefit of a physician 
(Skylab 2) so that the administration of medications was somewhat 

87 Barer, A. S. ct al. Physiological and hygienic substantiation for the design of imliv'd- 
ual measures to prevent the adverse effects of weightlessness. Space Biology and Aerospace 
Medicine (USSR), No. 1, 1975. 41-47. 

os Young Technologist (USSR), No. 6, 1973, p. 23 (FRD #1347). 

M Aviation Week and Space Technology. Sept. 23, 1974, p. 13. 

loovorobyev, Ye. et al. Preliminary results of medical monitoring (Soyuz 6, 7, and 8). 


simplified. During that 28 day Sight anti-motion sickness pills, anti- 
histamines, decongestant nose spray, and aspirin wore used. 101 

Although none of the Soviet Salyut crews have had the benefit of 
an attending crew physician, a rather long list of medications and 
drugs have been carried along. These have included drugs and ant acids 
for gastrointestinal disturbances, antinausea drugs, stimulants, first 
aid bandages and ointments, pain killers, tranquilizers and sedatives, 
cough medicine, antibiotics, and antiallergenic drug, a radioprotective 
drug and vitamin complex to be used only upon command from ground 
control, and nitroglycerine tablets for cardiac dysfunction. Injectable 
drugs have included atropine for acute nausea, caffeine for aeut< : 
fatigue, cordiamine for weakened cardiorespiratory function, and 
promedol for severe pain. 102 Essentially the same list of drugs and 
medications have been carried aboard subsequent Salyut nights in- 
cluding the most recent Salyut 4 mission. A recent East German 
article includes a picture showing the Salyut 4 drug kit including 
disposable syringes containing the previously mentioned atropine, 
promedol, cordiamine, and caffeine. Beside each drug name are listed 
symptoms and instructions for administration. 103 Presumably, inject- 
able drugs and the radioprotective drug are administered only after 
clearance from ground-control. Fortunately, there has been no occas- 
sion on either American or Soviet space stations in which the use of 
potent emergency drugs has been necessary. 


Although both American and Soviet space crews have traditionally 
complained about the poor palatability of space foods, the menu for 
space missions has steadily become more diverse since the early space- 
capsule series of flights. Foods available to American crews during the 
Apollo/Skylab series of flights have included freeze-dried rehydra- 
tables, thermostabilized foods, bite-sized cubes of either dried or moist 
food, and a variety of beverages. In Skylab 2. the crewmen reported 
that many of the foods tasted too bland. Accordingly, packets of spices 
such as tabasco sauce, horseradish, and onion and garlic powder were 
added to the menu. More than 110 food items were available by the end 
of the Apollo program. Hot and cold water was available for rehydra- 
tion. The daily caloric intake for American astronauts has averaged 
about 2,500 calories. Although there has been some weight loss in all 
American and Soviet flights, it has not been due to a shortage of 
food. 104 105 

The dailv caloric intake for Soviet cosmonauts has ranged from 
2,600 to 2,900 calories. Even in the first short Vostok flight of 1961, 
there was a fairly diverse menu. At that time, space food was provided 
in small, collapsible aluminum tubes containing approximately 160 
grains of product and consisting of pureed items such as meat and 
vegetables, prunes, a variety of fruit juices, processed chocolate, and 

101 Dr. Kerwin's log of Skylab 1. Medical World News, Sept. 7, 1973, 41-44. [Skylab 2 
was flip first manned visit to the Skylab 1 Station.] 

102 Gnrovskiy, N. N. Some results of medical investigations carried out during the flight 
of the Salyut-1 orbiting scientific laboratory. Op. Cit. 

103 The captain has his (space) station (a description of the Salvut-4 training program). 
Free World (East Germany). No. 8. 1975, 1-7. 

104 Berry, C. A. The lecrnev of Apollo. On. Cit. 

105 Dr. Kerwin's log of Skylab-1. Op. Cit. 


coffee with milk. Some bite-sized solid foods included bread, smoked 
sausage, and candy. 106 

By the time of the early Soyuz flights, the cosmonaut's menu had 
become even more diverse. Unlike the earlier Vostok and Voskhod 
flights, the diet consisted of unadulterated foods individually tailored 
to the tastes of the cosmonauts. Included were several kinds of bread 
and pastries, meat, juices, and other items. 107 

On Soyuz 9, the crew was provided for the first time with an elec- 
tric coil for heating food in special aluminum containers. The menu 
included soups and coffee, steak, pork chops, boned chicken, eggs, and 
a variety of other items. Fluid intake declined somewhat but remained 
within normal limits (1.6-1.8 liters per day). Water was treated with 
silver ions rather than chlorine in order to preserve taste quality. 108 

The food on the Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 flight consisted of an even 
greater diversity of canned, pureed, dehyrated, and natural foods 
many of which could be heated. Hot meals were enjoyed by the cos- 
monauts three times per day. The daily ration weighed 1,380 grams 
consisting of 154 grams of protein, 114 grams of fat, 307 grams of 
carbohydrates, and 760 grams of water for a total nutritional value of 
2.950 calories. Polyvitamins and sweets were also included in the diet. 
Daily intake of water was 1.9-2.0 liters. 109 The diet on Soyuz 12 and 
subsequent Soyuz/Salyut missions was essentially similar to the above 
but Avith new items added each time to conform to the individual tastes 
of new crew members. Apparently, spaceflight conditions have com- 
monly altered the tastes and appetites of cosmonauts. On Soyuz 12 
as in some previous flights, there was a decline in appetite and thirst 
and an unfavorable reaction to some foods normally preferred on 
Earth. However, cosmonauts in the Soyuz/Salyut missions have 
received ample nourishment despite some small decreases in bodv 
weight. 110 " 112 


In man, about 40 physiological functions and reactions have been 
identified which roughly conform to a daily (circadian) pattern of 
activity. One of the classical functions is sleep and wakefulness which 
follows an approximate 8 hour/16 hour cycle which tends to be static 
for several days despite time-zone shifts. So-called "jet lag" is used to 
describe the temporary fatigue and physiological dysfunction which 
people experience when they travel significant distances in an east-to- 
west or west -to-east direction. Other vital functions exhibiting daily 
rhythmicity include body temperature, heart and respiratory func- 
tion, brain activity, and a variety of metabolic functions. During a 
spaceflight, man is exposed to a dramatically altered light and dark 
cycle. In the course of a single day of orbital flight, an astronaut or 
cosmonaut, such as Titov in Vostok 2, will experience upwards to 

, VoT- 07 !?^ L G - Food and Water Supply. In : Foundations of Space Biology, Vol. Ill, Part 
L, 107o (in press). 

w ?Mobj«fi Ye. et al. Preliminary results of medical monitoring (Soyuz 6, 7, and 8). 
^"Mandrovsky, B. Soyuz-9. A manned biomedical mission. Op. Cit. 

™ 'GurovsMy N. N. et al. Some results of medical investigations carried out on the 
orbiting scientific laboratory. Op. Cit. 

25 Major medical aspects of the flierht of the Sovnz-12 spacecraft. Op. Cit. 

™ 1 nsigned. Salyut 3 : Soviets still catching up. Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 1974, 

112 SoTuz-17/Salyut-4 : Daily routine and life support system. Op. Cit. 


17 periods of relatively short lightness or darkness. The classical 
concept and perception of a 24 hour day, then, is lost in space. More- 
over, the added stresses of weightlessness, confinement, background 
noises, and emotional tensions are superimposed upon this desyn- 
chronization. For these reasons, the interest of Soviet and Ameri- 
can physiologists and space medicine specialists in daily physiologi- 
cal rhythms and the so-called "biological clocks'' that drive them has 
increased markedly, particularly over the past five years. 113 " 115 

Soviet cosmonauts throughout the Soyuz/Salyut series of flights 
have adhered to a 24 hour duty cycle, which has included a 16 hour 
working day and 8 hours of sleep. This schedule has been based upon a 
large body of fundamental research carried out under conventional 
laboratory conditions as well as in unconventional environments such 
as Antarctica. 116 Soyuz/Salyut flights have generally been scheduled 
to conform to Moscow time or launch-site time. Some variations of the 
daily schedule have been tested, however, with displacements ranging 
from 3-9 hours. The rhythm of sleep and wakefulness during the 
Soyuz 3-8 flights was reported as relatively constant. 117 During the 
Soyuz 9 flight, however, there was a gradual shift in stages so that 
the daily cycle was shortened by an average of 30 minutes per day. 118 
In general, Soviet cosmonauts have reported that less sleep is necessary 
during spaceflight than on Earth, so that flight sleep periods fall 
within the 6-7 hour range rather than the 7-8 hour ran^re. 119 There 
is apparently less of a problem of a phase-shift in the work/rest cycle 
(desvnehronosis) when it conforms closely to the natural diurnal 
rhvthm of the cosmonaut. 

Soviet research on biorhythms as related to spaceflight missions 
continues with emphasis on psychological and neurological factors 
involved in adaptation to new temporal situations. The belief persists 
that unfavorable responses to changes in work/res r cvcles can be 
avoided by the formulation of optimum duty cycles which conform to 
the individual biorhythm of the cosmonaut and by preliminary adap- 
tation of the cosmonaut to the new duty cycle prior to spaceflight. The 
static 24 hour cycle continues to be favored over phased variations in 
this cycle. 120 Some investigators have suggested that the interior of the 
spacecraft cabin be designed to simulate diurnal and seasonal varia- 
tions conforming to the middle latitudes of the Soviet Union to facili- 
tate adaptation to prolonged missions. 121 Recent Soviet research sug- 
gests that the process of adaptation to a new time zone or duty cycle 
requires about two weeks. The adaptation time can be decreased if the 
duty cycle is changed prior to exposure to a new situation and if the 
work load is increased. 122 

113 Brown. F. A., Jr. The "clocks" timing biological rhythms. American Scientist, Vol. 60, 
1972. 756-765. 

"♦Folk, G. E., Jr. Textbook of Environmental Physiology. Philadelphia. Lea and Febiger 
(2nd Ed.). 1974, p. 39-86. 

115 Leonov, A. A. et al. Psychological Features of Cosmonaut Activity. Op. Cit. p. 229- 


116 Medical Investigations During Arctic and Antarctic Expeditions. Vol. 229, Leningrad, 
1971. 105 p. (JPRS 56225). 

m Litsoy, A. N. Rhythm of sleep and wakefulness in crews of the spaceships Soyuz 3-9 
before, during, and after exposure to spaceflight. Izvestiva, Academy of Sciences, USSR 
(Biological Series). No. B, 1972. 836-845 (.TPRS 58173). 

iia Mfin^rovsky. B. N. Soyuz-9 flight, a manned biomedical mission. Op. Cit. 

us Soyuz 17 — Salyut 4 : Daily routine and life support system. Op. Cit. 

120 Litsov, A. N. Some principles of developing work-rest cvcles in prolonged manned 
p , finofljo-M-q. Space Biolosrv and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 2. 1974. 71-75. 

^'elnikov. L. N. Simnlation of diurnal and sea^nal rhythms in a spaceship interior. 
Sp.irn- Bioio-v and Medie!ne (USSR). No. 1. 1072, 74-77. 

]J2 Confor PTir p on Biorhvthms. Nature (USSR), No. 2. 1975, p. 104 (Library of Congress. 
FRD #2359). 



Although two Soviet space missions, Soyuz 1 (April, 19G7) and 
Soyuz 11 (June, 1971) have terminated in the deaths of four cosmo- 
nauts, none of the fatalities were due to medical causes. If technical 
problems had not intervened (Tangled parachute shroud lines on 
Soyuz 1 and valve failure in Soyuz 11), it is probable that all of the 
cosmonauts would have returned in good health. Likewise, the remain- 
ing Soviet space missions of the Soyuz/Salyut series have been free 
of serious biomedical problems and all cosmonauts have returned to 
Earth in good condition with all medical indices within normal limits. 

While both American and Soviet space missions have been free of 
major medical problems, minor ones continue to occur in both pro- 
grams. As mentioned earlier, some Soviet cosmonauts have exhibited 
shifts in work/rest habits and have slept for shorter periods of time 
during space missions. In Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 mission this problem 
was corrected through the use of mild sedatives. 123-125 

Both American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts have complained 
of a fullness or stuffiness of the head and chest, particularly during the 
initial phases of spaceflight. These uncomfortable, if not debilitating, 
sensations are apparently due to a shift in blood volume from the 
lower part of the body to the upper quadrant and head as a result of 
weightlessness. On Skylab 2, the astronaut-physician noted what 
appeared to be an engorgement of the jugular veins descending from 
the brain, which supports that explanation. These sensations are of a 
temporarv nature and disappear after one or two davs of space- 
flight. 126 " 1 ' 28 

Both American and Soviet space crews have occasionally experi- 
enced a temporary disruption of orthostatic tolerance after recovery. 
In the Soviet program, this condition was inexplicably most acute in 
the Soyuza 9 mission. Both cosmonauts complained of considerable 
difficulty in walking after the 18 day flight. 129 Temporary disturbances 
in coordination and orthostatic tolerance by using a stabilograph, a 
gimballed platform designed to test postural stability, were also noted 
in earlier Soviet flights. 130 

Decreased orthostatic tolerance and minor decreases in cardiac out- 
put have been noted in subsequent Soyuz/Salyut missions as deter- 
mined by lower-body -negative-pressure (LBXP) tests. This test is 
apparently successful in detecting changes in cardiovascular condi- 
tion in response to weightlessness. Apparently, exercise programs have 
been somewhat successful in minimizing these changes. 181 » 132 

123 Gurovskiy, N. N. et al. Some results of medical Investigations carried out during the 
flight of the scientific orbiting station. Salyut. Op. Cit. 

12 * Litsov. A. N. Rhythm of sleep and wakefulness in crews of the spaceships Soyuz 3-9 
before, during, and after exposure to spaceflight. Op. Cit. 

186 Pnrin. V. V. et al. Soviet research in space medicine. Op. Cit. 

i2« Berry. C A. The leeraev of Anollo. Op. Cit. 

127 Dr. Kerwin's loe: of Skylab-1. Op. Cit. 

125 Mandrovsky, B. N. Soyuz-9, a manned biomedical mission. Op. Cit. 
"9 Ibid. 

130 Purakhin. Yu. X. et al. Regulation of vertical posture after flight on Sovu7:-6. Sovnz-R. 
and 120 day hypokinesia. Space Biolosv and Medicine (USSR). No. 6. 1972, 47-53 (JPRS 

131 Pegtyarev. V. A. et al. Chances in indices of circulation in the crew of the orbital 
station. Snlvnt. during investigation in hvpokinesia conditions. Space Biology and Aero- 
space Medicine (USSR) . No. 2. 1074. 34-72. 

Pectyarev, V. A. et al. Results of examining the Salyut crew during the lower-body- 
aegative-pressure test. Op. Cit. 


Changes in plasma volume, certain blood components, blood chem- 
istry, and certain metabolic indices are common to both Soviet and 
American crews. A decrease in total plasma volume and in certain 
blood components is apparently a compensatory reaction to the weight- 
less state and is reversible upon return to Earth. Electrolyte balance 
and demineralization of bone tissue continues to be of concern to both 
programs. The latter condition in particular, involving a steady loss 
of calcium from bone tissue, is worrisome in terms of future, prolonged 
flights of several months duration. 133 > 134 

Throughout the American Apollo/Skylab program and the Soviet 
Soyuz/Salyut program, some astronauts and cosmonauts have been 
stricken with transient episodes of motion sickness and nausea, a con- 
dition first experienced by Cosmonaut Titov on Vostok 2. These sensa- 
tions have since been counteracted with drugs which suppress the par- 
asympathetic nervous system such as plavephine and atropine in the 
Soviet program and a combination of scopolamine and dexadrine in 
the American program. The symptoms usually disappear after a day 
or slightly more of spaceflight. Apparently there is no completely re- 
liable method of conditioning the vestibular systems of latently vul- 
nerable astronauts or cosmonauts to prevent this uncomfortable con- 
dition, although exercises involving certain head movements conducted 
during the early phases of spaceflight are being tested and show some 
promise. 135 - 136 

Finally, both American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts have ex- 
hibited moderate losses of body weight as a result of spaceflight. 
Table 4-6 provides a sampling of cosmonaut weight loss in the Soyuz 
4-12 series. Decreased body weight is not of a serious nature and is 
rapidly reversible upon return to Earth. 137 ' 138 


duration Name of 

Spacecraft (days) Cosmonaut 

Soyuz-4 3 V. A. Shatalov 

Soyuz-5 3 8. V. Volynov 

Soyuz-i, 5 2 Ye. V. Khrunov... 

Soyuz-4, 5 2 A. S. Yeliseyev... 

Soyuz-6 5 G. S. Shonin 

Do. 5 V. N. Kubasov 

Soyuz-7 5 A. V. Filipchenko. 

Do.. 5 V. V. Gorbatko... 

Do 5 V. N. Volkov 

Soyuz-8 5 V. A. Shatalov.... 

Soyuz-8. 5 A. S. Yeliseyev 

Soyuz-9 18 A. G. Nikolayev... 

Do 18 V. I. Sevast'yanov. 

Soyuz-12 2 V. G Lazarev 

Do. 2. 0. G Makarov 

Change in body weight in comparison with original 
on day of launch (kg) 

At place of After flight Before After water 
landing (1 day) water intake 
























































SOURCE: Natochkin, Tu. V., Functional Tests in the Study of Water-Salt Exchange and Renal Function in 
Cosmonauts, 1973 (not published). 

133 Berrv. C. A. The legacy of Apollo. Op. Cit. 

13* Leerenkov, V. J. Variations in the composition of peripheral blood of cosmonauts during 
IS and 24 day spaceflights. Op. Cit. 

135 Berry, C. A. The legacy of Apollo. Op. Cit. 

130 Bryanov, I. I. et al. Certain otorhinolaryngological problems in medical support of 
spaceflights. 1973, 12 p. (unpublished), 
is? Berrv. C. A. The legacy of Apollo. Op. Cit. 

138 Nato'chin, Tu. V. Functional tests in the study of water-salt exchange and renal func- 
tion in cosmonauts. 1973, 12 p. (unpublished). 


In summary, the minor organic problems encountered by Soviet and 
American space crews have been amenable to medical intervention 
during space missions. As spacecraft have become larger, exercise 
equipment and medical/first aid supplies have increased the margin 
of biomedical safety so that orbital flights of up to 84 days have been 
successfully accomplished. The successful 63 day flight of Soyuz 18/ 
Salyut 4 has further increased the Soviet confidence factor by yet 
another quantum. At present, there would appear to be no medical 
contraindications to flights of even longer duration. 

IV. Life Support Systems and Technology 

The life support system of a manned spacecraft is one of its most 
critical links, for any significant life support failure results in total 
mission failure. Therefore, the design of the life support system, which 
includes atmosphere, food and water, and waste disposal subsystems, 
is carefully predicated upon well developed empirical data on human 
energy requirements and waste generation. Thus, a TO kilogram (144 
pound) man aged 25-40 requires about 600 liters of oxygen, G00-800 
grams of dry food, and 2.0-2.5 liters of drinking water per day. An 
additional 5-10 liters of water per day is required for personal hygiene 
and sanitation during prolonged spaceflights. At the same time, the 
human metabolism on a daily basis generates about 400-500 liters of 
carbon dioxide, 2.5-3.0 liters of water in the form of urine and per- 
spiration, and 100-200 grams of solid waste. The life support system 
must be able not only to satisfy these basic challenges, but must do so 
on a sustained basis with virtually 100 percent reliability- It is therefore 
a tribute to bioengineers in both space programs that there has been 
no significant life support system failure on any of the 31 American 
or 26 Soviet manned spacecraft flown thus far. 139 - 14C 


Since the very beginning of the manned spaceflight program, the 
Russians have used a physical-chemical system for the generation of 
oxygen and the removal of carbon dioxide. The American program, on 
the other hand, utilizes fuel cells as the source of oxygen and lithium 
hydroxide (LiOH) for carbon dioxide removal. The Soviet spacecraft 
atmosphere is maintained as close to the normal terrestrial value as 
possible (14.7 psi or 760 mm Hg barometric pressure ; about 20 percent 
oxygen and 80 percent nitrogen), whereas the American spacecraft 
atmosphere is 100 percent oxygen at 5 psi (259 mm Hg) during the 
flight. Since the 1967 Apollo fire which occurred during a simulation 
test, a less flammable 60/40 oxygen/nitrogen mixture at 15 psi (776 
mm Hg) is used during the launch phase. Upper and lower limits of 
cabin atmosphere parameters for Soviet manned spacecraft in the 
Soyuz/Salyut series are given below : 141 - 144 

Barometric Pressure (mm Hg) : 710-900. 

Oxygen Content (percent) : 19-29. 

i3o Webb. P. Work, and Oxygen cost. In: Bioastronautics Data Book. Wash., D.C. 
NASA SP-300G. 1973 (2nd Ed.), p. 847-879. 

Rukavishnikov. N. N. et al. The Cosmonaut as Researcher. Op. Cit. p. 12. 

141 U.S. Library of Congrpss. Aerospace Technology Division. Foreign Science Bulletin. 
Vol. 3. No. 4. 1 0f>7. p. 7 fand other sources). 

142 Parin V. V. et al. Soviet rpsearch in space medicine. Op. Clt. 
Mandrovsky. B. Soyuz-9 fiicrht. a manned hiompdieal mission. Op. Cit. 

144 Major medical aspects of the flight of the Soyuz-12 spacecraft. Op. Cit. 


Oxygen Partial Pressure (mm Kg) : 164-190. 
Carbon Dioxide Content (percent) : 0.1-0.6. 
Carbon Dioxide Partial Pressure (mm Hg) : 3.0-8.5. 
Relative Humidity (percent) : 35-80. 
Air Temperature (degrees centigrade) : 13-30. 

The chemicals preferred by the Kussians for closed-system atmos- 
phere regeneration, including the manned spacecraft series to date, are 
oxides and superoxides of the alkali metals. Table 4-7 provides the 
functional characteristics of a number of these chemicals which simul- 
taneously release oxygen and absorb carbon dioxide. The chemical 
used for space cabin atmosphere maintenance is potassium superoxide 
(K0 2 ). This same chemical and others closely related to it are also 
used in undersea life support systems including diving gear. One 
astronaut requires about 4 kilograms of active chemical per day. 145 " 146 


Amount of active oxygen Carbon dioxide 


Substance % 1/kg capacity, 1/kg 

Lithium peroxide LijO: 31.7 242 487 

Lithium superoxide LiOj... 61.5 430 287 

Sodium peroxide Na 3 3 20.5 143 287 

Sodium superoxide NaOi 43.6 305 203 

Sodium ozonide Na 2 3 56. 3 394 158 

Potassium peroxide KzOj 14.5 101.5 203 

Potassium superoxide K0j 33.8 236 158 

Potassium ozonide K0|. 46.0 322 128. 

SOURCE: Umansky, S. P. Man in Space Orbit, Mashinostroyeniye Press, 1974, pp. 36-40. 

A large variety of impurities are generated by man and his activities 
including carbon monoxide, ketones, alcohols, aldehydes, aliphatic 
acids, methane, unsaturated hydrocarbons, dust, bacteria, and viruses. 
These are removed from the Soviet spacecraft atmosphere bv means 
of activated charcoal filters, dust precipitation filters, hopcalite and 
zeolite filters, special bacterial fibers, and chemical catalytic proc- 
esses. 147 

Thermal regulation of the air is accomplished by air-liquid ex- 
change. The cabin air is impelled by a fan through an air-liquid heat 
exchanger. The heated liquid is then pumped to an external heat 
exclumnfer and the heat is dissipated into space. The system is accurate 
to within ± 1.5 degrees centigrade. 148 

Excess water generated by man in a closed system is about 50-60 
grams per hour. Excess moisture in the space cabin atmosphere is re- 
moved by dehumidification. In Soviet manned spacecraft, a cooling 
drying technique is used to dehumidify the air. Air forced against a 
cool surface is condensed and the liquid phase is then removed using 
porous capillary wicks, ultimately passing into the water regeneration 
system. 149 

" 5 Shikanov. Ye. P. Handbook for Divers. Moscow. "Voyenizdat" Publishing House, 1972, 
p. 12-23 f.TPRS 60691). 

Umanpkiv. S. P. Man in Space Orbit. Moscow. "Mashinostroyeniye" Press, 1974, 
p. 36-40 (NASA TT-F-15973). 

147 Thid. 

148 GirF-hnyenknv. B. G. Air regenerating and conditioning. In: Foundations of Space 
Biolosrv Vol. III. Part 1., 1975 (in press). 

1W Ibid. 


The Russians have listed a number of attractive features of the 
active chemical air regeneration systems which explains their con- 
tinued use not only in the manned space program but also in manned 
undersea programs. These features include efficiency of operation over 
a broad range of temperature, humidity, and barometric pressure; 
resistance to vibration, acceleration, heat, and explosion; simplicity of 
design; high operational reliability and automatic performance; and 
of major importance, relatively low system weight. The major Soviet 
misgiving about the use of stored or liquid oxygen systems is the com- 
paratively high weight penalty as well as their vulnerability to dis- 
ruption by a number of spaceflight factors. Hence, the Soviet use of 
active chemicals for spacecraft atmosphere control is expected to per- 
sist, at least through the Soyuz/Salyut series of spacecraft. 150 


Food supply and management on Soviet spacecraft was discussed 
under "Nutrition" in Section III. (Space Medicine). A more detailed 
account of this aspect of life support for both the American and Soviet 
spaceflight programs is provided by Popov. 151 

The stored- water management system on the earlier Vostok and 
Voskhod spacecraft consisted of a rigid metal container, an elastic con- 
tainer for water storage, a water supply line connected to a mouth- 
piece, a cartridge for disinfecting and deodorizing the water, and a 
water cutoff device. The water was consumed by sucking through the 
mouthpiece. A silver ion preparation (0.1-.14 milligrams per liter) 
was used for purification and mineralization. Some water was re- 
claimed from the dehumidifier. 152 

As spaceflight missions have increased in duration, more elaborate 
and efficient water management systems have become necessary. Water 
reclamation was first successfully tested in the Soviet year-long cham- 
ber experiment of the late 1960's and has since evolved into an opera- 
tional system. 153 The w r ater regeneration system aboard the latest 
Salyut 4 space station provides that moisture from respiration and 
perspiration can be reclaimed. Moisture is condensed in cooling and 
dehumidifier units and stored. The stored gas/liquid mixture is then 
fractionated, purified, decontaminated, and heated prior to human 
consumption. Minerals are added to the reclaimed water in solid form 
and include calcium, magnesium, bicarbonates, chlorides, and sulfates. 
A warning signal is flashed if impurities remain in the reclaimed 
water. Both stored and reclaimed water are used for human consump- 
tion in present Soviet spacecraft. Total consumption of water is about 
2.2 to 2.5 liters per day per cosmonaut, including about 1.6-2.0 liters 
for drinking. During the 29-day Soyuz 17/Salyut 4 flight, the two 
cosmonauts consumed about 100* liters of water. The Soviets are now 
investigating more elaborate, closed water regeneration systems which 
would recycle virtually all water. Vaporization, sorbents, and semi- 
permeable membranes are candidate approaches under consideration. 

1E0 TlTTianskiy, S. P. Man in Space Orbit. Op. Cit. 

1( * Popov, I. G. Food and Water Supply. In: Foundations of Space Biologv and Medicine. 
Vol. TIT. Part 1., 1975 (in press). 
™ TMd. 

15 -'Wntor and food regeneration in space. Pravda Ukrainy (USSR) Feb. 5, 1975, p. 2. 


A major problem identified by Soviet scientists is the separation of 
gases from liquids in waste water. 154 155 


A grown man eliminates about 1.2 liters of liquid waste and 200 
grams of solid waste per day. On early Soviet spacecraft of the 
Vostok and Voskhod series, these wastes were stored separately. The 
waste management unit consisted of a urine and solid waste receiver, 
air filter, and blower. Upon activation of the blower, there was a 
porous substance in the filter which deodorized the air before it was 
returned to the cabin atmosphere. Liquid wastes were stored in spe- 
cial tanks aboard the spacecraft while solid wastes were stored in 
plastic bags which were sealed and stored after use. Both solid and 
liquid wastes were treated with various chemicals to suppress de- 
composition. Xo doubt, the waste management systems on the more 
recent Soyuz/Salyut series are more elaborate, although they have 
yet to be described in detail. The Soviets continue to investigate vari- 
ous methods for treating, storing, and reclaiming water from human 
wastes including distillation at reduced pressure, wet combustion, 
electrolysis, and capillary devices used to separate gases from liquids 
in waste products. 150 " 158 

As the duration of space missions has increased, personal hygiene 
has become more vital as a link in the life support system and to the 
well being of the crew. Accordingly, on the Soyuz/Salyut missions, a 
variety of supplies and equipment has been provided for tooth and 
oral hygiene, cleaning of the body, face, and hands, shaving, washing 
clothes, and trimming the hair and nails. Vacuum cleaners have been 
provided for the collection of loose hair and other debris. 159, 100 


The space suit is a portable life support system in which a micro- 
climate suitable for human activity is maintained. In effect, the space 
suit is a miniature sealed cabin reduced to human dimensions. Air or 
oxygen in the space suit is used for pressurization in addition to res- 
piration. Suits used for extra-vehicular activities in the Soviet 
manned spaceflight program are of two types. In the Vostok and 
Voskhod series of flights, space suit systems were of the open-circuit 
ventilation type whereby the expired air was vented into space. Pure 
oxygen was provided from tanks located in a back pack. In the Soyuz/ 
Salyut series, regenerative space suits have been used in which the 

154 Life support systems aboard the Soyuz-lS-Salyut-4 flight. Izvestiya (USSR 1 ). June 7, 
1975. p. 5 (FRD :S2445). 

155 Salyut-4 water regeneration system. Pravada (USSR). Mav 31. 1975, p. 3. CFRD 

156 Tefiraov, Y. P. et al. Some methods for transporting liquid wastes of the vital func- 
tions of a crew and sanitary waste water during spaceflights. Space Biologv and Medicine 
(USSR), No. 3. 1972, 24-2S (.TPRS 56675). 

137 Fmanskiy. S. P. Man in Snaee Orbit. Op. Cit. 

158 Borshchenko. V. V. Isolation and Elimination of Wastp Products. In : Foundations of 
Spaco Biology and Medicine, Vol. III. Part 1. Ch. 5. Washington. D.C. NASA. 1975 (in 

159 Gurovskiy, N. N. et. al. Some results of medical investigations carried out during 
tri^ fHtht of the scientific orbital station Salyut. Op. Cit. 

ifio Finocpnov. A. M. et al. Cosmonaut clothinsr and personal hvgiene. In: Foundations 
of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol III. Part 1. Ch. 4. Washington, D.C. NASA. 1975 

(in press). 


expired air is recirculated through a carbon dioxide absorbent. The 
basic elements of space suits are a covering layer, detachable gloves, 
pressure helmet, and attached or detached (spacecraft) life support 
system. Hie outer layer provides structural strength and consists of a 
system of cables and cords. A layer of rubberized material covers the 
outer layer. Thermal insulation is provided by an elastic layer with 
low heat conductivity. Through the inner aspect of this layer, a ven- 
tilation system, powered by a centrifugal blower supplies respirable 
gas to various sections of the suit. 161 " 163 

Conventional clothing worn inside the pressurized spacecraft cabin 
is designed for comfort, hygienic properties, and durability. Under- 
wear is made of cotton and rayon. Flight suits worn over the under- 
wear are made of polyester fibers which possess high thermal protective 
capability, high durability, elasticity, and resistance to wrinkling, 
chemicals, bacteria, solar energy, and general wear. For short- 
duration spaceflights, Soviet cosmonauts wore clothing only once, 
after which it was discarded and stored. On longer-duration space- 
flights of the Soyuz/Salyut series, flight clothing can be reworn after 
cleaning aboard the spacecraft. Soviet cosmonauts are also provided 
with conventional leather work boots of light weight. 164 


Unlike American spacecraft, in which the astronaut is the critical 
link in control and guidance, it has been continuing Soviet practice 
to minimize the role pla} r ed by the cosmonaut in the spaceflight mis- 
sion. Accordingly, the instrumentation inside the Soyuz cabin is mini- 
mally designed for human interaction. Cosmonauts have few if any 
launch duties. All command and control activities that are under 
cosmonaut control are carried out in the Soyuz descent module. The 
launch vehicle instrument panel contains no booster readouts or 
booster rocket guidance control. Nor do Soyuz crews have control 
over the timing of any necessary launch abort procedures which are 
carried out automatically or from the ground control station. During 
an abort, such as occurred in the recent Soyuz failure of April, 1975, 
the spacecraft shroud and descent module separation from orbital 
and service modules is under automatic control. Similarly, Soviet 
spacecraft orientation displays are virtually nonexistent and cos- 
monauts have no spacecraft attitude display or data on rates at which 
yaw, pitch, and roll maneuvers are made. Primary attitude reference 
is derived from the use of a simple periscope. 165 

The Soyuz spacecraft contains no man/machine interface typical 
of American spacecraft such as the Apollo digital computer which 
permits direct communication with the guidance and control systems. 
Virtually all Soviet operations are carried out by pre-programmed 
sequencers which cannot be manipulated either by the cosmonauts or 

lfl i Jones, W. Individual life support systems outside of a spacecraft cabin, space suits, and 
capsules. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. III. Part 1. Ch. 7. Wash- 
ington. D.C. NASA. 1975 (in press). 

162 Alekseyev, S. M. et al. Altitude and Space Suits. Moscow, "Mashinostroveniye" Press, 
19T3. p. 198-219. 

1OT Umanskiy, S. P. Man in Space Orbit. Op. Cit. 

181 Finogenov, A. M. et. al. Cosmonaut clothing and personal hvgiene. Op. Cit. 

»« Soyuz gives cosmonauts little control. Aviation Week and Space Technology, Jan. 21, 


ground crews. The sequencers are such that the Soyuz can be flown 
in the unmanned mode. Hand controllers do permit the cosmonaut 
to guido manually spacecraft attitude and translation. But in contrast, 
American spacecraft are provided with several control modes to guide 
spacecraft acceleration and rate. 166 Thus, the Soyuz is frequently 
referred to as a man-rated, unmanned spacecraft in which cosmonauts 
have minimal command, control, or trouble-shooting capability. 

Aside from spacecraft manual control considerations, there is evi- 
dence that the Russians have devoted considerable thought and re- 
search to the general problem of space cabin habitability. They have 
also thoroughly reviewed American approaches to the problem. The 
result is a fairly empirical approach to the design of the spacecraft 
cabin and associated equipment. The Soyuz command module has been 
designed for utility and comfort. Instrument panels and consoles pro- 
vide for the most efficient possible readout of data and manipulation 
by the operator. Other habitability factors of vital importance to crew 
function and well being are also being investigated in considerable 
depth. These include cosmonaut work-rest cycles and sociopsychology 
( di c euss^d in Section II and III), illumination of spacecraft working 
and living areas, and space cabin housekeeping problems. These fac- 
tors are assuming greater importance as the duration of space missions 
increases. Accordingly, Soviet research in this sphere is oriented 
toward interplanetary space missions of many months duration. 167 


As is the practice in the American manned space program. Soviet 
spacecraft are provided with emergency backup systems for virtually 
every link in the life support assembly. However, in the event of a 
catastrophic situation in which a space mission must be aborted, space 
crews are provided with emergency rescue equipment as well. In the 
Soyuz spacecraft, emergency separation of the descent module (which 
occurred in an April 5, 1975 Soyuz mission) is provided for during a 
launch phase malfunction by means of a solid fuel propulsion unit. 
Upon separation, the descent module parachute deploys for an even- 
tual soft landing on either land or sea. Once landed, the crew is pro- 
vided with a portable emergency supply unit in the event that landing 
has taken place in a remote area or far out at sea. The unit contains 
food, water, communications gear (radio with power source) , clothing, 
fishing and hunting equipment, and medicine. In the early Vostok 
series, the portable emergency unit was contained in the cosmonaut's 
seat, which, with the cosmonaut in it, could be ejected from the space 
capsule during an abort or landing in a remote area. 163 

The portable emergency supplies aboard the Soyuz spacecraft are 
intended for two cosmonauts and are subdivided into four units: In- 
sulated suits, flying boots and gloves are in the first and fourth units; 
foodstuffs with a total caloric value of about 4,500 calories (about a 

1M Ibid. 

167 petrov, Tu. A. Physiological hygiene and psycholosical aspects of life organiza- 
tion in spacecraft cabins. In : Foundations of Space Biologv and Medicine. Vol. III. Part 1. 
Ch. 6. Washington. D.C.. NASA. 1975 (in press). 

188 Chornyakov. I. N. Protection of the life nnd health of crews of spacecraft and space 
stations in emergency situations. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine. Vol. 3, 
Part 3, Chapter 14, Wash., D.C., NASA 1975, (In Press). 


2-3 day supply), a medicine chest, radio station, signal flares, and 
knife are in the second unit; two suits for rescue at sea are contained 
in the third unit. The sea rescue suits are buoyant, insulated, and con- 
tain emergency supplies for prolonged immersion in cold water. In 
addition, a portable, automatically inflating life boat is also provided. 
Therefore, the Soyuz spacecraft appears to be adequately equipped 
with emergency gear for rescue on either land or sea. 169> 170 

Once in space, Soviet spacecraft are also provided with emergency 
equipment and procedures to be used in the event of sudden cabin de- 
pressurization, fire, or failure of the atmosphere control systems. In 
the event of sudden cabin depressurization, which occurred during the 
re-entry of Soyuz 11 in 1971, a number of life support resources have 
been developed or are being developed to supply emergency air and 
oxygen. These include full pressure suits, partial pressure suits, and 
pressurized compartments and capsules. Pressure suits have been 
available for emergency use in Soyuz spacecraft since the aforemen- 
tioned accident. In the older Vostok series, the emergency air supply 
system was activated automatically when the cabin pressure dropped 
to 500-560 millimeters of mercury (normal pressure is about 760 mil- 
limeters of mercury). With a further drop in pressure to 400-460 
millimeters of mercury, there was automatic delivery of oxygen and a 
signal was flashed for the cosmonaut to seal his pressure suit helmet. 
Of course, in that series of missions, the cosmonauts were already 
wearing the pressure suit, whereas in the Soyuz-Salyut series, the 
cosmonauts are dressed in conventional clothing. Table 4-8 describes 
the emergency rescue procedure in the event of sudden depressuriza- 
tion and illustrates how critical time is in such a situation. 171 



Who performs rescue Available safety and Available time for 

work rescue means rescue work Limiting factor Terminology 

The victim, independ- 

Other crew members.. 

LSS, full pressure 
suit, PPS. 

LSS, full pressure suit, 
PPS, pressurized 

Same as above and 

10-15 sec 

120-150 sec 

150 sec. (up to 7 
min. for animals). 

Time during which 
consciousness and 
fitness are intact. 

Time in which vital 
functions are re- 

Time of appearance of 
irreversible struc- 
tural change. 

"Reserve time," 
"time of useful 

"Total rescue time," 
"survival time." 

"Resuscitation time." 

SOURCE: Chernyakov, I. N., Protection of the life and health of the crews of spacecraft and space stations in emergency 
situations in Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Volume 3, Part 3, Chapter 13, Washington, D.C. NASA, 1975 

In Soviet spacecraft, an atmosphere that is close in gas composition 
and pressure to that of the Earth is maintained during all phases of 
the flight, in contrast to American spacecraft which use a 100 percent 
oxygen atmosphere. With regard to fire safety, the Soviet practice is 
an advantageous one. But in the event of a spacecraft fire, a number 
of approaches are possible. The most direct one is to use the natural 
vacuum of space to extinguish the fire. This can be done by having the 

169 Umanskiy, S. P. Man in Space Orbit. Op. Cit. 

170 Volovicb, V. G. Medical Aspects of the safe descent and landing of a spacecraft on 
earth and other celestial bodies. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine. Vol. 3, 
Part 3, Chapter 13. Washington. D.C. NASA. 1975 (in press). 

171 Chernyakov, I. N. Protection of the life and health of the crews of spacecraft and 
space stations in emergency situations. Op. Cit. 


crew dress in full pressure suits followed by complete or nearly com- 
plete depressurization of the space cabin. Another possible approach 
would be to saturate the cabin with an inert gas (preferably nitrogen 
in the Soviet case) with the crew wearing full pressure suits provided 
with an emergency oxygen supply. 172 

In the event of a failure in the air recycling and conditioning sys- 
tems, Soviet spacecraft are provided with emergency backup systems 
as well as personal emergency gas supply systems in the form of full 
or partial pressure suits. The emergency systems are designed to pre- 
vent oxygen starvation (hypoxia), symptoms of too much or too little 
carbon dioxide (hypercapnea) , and overheating while the main life 
support assembly is being repaired. 173 


Since the 1960's, both the Soviet Union and the United States have 
been developing prototype life support systems which will maintain 
small crews for a year or even longer. Unlike the expendable life 
support systems used thus far on lunar and orbiting spacecraft, life 
support systems for long duration flights of several months will be of 
the recycling or regenerative type. Such a closed or semi-closed circuit 
system, which would be used for mission durations measured in years, 
must provide the needed consumables, regenerate as many materials 
as possible, and eliminate all wastes. Such a life support system would 
perforin four basic functions vital to the crew : Provide a safe and 
habitable breathing atmosphere, drinking water, food, and sanitation 
and hygiene. The atmosphere control system must regenerate breath- 
able gases; regulate temperature and humidity; provide appropriate 
ventilation and extra breathing gases to compensate for inevitable gas 
leakage ; monitor and control toxic gases in the atmosphere, and pro- 
vide early warning signals in the event of unacceptably high levels of 
any toxic gaseous constituent; and finally, control particulates in the 
atmosphere including dust and microflora. Drinking water must be 
recycled from waste waters to conserve weight. Wherever feasible, 
pure water must be recycled even from human and biological wastes 
as well as housekeeping water. Above all, the recycling life support 
system must be virtually free of actual or potential malfunctions and 
must perform faultlessly virtually 100 percent of the time. The com- 
plexity of the closed-circuit life support system as shown in Figure 4-4 
is therefore orders of magnitude greater than expendable (open-cir- 
cuit) systems thus far developed. 174 

17a Ibid, 
"a Ibid. 

174 .Tones, W. L. Life support systems for interplanetary spacecraft and space stations 
for lon.c term use. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine. Vol. Ill Part 2 Ch. 9, 
Washington, D.C. NASA, 1975 (in press). 


Basic LSS functions 

regenerating system 








Drinking water 






• Lightweight/low 


• Natural (salads) 

and hygiene 



Wash water 

Figure 4-4. — Characteristics of integrated life-support systems 

Source : Jones, W. L., Life support systems for interplanetary spacecraft and space 
stations for long term use. In Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. Ill, Ch. 0. 
Wash., D.C., NASA. 1975 (in press). 

The Russians have tested a number of prototype closed-circuit life 
support systems, the most notable one for a year long experiment in- 
volving three men in 1967. Both this test and a subsequent United 
States simulation of 90 days duration in 1970 demonstrated that life 
can be successfully sustained and that crewmen can perform efficiently 
for long periods of time in a system in which the basic components of 
life support are regenerated. 175 

More recent Soviet work with closed-circuit life support systems has 
concentrated on the concept of biological regeneration. To this end, the 
"Bios-3" complex was constructed to permit long-duration, man-rated 
tests involving different variants of biological life support systems. 
The complex is a welded block made of stainless steel divided into four 
equal compartments. The area of the block is 14 x 9 meters and the 
height is 2.5 meters. The compartments are linked by hermetic doors. 
Each compartment has an emergency exit. Two compartments con- 
tain higher plants, such as wheat and vegetables, one contains algae 
(Chlorella), and one is the crew living quarters. Simulated tests with 
3 crew members have been conducted for durations of up to six months. 
Xo adverse changes in medical status of the crew have been noted and 
a high work capacity has been maintained. 176 

At the Institute of Biomedical Problems in Moscow, men have lived 
for up to 30 days in a hermetically sealed room in which oxygen was 
completely supplied by protococcal algae (Chlorella). 177 Extensive re- 
search is continuing with the goal of perfecting a 100 percent closed- 
circuit biological life support system consisting of algae, a variety of 
higher plants, and even bacteria which will not only provide the crew 


1 ~ e Oitelson, I. I. et Hi IJfe support system with internal control based on photosynthesis 
Of hlcrh and unicellular plants. In: 24th IAF Conjrress, Krasnoyarsk. T'SSR. 107.°.. 34 p. 

w Sbepelev, Ye. Ya. Bioloertcal life support systems. In : Foundations of Space Biology and 
Medicine. Vol. 3, Part 2, Chapter 10. Washington, D.C., NASA. 1975 (in press). 

67-371—76 21 


with oxygen, and remove toxic gases and wastes, but provide nourish- 
ment as well. One is left with the strong impression that the Soviet 
effort in this field is very large and purposeful and that its ultimate 
goal is the creation of life support systems which will be able to sup- 
port reliably crews in manned orbiting laboratories, and ultimately, in 
interplanetary spacecraft. 178 ' 179 

V. Gravitational Biology and Medicine 

Since the very beginnings of the space programs of the United States 
and Soviet Union, aviation and space medical specialists have been 
particularly concerned about the influence of gravity or the lack of 
it on the organism. Accordingly, both countries have supported large 
research programs to investigate in detail the effects of accelerations 
(linear and radial), weightlessness, and terrestrial situations approxi- 
mating the weightless state (water immersion, bed rest, hypodynamia 
and hypokinesia) on humans and animals. The concern about the bio- 
medical effects of gravity can be better understood if the dynamics of 
a typical spaceflight are considered : During the launch phase, the 
space crew is exposed to brief but intense positive acceleration followed 
by prolonged exposure (thus far up to 84 days) to weightlessness. This 
long exposure to weightlessness is followed by yet another brief ex- 
posure to intense positive acceleration associated with the re-entry of 
the spacecraft through the dense layers of the atmosphere. Thus, in 
rather rapid sequence, a space crew is exposed to positive and negative 
extremes of gravity, having adapted for prolonged periods of time 
either to the Earth's gravity or to the weightlessness of space. Having 
somewhat adapted to weightlessness, the crew must finally re-adapt 
to the Earth's gravity. The transition from a positive to a null gravity 
situation is associated with alteration in human sensory perceptions, 
particularly those of the inner ear. Such an alteration often leads to 
vestibular disturbances. The. Soviet space life sciences community 
therefore continues to investigate the effects of : 1) temporary and 
chronic linear accelerations: 2) temporary and chronic rotatory (Cor- 
iolis) accelerations; 3) impact accelerations; and 4) weightlessness. 
Under laboratory conditions, linear accelerations are simulated in cen- 
trifuges, while rotatory accelerations are simulated on rotating chairs, 
inside rotating drums, or in rotating rooms. Weightlessness is only 
poorly approximated on Earth by means of bed rest, bodily restriction, 
clinostats, or test stands which, supnort human or animal subjects in 
planes other than vertical to the Earth's gravitational vector. Brief 
periods (a few minutes) of the true weightlessness cnn be produced 
by flying high performance aircraft through parabolic (Keplerian) 
trajectories. 180 


Initially, there was considerable apprehension in the Soviet bio- 
astronautics community that the health, and indeed the lives of cosmo- 
nauts would be imperiled by positive accelerations experienced during 
spacecraft launch and re-entry. Of particular concern to this day is the 

179 A Chlorpr.'T-br.soJ rinsed cycle life support system. Chemistry and Life (USSR), No. 5, 
1974. 58-63 (FRD ±-207^0 . 

179 Research on closed cycle life support svstems at the USSR Institute of Biomedical 
Problems. Pravda (USSR). April 2, 1975. p. 6 (FRD #234.^. 

150 Smith, A. H. Principles of Oravitationnl Biology. In Foundations of Space Biology 
and Medicine. Vol. II, Ch. 4, Book 1. Washington, D.C.* NASA, 1975, 129-162. 


ability of cosmonauts to withstand brief exposures to re-entry accelera- 
tions following prolonged adaptation to weightlessness. Fortunately, 
these apprehensions have been somewhat exaggerated, for neither 
American nor Soviet crews to date have been seriously alfected by any 
gravitational aspect associated with space missions. With respect to 
positive accelerations, engineering precautions such as antigravity 
suits, special harnesses, and contoured couches have precluded any dele- 
terious physiological effects. As spacecraft have become larger, more 
powerful, and more sophisticated, the positive G-forces experienced by 
space crews have gradually decreased. As more aerodynamic spacecraft 
are developed, the problem of re-entry accelerations will diminish even 
more, so that positive acceleration will essentially cease to confront the 
bioastronautics community as a major problem. For these reasons, there 
has been a somewhat decreased emphasis on the part of American and 
Soviet research teams on the physiological effects of linear accelera- 
tions. Nonetheless, some research continues and Soviet researchers in 
particular are investigating the effects of centrifugal accelerations on 
the cardiovascular system, central nervous system, respiratory organs, 
major digestive organs, kidneys, endocrine glands, blood and blood- 
forming tissues, and metabolic processes. Although human tolerance 
of maximum accelerations has been fairly well determined, possible 
subtle alterations in various organs and tissues are not well known. 
In nddition, there is an emphasis on determining the physiological ef- 
fects of accelerations in combination with other -physical factors such 
as altered gas atmospheres and radiation. 181 * 183 On a more theoretical 
level, the evolutionary aspects of gravitational perception is being in- 
vestigated in considerable depth. 184-185 

In recent years, Soviet researchers have been concerned about the 
effects of accelerations on the cardiovascular system. Cardiovascular 
disorders resulting from gravitational influences are caused by a re- 
distribution of blood mass in the body. The degree of redistribution 
and the accompanying changes in circulatory dynamics depend on 
the direction and force of the acceleration vector. The greatest cardio- 
vascular changes are brought about by longitudinal (±Gz) accelera- 
tions while the least significant changes result from transverse ( ±Gx) 
accelerations. This is because the major blood vessels in the body are 
situated primarily along the longitudinal axis, hence blood is more 
vulnerable to displacement by a longitudinal acceleration vector. 
Methods of monitoring human performance are being developed in 
order to detect rapidly and predict the limits of human tolerance to 
various vectors and magnitudes of accelerations. 186-188 

1P1 Kotovskly. Ye. F. et al. Functional morphology as a result of exposure to extreme 
factors. In Problems of Space Biology, Vol. 15, Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1971, p. 5-180 
(NASA TT-F-738). 

ira Chernigovskiy, V. N. (Ed.) Problems of Space Biology. Vol. 16. Moscow, "Nauka" 
Press. 1971. 335 p. 

1S3 Vasll'yev, P. V. et al. Prolonged linear and radial accelerations. In Foundations of 
Snace Biology and Medicine. Vol. II, Ch. 5, Book 1. Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975, 

184 Chornigovskly, V. N. (Ed.) Tbe srravitntlonal recentor : evolution, structure, cvto- 
chemical and functional organization. In Problems of Snace Biology. Vol. 12. Leningrad, 
"Nauka" Press. 1971, 523 p. 

185 Vinnikov, Ya. A. Evolution of the grnvlreceptor and its Investigation under conditions 
of acceleration and weightlessness. Archives of Anatomv, Histology, and Embryology 
(USRRU No. 1. 1974. 10-25 (FRD ±-1703). 

188 Vasil'yev, P. V. et al. Prolonged linear and radial accelerations. Op. Cit. 

187 Shul'zhenko, E. B. Human tolerance of chest-spine accelerations. Space Blolocry and 
Medie'ne (USSR), No. 1. 1074. 84-95. 

189 Kotovskaya, A. R. Information value of pulse pooling in auricular vessels for the 
assessment of human tolerance to + Gz accelerations. Space Biology and Aerospace Medi- 
cine (USSR), No. 1, 1975, 59-66 (FRD #2290). 


Intellectual and physical performance associated with brain Circu- 
lation under the influence of accelerations has traditionally received 
considerable attention in the Soviet Union. Research continues to elu- 
cidate the mechanisms of changes in cerebral circulation and the effects 
of those changes on various functions such as vision, speech, and motor 
acts including spacecraft control functions. Methods of simultaneous- 
ly monitoring a variety of physiological indices during accelerations 
such as the cardiovascular and nervous systems are being developed 
as tools for the selection of aviation and space personnel. The implica- 
tion of these studies is that candidate fliers and cosmonauts will con- 
tinue to be subjected to centrifuge runs during the selection and train- 
ing process and that acceleration tolerance will continue to be used as 
an important index of physical fitness. 189-192 

Methods of increasing human resistance to the harmful effects of ac- 
celeration are being examined. Approaches to this problem include 
protective clothing, contoured couches, special harnesses, physical 
training, repeated exposure to centrifugal accelerations, and the use of 
pharmacological agents. The effects of various drugs on resistance to 
-acceleration have been investigated. Suitable drugs would stimulate 
physiological compensatory mechanisms or depress the general ac- 
tivity of the body. Depressants such as chloral hydrate, sodium thio- 
pental, and hexanal have been rejected because they disrupt cardiovas- 
cular activity, circadian rhythms and decrease tolerance of heavy 
ad ivity. Trioxazine, a promising tranquilizer, has few undesirable side 
effects and has been successfully tested under experimental condi- 
tions. Stimulants of nervous system activity have also been tested 
and include caffeine, phenaminc, corazol, and strychnine. Cardiovascu- 
lar drugs tested include vasoconstrictors such as epinephrine and nor- 
epinephrine and vasodilators such as nitroglycerine and the cardiac 
glycosides. Another class of drugs includes those which normalize 
stress related to respiratory changes. Combinations of stimulants (cen- 
tredin and securinin) have been found to reduce the adverse effects of 
accelerations. Many of these drugs are now routinely included in the 
Soyuz/Salyut medical kit for emergency use. Since the flight of Soy- 
uz 9, after which the cosmonauts experienced difficulty in re-adapting 
to Earth's gravity, new, unspecified drugs have been added to enhance 
cardiovascular and muscular tonus and tolerance of acceleration. 
These drugs are also said to expedite re-adaptation to the Earth's 
gravity. However, the Soviets are cautious about the use of drugs under 
spaceflight conditions because various factors associated with the 
spaceflight tend to alter human response to pharmacological prepara- 
tions. Therefore, only mild sedatives and aspirin-like preparations are 
believed to have been used on Soviet space missions completed to 
date. 193-195 

1?8 7otova. X. I. Effect of bodv-to-head accelerations on telencephalon, va^culatore. 
Archives of Anatomy, Histology, and Embryology (USSR). No. 12, 1974, 37-43 (FRD 

180 Zubavin. V. B. et al. Application of multichannel rheogranhy for physiological studies 
on a centrifuge. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR). No. 5. 1972. 75-79 (FRD #1020). 

161 Ntkonov. A. V. et al. Influence of prolonged accelerations on the structure of speech 
siennls. Military Medical Journal (USSR). No. 9, 1973. 50-53 (FRD #1359). 

182 Zorile, V. I. et al. Action of prolonged longitudinal accelerations on the habit of steer- 
ing Military Medical Journal (USSR), No. 6, 1972, 89-94 (FRD #999). 

183 VasU\vev, P. V. et al. Pharmacological substances and resistance of the oreranism to 
accelerations. In Problems of Space Biology. Vol 17. Moscow, "Nauka" Press, 1971, 83- 
17:' l FRD it826K 

104 Vasil'yev. P. V. et al. Effect of psychotropic substanres on man's tolerance to ac- 
celerations. Space Biolocrv and Medicine (USSR^, No. 3, 1972, 50-59. 
185 Medical Gazette (USSR) July 18, 1975, p. 3. 


The possibly negative effect on acceleration tolerance of other pro- 
tective drugs such as radioprotective agents is also of concern to Soviet 
researchers. They are apprehensive that factors such as weightlessness, 
acceleration, ionizing radiation, and artificial gas atmospheres may 
alter normal human response to drugs. Some experiments have indi- 
cated that certain aminothiol and indolylalkylamine radioprotectors 
markedly alter animal responses to and tolerance of accelerations. Thus 
along with the benefits conferred by various protective drugs, there is 
also a risk factor which must be evaluated before protective drugs 
can be administered under actual spaceflight factors. 11 ' 6 

Omgoing Soviet research on the effects of acceleration is concentrat- 
ing on cellular and cytogenetic investigations of human beings and 
animals in order to elucidate the mechanisms of acceleration effects. 
Thus far, no cytogenetic changes have been detected in the somatic; 
cells of humans subjected to accelerations of 4-10 G. The effects o£ 
accelerations on cerebral circulation will be continued and refined in 
order to develop techniques for better predicting brain tolerance of 
this factor. Information will continue to be developed on permissible 
limits for human beings relative to work capacity. The beneficial 
effects of oxygen and other gas mixtures will also be evaluated. Data 
on human resistance to transverse (Gx) accelerations will continue to 
be gathered as well as data on the physiological effects of accelerations 
in combination with other factors. Finally, methods of protection 
against the adverse effects of linear accelerations will continue to be 
developed. 197 ' 198 


Of continuing concern to Soviet and United States aerospace bio- 
medical researchers are the various effects of weightlessness on the 
human body. At the very beginning of the manned spaceflight era. 
there were serious doubts as to whether man and animals could sur- 
vive in a gravity-free state for even a few hours. The earliest Soviet 
biosatellite flights using dogs, mice, and other organisms provided en- 
couraging evidence that this was probably not so. After the Vostok 
flights, there was cautious optimism that man could survive for at 
least a few days in zero gravity. But the 18 day flight of Soyuz 9 
temporarily re-kindled doubts about the seriousness of weightlessness 
effects, because both cosmonauts experienced considerable difficulty 
(orthostatic intolerance) in readapting to Earth's gravity. As it de- 
veloped, this was an anomaly, because subsequent Soviet and Ameri- 
can spaceflights of up to 63 and 84 days in duration respectively have 
been a success in the medical sense that space crews have been minimal- 
ly affected by weightlessness. 199-200 

Many problems of a biomedical nature associated with weightless- 
ness remain which will demand continuing research into the origin, 
prevention, and treatment if spaceflights of many months or years in 
duration are to be realized. The most significant of these problems are 

iee Antipov. V. V. et al. Study of the reactivity of the organism exposed to transverse ac- 
celerations. Aerospace Medicine, No. 8, 1971. 837-839. 

« 7 Bobkova. X. X. Results of cytogenetic investigations of the effects of 4-10 G accelera- 
tions on humans. Space Biologv and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). Xo. 6. 1974, 77-7-. 
Vasil'yev, P. V. et al. Prolonged linear and radial accelerations. Op. Cit. 

:j>9 perry. C. The legacy of Apollo. Op. Cit. 

«°°Parin. V. V. et al. Weightlessness (Biomedical Research). Moscow, "Meditsina" Pub- 
lishing House, 1974, 456 p. (FRD #2097). 


changes in orthostatic and vestibular tolerance; increased suscepti- 
bility to disease and infection; altered reactivity to drugs; decreased 
tolerance of acceleration and physical activity; demineralization of 
bones; various changes in blood circulation; kidney function; respira- 
tion; metabolism; and general deconditionng. The various reactions 
to weightlessness as they are now known have been summarized from 
the literature by Pestov et al. as shown in Tables 4-9 201 

201 Pestov, I. D. et nl. Weightlessness. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine. 
Vol. II, Ch. 8, Book 1. Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975, 305-354. 


Conditions and 
objects of 

Reactions observations 1 Notes 

1 2 

Sensations of an unsupported position, floating, Man (TW, KP, SF)... Emotion-| coloring of sensations (fear, joy , 

fallinp, spinning, turning, flow of blood to head, etc ) depends on experience and training 

deterioration of orientation in space, predomi- of subjects; in orbital flight-adaptation 
nance of visual information role in evaluating 
position of body in space 

Displacement of successive visual image during Man (KP, SF). Actual position of visual targets during 

G-forces— downward (oculogravi- illusion), and G-forces— above the successive image, and 

upward during weightlessness (oculoagravic illu- below it during weightlessness; with gaze 

sion): illusions are characteristic of initial periods fixei on a target, the successive image 

in weightlessness coincides with it 

Slowing down of speed and accmcy of movements; Man (KP, SF). Only in initial phase of SF, then adaptation 

errors in trying to hit center of target (deviation 
of hits upward) 

Deterioration of ability to carry o'Jt measured mus- Man (KP) 

cular efforts and evaluate differences in mass of 
objects not fastened down 

Pulse frequency : slowing of normalization following Man, animals (SF)... With PBR following initial decrease in 

action of G-forces; subsequent tendency toward frequency of pulse, increase in frequency 

slowing, increase in variability (possible arrhyth- (lack of training) 
mias of the bigeminal type); in final stage of long 
SF, slight increase 

Arterial pressure: moderate decrease, followed by Man (SF) In PBR, initial decrease followed by increase 

stabilisation, tendency toward decrease in pulse (sympathetic effect) 

Heart: decrease in size (according to data from x-ray Man (SF, R) Descriptions of cases of increased mechan- 

studies); symptoms of decrease in the contractile ical activity of heart during flight 
ability (according to electrocardiographic and 
seismocardiographic data and results of phase 
analysis of cardiac cycle) 

Bone tissue: demineralization (according to the data Man, animals (R) No changes observed when using method of 

from x-ray photometry) due to loss of Ca photon absorption 

Muscles: decrease in volume and strength. Man,animals(SF, R). Primarily atrophy of antigravitational 


Dehydration (decrease in plasma volume, followed Man, animals (R) Decrease in plasma volume develops on 1st 

by loss of intracellular fluid) or 2nd (Henry-Gauer reflex); recovery 

possible later 

Decrease in weight (mass) of the body by 2-5% of M3n, animals (R) Stay on moon in individual cases decreased 

original value body weight loss; following flight, weight 

rapidly returned to normal (exception; 
18-d flight of Soyuz-9) 
Similar changes in P8R 

Protein metabolism: increase in blood urea content; Man, animals(SF, R). 
increased excretion of creatinine with urine, nega- 
tive nitrogen balance 

Lipid metabolism; increase in the cholesterol, Man, animals (SF, R). 
lecithin, and nonesterfied fatty acid content of 

Decrease in excretion of Na-, CI-, K- electrolytes Man, animals (R) — 
with urine 

Reduced excretion of 17-oxycorticosteroids, in flight Man (SF, R) 

increase in excretion following flight 

Increase in concentration of antidiuretic hormone, Man (R) 

aldosterone, and renin 

Blood: neutrophilic laukocytosis lymphopenia, or Man, animals (SF, R). 
lymphocytosis, eosinopenia, increase in R0E[?j, 
changes in coagulatory and anti-coagulatory sys- 
tems of blood; thrombocytes— decrease or ab- 
sence of changes 

Delay in excretion of water from organism in test Man (R) 

with waterload 

Deterioration of tolerance o transverse G-forces Man (SF) 

during launch 

Changes not constant, depending also on 
nature of diet 

Related to previous losses of electrolytes 

during weightlessness 
Similar relationship in experiments with 

simulation of weightlessness 
Increase in aldosterone also noticed in SF 

Similar changes in experiments with PBR 

Not noticed after 18-d flight of Soyuz-9 
Not on all flights 



Conditions and 
objects of 

Reactions observations* Notes 

Sensation of heaviness of body, rapid fatigue, diffi- 
culty in walking, muscular pains 

Changes in postural, oculomotor reflexes and 

Decrease in oculomotor activity, asymmetry of 
nystagmoid movements 

Development of pain during movement or individual 
symptoms of it (dizziness, discomfort in stomach, 
nausea, vomiting) 

Frequency of respiration and pulmonary ventilation: 
increase during flight along the KP: various 
changes in SF: increase in post-flight period 

Gas exchange: increase during flight along a KP: 
decrease (according to data from analysis of re- 
generative substance) during the SF: increase 
during post-flight period 

Decrease in food consumption 

Orthostatic instability 

Decrease in physical working capacity 

Decreased immunity.. 

Increase in recovery period on long compared with 
short flights 

Man (R) Primarily after long-duration flights without 

preventive measures 
Animals (TW, KP)... Changes less in delabyrinthized animals 

than in normals 

Man (SF) 

Man (KP, SF) Participation of both vestibular and extra- 

labyrinthic mechanisms suggested, as well 
as change in interaction of afferent systems 

Man (KP, SF, R) Changes in flight depend on previous action 

of G-forces or nature of the work 

Man (KP, SF, R) Basad on an analysis of samples of expired 

air, collected during the SF, both a de- 
crease and an increase were noted: 
decrease in the PBR 

MAN (SF) Not observed on all flights: characteristic 

of PBR 

Man (R) Develops also under conditions of terrestrial 

experiments involving simulation of 


Man (R) Consequence of hypodynamia 

Man, animals (R) Increased danger of infectious diseases 

during and after flight 
Man (R) Improved living conditions and preventive 

measures shorten recovery period 

1 TW— tower of weightlessness; KP— Keplerian parabola; SF— space flight; R— readaptation period; PBR— prolonged 
bed rest 

SOURCE: Berry (1973) as cited by Pestov, I D et al. Weightlessness In Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine^ 
vol. II, Ch. 8, Wash., D.C., NASA, 1975, pp. 305-354. ' 

A number of hypotheses about the various mechanisms and path- 
ways of weightlessness effects have been presented as have theories 
about processes of adaptation to this factor. These are also summarized 
by Pestov et al. below (Figures 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7) : 202 

»* Ibid. 



Decrease in 



Redistribution of total 
volume of circulating blood 

Decrease in ADH 
(Henry-Gauer reflex) 


Loss of total 
water by organism 

Loss of Na^and K + 
ions through kidneys 


Decrease in 
plasma volume 


Tendency toward 
increase in aldo- 
sterone and ADH 



retention of 
Na* in kidneys 

Cessation of 
water loss, 
of weight 

Exchange of H + ions 
for K"*" ions in cells 

Increase ventilation 
in CO, in plasma 

New fluid and 
electrolyte bal - 
ance in cells 

(Decrease in mass 
of erythrocytes-- 
due to hyperoxia?r 

Decrease in 
mass of bone 
and muscle 


Lack of 
and new 
level of 
stress on 

Figure 4-5. — Proposed process of adaptation to weightlessness. 

Source: Leach (1970) as cited by Pestor, I. D. et al. Weightlessness. In: Foundations 
of Space Biology and Medicine, vol. II, ch. 8, Washington, D.C. NASA, 1975. pp. 305-354. 


Response of body 

Entry into zero gravity; redistribution of circulating 
Wood volume 

Lost of water, sodium, potassium (lots of body weight) 

Increased sodium retention: potassium loss continues: 
cell: acidotic- extracellular fluid: alkalollc 

Respiratory and renal compensation; hall to weight 
loss trend 


Body attempts to reduce volume: ADH decreases, 
aldosterone production decreases 

Decrease in plasma volume; aldosterone Increases 
(secondary aldosteronism) 

Intracellular escbarpe of potas*ium and hydroeen 
Jons; decrease in bone density, muscle cell potas- 
sium, and muscle mass-puasihly including cardiac 

Stabilizes with new effective circulating Hb»>d volume; 
new body fluid and electrolyte balance or "set" 

Figure 4-6. — Overview of Current Hypothesis Concerning Processes Involved in 
Man's Adaptation to Zero Gravity 

Source: Berrv (1971) as cited by Pestov, I. D. et al. Weightlessness. In: Foundations 
of Space Biology and Medicine, vol. II, ch. 8, Washington, B.C., NASA, 1975. pp. 305- 


Losses of mass of erythrocytes, 
7 Consequence of 0, toxicity 


Nervous system 
Vestibular apparatus: 

I Thresholds of motion sickness 

' Electrolyte imbalance 

7 Adaptation 

Cardiovascular system 
1 Pressure in the auricle 

Henry-Gauer reflex 


Blood volume — 
' (New level) 

1ADH (water loss) 

Bones and muscles 
1 Looses of mineral substances 
(Ca*+ Mg". K + , CI" N. P) 

Aldosterone (back 

' resorption of Na*) 
^►1 Losses of KMkidneys) I Density of bones 

M Contractility of the 

Leek of training of the heart 

Decrease in K* 
of the body 


Soft compensated 


— I Cortisol . 

Muscle mass 

|Britt!eness of benes 
t Muscular weakness 

?| Peripheral resistance 
Working — 



+ > Stress 
f Adrenaline / 

Figure 4-7. — Effects of the Influence of Weightlessness on Man (Working 


Source: White (1972) as cited bv Pestov, I. D., et al. Weightlessness. In: Foundations 
of Si»ace Biology and Medicine. Vol. II, ch. 8 Washington, D.C. NASA 1975. 305-354. 

One additional subject of particular interest to Soviet researchers is 
the influence of weightlessness on the dynamics of cerebral circulation. 
One reason for this concern is persistent reports by cosmonauts and 
astronauts of a feeling of full-headedness or stuffiness during initial 
phases of adaptation to zero gravity. Another reason for concern is 
that any persistent changes in cerebral circulation carry with them the 
potential danger that mental performance might be negatively in- 
fluenced. Therefore, methods are being developed to detect changes in 
cerebral circulation under actual spaceflight conditions and to pin- 
point mechanisms of changes in the dynamics of circulation under a 
variety of physical conditions. 203 

Considerable research is being conducted to develop methods for 
predicting the influence of prolonged exposure to weightlessness. 
Since spaceflights are an extremely expensive method of experimenta- 
tion, it is necessary to generally approximate conditions of weight- 

103 Moskalenko, Yu. Ye. Intracranial Blood Circulation Under Spaceflight Conditions. 
Moscow, 'Meditsina" Publishing House, 1971, 278 p. ( FK 1 > ^ 1208). 


lessness in the laboratory. A number of approaches have been devel- 
oped by Soviet and United States researchers including prolonged 
hypodynamia and hypokinesia, bed-rest, water immersion, and pro- 
longed isolation in spacecraft mockup and specially designed cham- 
bers. Short term exposure to true weightlessness can only be accom- 
plished by flying high performance aircraft through parabolic trajec- 
tories. The aim of Soviet experiments is to determine and predict the 
limits of human tolerance to simulated spaceflight conditions and to 
develop methods for enhancing human tolerance of these conditions. 204 
As mentioned in Section IV of this chapter, Soviet isolation experi- 
ments in specially designed chambers have lasted for as long as one 
year with minimal degradation of human performance or medical con- 
ditions. The first year-long test with three subjects was conducted in 
1967. 205 A second year long test has reportedly just been completed. 206 
Bed rest and hypokinesia experiments involving many subjects of up 
to 120 days in duration have been conducted in recent years to eluci- 
date mechanisms of physical deconditioning and changes in physiolog- 
ical and metabolic processes. 207 ' 208 Even hypnosis has been used to in- 
duce a subjective sensation of weightlessness in Soviet experiments. 209 
Of considerable interest to Soviet researchers is human tolerance of ac- 
celeration after prolonged exposure to conditions approximating the 
weightless state. The general finding is that there is a considerable 
decrease in acceleration tolerance particularly after experiments of 
30 or more days. 210 Another concern is altered reactivity to drugs and 
shifts in work-sleep patterns which occurs after prolonged exposure 
to simulated weightlessness. 211 " 213 Finally, cardiovascular changes and 
cerebral hemodynamics are of concern after prolonged (up to 120 
days) exposure to hypokinesia. 214 215 

A number of approaches are being developed to counteract the dele- 
terious effects of weightlessness. One approach would avoid the prob- 
lem of adapting to weightlessness by rotating the entire spacecraft 
around its own axis to produce artificial gravity. The other approach, 
presently receiving the most attention, would involve physical condi- 
tioning and the use of drugs and special garments to minimize the 
effects of the weightless environment. Both concepts are summarized 
below (Table 4-10) : 216 

204 Kopanev, V. I. et al. Physiology of the sensory sphere of man under spaceflight condi- 
tions. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine. Vol. II., Ch. 15, Book 2. Wash- 
ington, D.C., NASA. 1975, 571-560. 

203 Smirnov. K. M. Hypokinesia. Successes of the Physiological Sciences (USSR), No. 1. 

1972. 3-20 (FRD #918). 

20ti Aviation Week and Space Technology. March 10. 1975. p. 11. 

207 Portugalov, V. V. et al. Morphological and cytochemical studies of hypokinetic effects. 
Aerospace Medicine, No. 10. 1971, 1041-1049. 

208 Murakhovskiy, K. I. et al. Mineralization of human bone tissue in conditions of 
water immersion. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 6. 1973. 72-75 (FRD #1502). 

3tB Weightlessness under hypnosis. Socialist Industry (USSR), Nor. 18, 1973, p. 4. 

210 Barer, A. S. Man's tolerance of accelerations after prolonged exposure to conditions 
simulating weightlessness. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR) , No. 3, 1972, 49-53. 

2U Kas'yan, I. I. External respiration, cas metabolism and enerey expenditure In the case 
of varying human activitv under conditions of weightlessness. Izvestlva of the Academy 
of Sciences. USSR. Biological Series. No. 5, 1971, 673^681 (JPRS 54493). 

212 Belay, V. E. et ah Influence of 30 day hypokinesia on the reactivity of the organism 
to pharmacological preparations. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 4, 
1974. 83-84. 

213 Artishchuk, V. N. et al. Influence of 30 day bed rest on dynamics of hisrber nervous 
activity and sleep of operators. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 5, 
1974. 75-79. 

214 Moskalenko, Yu. Ye. Intracranial Blood Circulation Under Spaceflight Conditions. 
Op. Cit. 

215 Tizul, A. Ya. et al. Cerebral hemodynamics during 120-day clinostatic hypokinesia. 
Space Biology and Medicine (USSR) No. 4, 1972, 72-77. 

210 Pestov, I. D. Weightlessness. Op. Cit. 



Partial adaptation to weightless state 

Physical exercise Acceleration 

Calisthenics On-board centrifuge 

All kinds of sports Trampoline 

Tumbling, diving, zero-G training Oscillating support 

Isometric & isotonic contractions Vibrating bed 

Bicycle and hand ergometers Space station rotation 
Head movements during zero-G 

Controlled environment Drugs and medication 

Hypoxia Aldosterone 

Low temperature Antidiuretic hormone 

Diets Plasma expanders 


Pressure Counteractives 

Pressure breathing Glucose 
Positive pressure cuffs Pitressin 
Elastic garments Anabolic hormones 

Lower body negative pressure Electrostimulation 
Anti-G suit 

Complete adaptation 

Preconditioning of organism to subgravity level or zero-G state : recondition- 
ing organism to force of normal terrestrial gravitation. 

Source : Pestov, I. D. et al. Weightlessness. In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medi- 
cine. Vol. II. Ch. S. Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975, pp. 303-354. 

Among the problems associated with the first approach are the 
sheer expense and size of the hardware required, the different magni- 
tudes of acceleration which would occur in a large rotating system, 
supply and control programs, and the little-known physiological ef- 
fects of a constantly rotating system. Many Soviet specialists therefore 
continue to favor the second approach since it provides for partial 
adaptation to weightlessness while at the same time allowing for meas- 
ures to prevent the major unfavorable consequences of such adapta- 
tion. The manned spaceflight record to date has thus far vindicated 
the second approach. 217 218 

The use of lower body negative pressure (LBNP) as a method of 
conditioning the cardiovascular system against weightlessness con- 
tinues to be practiced on Soviet spaceflights and investigated under 
laboratory conditions. In experiments, LBXP selectively applied dur- 
ing prolonged immobilization and bed rest, increases orthostatic toler- 
ance and cardiovascular tonus. LBNP is also a useful tool for detect- 
ing signs of de-adaptation brought on by prolonged exposure to ac- 
tual or simulated weightlessness. The use of lower body over-pressure 
(LBOP) in combination with other measures is also being investigated 
as a means of preventing deconditioning. 219 " 222 

»' Ibid. 

ns Genin. A. et al. Measures against the unfavorable effect of weightlessness. Aviation and 
Cosmonautics (USSR), No. 3, 1972. 30-33 (JPRS 55714). 

119 Pestov. I. D. Apprahal of the prophylactic effect of LBNP during a 30 dav bed-rest 
regimen. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR) No. 4, 1974, 51-55 (FRD #1956). 

Aleksandrov, A. N. Effect of 30 day bed rest and LBNP on the functional state of the 
cardiovascular system at rest. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 1, 
1974, 71-72. 

M1 Suvorov, P. M. et al. Study of the possibility of using LBNP in the diagnostics of 
susceptibility to syncopes. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR) , No. 3, 1974* 


*»Asyamalov, B. F. et al. Substantiation of LBOP needed to prevent orthostatic dis- 
turbances. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 6, 1973, 56-60 (FRD #1499). 


Physical exorcise, antigravity garments, and electrical stimulation 
-of select muscle groups continue to be investigated individually or in 
combination with other conditioning approaches, including LBNP. to 
counteract the deconditioning effects of weightlessness. Electrical stim- 
ulation of muscles has shown promise in experiments and has been 
tested under spaceflight conditions. Experiments suggest that a higher 
degree of effectiveness is achieved when deeply located muscles are 
strongly stimulated. Physical exercise regimens using a variety of 
training devices, including stretch garments, springs, and expanders 
appear to have had successful results during spaceflights of up to G2 
days duration in the Soviet program. 223 - 225 

Pharmacological countermeasures against weightlessness effects are 
also being investigated, despite the often-stated apprehension that hu- 
man reactivity to drugs is altered during exposure to this factor. Such 
preparations as caffeine, phenamine, and securinin are now included in 
the Soviet spacecraft drug kit, although none of these drugs are be- 
lieved to have been used thus far in any spaceflight. 220 

In summary, it has been found that Soviet and American space 
crews have been able to adapt to long periods (63 and 84 days) of 
weightlessness and have experienced few difficulties upon return to the 
Earth's gravity. Physical and equipment approaches to the problem 
of counteracting the unfavorable effects of weightlessness have worked 
quite well, so that it is believed that orbital flights in present-gener- 
ation space stations of 90-120 days are feasible. Flights of even longer 
duration are somewhat more worrisome, at least to Soviet specialists, 
and speculation persists that some sort of artificial gravity may be 
necessary for flights of many months or years in duration. Future 
spacecraft are therefore envisioned which will be very much larger 
than present generation space stations. These would be constructed in 
orbit module-by -module to form large rotating complexes capable of 
accommodating large numbers of personnel. 227 * 228 


The vestibular organ is the major receptor of acceleration which 
relays information to the brain. It consists of fluid-filled semi-circular 
canals, the otolithic apparatus, connecting neurons, and cortical cen- 
ters. Under weightless or rotatory conditions, the otoliths, small grain- 
like structures in a capsule, lose weight or are shifted directionally. 
These changes have a variety of effects on the human organism ranging 
from unpleasant to dangerous. In general, vestibular disorders are ex- 
pressed as sensations of disorientation and nausea which can occur 
when the body is rotated rapidly or when it is exposed to zero gravity. 

Vestibular dysfunction has been a persistent concern, first in the 
Soviet manned spaceflight effort and later in the American program. 

923 Barer. A. S. Physiological and hygienic substantiation of the design of individual meas- 
ures to prevent the adverse effect of weightlessness. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine 
(USSR). No. 1. 1975. 41-47. 

Gornasro, V. A. et al. Use of an anti-eravitv suit in persons with decrpnspd orthostatic 
tolerance. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 5. 1974. 73-75 CFRD i+2047). 

I2 ~ NnTkovskiy. B. S. Human physiological performance after 30-day hypokinesia dnrin? 
which prophvlactic measures were used. Space Biologv and Aerospace Medicine, (USSR), 
No. 4. 1974. 43-47 (FRD i£1954). 

YasiTyev. P. V. et al. Pharmacological agents and weightlessness. Basic responses of 
the omnism to the effort of prolonged hypodvnamla and weightlessness. In : Problems of 
Space Biolopy, Vol. 17. Moscow, "Nauka" Press. 1971. 173-197 (FRO i-S27). 

227 Rukavishnikov. N. Artificial gravity aboard spacecraft. Aviation and Cosmonautics 
(USSR). No. 6. 1974. 40-41 (FRD#1892). 

« s Unsigned. Izvestiya (USSR), July 23, 1974, p. 5 (FRD #1945). 


As mentioned earlier, the Soviet cosmonaut, Titov, first experienced 
dizziness and nausea during the flight of Vostok 2. Later, other Soviet 
and American space crews were to experience similar symptoms. So- 
viet cosmonauts have reported that illusions of vestibular origin are 
intensified during rapid head movements and are analagous to sensa- 
tions experienced during rotation. Some American astronauts have de- 
veloped weak signs of motion sickness which did not seriously aiTect 
work capacity. Four Soviet cosmonauts have reported moderate vevStib- 
ular disturbances. Of 27 Apollo astronauts. 6 have reported unpleas- 
ant sensations in the stomach, two have reported nausea and vomit- 
ing, and three have reported spatial disorientation and illusions. While 
none of these episodes has been of an incapacitating nature, the phe- 
nomenon is of sufficient concern to justify a considerable research 
effort in both space programs to elucidate the mechanisms of vestib- 
ular disorders while developing approaches to prevent or treat 
them. 229 " 230 

Motion sickness is a major side effect of the weightless and rotat- 
ing environments although the genesis of the disorder differs in e^cfi 
environment. There is a heavy investment of Soviet and American re- 
search effort to determine the mechanisms by which vestibular dis- 
turbances occur under a variety of situations. In both programs, rotat- 
ing chairs, counter-rotating striped drums, and entire rotating rooms 
in which test subjects can remain for days and weeks are used. The 
Soviet literature on the subject of vestibular function is extensive. The. 
research effort is devoted to both theory and practice with particular 
emphasis on the physiology and anatomy of the vestibular apparatus: 
the relationship of the vestibular apparatus to the brain and other sen- 
sory systems; the response of the vestibular apparatus to various ro- 
tatory and Coriolis accelerations : the genesis and prevention of motion 
sickness ; the vestibular training of fliers and cosmonauts : and vestibu- 
lar pharmacology. 231 * 234 What emerges from these studies is the fact 
that human head and body movements relative to the plane of rotation 
as well as repeated exposure and training play an important role in 
the onset, severity, and duration of vestibular autonomic reactions. 
There is also considerable interaction between the vestibular apparatus 
and other sensory systems, most notably the visual analyzer. 235 " 238 

There is a close relationship between vestibular stability and neuro- 
humoral function. For example, high tolerance of rotatory accelera- 
tions is associated with increased epinephrine and norepinephrinese- 

228 Yuganov. Ye. M. et al. Physiology of the sensory sphere under spaceflight conditions. 
In : Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. II, Ch. 15, Book 2. Washington D 1 
NASA. 19?5. 571-599. 

■*» Graybiel. A. Angular velocities, angular accelerations, and coriolis accelerations. Tn : 
Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. II, Ch. 7, Book L Washington. D.C.. NASA, 
1975. 247-304. 

221 Bryanov. I. I. et al. The genesis of vestibulo-automatie disorders in spaceflights. Space 
Biology and Aerospace Medicine. (USSR) No. 3, 1975. 85—88. 

23 - Bryanov. I. I. Certain otorhinolaryngological problems in the medical support of space- 
flights. Op. Cit. 

233 Kalinovskaya, I. Vestibnlomotor Reactions in Man. Moscow, "Mir" Publishing House . 
1970. 105 p. (Translated by M. Singer). 

234 Khilov. K. L. Function of the Organ of Equilibrium and Motion Sickness. Lenin- 
grad. "Meditsina" Publishing House, 19G9. 27S p. 

235 Solodovnik. F. A. To'erance of rotation with continuous and intermittent head' 
movements. Military Medical Journal (USSR) . No. 4. 1974. 53-55 (FRP #1818). 

236 Polyakov. B .1. Peculiarities of the nystagmic reaction of human beings after their 
exposure to linear accelerations. Space Biologv and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No 3. 
1974. 60-63. 

237 Kekhayev. V. N. Interrelationship between the vestibular p.nd visual analvzers. Herald 
of Otorhinolaryngology (USSR). No. 13. 1974. 54-57 (FRD :£1904). 

» s Kurashvill, A. E. et al. Problems of infraction of the vestibular and optic analvzers. 
Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), Xo. 2, 1974, 42—47. 


cretion while low tolerance is associated with decreased secretion of 
these substances. 239 

Other physical factors such as heat and gas atmosphere play a role 
in the sensitivity of the vestibular analyzer to rotatory accelerations. 
High temperature, particularly in the 45-50°C range, decreases human 
resistance to motion sickness. Similarly, a hypoxic gas mixture (10.5 
percent oxygen and 89.5 percent nitrogen) increases vestibular sen- 
sitivity while decreasing vestibular stability. On the other hand, an 
atmosphere rich in oxygen (40-43 percent) and carbon dioxide (2 
percent) increases vestibular stability to rotatory stimuli. 240 " 242 

As a result of the large body of theoretically oriented research, a 
number of approaches are being developed to detect space crew candi- 
dates with latent or subtle vestibular sensitivity to spaceflight factors. 
At the same time, methods are being developed to train cosmonauts 
in order to prevent, or at least delay and minimize anticipated 
vestibular disorders during spaceflight. For example, a series of 2.622 
experiments were conducted between 1961 and 1970 on 777 subjects. 
The subjects were exposed to pressure and heat chambers, spacecraft 
mockups, and aircraft which flew through parabolic trajectories to 
produce short term weightlessness. They were also exposed to rotating 
chairs and other vestibular training devices. The results of these tests 
were compared with data from the Vostok and Soyuz flights. It was 
determined that isolation, decreased atmospheric pressure, a helium- 
oxygen atmosphere, hypokinesia, overheating, and hypoxia signifi- 
cantly decreased vestibular and orthostatic tolerance. All kinds of 
physical activity were found to improve tolerance. Figure skating, 
water sports, basketball, and soccer were the most effective approaches, 
while running was the least effective. A crawl swimming stroke with 
simultaneous rotation and rotational chair training with fast head 
movements were two particularly effective exercises. The most effective 
methods of determining vestibular sensitivity in pilots and cosmonauts 
were tolerance tests in aircraft and the use of a vestibular test with 
simultaneous optokinetic stimulation. 243-240 Recently, the selective tens- 
ing of shoulder muscles has been found to decrease the severity of 
motion sickness and to shorten the subsequent recovery period. 246 

As with other spaceflight stresses, the Soviets have conducted con- 
siderable research on pharmacological preparations which prevent or 
suppress motion sickness and vestibular disorders. A novel prepara- 
tion tested in 1972 was sodium hydrocarbonate. Intravenously injected, 
the preparation was tested in the laboratory, in clinics, and at sea. A 

239 Nemchenko, N. S. Effect of Coriolis acceleration accumulation on catecholamine ex- 
cretion. Military Medical Journal (USSR), No. 4, 1974, 55-56 (FRD #1822). 

240 Yuganov, E. M. et al. Influence of high temperature on the onset of motion sickness. 
Military Medical Journal (USSR), No. 6, 1972, 86-88. 

241 Sidelnikov, I. A. et al. Threshold sensitivity of the vestibular analyzer during 
hypoxia. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 6, 1974, 55-58. 

242 Markaryan, S. S. et al. Effect of increased oxygen and carbon dioxide content on vesti- 
bular resistance. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 2, 1975, 65-68. 

243 Khilov, K. L. Certain problems of vestibular function evaluation in pilots and cos- 
monauts. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 5, 1974, 476-498 (FRD 
# 1965). 

244 Kopanev, V. I. The problem of human statokinetic tolerance In aviation and space 
medicine. Izvestiya of the Academy of Sciences, USSR. Biological Series. No. 4, 1974, 476- 
498 (FRD # 1965). 

245 Yakovieva, I. Ya. et al. Function of spatial coordinate perception during active, pas- 
sive, and complex vestibular training. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), 
No. 5, 1974, 60-66 (FRD #2040). 

246 Ayzikov, G. S. et al. Human tolerance of Coriolis accelerations while tensins various 
groups of muscles. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 3, 1975, 69-74 
(FRD #2480). 


positive effect was noted a few days after injection which persisted for 
several months. The mechanism of action of this preparation is ob- 
scure and its present status as a motion sickness drug is not known. 247 
A whole plethora of more conventional drugs to counteract motion 
sickness have been tested. Most have been anticholinergics, antihis- 
tamines, and tranquilizers used individually or in combination. Pro- 
phylactic vitaminization with pyridoxino containing compounds has 
also been tested with favorable results. The drugs included in the 
Soyuz/Salyut medical kit for vestibular disorders and motion sick- 
ness include plavefin, atropine, ethaperazine, and trioxazine. Appar- 
ently, plavefin is the most commonly used drug for motion sickness. It 
is not known whether these drugs have actually been used during space 
missions. 248-251 

Because there has been considerable speculation in recent years that 
future Soviet orbiting space stations will be of the rotating type, ves- 
tibular physiologists are concerned about the chronic effects of In rge- 
system rotation on the orientation and vestibular well-being of future 
crews. The magnitude of the effect of Coriolis acceleration will depend 
on the rotational velocity of the spacecraft, the angular velocity of 
head movements by the crew, and the angle between the axes of rota- 
tion of the spacecraft and a crew member's head. The vestibular effects 
of chronic (up to one month) rotation in large rotating chambers are 
therefore being investigated in considerable detail with large numbers 
of test subjects. Experiments suggest that, in order to reduce the effects 
of rotation on the vestibular apparatus, crew members will need 
to move their head translationalb 7 . The experiments also indicate that 
chronic rotation increases vestibular tolerance of that factor which 
persists for up to two weeks after exposure. If rotating space stations 
become a reality in the future, space crews may find themselves under- 
going lengthy training in large rotating rooms prior to space 
missions. 252 253 


In recent years there has been relatively little space-related litera- 
ture on the physiological and psychological effects of noise and vibra- 
tion. Most of the extensive literpture on these subjects appears in the 
field of occupational hygiene. This may indicate that Soviet space- 
craft design has reached a stage where neither of these two factors are 
as much of a biomedical threat as they were considered to be in earlier 
phases of the Soviet space program. 

247 Barnatskiy. V. N. et al. Use of sodium hydrocarbonate as a means of treating and 
prevpnting motion sickness. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 6, 1972, 70-7.". 

248 Vasil 'yev, P. V. et al. Vestibular function disturbance nnd medicinal prophylaxis 
of motion su-kness. In : Problems of Space Biology. Vol. 17. Moscow. "Nauka" Publish- 
ing House. 1071. 198-230 

249 Lapayev, P. V. et al. Prophylactic vitaminization with pyrldoxine-containlncr com- 
pounds as a means of preventing vestibular disturbances. Hygiene and Sanitation (USSR), 
No 5. 1071. 20-34 (.TPRS 5404,9) 

830 Ourovskiy, N. N. et al. Some results of medical investigations carried out during the 
flight of the orbiting scientific station. Salyut. Op. Cit. 

85i Motion sickness. Medical Onzette (USSR), May 24. 1974. p.3 (FDR # 1859) 

2 ~ 2 Solodovnik, F. A. et al. Fffeet of Coriolis acceleration on the vestibular apparatus 
of n cosmonaut and its experimental studr in the laboratory. In : Problems of Bionics. 
Moscow. "Nauka" Press. 1073. 53-58 (FRD # 1353). 

25 s Oalle. R. R. et al. Certain principles of adaptation to prolonged rotation. Space 
Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 5, 1974, 53-60 (FRD #2044). 


Of some concern to Soviet space medicine specialists are the chronic 
effects of relatively low intensity, high frequency noise of the type 
encountered in spacecraft cabins emanating from life support units 
and other systems. For example, Soviet experiments have indicated 
that exposure of human subjects for 30 days to high frequency noise 
with an intensity of 74-70 decibels (85-90 decibels is generally con- 
sidered to be the threshold for hearing damage) will lead to a sen- 
sation of the ears being stopped up. Recovery from this sensation re- 
quires about 40 hours. Exposure of subjects for 60 days to 60-65 deci- 
bel high frequency noise resulted in an insignificant decrease in audi- 
tory sensitivity. Therefore, it may be assumed that prolonged high 
frequency noise levels in Soviet spacecraft do not exceed 65 decibels 
and are probably well below that level. The Soviets consider changes 
in auditory thresholds to be a good index of psychophysiological re- 
actions to other factors such as hypodynamia and isolation. 254 

Vibrations are also of concern, although they have not apparently 
presented any great problem to space crews thus far. It has been found 
that vibrations are better tolerated in a standing rather than in a sit- 
ting or semirecumbent position typical of space-crews. Exposure to 
vertical vibration causes changes in higher nervous activity expressed 
as apathy and somnolence. Subsequent changes in vibration, tactile, and 
pain sensitivity may occur along with disorders of the visual and ves- 
tibular systems. Subjects chronically exposed to vibration may become 
neurotic and suffer serious deterioration in vision. Decreased visual 
acuity is directly related to the amplitude and frequency of vibration. 
A 40 percent decrease in visual acuity has been noted at a vibration 
frequency of 20 cycles per second mid an amplitude of 1.6 millimeters. 
Such severe vibrations apparently have not been encountered on Soviet 
spacecraft. 255 256 

VI. Problems of Space Radiation 


The duration of a spaceflight, its trajectory, and various other 
parameters determine the type of exposure to space radiations and the 
corresponding radiation hazard to the crew. The three types of radia- 
tion encountered in space include primarv cosmic or galactic radia- 
tions, solar radiation, and geomagnetically trapped radiations in the 
Van Allen belts which surround the Earth. 257 

Primarv cosmic radiations are made up of protons (about 85 per- 
cent), alpha particles (about 12 percent) and heavy nuclei (about 2 
percent). The activity of cosmic radiation events is fairly constant so 
that throughout the solar svstem there is relatively little difference in 
radiation intensity. Near Earth, cosmic radiation intensity varies in 
11 year cycles. 258 

2 ~*Yaganov, Ye. M. Physiology of the sensory sphere under spaceflight conditions. Op. 

256 T hH. 

"~ a Notes on the Second Symposium. "Influence of Vibration on the Human Organism 
find the Problem of Vibration Protection.'' Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine- 
(USSR), No. 0. 1974. 82-S3. 

— I'.-rker. J. F. et al. (Ed.) Bioastronautics Data Book. Op. Cit. pp. 417-454 

25,5 Ibid. 


Solar activity also varies in 11 year cycles. At the peak of solar ac- 
tivity, giant eruptions on the surface of the sun, termed solar flares, 
occur. These develop rapidly and last from 30 to 50 minutes during 
which time intense radiation is emitted. The intensity of radiation var- 
ies substantially with the size and activity of a solar flare. High energy 
protons, alpha particles, and a few heavy nuclei emitted during solar 
llare activity constitute a radiation hazard to spacecrews outside of the 
Van Allen belts of geomagnetically trapped radiation. 259 

There are two belts of geomagnetically trapped radiation around 
the Earth which contain electrons and protons. Space vehicles with 
trajectories of 30 degrees inclination from the equator or larger will 
traverse these Van Allen belts five times each day. Nearly the ei 
accumulated radiation exposure of all orbital missions to date is at- 
tributable to Van Allen belt radiation. But the dose received by space- 
crews has been determined to be of no biologically significant 
hazard. 260 261 

The characteristics of space radiations are summarized in Table 4-11. 




Nature of 


Mass Where Found 

Photon Electromagnetic. 

X-ray Electromagnetic. 

Gamma ray Electromagnetic. 

Electron Particle 

Positron Particle.. 

Proton Particle.. 

Neutron Particle. 

Pi meson Particle 

Alpha particle Particle 

Heavy primary nuclei.. Particle 

— e 



1 m e > 
1 m e 

1.840 m, 
or 1 amu* 

1.841 m. 

273 m, 

4 amu 
6 amu 

Radiation belts, solar radiation (produced by 
nuclear reactions and by stopping elec- 
trons), and everywhere in space 
Radiation belt and elsewhere 
Cosmic rays, radiation belt, solar flares 
Primary cosmic rays, radiation belt, solar 

Secondary particles produced by nuclear 
interactions involving primary particle 

Cosmic rays, radiation belt, solar flares 

Primary cosmic radiation (nucleus of 

helium atom) 
Primary cosmic radiation (nuclei of heavie 


1 m e =electron mass. 

2 amu = atom mass unit 

(Newell & Naugle, 1960;Sondhaus & Evans, 1969; Glasstone, 1958) 
SOURCES: The Bioastronautics Data Book, 1974. 

In addition to the above, there is a fourth type or secondary type of 
radiation which occurs after primary radiation has passed through a 
resistant substance such as the spacecraft structure or radiation shield- 
ing. This type of radiation is often referred to as bremsstrahlung and 
consists of gamma rays. 

The radiation doses accumulated by Soviet and American astronauts 
during space missions are summarized in Table 4-12. 

260 Ibid. 

281 English, R. A. Apollo experience report : protection against radiation. 
D.C., NASA. 1973. 15 p. (NASA TX-D-70S0) 



TABLE 4-12. 



Av. absorbed 
dose (mrad) Spacecraft 1 

Av. absorbed 
dose (mrad) 

Vostok. ... 
Vostok 2.. 
Vostok 3.. 
Vostok 4.. 
Vostok 5.. 
Vostok 6.. 

Voskhod 2. 

Soyuz 3... 
Soyuz 4... 
Soyuz 5... 
Soyuz 6... 
Soyuz 7... 
Soyuz 8... 
Soyuz 9... 


2.0 Gemini 3.. 
11.0 Gemini 4.. 
62.0 Gemmi5_. 
45.0 Gemini 6.. 
80.0 Gemini 7.. 
44.0 Gemini 8.. 

Gemini 9.. 
33.0 Gemini 10. 
60.0 Gemini 11. 

Gemini 12. 


70.0 Apollo 7... 
62.0 Apollo 8... 
70.5 Apcllo9... 
63.0 Apcllo 10_. 
5 Apollo 11.. 
5 Apollo 12.. 
Apcllo 13.. 
!70.0 Aocllo 14.. 
Apcllo 15.. 
Apcllo 15.. 
Apollo 17.. 









■ Inclination of orbit for Vostok and Voskhod spaceships=65 = ; for Soyuz ships = 52" ; for Gemini craft=33° ; for Apollo 
craft = 31-33°; for Skylab. 50°. 

SOURCE: Tobias, C. et al. Ionizing Radiation. In: Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, Vol. II, Ch. 12, Wash. 
D.C, NASA, 1975, pp. 473-531. 

During the first occupation of Salyut 4, the average 24-hour dosage 
was about 15-20 millirads. 

Despite a higher orbit, the radiation dose was relatively small as a 
result of low solar activity. 262 " 203 

The more significant radiation effects which could occur in the event 
of harmful radiation doses include: 

Early Effects : 

Skin erythema and desquamation. 

Gastrointestinal and neuromuscular effects. 

Depression of blood formation. 

Decreased fertility or sterility. 

Early death. 
Late Effects : 

Permanent or delayed skin changes. 

Increased incidence of cataract. 

Increased incidence of leukemia and other cancers. 

General shortening of life span. 26 * 

In the Soviet Union, the dose standards for short term spaceflights 
of up to 30 days, expressed in rem (roentgen equivalent man ; roughly 
equivalent to rad) . have been calculated as : 

Allowable dose — 15 rem. 
Dose of justified risk — 50 rem. 
Critical dose — 125 rem. 

As can be seen in Table 4-10. the radiation doses thus far absorbed 
by astronauts and cosmonauts have not even approached the allowable 
dose level. Nonetheless, there continues to be concern in Soviet and 
American bioastronautics circles that solar flare events could expose 

192 Tobias. C. et al. Ionizing radiation. In Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, 
Vol II. Ch. 12. Book 2. Washington. D. C. NASA, 1975, pp. 473-531 
^Trud. (USSR) Feb. 1. 1975! p. 2 

^LanErhpm. W. H. Radiobiological factors In space conquest. Aerospace Medicine, Xo. 8, 
1969, S34-S43 


space crews to doses exceeding the allowable level, particularly dur- 
ing prolonged interplanetary flights. Soviet estimates of the maximum 
allowable dose of radiation for such flights have been calculated as 
follows : 



Flight Duration (years) : (rem) 

1 200 

2 250 

3 275 

It should be noted that there is considerable variation in recom- 
mended maximum allowable radiation doses for prolonged flights 
in the international bioastronautics community. Some experts have 
recommended that space crews could receive a dose of 300 rem per year 
of flight. 265 


Since the recognition of potential hazards from space radiation, the 
Soviet Union has supported an extremely large effort to determine 
systematically and empirically what effects the various types of ioniz- 
in radiation have on man, animals, plants, and micro-organisms and 
how to prevent or minimize these effects. The basic philosophy behind 
this large research effort is that radiation injury has no threshold. 
Therefore, any exposure to ionizing radiation, regardless of dose, can 
be potentially harmful. Moreover, radiation has a cumulative effect on 
biological systems which means that even a relatively small radiation 
doses can be damaging if exposure time is prolonged. 266-269 

A large data base has been accumulated by Soviet and American 
researchers on the clinical effects of whole-body radiation. These ef- 
fects at acute radiation dose levels are summarized in Table 4-13. 


Dose in Rada Probable Effect 

10-50 No obvious effect, except, probably, minor blood changes. 

50-100 Vomiting and nausea for about 1 day in 5%-10% of exposed 

personnel. Fatigue, but no serious disability. Transient re- 
duction in lymphocytes and neutrophils. 

100-200 Vomiting and nausea for about 1 day, followed by other symp- 

toms of radiation sickness in about 25%-50% of personnel. 
No deaths anticipated. A reduction of approximately 50% 
in lymphocytes and neutrophils will occur. 

200-350 Vomiting and nausea in nearly all personnel on first day, fol- 

lowed by other symptons of radiation sickness, e.g., loss of 
appetite, diarrhea, minor hemorrhage. About 20% deaths 
within 2-6 weeks after exposure; survivors convalescent 
for about 3 months, although many have second wave of 
symptoms at about 3 weeks. Up to 75% reduction in all cir- 
culating blood elements. 

265 Tobias. C. Ionizing Radiation. Op. Cit. 
- ss Ibid. 

287 Kuzin. R. A. Radiation Barrier in the Road To Space. Moscow, "Atomizdat" Publish- 
In? House. 1071. 134 p. 

208 Gurovskiy. X. N. The Function of the Oreranlsm and Factors of Spaceflight. Moscow, 
"Meditsina" Publishing House. 1974. 232 p. (FRD # 2078) 

269 Generozov. V. L. Establishment of methods for calculating the radiation hazard of 
•protons from solar flares. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine, Xo. 13, 1975, 74-76. 


850-550 Vomiting and nausea in most personnel on first clay, followed 

by other symptons of radiation sickness, e.g., fever, hemor- 
rhage, diarrhea, emaciation. About 50% deaths within 1 
month ; survivors convalescent for about 6 months. 

550-750 Vomiting and nausea, or at least nausea, in all personnel 

within 4 hours from exposure, followed by severe symptoms 
of radiation sickness, as above. Up to 100% deaths ; few 
survivors convalescent for about 6 months. 

1000 Vomiting and nausea in all personnel witbin 1-2 hours. All 

dead within days. 

5000 Incapacitation almost immediately (minutes to hours). All 

personnel will be fatalities within 1 week. 
Source: (Langhara, 1967) as cited In The Bioastronautlcs Data Book, 1974. 

Less perfectly understood are the delayed effects of low levels of 
ionizing radiation at dose levels of less than 5 rem. Therefore, exten- 
sive research continues to be conducted to determine the effects of 
protons, heavy ions, and other types of corpuscular space radiations 
on man, animals, plants, and micro-organisms at the macroscopic and 
microscopic level. 270 

Soviet scientists continue to concentrate on investigations of the 
effects of ionizing radiations at the organ level. Of particular interest 
are effects on critical organs and organ systems such as the eye, vesti- 
bular apparatus, central nervous system, blood, and metabolic and 
immune processes. 271 Light flashes experienced in space by cosmo- 
nauts and astronauts arc theorized by some researchers to be an indi- 
cation that the retina is extremely sensitive to penetrating cosmic ra- 
diations and high energy particles. 272 273 

There is also considerable interest in the long-term effects of cumu- 
lative doses of low-level ionizing on the incidence of tumors, genetics,, 
and the general longevity of animals, plants, and micro-organisms. 
Soviet experiments on dogs chronically exposed to low levels of radia- 
tion for up to four years have been conducted with periodic and sys- 
tematic examinations of various organs, tissues, and those of the pro- 
geny of irradiated dogs. Those studies reflect Soviet interest in the 
radiobiological aspects of very long-duration spaceflights. 274 275 

Recently there has been heavier Soviet emphasis on cytological, bio- 
chemical, genetic, and molecular mechanisms of ionizing radiation ef- 
fects. Specimens ranging from human tissue cultures to the most 
primitive micro-organisms are being surveyed in order to elucidate the 
mechanisms of radiation sensitivity and resistance. By better under- 
standing these mechanisms it is anticipated that methods of protecting 
organisms, including man, from the adverse effects of radiations can 
be developed. 276 " 278 

270 Tobias, C. et al. Ionizing radiation. Op. Cit. 

271 Ibid. 

272 Demirchoglivan, G. G. Visual effects of the eve-penetrating cosmic ravs and high 
energy particles. Biophysics (USSR). No. 2. 1974, 314-318 (FRD # 1785) 

273 Grigor'yev, Yu. G. et nl. Optic effects of cosmic rays. Space Biology and Aerospace 
Medicine (USSR), No.4, 1975, 46-53 

274 Shilov, V. V. et al. Natural immunity of does exposed to long-term chronic gamma 
irradiation. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 5, 1973. 23-28. 

275 Yakovleva, V. I. Development of tumors in dogs chronically exposed to low doses of 
gamma radiation. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine, No. 6, 1974. 20-24. 

276 Ivanov, V. I. Radiobiologv and genetics of Arabidopsis. In: Problems of Spare 
Biology. Vol. 27. Moscow, "Nauka" Publishing House, 1974. 191 p. (FRD # 2023) 

277 Grigor'yev, Yu. G. et al. Cytoloffieal and cytogenetic effects in bacterial and mam- 
malian cells due to the action of accelerated heavy Ions. Space Biology and Aerospace 
Medicine (USSR), No.2. 1974. 308 

278 Kuzin, A. M. Effect of Ionizinjr Radiations on Cell Membranes. Moscow, "Atomizdat" 
Publishing House, 1973, 112 p. (FRD # 1589). 


While most research on space radiobiology is conducted on Earth, a 
great many experiments have been conducted on biological satellites 
and manned spacecraft to obtain first hand data on the various effects 
of space radiations. Table 3-5 of Chapter Throe (p. 233) summarizes 
manned and unmanned spaceflights in which biological experiments, 
primarily of a radiobiological character, have been conducted. Some 
of these experiments have indicated that spaceflight factors (pri- 
marily radiation and weightlessness) can affect cell genetics and re- 
production. An abnormally high number of chromosomal changes 
have been observed in some insect larvae. Spaceflight factors have in- 
creased the germinating capacity of a variety of plant seeds. Those 
findings are of interest because the Russians are particularly interested 
in the use of higher plants as critical links in future spacecraft life 
support systems. However, it remains a matter of conjecture as to 
whether space radiation can increase the incidence of genetic changes 
in human or animal cells, since many of these experiments have yielded 
data of inconclusive or borderline significance. For this reason, it is 
expected that the Russians will continue to develop methods for better 
evaluating the effects of space radiations. 279 


While it is more expedient, less complicated, and certainly less ex- 
pensive to study the isolated effects of individual spaceflight factors 
on the organism, such an approach is not entirely realistic in the view 
of many Soviet bioastronautics specialists. For many spaceflight 
stresses rarely act on the body individually, but as complex influences. 
In other words, the space crew is simultaneously exposed to such fac- 
tors as accelerations, noise, heat, changes in gas atmosphere, and emo- 
tional and physical stresses, the latter particularly during the launch 
and re-entry phases of the flight. Exposure to these factors during 
the re-entry phase follows a prolonged period of exposure to weight- 
lessness, space radiation, isolation, and altered daily rhythms of activ- 
ity. Hence, many Soviet specialists have emphasized the importance 
of research on the simultaneous effects of multiple spaceflight factors 
because of their concern that such complex factors evoke physio- 
logical responses that differ from the stereotyped response to indi- 
vidual factors. Combined factors may be mutually additive, synergis- 
tic, or antagonistic in effect. With an additive interaction, the effect 
of the combined factors is equal to the sum of the effect of each factor 
individually. With a synergistic interaction, the combined factors 
will evoke a greater response than the simple sum of the effect of each 
individual factor. With an antagonistic interaction, the overall effect 
is less than the sum of the effects of the individual factors. Thus, Soviet 
research on the effects of combined factors are roughly organized as 
follows : 

Ionizing Radiation: 

Ionizing radiation and acceleration. 
Ionizing radiation and weightlessness. 

Ionizing radiation and altered gas atmospheres (hypoxia, hyperoxia etc.). 
Weightlessness : 

Weightlessness and hypokinesia. 

™ Tobias, C. A. et al. Ionizing radiation. Op. Clt. 


Acceleration : 

Acceleration and hypodynamia. 

Acceleration and thermal factors. 

Acceleration and altered gas atmospheres. 
Vibration : 

Vibration and acceleration. 

Vibration and hypoxia. 

Vibration and thermal factors. 

Vibration and ionizing radiation. 

Superimposed upon the general classes of combined factors listed 
above are various physiological factors which also must be considered. 
These include biological rhythms, emotional and physical stress, and 
tho general condition of the organism. Investigations of the effects of 
combined factors are particularly important because it has been noted 
that spaceflight factors, either individually or combined, alter sensi- 
tivity and reactivity thresholds to pharmacological preparations and 
other substances which are being contemplated to prevent or minimize 
the deleterious effects of spaceflight or to increase the resistance of the 
organism to the various spaceflight factors. 280-283 

While it is a common finding that the effects of combined spaceflight 
factors exceed or otherwise differ from the effects of individual factors, 
it has also been noted that one factor may increase the resistance of an 
organism to another. Such appears to be the case with hypoxia and 
ionizing radiations. As mentioned in Section VII of this chapter, short- 
term exposure to hypoxia (G percent oxygen instead of the normal 20 
percent) prior to irradiation has been found to have a distinct radio- 
protective effect in experiments with animals. 2S4 In contrast, short term 
(3 hour) exposure to an atmosphere rich in oxygen (98 percent) fol- 
lowing irradiation has been found to have a negative effect on radia- 
tion tolerance and amplifies signs of radiation sickness. 283 These studies 
suggest that the oxygen content of artificial gas atmospheres can play 
an important role in resistance to and recovery from radiation damage. 

While Soviet interest in the biomedical effects of combined space- 
flight factors has been high since the mid-1960's, evaluation of those 
effects has been complicated by a lack of mathematical and computer 
technology with which to statistically process and analyze large vol- 
umes of parallel data. Therefore, there has been a growing effort in 
recent years to develop statistical techniques and models with which to 
cope better with complex biological systems and their interaction with 
multiple influences. The improvement of methods and equipment for 
such research will enhance the ability to plan biomedically for future 
prolonged spaceflights, in the opinion of Soviet specialists. 286 

280 Tobias, C. A. et al. Ionizing radiation. Op. Cit. 

281 Antipov, V. V. et al. Combined effect of flight factors. In : Foundations of Space 
Biology and Medicine. Vol. II, Ch. 17, Book 2. Washington, D. C, NASA, 1975, pp. 639-667 

282 Lukyanova, L. D. Peculiarities of the energy metabolism in the central nervous 
system during the combined effect of vibration and irradiation. Space Biology and 
Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 2, 1975, 32-37. 

283 Andrianova, L. A. The state of hypothalamic neurosecretory nuclei after a combined 
effect of acceleration and ionizing radiation. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine 
(USSR) , No. 3, 1974, 14-17 

284 Ovalcimov, V. G. et al. Adaptation to hypoxia as a factor modifving its radiopro- 
tective effect. Medical Radiology (USSR), No. 6, 1974. 49-53 (FRD # 1898) 

280 Ivanov, K. V. et al. Changes in blood carboanhydrase activity in the organism after 
Irradiation and exposure to increased oxygen pressure. Radiobiology (USSR), No.l, 
1975, 134-126 (FRD # 2318) 

288 Antipov, V. V. Combined effects of flight factors. Op. Cit. 



As is the case with the other spaceflight stresses thus far discussed, 
the Russians continue to search for promising pharmacological prepa- 
rations which could be used to prevent or minimize the harmful effects 
of space radiation on the organism and to speed recovery from such 
effects. A vast number of compounds (more than 10,000 drugs) have 
been tested under laboratory and clinical situations. The basic classes 
of compounds include : 

Preparations Which Affect Oxygen Metabolism : 

Increase cellular oxygen consumption. 

Decrease tissue respiration. 
Free-Radical Preparations : 


Bioa mines. 


Agents with enzyme activity. 
Preparations Counteracting Biochemical Potentiation : 

Protecters of biological structures. 

Inactivators of enzymes. 
Natural or Biologically Protective Agents : 

Amino acids. 




Central Nervous System Stimulants and Depressants. 

Hematopoietic Stimulants. 

Combinations of the Above Together With : 

Physical conditioning. 

Exposure to stresses (hypoxia etc.). 

Of the large number of radioprotective drugs tested on various kinds 
of organisms, the most promising for human application are the mer- 
captoalkylamines, thiazolidines, indolylalkylamines, aminodi sulfides, 
and a number of amino acids. Typical drugs which have received con- 
siderable attention in the Soviet literature include. 


Cystamine dichlorhydrate. 

Aminoethy iiosothiourea ( AET ) . 
Mercaptoethanolamine (MEA) . 
Serotonin (5 HT). 
5-methoxytryptamine (5 MOT). 
Para-amino-propiophenone ( PAPP ) . 

Crystaphos (sodium beta-aminoethylmonothiophosphate) . 287 - 200 

Combined approaches to radiation protection are also being investi- 
gated. The use of metabolites such as ATP in combination with various 
drugs has decreased the severity of radiation sickness with a minimum 
of undesirable side effects. Combinations of sulfur containing and 
indolyalkylamine radioprotective drugs together with exposure to 

; 2OT Eydus, L. Kh. Physicohchemical Foundation of Radiobiological Processes and 
Protection From Radiation. Moscow. "Atoinizdat" Publishing House, 1972, 240 p. 

283 Guskova, A. K. et al. Radiation Sickness in Man. Moscow, "Meditsina" Publishing 
House, 1971, 382 p. 

289 Vasil'yev, P. V. et al. Chemical prophylaxis and therapy of radiation sickness. IN: 
(Problems of Space Biology, Vol. 17. Moscow, "Nauka" Publishing House, 1971, 270- 
308 (FRD # 830) 

280 Vasin. M. V. et al. Radioprotective properties of indolylalkylaminoethanols. Radio- 
biology (USSR), No. 5, 1971, 779-781 (FRD #802). 


stresses such as hypoxia have also shown promising results in animal 
-experiments. 291 292 

The effects of radioprotective agents on vital organ systems such 
as the vestibular apparatus is also of concern since many of the agents 
under consideration affect vital nervous functions. Finally, there is 
concern that certain preparations which confer protection against 
radiation may reduce tolerance of other stresses associated with 
spaceflight. 293 

Despite the large Soviet effort in this field, there is little evidence 
that the radioprotective drugs investigated thus far are actually in- 
cluded in the Soviet spacecraft medical kit. This may be due to the 
fact that nearly all radioprotective compounds have various unde- 
sirable side effects which may be further potentiated by the space- 
flight itself. There has been some speculation, however, that Soviet 
cosmonauts have been administered unspecified "prophylactic" radio- 
protective drugs prior to the flights of Soyuz 4 and 5. And a com- 
pound called "ambratine", a complex of vitamins, was listed as the 
only radioprotective preparation aboard the Soyuz 11/Salyut 1 com- 
plex in 1971. But there has been no further mention of the use of 
radioprotective preparations or drugs since that flight. In general, 
most Soviet experts in the field are of the opinion that the use of radio- 
protective agents thus far investigated is unrealistic and that other 
alternative methods of protection against radiation, such as shielding 
or the use of force fields, will have to be developed. 294 295 

As an alternative to radioprotective drugs, the Russians are investi- 
gating other approaches to crew protection during space missions. The 
most obvious approach is the use of certain materials to shield the en- 
tire spacecraft, certain compartments therein, or vital parts of the 
human body known to be particularly sensitive to the effects of ioniz- 
ing radiations. This is a complicated problem because certain of the 
primary cosmic radiations are so powerful that no type of shielding 
could possibly stop them. In addition, there would be the problem of 
secondary radiations which occur when primary radiations pass 
through shielding or other materials. Nonetheless, Soviet investigators 
are calculating the parameters of shielding which would be necessary 
to minimize the effects of space radiations, particularly those from 
solar flares, during prolonged missions. 296 


Radiations which do not produce ionization effects in biological 
tissues are also of some concern during spaceflights. These include the 
radiof requency and microwave radiations emitted from radio and nav- 
igational equipment, electric and magnetic fields which might be used 
to deflect ionizing radiations in the event of a solar flare emer- 
gency, ultraviolet radiation from the Sun, and the visible and infrared 

281 Sverdlov, A. G. et al. Relation of the hypoxic and protective effect of some radioprotec- 
tor<?. Radiobiology (USSR). No. 2, 1972. 221-228 (FRD#922). 

292 Antipov, V. V. et al. Study of the reactivity of the organism exposed to transverse ac- 
celerations and radioprotectors. Aerospace Medicine, No. 8, 1971, 72—81. 

2B3 Suslova, L. N. et al. Effect of radioprotectors on the functional state of the vestibular 
analyzer. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR). No. 2, 1973, 45-48. 

2M Janni. ,T. A. review of Soviet manned spaceflight dosimetry results. Aerospace Medi- 
cine. No. 12. 3 9G9. 1547-1556. 

295 Gurovskiv, N. N. et al. Some results of investigations during the flight of the scien- 
tific orbiting station. Salyut. Op. Cit. 

206 Dudkin, V. Ye. et al. Analysis of the thieknp's of a radiation shelter for prolonged 
spaceflights. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 4, 1975, 72-74. 


radiations. Of present concern to Soviet space radiobiologists arc the 
effects of electrostatic, and magnetic fields. This is apparently duo to 
a parallel interest in the use of these fields to surround the spacecra :'t 
and act as a temporary shield against bursts of ionizing radiation-. 
Considerable attention has therefore been given to the biological ef- 
fects of very strong fields of this type on humans, animals, and micro- 
organisms. 297 " 301 

VII. Gas Atmosphere and Pressures 

The constant maintenance of an artificial spacecraft atmosphere 
which optimally satisfies the metabolic requirements of space ere 
among the most vital problems in the space life sciences. Not only must 
the spacecraft atmosphere be totally reliable virtually 100 percent of 
the time, but its pressure and chemical composition must be constant 
within rigorous physiological limits. For this reason. Soviet and Amer- 
ican research on the physiological effects of altered gas atmospheres 
and pressures has been and continues to be extensive. 

Soviet research concentrates on those parameters of the gas at- 
mosphere most vital to human physiology, namely, pressure and 
chemical composition. There is emphasis on the choice of diluent gases 
and the permissible limits of the partial pressures of oxygen (p0 2 ) and 
carbon dioxide (pCO-*) , temperature, toxie substances, and other subtle 
parameters. The Soviet research effort, like the American one, is fun- 
damentally subdivided into physiological investigations of the effects 
of oxygen-poor (hypoxic), oxygen-rich (hyperoxic), and carbon- 
dioxide variable (hypercapnic and acapnic) atmospheres as well as 
those containing a variety of inert gases including nitrogen, helium, 
neon, and argon. Pressure physiology includes investigations of the 
effects of high pressure (hyperbaric) and low pressure (hypobarie) 
atmospheres as well as studies of the physiological effects of rapid 
changes in pressure (compression and decompression). Finally, the in- 
fluence of altered gas atmospheres on tolerance of and adaptation to 
other spaceflight factors such as confinement, isolation, accelerations, 
and radiation is receiving considerable attention. 302 - 305 


While oxygen is necessary for life, in higher than normal concentra- 
tions it has distinct and complicated toxic effects on the organism. 
The persisting Soviet philosophy in the manned space program is to 

287 Trukhanov, K. A. et al. Active Protection of Spacecraft. Moscow. "Atomizdat" Pub- 
lishing House. 1970. 230 p. 

298 Unsigned. Honey comb in space (active protection of spacecraft with force fields . 
Chemistry and Life (USSR). No. 7. 1975. 26-28. 

299 Nakhil'nitskaya. Z. N. The biological effects of constant magnetic fields. Space Bi I 
and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 6, 1974, 3-15. 

300 Galaktionova. G. V. et al. Modification of the cytogenetic effect of ionizing radiation 
during exposure to constant magnetic fields. Space Biologv and Aerospace Medicine 
(USSR). No. 6. 1974. 25-28. 

301 Stasyuk. G. A. Alterations in blood content after the short-term effect of a continuous 
magnetic field on the human organism. Physicians Practice (USSR), No. 12, 1973, 36-38 
(FRD #1582). 

302 Malkin. V. B. Barometric pressure and gas composition. In: Foundations of Space 
Biolocry and Medicine. Vol. II. Ch. 1. Book 1. Washington. D.C., NASA. 1975. pp. 3-64. 

303 Sirotonin, N.N. The pathogenic effects of gas atmospheres. In : Pathological Phil- 
ology of Extreme States (P .D. Gorizontov et al, Eds.). Moscow. "Meditsina Publishing 
House. 1973. pp. 36-70 (FRD #1699). 

304 Agadzhanyan. N. A. The Orcanism and its Gas Environment. Moscow, "Medltsli 
Publishing House. 1972, 246 p. (FRD #1317). 

sw Kotovskiy, Ye. F. Functional morphology during extreme states. In: Problen- of 
Space Biology, Vol. 15. Moscow, "Nauka"' Press, 1971, pp. 180-429. 


provide the crew with an atmosphere as close in pressure and chemical 
composition to the terrestrial atmosphere as possible. In contrast, pure 
oxygen (p0 2 = 2r>8 mm Hg) is utilized in the United States manned 
spaceflight effort. 

There continues to be concern in the international bioastronautics 
community about the physiological effects of oxygon in increased 
concentrations at normal, increased, or decreased pressures. This re- 
search has application not only in manned space programs but in the 
manned undersea programs as well. Emphasis is on the specific patho- 
logical effects of hyperoxia. particularly on the central nervous sys- 
tem, respiratory organs, cells, and metabolism. There is also interest 
in the functional effects of oxygen on the human brain, respiratory, 
and cardiovascular systems. Adaptation to increased oxygen partial 
pressures is of importance relative to spaceflights of months or years 
in duration. Soviet scientists are concerned that not enough is known 
about the chronic effects of pure oxygen at relative low pressures 
(0.2-3.0 atmospheres). They are particularly interested in the adapta- 
tion of humans and animals to such atmospheres. 306 * 307 

Specific mechanisms of the toxic action of high oxygen concentra- 
tions are receiving considerable attention. Particular emphasis is on 
the lungs and central nervous system and the role of the latter in 
the genesis of convulsions, which occur as a result of severe oxygen 
poisoning. Of concern is a general lack of data on the periods and 
amounts of time pure oxygen under normal and increased pressure 
may be used by healthy or diseased individuals. 308 

Methods of quickly detecting the toxic effects of oxygen on the 
central nervous system are being developed. A measurable reduction in 
the amplitude of electrical signals from the acoustic portion of the 
brain is a sensitive index of the effect of hyperoxic atmospheres on 
nervous and sensory systems. 309 

Recent investigations have also focused on the toxic effect of oxygen 
on endocrine and neurochemical systems. Studies indicate that an 
important factor in the pathogenesis of the toxic effects of hyperoxic 
environments is a disruption of the synthesis and breakdown of neural 
mediators. 310 ' 311 Oxygen at 4 atmospheres pressure causes an increase 
in ammonia and glutamic acid and a decrease in tissue glutamine which 
requires some 40 to 60 days to normalize in animals. 312 Pure oxygen 
has also been found to amplify the change caused by other factors, 
such as ionizing radiation, by inhibiting blood enzyme activity. 313 

Certain drugs are being investigated as a means of suppressing the 
toxic effect of oxygen. Some drugs which have been found to coun- 

30a Zhironkin. D. G. Oxygen: Physiological and Toxic Effects. Leningrad. "Nauka" 
Press, 1972. 135 p. (FRD ±rl616). 

307 Agadahanyan. N. A. The organism and the gaseous environment. Op. Cit. 

308 Berezovskly, V. A. Tissue Oxygen in Humans and Animals. Kiev, "Naukova Dumka" 
Publishing House, 1975. 277 p. 

309 Karamel, H. et al. Chancres in acoustic brain evoked potentials in a normoxic and 
hyperoxic atmosphere. Space Biology and A ero space Medicine (USSR). No. 4. 1975. 61-65. 

310 Yeremeyev, N. S. et al. Effects of increased partial pressure of oxygen on the sym- 
pathetic adrenal and acetylcholine systems. Phvsiological Journal (USSR), No. 15, 1972, 
768-772 (JPRS 61376). 

311 Uudarev, V. P. et al. Gas exchange and certain blood indices during thvroid dys- 
function. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 2, 1975," 16-20 (FRD 

313 Gablbov. M. M. Ammonia, glutamine, and glutamic acid content in rat tissues dur- 
ing and aft^r hyneroxia. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 2. 1975, 
12-1 fi (FRD ^2333). 

313 Tvanov. K. V. et al. Chances in blood carboanhydrase activity in the organisms 
after irradiation and exposure to increased oxygen pressure. Op. Cit. 


teract toxic effects have also been found to increase tolerance of low 
concentrations of oxygen. 314 

The interaction of oxygen and other gases on the physiological 
function of sensory systems such as the vestibular apparatus is of 
particular interest to Soviet space medicine specialists. As mentioned 
earlier, a gas mixture rich in oxygen and carbon dioxide (40-4^ percent 
oxygen and 2 percent carbon dioxide) known as OCON-2 has been 
shown to prevent motion sickness and suppress latent vestibulo-auto- 
nomic disturbances. The mixture is apparently applied for a relatively 
brief period of time prior to or during exposure to simulated space- 
flight conditions. 315 

Other beneficial uses of pure oxygen include its use in high pressure 
chambers to treat a variety of disorders and diseases including decom- 
pression sickness, and to counteract the negative effects of hypoxic 
atmospheres. But while research continues and large hyperbaric facili- 
ties are being constructed to further elucidate both the beneficial and 
detrimental effects of high oxygen concentrations, there is no indica- 
tion of any trend toward the use of a low-pressure, pure oxygen atmos- 
phere in Soviet manned spacecraft as is used in the American manned 
spaceflight program. 316 


Just as a hyperoxic atmosphere can be detrimental to health, so can 
an atmosphere deficient in oxygen (hypoxic). Because of the potential 
danger of accidental spacecraft cabin depressurization or life support 
svstem malfunction, there is considerable interest in the effects of 
different degrees of hypoxia on human physiology, psychology, and 
work capacity. Mechanisms of adaptation to hypoxic environments 
also continue to receive considerable attention. As is the case with 
research on hyperoxia, attention is focused on how hypoxia affects 
major organs and tissues. 317 - 318 

Soviet research on the systemic effects of acute and chronic hypoxia 
is extensive. Of particular concern is the effect of oxygen deficiency on 
vestibular functions. One study has found that the effect of hypoxia 
combined with bedrest was insignificant, although bedrest itself 
decreased vestibular stability. 319 Another test in which 40 human 
subjects breathed a hypoxic mixture (10.5 percent oxygen) for 
30 minutes at a time revealed that hypoxia increased vestibular 
sensitivity to rotatory accelerations and generally decreased vestibular 
stability. This approach is now used to detect latent vestibular sensi- 
tivity in pilot and cosmonaut candidates. 320 

Cardiovascular responses to hypoxia are also being investigated. 
Disturbances in the rhythm of cardiac function are noted in subjects 
exposed to a hypoxic environment. One type of disturbance indicates 
reduced tolerance of hypoxia while another type has no effect on 

314 Brestkina. L. M. et al. Effect of 1.4-benzodiazepin derivatives on the toxic effect of 
oxygen under increased pressure. Pharmacologv and Toxicology (USSR), No. 2, 1975, 

315 Markaryan. S. S. et al. Effect of increased oxygen and carbon dioxide content on 
vestibular tolerance. Op. Clt. 

315 Unsigned. New Moscow hvperhario oxygenation "barohospital". Medical Gazette 
(USSR). April 18. 1075. p. 4 (FRD #2380). 

317 Agadzhanyan. N. A. The organism and its gaseous environment. Op. Cit. 

319 Koiovskiy, Ye. F. et al. Functional morpbologv during extremal actions. Op. Cit. 

319 Vasil'yev. A. I. et al. Hypokinetic effect on vestibular function in an altered atmos* 
phere. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR) . No. 4. 1075. 58-61. 

310 Sidel'nikov. I. A. et al. Threshold sensitivity of the vestibular analyzer during hy- 
poxia. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine. No. 6', 1974, 55-58. 


tolerance. A combination of tests involving the injection of potassium 
chloride, orthostatic probes, and physical exercises are recommended 
to detect latent cardiovascular intolerance to hypoxic conditions.- 1 

Considerable attention is given to respiratory responses to hypoxia 
both at the primary (lun<r) and secondary (blood) Level. Hypoxic 
environments change lung tissue and blood chemistry and affect the 
blood forming (hematopoietic) system. The nature of these chai 
are used as indices of tolerance of or adaptation to hypoxia. 322 - 323 

Changes in the function and morphology of other organs in response 
to acute or chronic hypoxia are also investigated. These include the 
liver and kidneys, endocrine glands, gastrointestinal tract, and the im- 
mune system. General functional changes are also documented in 
human and animal subjects exposed to hypoxia arising from simulated 
failures in environmental control systems. 324-328 

"While many investigations of the systemic effects of hypoxia are 
conducted under acute (rapid onset) conditions, there is a large Soviet 
research effort to investigate the effects of chronic (gradual onset) 
hypoxia. These studies are conducted in facilities located in mountain- 
ous regions of the Soviet Union as well as in polar regions. The pur- 
pose of this research is to evaluate physical and psychological work 
performance, elucidate mechanisms of adaptation, and develop ap- 
proaches for facilitating adaptation to hypoxic environment. 328 *" 32 * 50 

While the specific cellular and biochemical mechanisms of adapta- 
tion to hypoxia remain elusive, it is clear that there is a definite process 
of adaptation. Two approaches to facilitating adaptation involve pre- 
conditioning in a pressure chamber or moderate high altitude and the 
addition of carbon dioxide to an oxygen deficient atmosphere. The 
carbon dioxide stimulates respiration and improves the efficiency of 
oxygen uptake. Altitude resistance improves after pressure chamber 
exposure. As mentioned earlier, resistance to other spaceflight factors 
such as accelerations has been demonstrated in Soviet studies to im- 
prove after prolonged adaptation to high altitudes. Accordingly, high 
altitude training centers are extensively used by Soviet cosmonauts. - : 

There has been a considerable amount of Soviet research on phar- 
macological preparations which increase resistance to the detrimental 

881 Malkin. V. B. et al. Electrocardiographic changes during acute hypoxia and their 
importance. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 2. 1974. 54-01. 

S22 Yumatov, Yu. A. Respiratory index dynamics of arterial blood, cerebrospinal fluid, 
and tissue from the bulbar respiratory center during Hypoxia. Physiological Journal 
(USSR). No. 4. 1975. 600-609 (FRD #2375). 

883 Tavrovskaya. T. V. et al. Quantitative characteristics of erythropoiesis in humans 
and animals adapted to prolonged hypoxia. Bulletin of Experimental Biology and Med- 
icine fUSSR),No. 1. 197'. 19-21 (FRD #2205). 

321 Nazarenko. A. I. Influence of experimental circulatory hypoxia on tissue respira- 
tion and glycolysis of the liver and kidnevs. Phvsiological Journal (USSR), No. 3, 
1975. 377-380 (FRD #2427). 

325 Gribanov. O. A. Phospholipid metabolism in endocrine nrgnns during acnte hy- 
poxia. Snace Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 2. 1975. 9-12 (FRD #2332 

Babkina. O. I. et al. Effect of different atmospheres on active transport of gfuco<e 
in the small intestine of rats. Space Biology and Medicine (USSR). No. 5. 1971. 22-20. 

327 Durnova, G. N. et al. Effects of hypoxia on the function find metabolism of alveolar 
macrophages. Bulletin of Experimental Biology and Medicine (USSR), No. 3, 1975, 113- 
11." (FRD ii-2358). 

325 Popkov. Y. L. et al. Functional and morphological changes during lethallv increas- 
ing hynoxia and hypercapnia. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR), No. 4, 
1974. 24-28. 

32Sa Aydraliyev. A. A. et al. Change in human work capacity under high altitude con- 
ditions. Space Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 4. 107n. 83-84. 

3:sb Petrukhin, V. G. et al. Effect of repeated exposure to a rarified atmosphere on the 
animal pud human organism. Snace Biology and Aerospace Medicine (USSR). No. 3. 1975, 
53-5fi 'FRD ±2476). 

**« Dudnrev. V. P. et al. Symposium. "Molecular Foundations of Adaptation to Hy- 
poxia" fa review). Physiological Journal (USSR) . No. 2. 1074. 273-274 (FRD #1755). 
3283 Malkin, V. B. Barometric pressure and gas composition. Op. cit 


effects of hypoxia and other altered gas atmospheres. For example, the 
widely used drug, reserpine, has been found to increase significantly 
tolerance of hypoxia due to its cholinergic action and its effect on 
oxidative processes. The mechanism of effect of many other prepara- 
tions used to facilitate adaptation or increase resistance to hypoxia, 
hyperoxia, or hypercapnia is being investigated. Of particular impor- 
tance are the cardiovascular, narcotic, anesthetic, allergenic, or other 
side effects of these experimental drugs. The pharmacological potentia- 
tion of the radioprotective effect of lrypoxia is also being investigated 
as mentioned earlier. 328e " 330 


While carbon dioxide in somewhat higher than normal concentra- 
tions has been found to have a beneficial effect on human tolerance 
to such stresses as hypoxia and acceleration, the gas becomes toxic at 
high concentrations. The terrestrial atmosphere contains a small 
amount of the gas (0.03 percent). A tenfold increase in carbon dioxide 
does not have a substantial effect on human vital activity and work 
capacity. But beyond this point, a substantial increase in carbon di- 
oxide affects the central nervous system, cardiopulmonary system, 
acid-base equilibrium in the blood, and mineral metabolism. The gas 
is therefore of concern relative to the potential failure of spacecraft 
environmental control systems because man at rest yields about 400 
liters of carbon dioxide per day as a by-product of respiration. The 
acute and chronic effects of carbon dioxide are summarized in Figure 
4r-8 and Table 4-14. 

Pco,, mm Hg 

Indifferent zona 

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 

Timo. min 

Figure 4-8. — Classification of CO* toxic action effects in relation to Pco a . 

Source : Malkin, V. B. Barometric pressure and pas composition. In Foundations of Spac# 
Biology and Medicine, vol. II, ch. 1, Washington, D.C., NASA, 1975, pp. 3-64. 

328e Markova. Ye. A. et al. Mechanisms of the antihypoxic action of reserpine. Path- 
ological Physiology and Experimental Therapy (USSR), No. 2. 1975. 68-69 (FRD ^2416). 

328 Vasil'yev. P. V. et al. Pharmacological substances and resistance of the organism 
to atmospheric changes: The effect of hypoxia and hypercapnia on the organism. In: 
Problems of Space Biology. Vol. 17. Moscow. "Nauka" Press, 1971. pp. 10-82 (FRD #825). 

380 Ovakimov. V. G. et al. Pharmacological potentiation of the radioprotective effect of 
hypoxic hypoxia. Radiobiology (USSR), No. 6, 1974, 859-863 (FRD #2374). 




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Soviet research has indicated that prolonged exposure to elevated 
carbon dioxide (above 7.5 mm Hg) is undesirable because of chronic 
toxicity. In an artificial gas atmosphere to be used for 3 or 4 months, 
the pC0 2 must not exceed 3-6 mm Hg. Investigations continue to 
determine the optimum limits of carbon dioxide in artificial gas atmos- 
pheres to be respired for long periods of time. The positive effect of 
carbon dioxide on tolerance of hypoxia and other stresses is also receiv- 
ing considerable attention. 331 - 3 ' 3 

Carbon monoxide is also a gas of concern in the artificial gas atmos- 
phere because it is extremely toxic at very low concentrations. Several 
investigations in which animals have been exposed to this gas have 
been conducted. These studies have indicated that spaceflight factors 
such as hypokinesia decrease resistance to the gas. Exposure to oxygen- 
rich environments facilitates the elimination of carbon monoxide while 
not significantly altering resistance to it. The studies indicate that the 
permissible concentration of carbon monoxide in spacecraft should not 
exceed and should perhaps be less than the permissible limit allowed 
under industrial conditions. 334-335 

The use of inert diluent gases such as helium in artificial gas atmos- 
pheres is receiving considerable attention in the Soviet and American 
space and undersea life sciences communities. Both Soviet and Ameri- 
can investigations of man and animals chronically exposed (up to 60 
days) to helium-oxygen and helium-nitrogen-oxygen atmospheres at 
normal pressure have revealed no unfavorable effects on metabolism, 
respiration, circulation, or central nervous function. Although ter- 
restrial life forms are accustomed to nitrogen in the atmosphere, its 
absence has not been found to be of serious biological significance. 
Human mammalian cell cultures exposed to helium-oxygen atmos- 
pheres for up to 10 generations have revealed no noticeable shifts from 
normal. The only feature which has been found to differentiate bio- 
logically helium from nitrogen is the thermophysical property of the 
former which intensifies thermoregulatory processes because of its 
high heat conductance. In one recent Soviet experiment, however, a 
helium-oxygen atmosphere was found to increase the tolerance of hu- 
man subjects to accelerations of 4-8 G. The positive effect was at- 
tributed to an intensification of respiration and an elevation of pul- 
monary ventilation and gas exchange possibly associated with a de- 
cline in aerodynamic resistance to breathing. Thus, there appear to be 
few if any biomedical barriers to the use of helium and certain other 
of the inert gases at normal pressure in an artificial atmosphere. In- 
deed, helium is commonly used as a diluent gas in hyperbaric deep- 
diving atmospheres. However, there is no indication that diluent gases 

331 Malkin. V. B. Barometric pressure and pas composition. Op. Cit. 

332 Glazkov